
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THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PROGRESS AND TERMINATION

OF THE

ROMAN REPUBLIC.

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HISTORY

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ROMAN REPUBLIC.

CHAP. XX.

Cæsar takes possession of his province.—Migration of the Helvetii.—Their defeat.—War with Ariovistus.—Return of Cæsar for the winter into Italy.—Great concourse of citizens to his quarters.—Motion to recall Cicero.—Disorders that followed upon it.—Consultations of Pompey and Cæsar.—Augmentation of the army in Gaul.—Second campaign of Cæsar.—Operations on the Aisne.—On the Meuse and the Sambre.—Battle with the Nervii.—Successful attempt for the restoration of Cicero.—Controversy relating to his house.—Repeated riots of Clodius.—Trial of Milo.

WHILST the transaction which terminated in the exile of Cicero was still in its course, Cæsar, although, by assuming the military character, he had disqualified himself to take any part in civil affairs, had actually left the city and embodied his legions, yet he still remained in the suburbs of Rome to observe the issue of that business, and to direct the conduct of his party. He thought him-

self too much interested in the event to leave it entirely under the direction of Pompey, with whom his own connection was recent or precarious, and might be of short duration. He was inclined to ruin, if he could not gain, a person who, by his talents and character, was of so much consequence to the parties who contended for power in the State. Having failed in the attempt which he made to gain him as a dependant on himself, or to carry him as a part of his own retinue into Gaul, he secretly promoted the designs of Clodius against him, and employed his own retainers and friends to co-operate with this furious Tribune, until he saw the purpose accomplished.

The provinces of which Cæsar had obtained the command, comprehended, as has been observed, under the denomination of the two Gauls, considerable territories on both sides of the Alps. The Cisalpine Gaul, which was joined to Italy, extended to Lucca, not far from Pisa, on one side of the Apennines, and to the Rubicon, not far from Ariminum on the other. Beyond the Alps, the whole territory from the Mediterranean to the Rhine and the Meuse, was known by the name of Gaul. A part of this tract, which was bounded by the Rhone, the mountains of Auvergne, the Garonne, and the Pyrenees, was already a Roman province, including, together with Languedoc and Dauphiné, what, from its early subjection to the Romans, took the name, which it still retains, of Provence.

The remainder of the country was divided into three principal parts, occupied by the

Celtes, and the *Belgæ*, nations differing in language, establishments and customs. The first division extended from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; the second from the Garonne to the Seine; and the third from thence to the Meuse and the Scheld.

In each of these tracts there was a multiplicity of separate cantons or independent communities, of which Cæsar had occasion to enumerate no less than four hundred. Even the smallest of these communities, by his account, was broken into parties and factions, who had their respective objects, and were engaged in opposition and frequent contests. The *People*, in general, were held in a state of dependence by two separate orders of men, whose condition and character may account for the manifold divisions and animosities that took place in their country. One order was ecclesiastical, composed of the Druids, who, by their profession, had the keeping of such mysteries, and the performance of such rites, as were then in use; and, having over their fellow-citizens the claim to a hierarchy, had, among themselves, in the various pretensions to preferment and rank in their own order, continual subjects of competition, jealousy and quarrels.

The other division was entirely military, formed under leaders whose principal distinction arose from the number of their armed adherents, and who, therefore, vied among themselves in the multitude of their retainers, or in the force of their parties *.

The country, we learn, in general, was intersper-

* Cæsar. de Bell. Gall. lib. vi, c. 10—20.

sed with what are called towns, and what were, in reality, safe retreats, or places of strength. It abounded in corn and cattle, the resources of a numerous people; armies were collected, and political assemblies were statedly, or occasionally, called: but how the people were accommodated, or in what degree they were supplied with the ordinary productions of mechanic or commercial arts, is no where described.

In these particulars, however, as they were probably less skilful than the Italians, so they surpassed the Germans, to whom they yielded in the reputation of valour; and they were now in reality on the eve of becoming a prey to the rapacity and ferocity of the one, or to the ambition, refined policy, and superior arts of the other.

Among parties, who were already so numerous, and likely to be divided indefinitely by family or personal jealousies, Cæsar was about to find the occasion, which he undoubtedly sought for, of raising his reputation in war, of enriching himself and his dependents, and of forming an army inured to service, and attached to himself. While he was yet in Italy, he had intimation of a wonderful project formed by the Helvetii, natives of the tract which extends from the Jura to the Alps, and of the valleys which divide those mountains, to quit their own country in order to exchange it for a better settlement, in a less inclement region, on the lower and more fertile plains of Gaul.

They had taken, for this purpose, in every canton, an exact account of their own

mustered no less than three hundred and fifty-eight thousand souls, of whom ninety-two thousand were warriors, or men fit to bear arms. To put this multitude in motion, a great apparatus of provisions, of horses, and of carriages was necessary; and they allotted no less than two years for the preparations necessary to this undertaking. This time was now elapsed, and the swarm began to dislodge on the twenty-fifth of March of the year in which Cæsar was to take possession of his province. On receiving the alarm, he set out from Italy, and with hasty journeys arrived at Geneva, where, to prevent surprise, he broke down the bridge of the Rhone, and took other measures to preclude the access of strangers to his province.

In the mean time, the Helvetians sent a pacific message, desiring, that they might be allowed to pass the Rhone, and giving assurances that they would abstain from every sort of hostility on their march through the Roman province. Cæsar, in order to gain time, affected to take their request into consideration, promised to give them an answer by the middle of April; and in this manner amused them, while he assembled the legion that was dispersed in different parts of the province, and ordered new levies to be made with the greatest dispatch. At the same time, he fortified the banks of the river, from the Lake of Geneva, to the narrow pass * at which the Rhone enters between the Jura and the Vuache, and from thence running under cliffs and

* Fort l'Ecluse.

steep mountains, renders the access from Helvetia to Gaul either impracticable or easily obstructed *.

Being thus prepared for his defence, he, on the return of the Helvetian deputies, gave them for answer, That the Romans never allowed strangers to pass through their country; and that if any attempt

* The tract of Cæsar's lines at Geneva, like that of Hannibal's passage of the Alps, has occasioned some controversy among antiquaries. His own words in the Commentaries are,—"A lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum in-"fluit, ad montem Juram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, millia "passuum decem novem, murum, in altitudinem pedum sexdecem, fossamque "perducit." This line has been fancied by some, and even represented in maps and plans, as having one end on the Lake, at or near Nyon; the other at the foot of Mount Jura, near the Dole. But in assuming this tract, we must suppose Cæsar to have committed a great blunder in breaking down the bridge of Geneva in his own rear, by which he was to have communication with the province he was to defend, and from which he was to draw his supplies. We must also overlook every circumstance of the attack afterwards made upon this line, when the Helvetians, being refused a passage, came to force it, by fording the Rhone, or passing in boats and rafts, and trying to scale the banks where least inaccessible:—"Helvetii, ea spe dejecti, navibus junctis, ratibusque com-"pluribus factis; alii, vadis Rhodani, qua minima altitudo fluminis erat, non-"nunquam interdiu, sæpius noctu, si perrumpere possent conati, operis muni-"tione et militum concursu et telis repulsi, hoc conatu destiterunt." These circumstances necessarily place the line to be attacked on the very banks of the Rhone, opposite to where the Helvetians approached it; and as it was certainly unworthy of Cæsar to be fencing impassable rocks and precipices, the amount of his line was probably no more than some breastworks, cast up at places where the banks of the river, generally steep, were most accessible. And his words apply to this tract no less than to any other: it actually measures from the point at which the Rhone issues from the Lake of Geneva to the Jura, near l'Ecluse, about nineteen miles.

As Cæsar never lost sight of his interest in the city, nor ceased to consider how he was talked of there, it is probable that his Commentaries contain the very accounts that were sent to be propagated at Rome; and the better for his purpose, that they left every one to conceive this nineteen mile fence of sixteen feet high, as continued without interruption from end to end. But the present compiler trusts he will be approved in stating the fact, as it results from circumstances without ambiguity or the chance of mistake. Vid. Cæs. de Bell. Gall. lib. i, c. 8.

were made on his province, he should repel it by force. Upon receiving this answer, the Helvetians, though too late, endeavoured to effect the passage of the Rhône, and made repeated attacks, either where the river was fordable, or where it admitted the use of rafts or of boats, but were repulsed in every attempt, and were at last obliged to turn to the right, where, by the consent of the Sequani, their neighbours in that part of the country, they passed over the Jura into Gaul.

Cæsar, probably not more alarmed for the safety of his province, then desirous to render it a scene of action, determined to observe the migrations of this enemy, and to seize the occasion they furnished him of forming his troops to service. For this purpose, he himself, in person, repassed the Alps, and without any regard to the limitations of his commission, which restricted his military establishment to three legions, ordered additional levies, and with the forces he had assembled near Aquileia, returned to his northern province. In this march he met with opposition from the inhabitants of the mountains, who endeavoured to obstruct his way: but he had traversed the country of the Allobroges, and passed the Rhône above its confluence with the Soane *, when he had intelligence that the Helvetii, having cleared the passes of Jura, and marched through the country of the Sequani, were arrived on the Soane; and although they had hitherto, agreeably to their stipulations with the natives, abstained from hostilities, that they

* Then the Arar.

threatened the nations inhabiting beyond with fire and sword.

Upon application made to him for prote the natives inhabiting between the Soan. Loire, this willing auxiliary continued his march; and being informed, that of the Helvetii, who had moved in four divisions, (this being the number of their cantons), the three first had already passed the Soane, and that the fourth division being to follow, yet remained on the nearer bank of the river, he marched in the night with three legions, surprised this rear division; and, having put many of them to the sword, forced the remainder to take refuge in the neighbouring woods.

As soon as the main body of Cæsar's army arrived on the Soane, he constructed a bridge, and passed that river in his way to the enemy. The Helvetians, sensible of their loss in the late action, and alarmed at the rapidity of his motions, he having executed in one day the passage of a river which had detained them above twenty days, sent a deputation to treat with the Roman Proconsul, and to obtain, if possible, his permission to execute their project of a new settlement on amicable terms. They offered, in case they were allowed to sit down in quiet, to leave the choice of the place to himself; bidding him remember, at the same time, that "the arms of the Helvetii "had, on former occasions, been felt by the Romans; "that the recent fate of a single canton taken by "surprise ought not to flatter him too much; that "the Helvetians had learned from their fathers to "rely more on valour than on negociation or arti-

" fice; but that they did not wish to have their pre-
" sent migration signalized with any massacres, nor
" their new settlement stained with Roman blood."

To this message Cæsar replied, " That he could
" recollect to have heard of insults which had been
" offered to the Romans by their nation, and to which
" they now probably alluded; that he likewise had
" more recent provocations, which he knew how to
" resent; nevertheless, if they meant to comply with
" his demand, to repair the injuries they had done to
" the Allobroges * and to the Edui †, and to give
" hostages for their future behaviour, that he was
" willing to grant them peace."

Upon this reply the Helvetian deputies withdrew, saying, That it was the practice of their countrymen to receive, not to give hostages; and both armies moved on the following day: the Helvetians, in search of some quarter where they might settle without interruption; and Cæsar, to observe their motions, and to restrain them from plundering the country of his allies. Both continued on the same route during fifteen days, with no more than an interval of five or six miles between the front of the one army and the rear of the other.

On this march Cæsar's cavalry, having rashly engaged themselves on unfavourable ground, received a check; and he himself, being obliged to follow the course of the Soane, by which he received his provisions, was likely to lose sight of the enemy, when

* Inhabitants of what is now the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy.

† Occupying the country between the Soane and the Loire.

he had intelligence, that they had taken post at the foot of a hill, about eight miles in his front, and seemed to have formed a resolution to receive him in that position, if he should choose to attack them. Having examined the ground on which they were posted, and observing, that the height in their rear was not by nature inaccessible, nor sufficiently secured against him, he dispatched Labienus in the night at the head of two legions, with orders to possess himself of the eminence, and to fall down from thence on the enemy's rear whenever he saw them attacked by himself in front. Labienus accordingly got possession of the hill, while Cæsar continued his march on the plain, to occupy the attention of the enemy, and to attack them in front. But the purpose of this disposition was frustrated by the misinformation of an officer of horse, who, being advanced before the army, reported, that the enemy still appeared on the height, and that Labienus probably had failed in his attempt to seize it. Cæsar, disconcerted by this information, made a halt, in which he lost so much time as to give the enemy an opportunity to decamp, and to retire in safety. He nevertheless continued his pursuit for one day longer, and at night encamped about three miles in their rear. But being obliged, on the following day, to alter his route, in order to receive a supply of provisions, the enemy believed that he was retreating, and began to pursue in their turn. He halted on a rising ground to receive them, placed the new levies with his baggage on the heights, and the choice of his army on the declivity towards the plain. There

advancing to attack him, after an obstinate engagement which lasted from one in the afternoon till night, were defeated with the slaughter of about two hundred thousand of their people; and the remainder, amounting to no more than one hundred and thirty thousand souls, reduced to despair by the sense of their losses, and the want of subsistence, surrendered at discretion. Cæsar ordered them back into their own country, charging the Allobroges to find them subsistence, until they should be able to provide for themselves. The Boii, however, a part of this unfortunate migration, were received by the Edui, who, to gain this accession of people, allotted part of their own lands to accommodate these strangers *.

At the end of this first operation of Cæsar, while great part of the summer yet remained, another service on which to employ his army soon presented itself. The nations who inhabited the banks of the Soane and the Loire, being sensible of the deliverance they had received from a storm, which, by the uncertainty of its direction, alarmed every quarter of Gaul, sent deputies to congratulate the Roman general on his late victory, and to propose that they might hold, under his protection, a general convention of all their states. The object of their meeting, as it soon after appeared, was to obtain some relief from the common oppression they underwent from the tyranny of Ariovistus, a German chief, who, who, when the Gauls were at war among themselves,

* Cæs. de Bell. Gall. lib. i, c. 28, 29.

had been invited as an auxiliary to one of the ties, and had obtained the victory for his allies took for the reward of his services, possession o third of their territory, which he bestowed o own people, and assumed for himself the sovere of the whole. His force was daily augmented b continual arrival of more emigrants from Germany ; so that, from fifteen thousand men, with whom this chief had at first arrived from Germany, his followers had multiplied to an hundred and twenty thousand. To accommodate this numerous people, he had recently made a demand of another third of the territory of the Sequani, and was extending his possessions from the neighbourhood of the Rhine to the Soane. Most of the nations on this tract had been obliged to submit to exactions made by these strangers, and to give hostages for the regular payment of their contributions.

The unfortunate nations, who, by trusting to the protection of a barbarous prince, had exposed themselves to this calamity, now applied for relief to another power, whose pretensions in the end were likely to be equally dangerous to their freedom. Sensible of the hazard to which they exposed their hostages by entering into any open concert against the Germans, they made their application to Cæsar in secret, and found him sufficiently willing to embrace every opportunity of rendering his province a theatre of action to his army, and of renown to himself. He sent without delay a message to Ariovistus, desiring to have a conference with him on affairs that concerned the general interests of Gaul. This haugh-

ty chieftain replied with disdain, "That if the Ro-
"man general meant to have an interview with him,
"his place of residence was known; that he nei-
"ther could trust himself in the quarters of Cæsar
"without a proper escort, nor would he subject
"himself to the expence of assembling an army,
"merely for the satisfaction of a conference with
"him."

Cæsar renewed the message, with an express requisition that the hostages of the Edui should be restored; that Ariovistus should abstain from hostilities against this People, or against any other ally of the Romans; and that he should not suffer any more of his countrymen to pass the Rhine.

To this message Ariovistus replied, That he had conquered the possessions which he held in Gaul, and that he knew of no power who had a right to direct him in the use of his conquests; that whoever attacked him should do so at his peril; and that Cæsar, if he thought proper, might try the spirit of his people; they were ready to receive him, and had not for fourteen years slept under any roof.

Cæsar, not to seem backward in accepting this challenge, and in compliance with a maxim which he often observed with success, *That his blows should anticipate his threats, and outrun the expectations of his enemy*, advanced upon the Germans before they could think him in condition to act against them. For this purpose, without communicating his design to any person of his own army, he repassed the Soane, and ascended by the course of the Douse to Vesontio, now Besançon, a place of strength, which

he understood Ariovistus meant to seize, and employ as the principal resort of his forces.

Here, for the first time, his intention of m war on the Germans began to be suspected own army; and the legions, taking their acco the strength and ferocity of that enemy from the report of the Gaulish auxiliaries, were greatly alarmed. Many citizens of distinction, who had crowded to the standard of Cæsar, as to a place of victory and honour, now, under various pretences, applied for leave to retire. Their example spread a kind of panic in the army, and both officers and men muttered their resolution not to obey, if they should be ordered upon what they were pleased to consider as a service so unreasonable and wild.

Cæsar, being thus called upon to exert that undaunted courage and masterly eloquence by which he was distinguished on many occasions, assembled all the officers of his army, and reprimanded them for attempting to penetrate the designs of their general, or for pretending to question the propriety of his motions. The matter in dispute with Ariovistus, he said, might be terminated in an amicable manner. This chieftain had very lately made advances of friendship to the Romans, had been favourably received, and there was no reason to believe that he would now wantonly provoke their resentment. "But if he should, of whom are you afraid? Of a "wretched remnant of the Cimbri or Teutones, al- "ready vanquished by Marius? Of a people con- "fessedly inferior to the Helvetians, whom you have "subdued? But some of you, I am told, in order to

"disguise your own fears under the affectation of "wisdom, talk of difficulties in the ways by which "you are to pass, and of the want of provisions "which you are likely to suffer. I am not now to "learn from such persons what I owe to my trust, "nor to be told that an army must be supplied with "provisions. But our allies are ready to supply us "in greater quantities than we can consume, and "the very country we are to pass is covered with "ripe corn. As for the roads, you shall speedily "see and judge of them. I am little affected with "what I hear of a design to abandon me in case I "persist in this expedition. Such insults, I know, "have been offered to commanders, who, by their "avarice, or by their miscarriages, had forfeited the "regard or the confidence of their troops: what "will happen to me, a little time will discover. I "meant to have made a longer halt at this place, "but shall not defer giving you an opportunity to "show, whether regard to your duty, or the fear of "a supposed enemy, is to have the greatest effect "on your minds. I mean to-morrow, at two in the "morning, to decamp, and shall proceed, if no other "part of the army should follow me, with the tenth "legion alone."

This speech had a very sudden effect. The tenth legion, having been formerly distinguished by their general, felt this expression of confidence as an additional motive to deserve it, and sent a deputation of their officers to return their thanks. The whole army soon vied in excuses for their late misbehaviour, and in assurances of their resolution to support

their general in any service on which he mig
pleased to employ them. He accordingly deca
at the hour appointed; and making a circuit of
miles, to avoid some difficulties which lay on t
rect road, after a continual march of seven da
which he was conducted by Divitiacus, a nat
Gaul, he arrived within twenty-four miles of the
German quarters.

Upon this unexpected arrival, Ariovistus, in his turn, thought proper to desire a conference with Cæsar. He proposed that they should meet on horseback, and be attended only by cavalry. In this part of his army, which was composed chiefly of Gaulish horse, Cæsar was weak. But, not to decline the proposal that was made to him, he mounted his supposed favourite legion on the horses of the Gauls, and with this escort came to the place appointed for the conference.

It was an eminence in the midst of a spacious plain, about half-way between the two armies. The leaders, each attended by ten of his officers, met at the top of the hill. Their escorts drew up on each side at the distance of two hundred yards. Cæsar began the conference, by reminding Ariovistus of the honours recently bestowed upon him by the Roman Senate, who ordered him the usual presents, and gave him the title of king. "The Edui," he said, "were the allies of Rome; they had formed "this connection in the height of their prosperity, "and when they were supposed to be at the head "of the Gaulish nations; that it was not the cus-"tom of Romans to let nations suffer by their alli-

" ance, but to render it in every instance, to the " party who embraced it, a source of prosperity and " honour. He therefore renewed his former requi- " sition, that Ariovistus should not make war on " the Edui, or on any nation in alliance with the " Roman People; that he should remit the tribute " he had imposed upon them, and release their hos- " tages; and, if he could not send back into their " own country such of the Germans as were already " on this side of the Rhine, that he should at least " prevent the arrival of any more from that quar- " ter."

In answer to these propositions, Ariovistus replied, That he had been invited into Gaul by the natives of this country; that he had done them services, and had exacted no more than a just retribution; that in the late quarrel betwixt them and himself, the Gauls had been the aggressors, and had suffered no more than the usual effects of defeat; that, to indemnify him for his losses, they had subjected themselves to a tax, and had given hostages for the regular payment of it. " Am not I too," he said, " by your own account, in alliance with the Ro- " mans? Why should that alliance, which is a safe- " guard and an honour to every one else, be a loss " and a misfortune to me? Must I alone, to pre- " serve this alliance, resign the advantage of trea- " ties, and remit the payments that are due to me? " No; let me rather be considered as an enemy than " as an ally upon these conditions. My country- " men have passed the Rhine, not to oppress the " Gauls, but to defend their own leader. If stran-

" gers are to be admitted here, the Germans, a
" first occupiers, have a right prior to that o
" Romans. But we have each of us our prov
" What do the armies of Rome on my territ
" I disturb no possession of yours. Must I acc
" to you likewise for the use which I make of
" own?"

To this pointed reply Ariovistus subjoined a reflection, which showed that he was not unacquainted with the state of parties at Rome. "I know," he said, "that the Romans are not interested in this "quarrel, and that by cutting you off, I should per- "form an acceptable service to many of your "countrymen. But I shall take no part in your in- "ternal divisions. Leave me; make war where you "please; I shall not interpose in any matter which "does not concern myself."

Cæsar continued to plead the engagements which the Romans had contracted with many of the nations who now claimed their protection. "If conquest "could give any right to possession," he said, "we "are the first conquerors. We have long since sub- "dued the Arverni; but it is not our practice to en- "slave every nation we vanquish, much less to for- "sake those we have once patronized." While he yet spoke, the German horse had advanced, and even began to throw darts, which made it expedient for Cæsar to break up the conference. He accordingly withdrew, giving strict orders to his people not to return the insults of the enemy.

In a few days after this conference, the German chief proposed another personal interview, or, if that

were declined, desired that some person of confidence should be sent with whom he might treat. Being gratified in the second part of this alternative, but intending no more by the request than a mere feint to lull his antagonist into some degree of security, he pretended to take offence at the quality of the persons who were sent to him, ordered them into custody, and on the same day put his army in motion upon a real design, which showed that, barbarian as he was, he understood the plan, as well as the execution, of military operations. Observing the quarter from which the Romans derived their subsistence, he made a movement, by which he passed their camp, took a strong post about eleven miles in their rear, and by this means intercepted their ordinary supply of provisions.

Cæsar for many days successively endeavoured, by forming on the plain between the two armies, to provoke the enemy to a battle; but having failed in this purpose, was obliged to divide his army, and to place it in separate posts, which he fortified, in order to recover a communication with the country behind him. It was reported, that the Germans, although they had borne with great impatience the defiances which Cæsar had given, were restrained from fighting by the predictions of their women, who foretold, that their own people would be defeated, if they should hazard a general action before the change of the moon; but while they waited for this period, their warriors, notwithstanding the awe in which they stood of predictions, endeavoured to dislodge one of the divisions of Cæsar's army, and,

having failed in that attempt, were afterwards attacked by the Romans in their camp, and defeated with great slaughter. Ariovistus himself, with the remains of his followers, fled to the Rhine, about fifty miles from the field of battle, passed that river in a small boat: while numbers of his people perished in attempting to follow him, and the greater part of those who remained were overtaken, and put to the sword by the cavalry, which pressed on their rear.

In this manner Cæsar concluded his first campaign in Gaul, and laid the foundation of farther progress in that country, by stating himself as the protector of its native inhabitants against the Helvetii and the Germans, two powerful invaders who were likely to subdue them. He placed his army for the winter among the nations whom he had thus taken under his protection, and set out for Italy, under pretence of attending to the affairs of his province on that side of the Alps; but more probably to be near the city, where he had many political interests at stake, friends to support, and enemies to oppose, in their canvas for the offices of State. His head quarters were fixed at Lucca, the nearest part of his province to Rome; and that place began to be frequented by numbers who were already of his party, or who desired to be admitted into it, and with whom he had previously made his own terms, in stipulating the returns they were to make for the several preferments in which he undertook to assist them.

At the election of Consuls for this year, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was joined with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, of whom the latter had, in the capacity of Tribune, distinguished himself as an instrument of the most dangerous factions. Lentulus had lately attached himself entirely to Pompey, and, by the influence of this patron, probably now prevailed in his election. He had been Edile in the Consulate of Cicero, and had taken a vigorous part in those very measures for which Cicero was now suffering in exile *. He was likely to favour the restoration of that injured citizen, and, upon this account, was now the more acceptable to Pompey, who, having an open rupture with Clodius, was disposed to mortify him by espousing the cause of his enemy.

Clodius, soon after his late victory over Cicero, greatly rose in his presumption, and, forgetting that he had prevailed more by the connivance of Pompey and Cæsar, and by the support of their friends, than by any influence of his own, ventured to set Pompey himself at defiance, to question the validity of his acts in the late settlement of Asia, to set the younger Tigranes, still the prisoner of Pompey, at liberty †, and proposed to restore him again to his kingdom. During the debates which arose on these measures in the assembly of the people, Pompey had the mortification to find that the sarcasms of Clodius were received by the audience in general with applause, as well as by the partisans of the Senate, in particular, with marks of great satisfaction. Chiefly

* Cicer. ad Attic. lib. iii, ep. 22.
† Vid. Ascon. Padian. in Orat. pro Milone.

governed by vanity, and impatient of obloquy, he absented himself from the assemblies in which he received these insults, so long as Clodius remained in office, and was ready to embrace every measure by which he might be revenged of that factious Tribune, or regain his own credit with the more respectable class of the citizens *.

The majority of the Senate, who justly considered as their own the cause of a magistrate, under whose auspices they themselves had acted, now encouraged by this division among their enemies, had ventured on the twenty-ninth of October, while Clodius was yet in office, to move for the recall of Cicero. Eight of the Tribunes concurred in urging this measure, and it was rejected only in consequence of the negative of Ælius Ligur, one of the college, whom Clodius had prepared to act this part, and whom he was ready to support with a party in arms, if the opponents should persist in their motion †.

Upon the election of the new Consuls and Tribunes for the following year, better hopes of success were entertained by the friends of the exile. Lentulus declared that the restoration of Cicero should be the first object of his administration; and that he should not fail to move it on the day that he entered on office. Metellus, too, the brother-in-law of Clodius, though always inclined to favour the popular faction, could not in this matter set himself in opposition to Pompey, whom he had hitherto followed in all his designs; and declared his intention to con-

* Plut. in vit. Cicer. p. 475, & 476.

† Cic. ad Att. lib. iii, ep. 23.

cur with the Consul *. At the same time, Milo, Sextius, and six more of the Tribunes, with all the Prætors except Appius Claudius, the brother of Publius, declared their intention to take an active part in forwarding this measure.

Encouraged by these appearances, Cicero left his retreat at Thessalonica, and arrived at Dirrachium, before the twenty-fifth of November, to be at hand to consult with his friends on the steps that were to be previously taken. Meanwhile, the Consuls-elect had their provinces assigned. Lentulus was destined to command in Cilicia and Cyprus; and Metellus in the farther province of Spain. Both were amply gratified in every article of their appointments, in order to confirm them in the interest of the Senate: but Cicero expressed great anxiety lest these concessions should be found premature; and, being made before the new Tribunes entered on office, or could have their voice in these destinations, was afraid lest it might alienate their affections from his party, and render them less zealous to move for his recall. The Consul Lentulus, notwithstanding, kept his word; and, on the first of January, the day of his entering on office, moved the Senate to resolve that Cicero should be immediately recalled from banishment; that all persons opposing his return should be declared enemies to their country; and that if the People should be disturbed by violence in passing this

U. C. 696. P. Corn. Lentulus Spinther, Q. Cæcil. Metell. Nepos.

* Cicero ad Att. lib. iii, ep. 24.

decree, it should, nevertheless, be lawful for the exile to avail himself of it*.

This motion was received in the Senate with general applause. Eight of the Tribunes were zealous in support of it. On the contrary, two members of the college, Numerius and Serranus, were gained by Clodius to oppose it. Serranus, at the first meeting of the Senate on this business, could venture no farther than to plead for a delay. He was prevailed upon, however, during the intervening night, to interpose his negative in form, and the motion, accordingly, could proceed no farther in the Senate.

It was resolved, notwithstanding, to propose a law to the People for Cicero's restoration; and a day was fixed for this purpose. Early in the morning of that day, Fabricius, one of the Tribunes in the interest of the exile, endeavoured to occupy the place of assembly with an armed force, but found that Clodius, with a numerous troop of gladiators, was there before him. A conflict ensued, in which Fabricius, together with Cispius, another of the Tribunes who came to his assistance, with all the party of the Senate, were driven from the Forum.

Clodius, at the head of his gladiators, with swords already stained in blood, pursued his victory through the streets. The temple of the Nymphs, in which were kept some public records which he wished to destroy, was set on fire†; the houses of Milo and Cæcilius the Prætor were attacked. "The streets

* Cicero ad Att. lib. iii, ep. 26, et in Orat. post reditum.

† Cicero pro Milone, 27 Parad. 4 d. Haruspicum Responsio, 27.

"the common sewers, the river," says Cicero, "were "filled with dead bodies, and all the pavements were "stained with blood." No such scene had been acted since the times of Octavius and Cinna, when armies fought in the city for the dominion of Rome *.

Quintus Cicero escaped by hiding himself under the dead bodies of his own servants, who were slain in defending his house. The Tribune Publius Sextius actually fell into the hands of his enemies, received many wounds, and was left for dead among the slain. This circumstance, however, alarmed the party of Clodius not less than it alarmed his opponents. The odium of having murdered, or even violated, the person of a Tribune, was likely to ruin their interest with the People; and they proposed to balance this outrage by putting to death Numerius, another Tribune, who, being of their own side, should appear to be killed by the opposite party; but the intended victim of this ridiculous and sanguinary artifice, receiving information of their design, avoided being made the tool of a faction at the expence of his life, and made his escape †.

After so strange a disorder, parties for some months, mutually afraid of each other, abstained from violence. The Tribune Milo commenced a prosecution against Clodius for his crimes; but it was for some time eluded by the authority of Appius Claudius ‡,

* Orat. pro Sext. c. 35, 36, 38.

† Cicero pro Sextio.

‡ The family name of these brothers is differently spelt by Cicero and others, probably from the affectation of Publius to refine on the orthography of his name.

brother of the accused, who was now in the office of Prætor; and the forms of trial, when actually beg were repeatedly interrupted by the armed party gladiators, with which Publius Clodius himself fested every place of public resort. It was vain oppose him without being prepared to employ a similar force, and Milo, accordingly, had recourse to this method. He purchased a troop of gladiators, and of Bestiarii, or persons trained to the baiting of wild beasts, the remainder of a band which had been employed for public entertainment by the Ediles Pomponius and Cosconius, and which was now in the market for sale. He ordered the bargain to be secretly struck, concealing the name of the buyer, lest the opposite party, suspecting the design, should interpose to prevent him.

So provided, Milo ventured to encounter with Clodius. Their parties frequently engaged in the streets, and the populace, fond of such shows, enjoyed the spectacle which was thus freely presented to them in every corner of the city *.

While the disorders which arose from the disputes relating to Cicero's restoration were daily augmenting, he himself fell from the height of his hopes to his former pitch of dejection and sorrow. The attempt which had been made in his favour might have succeeded, if Pompey had been fully prepared to concur in it. But all the measures of the Triumvirate being concerted at the quarters of Cæsar, Pompey was obliged, after declaring his own inclinations

* Cicero ad Att. lib. iv, ep. 2.

on the subject, to consult his associate, and found him by no means inclined to restore a citizen who was likely to be of so much consequence, and who was to owe the favour of his restoration to any other than himself. The Tribune Sextius, before the late violent convulsions, had made a journey into Gaul, to solicit the assent of Cæsar to this measure, but could not prevail; and it is probable, that this artful politician was unwilling to restore an exile who was likely to ascribe the principal merit of that service to Pompey, and who, by his own inclinations in favour of the Senate, was to become an accession to a party which Cæsar wished to degrade and to weaken by every means in his power. It was to strengthen himself against the Senate that Cæsar made his coalition with Pompey and Crassus; and from animosity to this body, he wished to crush every person of consequence to their party, and to favour the pretensions of any turbulent citizen who ventured to act in open defiance of their government.

Pompey, in the mean time, though committing himself as a tool into the hands of Cæsar, was flattered with the appearance of sovereignty which he enjoyed in the city, and willingly supported his rival in every measure that seemed to fix his attention abroad, blindly consented to the repeated augmentations of the army in Gaul, and approved of every enterprise in which their leader was pleased to employ them.

In this year, which was the second of Cæsar's command, two more additional legions were by his orders levied in Italy; and, under pretence of an ap-

proaching war with the Belgæ, a nation consisting of many cantons in the northern extremities of Gaul this reinforcement was made to pass the Alps to the northward in the spring. As soon as the forage was up, Cæsar himself followed in person, took the field and, in the usual spirit of his conduct, endeavoured, by the rapidity of his motions, to frustrate or to prevent the designs of his enemies.

The army of Gaul now consisted of eight Roman legions, besides numerous bodies of horse and foot from different parts of the provinces, archers from Crete and Numidia, and slingers from the Balearian islands; so that it is likely the whole may have amounted to about sixty thousand men. The greater part of this army had wintered on the Soane*, and the Douse†, as protectors, not as masters, of the country, being received only in the character of allies.

Cæsar, being attended by many of the natives, as auxiliaries or as hostages, and having spent twelve days in preparing for his march, took his route to the northward, under pretence of carrying the war into the enemy's country, or of preventing them from gaining, in accession to their supposed confederacy against the Romans, any of the nations in the southern parts of Gaul. His passage lay through the high, though level, countries, now termed Burgundy and Champagne, in which the Soane, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the Seine, with so many other considerable rivers, that run in different direction

* Anciently named the Arar. † The Dubis.

have their source. After a march of fifteen days, he arrived in the Canton of the Remi *, where he found a people, though of the Belgic extraction, disposed to receive him as a friend, and to place themselves under *his* protection.

From this people he had a confirmation of his former intelligence, relating to the designs of the Belgic nations, and an account of the forces which they had already assembled. From the tract of country that is watered by the rivers, which are now called the Oyse, the Scheld and the Meuse, he understood that no less than three hundred and fifty thousand men could be mustered, and were actually assembled, or preparing to assemble, against him. To prevent the junction of this formidable power, or to distract part of its force, he detached his Gaulish auxiliaries to make a diversion on the Oyse, while he himself advanced to the Aisne, passed this river, and fortified a station on its northern bank. Having a bridge in his rear, he left six cohorts properly intrenched in its neighbourhood, to secure his communication with the country behind him.

While he remained in this position, the Belgæ advanced with a great army, attacked Bibrax, a place of strength about eight miles in his front; and having spent many hours in endeavouring to reduce it, were about to renew their assault on the following day; when Cæsar having in the night thrown into the garrison a considerable reinforcement of archers and slingers, the appearance of this additional

* Now the district of Rheims.

strength on the battlements, induced the enemy to refrain their attack.

They, nevertheless, continued to advance, la waste the country, and came within two miles of t Roman camp. They had a front, as appeared fr their fires, extending about eight miles.

Cæsar, considering the numbers and reputation of this enemy, thought proper to proceed with caution. He observed them for some days from his intrenchments, and made several trials of their skill in partial encounters, before he ventured to offer them battle. But being encouraged by the event of these trials, he chose a piece of sloping ground, which extending in front before his camp, was fit to receive his army. As the enemy's line was likely far to exceed him in length, he threw up intrenchments on the right and left to cover his flanks; and with this precaution, to prevent his being surrounded, drew forth his army to battle. The Belgæ, too, were formed on their part; but the ground between the two armies being marshy, neither thought proper to pass that impediment in presence of the other; and after a few skirmishes of the horse and irregular troops, the Romans re-entered their camp. The enemy, upon this event, disappointed in their expectations of a battle, took their way to the fords of the Aisne *, in order to pass the river, and get possession of the bridge in the rea of the Romans. Cæsar had intelligence of th movement from the officer who was stationed to guard that post; and marching instantly with all t

* Axona.

cavalry, archers, and slingers of his camp, arrived in time to overtake them, while yet entangled in the fords, and obliged them to retire.

The Belgæ, having made these successive attempts with more impetuosity than foresight or conduct, soon appeared to be ill qualified to maintain a permanent war with such an enemy. They were disheartened by their disappointments, and alarmed by the rumour of a diversion which Cæsar had caused to be made in a part of their own country. They had exhausted their provisions, and found themselves under a necessity to break up their camp. It was therefore resolved, in their general council, that their forces, for the present, should separate; and that if any of their cantons should be afterwards attacked by Cæsar, the whole should assemble again for their common defence.

With this resolution they decamped in the night, but with so much noise and tumult, that Cæsar suspected a feint, or an intention to draw him into a snare. He therefore remained in his lines till the morning, when it appeared that they were actually gone, and were seen at a distance on the plain, moving without any regard to order, and as in a total rout, striving who should soonest get beyond the reach of their enemies. He pursued them with his cavalry so long as it was day, and though with great bravery resisted in his attacks on their rear, made considerable havock. At the approach of night he discontinued the pursuit, and withdrew again to the camp he left in the morning. On the following day he moved with his whole army, and, that the enemy

might not have time to re-assemble their forces, determined to penetrate into the heart of their country. In the beginning of his march, he followed the course of the Aisne, and in his way reduced the Suessone and Bellovaci, two cantons which lay on the right and the left, near the confluence of this river with the Oyse. From thence, being himself to march to the northward, to visit the banks of the Sambre and the Meuse, he detached the young Crassus, with a considerable force, towards the sea-coasts, to occupy those cantons which now form the provinces of Normandy and Bretanny.

Part of the country through which the Meuse and the Sambre passed, now forming the dutchy of Hainault, was then occupied by the Nervii, one of the fiercest of the Belgic nations, who, having heard with indignation of the surrender of the Bellovaci and Suessones, their neighbours, prepared for resistance, sent such of their people as, by their sex or age, were unfit to carry arms, into a place of security, assembled all their warriors, and summoned their allies to a place of general resort. They took post on the Sambre, where the banks on both sides of the river being covered with wood, enabled them to conceal their numbers and their dispositions. They had intelligence that Cæsar, except in presence of an enemy, usually moved his legions with intervals between them, which were occupied by their baggage; and they made a disposition to surprise him on the march and under this disadvantage. For this purpose, they chose their ground on the Sambre, and agreed that the van of the Roman army should be suffered

pass unmolested, but that the appearance of the first column of baggage should be the signal for a general attack to be made at once from all the different stations in which their parties were posted.

Cæsar, in the mean time, about three days after he had marched from Samarobriva, now supposed to be Amiens, being apprised that he was come within ten miles of the river, on the banks of which the enemy was posted, altered the form of his march, placed six legions, clear of encumbrance, in the van of his army, next to these the whole of his baggage, and in the rear the two legions recently embodied in Italy. When he entered the open grounds on the Sambre, a few parties of horse appeared, but were soon driven into the woods by his cavalry. The legions that came first to their ground began, as usual, to intrench, and received no disturbance till the column of baggage came in sight. At this signal, multitudes of the enemy presented themselves on every side, drove in the cavalry that were posted to cover the working parties, and in many places were close in with the main body of the army, before the infantry had time to uncover their shields, or to put on their helmets. The Roman soldier, nevertheless, ran to his colours, and, without waiting for the orders of his general, from whose abilities, on this occasion, he could derive no advantage, endeavoured to join his companions in the order to which they were accustomed.

The first events of this tumultuary action were various in different places. The Nervii, in one part of the field, forced the imperfect works of the Ro-

man camp; but in another part of it were themselves forced from their ground, and driven in great numbers into the river. Some of the Roman legions were broken, lost the greater part of their officers, and when Cæsar arrived to rally them, were huddled together in confusion. He himself was reduced to act the part of a legionary soldier: with a shield which he took from one of his men, he joined in the battle, and in this manner, by his presence, or by his example, kept the enemy at bay, until he was relieved by the arrival of two legions of the rear-guard, and of two others that were sent by Labienus to support him.

This seasonable relief, where the Romans were most distressed, changed the fortune of the day; and the confusion, which in the beginning of the action, had, by the Nervii, been turned to so good account against their enemy, now became fatal to themselves. The greater part of them fell in heaps on the ground where they first began the attack. The few who attempted to fly were met at every opening of the woods by parties of the Romans, by whom they were forced into the thickets, or put to the sword; and as they fell in the end with little resistance, many became a prey even to the followers of the legions, who put themselves in arms, and bore a part in the massacre. Of four hundred chiefs only three escaped; and of an army of sixty thousand men, no more than five hundred left the field of battle. The piteous remains of this nation, consisting of superannuated men, of women, and of children, sent, from the marshes in which they had been concealed, a mes-

sage to implore the victor's mercy; and he, with a mildness, uncommon in this or any ancient war, took them under his protection, and restored them to their usual place of abode: Laying at the same time an injunction on their neighbours not to molest them. In this, he studied the reputation of clemency to the vanquished *, as in battle he maintained the superiority of force and valour.

Another enemy yet remained in the field. The Attuatici, descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, the late terrors of Gaul, of Spain, and of Italy, being settled below the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, had been on their march to join the Nervii, when they heard of this unfortunate action; and then withdrew to their own country. Being pursued by Cæsar, they shut themselves up in their principal fortress. Here they made a voluntary submission; and being commanded to lay down their arms, threw such a quantity of weapons from the battlements, as almost filled up the ditch to the height of the ramparts. But Cæsar, having delayed taking possession of the place till the following day, the besieged, whether they only meant to deceive him, or repented of their surrender, took arms again in the night, and in a sally endeavoured to surprise the Roman army. In this desperate attempt, four thousand of them being killed, and the remainder

* Ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur. De Bell. Gall. lib. ii, c. 28. The world was yet to learn how odious, and, in the end, how calamitous for both, it is for one nation to become subject to another; and Cæsar, intent to preserve as well as effect his conquests, took measures of mildness and clemency for the one, as he did those of prowess and valour for the other.

being forced back into the town, were, in consequence of their former breach of faith, to the amount of fifty thousand persons, sold for slaves.

Thus Cæsar having, in the second year of his command, penetrated to the Meuse and the Scheld, being master of the eastern frontier of Gaul as far as the Rhine, and having even from beyond that river received some offers of submission; being master, too, of several cantons in Normandy and Bretanny, which had submitted to the young Crassus, quartered his army for the winter in the midst of these conquests, and himself, as at the end of the former campaign, set out for Italy and the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here the principal point which he left in contest between the parties, relating to the restoration of Cicero, had been for some time determined. Clodius had found a proper antagonist in Milo, and, as often as he himself, or any of his party, appeared in the assemblies of the people, or in the streets, was every where attacked with weapons similar to his own: And in the view of these disorders, it was agreed among the citizens in general, that if the laws could not give protection to those who were most willing to be governed by them, they should not by their formalities screen the disorderly and profligate in the practice of every species of crime.

Clodius had now for some months lain under an impeachment from Milo, and had declared himself candidate for the office of Ædile, endeavouring by violence, and by the artifices of his brother, to put off the trial till after the elections, when, if he should

be vested with any public character, he might find a refuge under the privilege of his office. His own influence, however, and the fear which citizens entertained of his armed banditti, who were now in a great measure restrained by Milo, had abated so much, that the party of the Senate determined to make another vigorous effort for the recall of a member, whom the violence of this profligate had forced into exile.

This business was, accordingly, again brought forward; and about the beginning of June a decree was obtained in the fullest terms for the restoration of Cicero. The Consul was charged with the farther conduct of this measure, as of the utmost consequence to the public. This officer, accordingly, issued a proclamation, in terms employed only on the greatest occasions, requiring all who had the safety of the republic at heart to support him in the execution of this decree. There was, in consequence of this proclamation, a great concourse of orderly citizens from all parts of Italy. The enemies of the measure shrunk and withdrew their opposition. The act passed in the assembly of the People on the fourth of August. Cicero had been so confident of this event, that he on the same day sailed from Dyrrachium, and on the following arrived at Brundisium. On the eighth day, being still at this place, he had notice of the act being passed, set out for Rome, continued his journey through multitudes of people, who were assembled on the roads to testify their joy upon his return, and entered the city on the fourth of September.

Next day he addressed the Senate in a harangue, which is still extant, composed of lavish panegyric or vehement invective, corresponding to the demerit or merit of parties in his late disgrace and restoration. The multitudes that were assembled on this occasion, their impatience to see him, their acclamations and wonderful unanimity in his favour, raised him once more to his former pitch of glory, and appeared to repay all the services he had rendered to the public, and to compensate all the sorrows of his late disgrace. The whole matter may have been, to persons of reflection, an evidence of that weakness with which this ingenious man suffered himself to be affected by popular opinion, and of the levity with which multitudes, in the changes of fortune, run into opposite extremes.

During these transactions, Cæsar was at a great distance, on the northern extremities of Gaul, engaged with fierce and numerous enemies, involved in difficulties, concerning which there were various reports, and of which the issue, with respect to himself and his army, was supposed to be doubtful. In these circumstances, however willing Pompey may have been to persevere in the measures concerted with Cæsar, it is probable that he found himself unable to resist the force of the Senate, which was now exerted to obtain the restoration of a person who had taken so distinguished a part in their measures.

It is possible likewise, that in these circumstances Pompey may have taken upon him to act independently of his associates, though he afterwards, in

trying to gain Cicero to the party of the triumvirate, affected to give Cæsar equal merit with himself in procuring his recall; and he appealed to Quintus, the brother of Marcus Cicero, for the truth of this assertion *. Cicero himself, however, was not disposed to give Cæsar any credit upon this account; and, though both Cæsar and Crassus, after the matter was decided, affected to concur in the measure, yet he does not seem to have believed them sincere. He imputes to Cæsar an active part in the injury he had received, but none in the reparation that was done to him †.

Pompey, not the less jealous of Cæsar for their pretended union, and sensible of the advantage his rival had gained in having a military command of so long a duration at the gates of Rome, now wished to propose for himself some appointment of equal importance. The moment of cordiality in the Senate, on their recovering a favourite member, and the first emotions of gratitude in the breast of Cicero himself, whom he had recently obliged, seemed to form a conjuncture favourable for such a proposition; and he laid, with his usual address and appearance of unconcern, the plan of a motion to be made for his purpose.

The importation of corn into Italy had been lately interrupted, and a great scarcity and dearth had ensued. The populace being riotous upon this complaint, had in the theatre attacked with menaces and

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. i, ep. 9.

† Orat. in Senat. post reditum, c. 15.

violence numbers of the wealthy citizens who were present, and even insulted the Senate itself in the Capitol. A report, industriously raised by the enemies of Cicero, was propagated, to make it be believed that the distress arose from his engrossing for so long a time the attention of government; and, in opposition to this surmise on the one hand, it was alleged on the other, that the late corn act of Clodius, and the misconduct of one of his relations, intrusted by him with the care of the public granaries, was the cause of all this distress. But whatever may have been the cause, it was insinuated by the adherents of Pompey, that no man was fit to relieve the People besides himself; that the business should be committed to him alone; and Cicero, in entering the Senate, was called upon by the multitude, as he passed, to make a motion to this purpose, as bound to procure some relief to the People, in return to their late cordiality in his cause.

Cicero had in reality owed his recall to the declarations of Pompey in his favour; and, however little reason he had on the whole to rely on his friendship, it was convenient for the present to appear on good terms with a person of so much influence. He suffered himself, therefore, to be carried by the stream that seemed to run in favour of this fashionable leader. As if the necessity of the case had suggested the measure, he moved the Senate, that a commission, with proconsular power over all the provinces, should be granted to Pompey, to superintend the supplies of corn for the city. The Senate, either of themselves disposed to grant this request, or won

by the eloquence of their newly recovered member, instructed the Consuls to frame a resolution to this purpose, and carry it to the assembly of the People for their assent.

Here C. Messius, one of the Tribunes, proposed to enlarge the trust, and to comprehend the superintendency of the revenue, with an allotment of fleets and armies suited to the extent of this unprecedented commission. Pompey, however, observing that this additional clause was ill received, denied his having any share in proposing it, and affected to prefer the appointment intended for him in terms of the act which had been proposed to be drawn up by the Consuls. His partisans, in the mean time, still pleaded, though in vain, for the extension of the commission as proposed by Messius. The extravagance of the proposal gave a general alarm to the Senate, and still more to the party of Cæsar, who were willing to employ Pompey as an agent in the city, but not to arm him with a military force, or to give him in reality that sovereignty in the empire, of which, by his residence in the capital, he so much affected the appearance.

The extraordinary commission, now actually granted to Pompey, although it was exorbitant in respect to the influence it gave him over all the producers, venders, buyers, and consumers of corn throughout the whole empire; yet, as it did not bestow the command of an army, fell short of the consequence which Cæsar principally dreaded in his rival; and though probably the cause of some jealousy betwixt them, did not produce any immediate breach.

Pompey, being entitled by this commission to appoint fifteen lieutenants, put Cicero at the head of the list; and this place was accepted of by him, on the express condition, that it should not prevent his standing for the office of Censor, in case an election took place on the following year *. He was now in the way of recovering his consideration and his dignity, but was likely to meet with more difficulty in respect to his property, which Clodius had taken care to have forfeited, having even demolished his house, and consecrated the ground on which it stood to pious uses. This last circumstance had placed a bar in his way, which could not be removed without a formal decree of the Pontiffs.

The college met on the last of September, to hear parties in this cause. A violent invective having been pronounced by Clodius against his antagonist, Cicero replied in that oration, which is still extant among his works on the subject of his house †. The question was, Whether the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, being formally consecrated, could be again restored to a profane or common use? The Pontiffs appear to have been unwilling to give any explicit decision. They gave a conditional judgment, declaring, that the consecration of Cicero's ground was void, unless it should be found that this act had been properly authorised by the People. Both parties interpreted this judgment in their own favour; and the Senate was to determine whether,

* Cicero Orat. in Senat. post re

† Pro Domo sua.

in the act of consecration, the consent of the People had or had not been properly obtained.

The Senate being met on the first of October, and all the parties who were members of it being present, Lucullus, in the name of the Pontiffs his colleagues, reported, That they had been unanimous in their judgment to revoke the act of consecration, unless it should be found, that the magistrate, who had performed that ceremony, had been properly authorised by the People; but that this was a question of law now before the Senate. A debate ensued, in which Lentulus Marcellinus, Consul-elect for the following year, gave his opinion against the legality of the consecration: he was followed by numbers, and the judgment of the Senate was likely to be on that side, when Clodius, to put off the question, spoke for three hours, and would have prevented the Senate's coming to any resolution, if the members, becoming impatient, had not silenced him at last by their interruptions and clamours. A resolution being moved for in the terms that had been proposed by Marcellinus; the Tribune Serranus, who had formerly suspended the decree for the recall of Cicero, now again interposed with his negative. The Senate, nevertheless, proceeded to engross the decree, in which it was resolved, that the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, should be again restored to the owner in property; that no magistrate should presume to contest the authority of the Senate in this matter; and that if any interruption were given in the execution of this decree, the Tribune, who now interposed with his negative, should

should be accountable for the consequences. Serranus was alarmed. His relation, Cornicinus, to give him the appearance of greater importance, and an opportunity to recede with dignity, laid himself on the ground at his feet, and besought him, by his entreaties, to say, that he would not insist for the present on the negative he had given; but he begged the delay of a night to consider of the matter. The Senate, recollecting the use which he had formerly made of such a delay on the first of January, was disposed to refuse it, when, upon the interposition of Cicero himself, it was granted; and this Tribune having thought proper to withdraw his negative, the act accordingly passed on the second of October. Cicero was allowed two millions Roman money * to rebuild his house in town; five hundred thousand † to rebuild his villa at Tusculum, and two hundred and fifty thousand ‡ to rebuild that at Formiæ. The first sum he seems to have considered as adequate to his loss, but complains of the other two §. He proceeded, without delay, to take possession of his ground, and to employ workmen in rebuilding his house. He had made some progress, when Clodius, on the third of November, came with an armed force, dispersed the workmen, and attacked the house of Quintus Cicero, the brother, that was adjoining, set it on fire, and kept a guard of his retainers in the streets till it was burnt to the ground.

By this act of violence, Clodius had rendered his

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* About L. 16,145 : 16 : 8.

‡ About L. 2018 : 4 : 6.

cause, in the criminal prosecution which still hung over him, in a great measure desperate. His safety required the actual destruction of his enemies, and he had no scruple to restrain him from the most violent extremes. He accordingly attacked Cicero as he passed in the streets, on the eleventh of November, attended by a company of his friends, forced them into a walled court, where they found means, with some difficulty, to defend themselves. Clodius, in this attack, had frequently exposed his own person, and might have been killed; but Cicero was now become too cautious for so bold a measure. "I "have put my affairs," he writes to Atticus, "under "a gentle regimen; and, in all the cures I am to ap- "ply for the future, have renounced the use of the "surgeon's knife."

Clodius, upon this occasion, being disappointed of his design upon Cicero's life, came into the streets on the following day, which was the twelfth of November, with a number of slaves provided with lighted torches, and escorted by a party armed in form with shields and swords. They made directly for a house belonging to Milo, with intention to set it on fire; took possession of that of P. Sylla, in its neighbourhood, as a fortress or place of arms from which to resist all attempts to extinguish the flames, and till the house they were about to destroy should be burnt to the ground.

While they were proceeding to execute this design, a number of Milo's servants, led by one Flaccus, sallied forth against the incendiaries, killed several of the most forward, put the rest to flight, and would

not have spared Clodius himself, if he had not withdrawn to the cover, which, in forming this project, he had prepared for his party.

On the following day, Sylla made his appearance in the Senate, in order to exculpate himself of the ill use which had been made of his house; but Clodius did not venture abroad. It appears scarcely credible, that a state could subsist under such extreme disorders; yet the author of them had been long under prosecution for crimes of the same nature; and it was still a question, whether the charge against him should be heard, or whether he should not be allowed to take refuge in some one of the offices of State, to which he was sure of being named by the People, provided the elections were allowed to precede his trial.

Marcellinus, the intended Consul of next year, moved the Senate to hasten the trial, and to join the late disorders committed by the criminal to the former articles of the charge which lay against him. But Metellus Nepos, one of the present Consuls, and the relation of Clodius, having formerly found a pretence for delay, still struggled, if possible, to repel the attack; and for this purpose endeavoured to prevent any immediate determination of the Senate, by prolonging the debate. But the majority of the members were greatly exasperated, and obtained a resolution, that the trial of Clodius, for these repeated acts of violence and outrage, should precede the elections. His friend the Consul Metellus, nevertheless, that he might have the chance [illegible] this prosecution in the public offic[illegible]ich he

aspired, would have brought on the elections on the nineteenth of November, if he had not been prevented by Milo, who, in the middle of the preceding night, had, with an armed force, occupied the place of assembly, and was prepared to observe the heavens, and to announce some of the celestial presages of unfavourable events, in case other methods to suspend the elections should not have prevailed.

Metellus, with the two brothers, Appius the Prætor, and Publius Clodius, being apprised of this intention, and of the power with which it was supported, did not make their appearance in the field, and Milo kept his station till noon, when he withdrew with the general applause of the Senate, and of the more orderly citizens.

The meeting, or assembly of the People, being adjourned to next day, Metellus, in order to lull the vigilance of Milo, assured him, that there was no occasion to occupy posts in the dead of the night; that he meant to do nothing before it was day; that if any one wished to suspend the election, he should, in the morning, be found in the market-place, and there submit to the forms which any one was legally entitled to plead against his proceeding. Milo, accordingly, at break of day, repaired to the market-place, where he expected to be joined by the Consul; but soon afterwards was told, that Metellus had deceived him, was hastening to the field of Mars, where the elections were commonly held, and would instantly begin to call the votes, when it would be too late to interpose even under the pretence of religion. Upon this information, Milo immediately pursued,

and overtook his antagonists before the election began; and, by declaring his intention to observe the heavens, once more frustrated the designs of the faction.

On the twenty-first, the People could not assemble by reason of the public market; and their meeting being called for the twenty-third, Milo again took possession of the field with an armed force; and Cicero, who concludes a letter to Atticus with describing this state of affairs, made no doubt of Milo's success*. What passed on this day is not particularly mentioned; but it is known that Clodius at last prevailed; that, being elected Ædile, he was, by the privilege of his office, screened from the prosecution that was intended against him; and being himself safe, did not fail, upon the expiration of Milo's Tribunate, to retort the charge upon his prosecutor; and accordingly brought him to trial on the second of February, for acts of violence or breach of the peace.

U. C. 697. Cn. Corn. Lentulus Marcellinus, L. Mar. Philippus.

Pompey, as well as Cicero, appeared in defence of Milo; and they succeeded in having him acquitted, while they incurred a torrent of reproach and invective on the part of the prosecutor. The market-place was crowded with the partisans and retainers of Clodius, who had instructed them, in replies to his interrogations, to direct all their abuse on Pompey. "Who starves the People for want of corn? he asked: They answered, Pompey. Who wants to be "sent to Alexandria? Answer, Pompey." This farce

* Cicero ad Attic

greatly disturbed the concerted dignity of this politician. As his principal object was consideration, he could not endure contempt. He was on bad terms with the Senate; and they listened to the invective of his personal enemies with apparent satisfaction. He complained to Cicero, that the People were alienated from him; that the Nobility were his enemies; that the Senate was adverse, and the youth in general ill disposed to him *. He had indeed submitted to become the agent of a faction at Rome; and, with the friends of the republic, incurred all the odium of what was done by their influence. Cæsar, in the mean while, was rising every day in military reputation, and had formed an army almost at the gates of Rome, with which he held every party in the republic in awe. Pompey, on this occasion, really did, or affected to believe, that a design was formed against his own life; he assembled a numerous party of his retainers from the country, and absented himself, during some time, from the Senate and from the assemblies of the People.

* Cicer. ad Quin. frat. lib. ii, epist. 3.

CHAP. XXI.

Return of Cato from Cyprus.—His repulse at the election of Prætors.—Arrival of Ptolomy Auletes at Rome.—Visit of Pompey and Crassus to Cæsar's quarters at Lucca.—Renewal of their association.—Military operations in Cæsar's province.—Violent election of Crassus and Pompey.—Provinces.—Of Crassus in Syria.—Of Pompey in Spain for five years.—Crassus departs for Syria.

THE particulars we have related in the last chapter, have led us on to the middle of February, in the Consulate of Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus. The first was attached to the forms of the republic, and was a strenuous partisan of the Senate. His election was probably a sequel of the victory which this party had obtained in the restoration of Cicero. Philippus, the other Consul, was now nearly related to Cæsar, having married Atia his niece, the widow of Octavius; and possibly owed his preferment in part to this connection. He was, by his marriage with the mother, become the stepfather of young Octavius, now a boy of ten years of age, and entered as a part of his family. This parent, indeed, appears to have been a man of great moderation, no way qualified to be a party in the designs or usurpations of the family with which he was now connected, and which make [illegible] in the sequel of this history.

Some time before these Consuls entered on office, or in the end of the preceding year, Marcus Cato arrived from having executed his commission to Byzantium and Cyprus. The business upon which he had been sent to the first of these places, was to restore some exiles who had been driven from their country in the violence of faction. At the second he was to seize the treasure and the other effects of the king, and to reduce his kingdom to the form of a Roman province. This measure, by all accounts, was unjust, and the office highly disagreeable to Cato; but he was determined to perform it with the punctuality and respect due to an order of the State. While he himself went to Byzantium, he sent forward Canidius to Cyprus, to intimate the commands of the Roman People, and to exhort the king to submission. Upon his return to Rhodes, in his way to Cyprus, he had intelligence, that this prince, unable to bear the ruin of his fortunes, had, in despair, killed himself. His treasure was seized, and his effects sold: the whole yielded to the treasury about seven thousand talents of silver. Upon the approach of Cato to Rome, the magistrates, the Senate, and multitudes of the People, went forth to receive him. The Senate thought proper in this manner to distinguish a friend, and to favour him with some marks of consideration, in order to balance, if possible, the public honours which were so frequently lavished on their enemies. For the same purpose, likewise, they resolved to insert the name of Cato among the Prætors of the present year; but this honour he himself rejected, as unprecedented and illegal. The year fol-

lowing, however, when he stood candidate for this office in the ordinary form, he was rejected; and Vatinius, the well-known tool of Cæsar, who had been commonly employed by him in things which were thought too mean for himself to appear in, was chosen *.

Cæsar, as has been observed on different occasions, had a serious antipathy to Cato. Considering him as a determinate and resolute opponent, he employed all his influence to exclude him from the offices of State, and probably had a particular pleasure in procuring him a repulse, by the preference of so mean an antagonist as Vatinius, who in this instance had the majority of votes against him. But, in mentioning this event, Valerius Maximus, with the sense which remained of it in subsequent ages, though with the quaintness of epigram, is pleased to reverse the form of expression, usual in speaking of disappointed candidates, saying, "That the list of Prætors for this "year had not the honour of Cato's name †."

Cato, in the execution of his late commission, had taken exact inventories of all the effects sold at Cyprus; but his books being lost, or burnt, in a vessel which took fire on the voyage, Clodius frequently threatened him with a prosecution to account for the sums he had received; and in this was seriously instigated by Cæsar, who, from his winter quarters at Lucca, watched all the proceedings at Rome.

From this station, the Proconsul of Gaul, although

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* Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis,

† Val. Max. lib. vii, c. 5.

he could not attend in person, sent his agents to the city, took part in every transaction of moment that related to his adherents or to his enemies. It appeared to be his maxim, that no man should be his friend or his enemy without feeling the suitable effects. Memmius, who had been Prætor with Domitius Ahenobarbus, and who had joined his colleague in the prosecution that was commenced against Cæsar at the expiration of his Consulate, having since been Prætor of Bithynia, and accused of misconduct in his province, was attacked by him in a memorial which he drew up to be employed in support of the charge. Memmius, in defending himself, recriminated, sparing no kind of invective; and in the issue of this matter had the good fortune to escape from the resentment of his enemy.

The power of Cæsar, aided by his influence in so important a station, was daily increasing; and as he spared no pains to crush those whom he despaired of gaining, so he declined no artifice to gain every one else. All the spoils of his province were distributed in gratuities at Rome. He knew the state of every man's family, and where he could not reach the master, paid his court to the mistress, or to the favourite slave. While in his winter quarters at Lucca, so many Senators resorted from Rome to pay their court, that of these no less than two hundred were said to have been present at one time; and so many of them in public characters, that the Lictors, who, with the badges of office, paraded at the entrance of

his quarters, amounted to one hundred and twenty *.

During this winter, a question relating to the restoration of Ptolomy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, gave rise to warm debates in the Senate. This prince had been dethroned by his subjects; and, conceiving that he had sufficient credit with many persons at Rome, who had experienced his bounty, he repaired thither to solicit his own restoration. In his way, he had an interview with Marcus Cato at Cyprus, and was advised by him to return to Egypt, and to accept of any terms from his own People, rather than to enter on such a scene of anxiety and mortification, as he should find every suitor for public favour engaged in at Rome. The giddiness of the multitude, the violence of the parties, of which one was sure to withstand what the other promoted, the avarice of those who might pretend to be his friends, and whose rapacity the treasures of his kingdom could not aswage, were sufficient to deter the king from proceeding on his voyage. But the importunity of his attendants, who wished to have him restored without any concession to his subjects, confirmed him in his former resolution. He accordingly proceeded to Rome; and, to the great encouragement of his hopes, was favourably received by Pompey, who was then possessed of the reigning influence in the city, and who considered this occasion of restoring a king of Egypt to his throne, as a proper opportunity to have-

* Plutarch in Ca

a military command for himself, joined to the civil commission of which he was already possessed.

In the mean while, the people of Alexandria, not knowing to what place their king had withdrawn, imagined that he was dead, and put his daughter Berenice in possession of the kingdom. Being afterwards informed, that he had gone to sea, and steered for Italy, where he was likely to engage the Romans against them, they sent a deputation to counteract his solicitations in the Senate. But these deputies being intercepted, and murdered by order of the king, he proceeded without opposition, in his application at Rome, and obtained a decree for his restoration to the crown. In this the opposite parties agreed, for some one leader in each aspired to be employed in resettling the kingdom of Egypt; but the unfortunate king soon found, that in this act, pronounced in his favour, he had yet made but a small progress in his suit. The whole difficulty arose in the choice of a person to carry the decree of the Senate into execution.

Soon after the general decree had passed, Lentulus Spinther, Consul of the present year, being destined, at the expiration of his magistracy in the city, to command in Cilicia and Cyprus, had inserted the business of restoring the king of Egypt as a part of his own commission. But after Lentulus was gone for his province, this part of the commission, probably by the influence of Pompey, who had views on that expedition, as the object of a military command for himself, was recalled. A strong party of the Nobles, however, being jealous of the state which Pom-

pey affected, and of his continual aim at extraordinary powers, conceived an expedient to disappoint him on this occasion, or to render the commission unworthy of his acceptance. In visiting the books of the Sybils, verses were said to be found, containing an injunction to the Romans, not indeed to withhold their friendship from a king of Egypt soliciting their protection, but "to beware how they attempted to restore him with a military force." The authenticity of this oracle was acknowledged, or declared by the Augurs; and the Tribune Caius Cato, who was averse to the cause of Ptolomy, availed himself of it, to suspend the effect of the resolution which had been already taken in favour of that prince. The Senate and People were divided in their opinions. One party urged, that Pompey should be appointed to restore the king of Egypt to his throne; others agreed, that he might be appointed, provided that he undertook the commission as Proconsul, attended by two Lictors, and, in the terms of the oracle, without any military force*. Pompey himself affected to think, that the business should have been left as it was in the department of Lentulus the Proconsul of Cilicia and Cyprus; but his retainers, so long as they had any hopes of rendering this a military commission, or of making it a pretence for placing their patron again at the head of an army, never ceased to urge that he should be employed in it.

Ptolomy himself likewise wished to have this bu-

* Dio. lib. xxxix, c. 12—16. Cicero ad Lentulum, Familiares, lib. vii.

siness devolve upon Pompey, as the most likely person to have the force of the republic at his disposal, and to employ it effectually. But both despairing at last of success, Ptolomy retired to Ephesus; and fearing the resentments he had provoked in the contest with his own people, and in the late murder of their deputies, he took refuge in the temple of Diana; a retreat from which he was not conducted, till about two years afterwards, when Gabinius undertook to replace him on his throne *.

Pompey was disgusted with his disappointment in not being named to this service, and probably mortified more by the little respect that was paid to him by all parties, while he lay under the lash of continual invectives from his petulant opponents Clodius and Caius Cato. Having obtained, on the fifth of April, a grant of some money towards executing his office of general purveyor of corn for the People; and having heard his own and Cæsar's embezzlement of the public treasure, especially in the alienation of the revenues of Campania, severely censured in the Senate †, he left Rome on pretence of applying, in Sardinia and Sicily, the sums with which he was now intrusted, for the purchase of corn. In his way to this market he passed by Lucca, and, together with Crassus, augmented the number of attendants who paid their court at the quarters of Cæsar. At an interview of these three leaders, they renewed their former confederacy; and it being known, that Do-

* Dio. Decad. xi, lib. 5.
† Cicero Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 5, et 6.

mitius Ahenobarbus was to stand for the next election of Consuls, Cæsar, considering how much a citizen so determined in opposition to himself, instigated by Marcus Cato, and supported by the party of the Senate, might attempt or execute against him in his absence, proposed, that the opposition to this candidate should not be committed to any person of inferior consideration in their party; but that Pompey and Crassus should themselves enter the lists, in order to exclude Domitius from the Consulate *.

It was agreed likewise, at this conference, that upon the expiration of the term for which they were to hold the magistracy at Rome, Pompey should have the province of Spain, Crassus that of Syria, each with a great army: that Cæsar should be continued in his present command, and have such additions to the establishment of his province as might enable him to support an army of eight Roman legions, with the usual accompaniments of auxiliaries and irregular troops. Such was already in fact the state of his forces †, including a legion of native Gauls; he having, contrary to the express limitations of his commission, by which he was restricted to three legions, made this enormous augmentation. This concert, like the first which united these parties together, was, for some time, kept a secret, and only began to be surmised about the usual time of elections.

Soon after these matters were settled, Crassus being to remain in Italy, Pompey proceeded on his voyage to Sardinia, and Cæ



* Suet. in Cæsare, c. 24.

in Gaul, where the war in different places had been renewed in his absence. Among the dispositions he had made for the winter, the young Crassus was left to command on the coasts of the British Channel; and Galba, another of his lieutenants, was posted among the Alps, to protect the traders of Italy at a principal pass of these mountains. This officer had dislodged the natives from many of their strongholds, from which they were accustomed to infest the highways, or to lay such as were passing under severe contributions; and he took hostages for their good behaviour for the future. He fixed his quarters, during the winter, at Octodurus, supposed to be the village of Martinach in the Vallais, situated at the foot of the mountains by which travellers now pass in the route of the greater abbey of St Bernard. Here he remained for some time, in quiet possession of his post; but the natives, observing that the legions under his command had been greatly reduced by the services of the preceding campaign, and by the detachments which he had recently made from his quarters, formed a design to surprise and to cut him off. For this purpose, the inhabitants of the village in which he was quartered suddenly withdrew from him, and soon after appeared with multitudes of their countrymen on the neighbouring mountains. From thence they made a furious attack on the Roman entrenchment, continually sending fresh numbers to relieve those who became fatigued, or had exhausted the store of their missile weapons.

The Romans, on the first prospect of this attack,

had deliberated, whether they should not aban
their post; but had resolved to maintain it, and w
now become sensible that they must perish, if they
could not, by some impetuous effort, disperse the
enemy who were assembled in such numbers against
them. For this purpose, they determined to break
from their lines, and to mix with their assailants
sword in hand; a manner of fighting, in which, by
the superiority of the Roman shield and sword, they
always had a great advantage. They accordingly
sallied from their intrenchment, and, after the slaugh-
ter of ten thousand of the enemy, about a third of
the whole, put the remainder to flight. Galba, not-
withstanding the respite he obtained by this victory,
not thinking it prudent to remain in a situation in
which he had been exposed to so much danger, with-
drew, for the remainder of the winter, to the neigh-
bourhood of Geneva.

The war had broke out at the same time in the
quarters of Crassus, at the other extremity of the
province. Some nations, who had made their sub-
mission, and given hostages at the end of the pre-
ceding campaign, repented of this step, and entered
into a concert to recover their liberties. They be-
gan with seizing the Roman officers who had been
stationed among them as commissaries to provide for
the subsistence of the army, and they detained the
as pledges for the recovery of those whom th
themselves had given as hostages for their ow
peaceable behaviour.

The principal authors of t the i
habitants of what is now te of Br

tanny, between the rivers Vilaine and Blavet. They trusted to the strength of their situation on small islands, peninsulas, or head-lands, of which many were joined to the continent only by some narrow beach or isthmus, which the sea at high-water overflowed. They depended likewise on the strength of their shipping, in the use of which, by the practice of navigation on that stormy sea, and by their frequent voyages even to Britain, they were extremely expert. They were said to supply the want of canvas and hempen cordage with hides and thongs of leather, and the want of cables with iron chains, to which they fastened their anchors.

Cæsar, having received intelligence of this revolt while he remained in his quarters at Lucca, sent orders to build as many ships as possible upon the Loire, and to assemble mariners from the neighbouring coasts. Apprehending, at the same time, a general defection of the province, and perhaps a descent from the Germans, that were ever ready to profit by the distress or divisions of their neighbours, he sent Labienus with a large body of horse to the Moselle, at once to awe the Belgic nations, and to observe the passage of the Rhine. He sent also Titurius Sabinus with a proper force into Normandy, where the natives were already in arms; and the young Crassus to the Garonne, to occupy the people of Gascony in their own country, and to prevent their junction with the principal authors of this rebellion.

He himself made haste to join the troops that were stationed in Britanny, and ordered Decimus

Brutus to assemble his fleet, and to make sail without loss of time for the Bay of Vannes. After arrival on the coast, he met with all the difficulties which he had reason to expect from the nature of the country, and from the disposition and skill of its inhabitants. The enemy had retired from the continent to their strong-holds on the promontories or head-lands, in which they were periodically surrounded by the sea. Being attacked at one station, they withdrew in their boats to another; and by their situation seemed to be secure from any enemy, who was not in a condition to assail them at once, both by sea and by land. They could *frustrate* his operations on shore, by embarking on board of their vessels; and his attack from the sea, by landing from their boats, which they drew up on the beach.

Cæsar, to decide the event of this singular contest, was obliged to wait the arrival of his shipping. As soon as it appeared, the natives, sensible that their fate depended on the event of a sea-fight, embarked the most expert of their warriors, got under sail with all their force, amounting to two hundred and twenty vessels, and steered directly for their enemy. While the fleets drew near to each other, the shores were crowded with spectators; and the army, with Cæsar himself, came forth on the heights, from which they could behold the scene.

The Romans, being inferior to their enemy in the management of sails, as well as in the strength of their vessels, endeavoured to supply [illegible] defect, as usual, by an effort of address or contrivance. They had provided themselves with [illegible] scythe

fastened to shafts of a proper length, to cut the enemy's rigging, and by this means to let loose or discompose their sails; and having thus, in the first encounter, disabled many of their ships, they afterwards grappled, and boarded them sword in hand.

The Gauls, seeing a great part of their fleet in this manner irrecoverably lost, would have escaped with the remainder; but were suddenly becalmed, and being, from ten in the morning till night, exposed to the continual attacks of their enemy, were all either taken or destroyed; and the nation, thus bereft of its principal strength, and the flower of its people, surrendered again at discretion.

Under pretence that the inhabitants of this district had violated the law of nations, in seizing the persons of officers who were stationed among them, in a public character, their leaders were put to death, and their people sold for slaves. Those of the lower banks of the Seine, at the same time, having been defeated by Titurius, agreeably to what was said to be the character of Gaulish nations in general, returned to their former submission, with a levity equal to that with which they had joined the revolt.

The nations inhabiting the banks of the Garonne were still inclined to resist the approach of the Romans to their country. To the advantage of numbers, they joined a lively courage, of which these invaders had frequently felt the effects. Every chief was attended by a number of followers, whom he called his *Soldurii*, and who had devoted themselves to his service. While the chieftain lived, the *Soldurii* fared in every thing alike with himself; but if he

perished by violence, they too must die, and was no instance of their failing in this part of engagement.

Crassus being arrived on the Garonne, and warned by the example of other Roman officers, who had fallen or miscarried in that country, deferred passing the river till he had augmented his force by the junction of some troops from Toulouse, and other parts of the Roman province. Being thus reinforced, he proceeded against the natives: These comprehended many little hordes, of which Cæsar has, on this occasion, enumerated twelve; but jealous of one another, and unwilling to join even in their common defence. They accordingly, notwithstanding their known valour, fell separately into the hands of the Romans, and, in the end, were all of them vanquished, or made their submission.

By these conquests, the former acquisitions of Cæsar on the Seine and the Marne, had a direct communication with the districts of Toulouse and Narbonne, or what had already been for a considerable period the Roman province of Gaul. And the conqueror, having re-established peace in those parts of the country, which are now termed Britanny and Normandy, closed the campaign with a march still farther to the northward, where he penetrated through marshes and woods into Br[illegible] by heavy rains, and the app[illegible] turned on his route, without [illegible] and having put his army int[illegible] the nations who had lately [illegible] out as usual for Italy. There [illegible]

ly wanted by Pompey and Crassus, who, on the approach of the elections, were likely to meet with unexpected difficulties in executing the plan which had been lately concerted betwixt them.

At Rome, the spring, and part of the summer, had passed in disputes among those who were attached to the opposite parties. Clodius had attacked Cicero in his own person, in his effects, and in the persons of his friends. P. Sextius, who, in the character of Tribune, had been so active in the recall of this injured exile, and who had exposed his own life in the riots to which that measure gave rise, was now accused, and brought to trial for supposed acts of violence committed by him in the course of those contests. He was defended with great zeal by Hortensius, and with a proper gratitude by Cicero; and by their joint endeavours was, on the twelfth of March, acquitted by the unanimous verdict of his judges*.

After this trial was over, a point of superstition, curious as it serves to mark the age, gave occasion to a fresh dispute between Cicero and his enemy Clodius. Upon a report that horrid noises and clashing of arms had been heard under ground in one of the suburbs, the Senate thought proper to take the subject under consideration, and they referred it for interpretation to the college of Augurs. This body delivered in judgment, that the gods were offended, among other things, by the neglect and profanation of holy rites, and by the prostitution of sacred places to profane uses. This response Clodius endeavoured

* Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii, epist. 4. Orat. pro Sext.

to apply to the case of Cicero's house, once co crated and set apart for religion, and now again faned by being restored to its former owner. Cicero endeavoured to remove the charge of profanation from himself to Clodius, by reviving the memory of his famous adventure in Cæsar's house. "If I quote "any more recent act of impiety," says he, "this ci- "tizen will recall me to the former instance, in which "he intended no more than adultery." He proceeded, however, to apply the response of the Augurs to a more late adventure of Clodius, in alarming the theatre at the head of an armed rabble, while the games were celebrating in honour of the great Goddess.

The Senate for two days together listened to the mutual invective of these parties, and were entertained with their endeavours to surpass each other in declarations of zeal for the sacred rites which had been profaned. Cicero, however, by the goodness of his cause, the force of his admirable talents, and perhaps still more by the aid of the Triumvirate, who were at this time at variance with Clodius, prevailed in the contest.

This martyr in the cause of the Senate, ever since his return from banishment, had courted the formidable parties, whose power, at le experienced. He committed, o himself entirely into the hands of a declaration of much attachme composed a flattering panegyri this leader received with great

* Cicero ad Att. lib. iv, e

more on account of the breach it was likely to make among his opponents in the Senate, than on account of any satisfaction he otherwise received from it, or of any real accession of strength it gave him in the pursuit of his designs. By this conduct, indeed, Cicero disgusted his former friends, and felt his situation in the city so painful, that he absented himself, during great part of the summer; a circumstance which interrupted the course, or changed the subject of those letters to which we are indebted for the best record or account of the times.

We have great reason to regret any interruption of materials from which the history of a Consulate so interesting as the present could be collected. The republic seems in part to have recovered its dignity by the able and resolute conduct of Marcellinus, and by the tacit concurrence of his colleague Philippus, who, though connected with Cæsar, did not co-operate in the projects of his party *. By the influence of these Consuls, the applications made to the Senate by Gabinius, now commanding in Syria, for certain customary honours, were rejected †. This refusal was intended to mortify Pompey, who protected Gabinius, and who himself was commonly treated by Marcellinus with great freedom and severity. Those who opposed the Triumvirs recovered their courage, and Domitius Aheńobarbus by their influence, was in a fair way to succeed in his election for Consul of the following year. While the Tribunes, conducted chiefly by a Cato, one of their number, distinguished

* Cic. ad Q. int. Frat. lib. ii, ep. 6. † Ibid. ep. 7.

from his more respectable namesake by the appel tion of Caius, indirectly supported their cause, proposing many regulations in behalf of what was called the Popular Interest; the Consul Marcellinus endeavoured to mar or interrupt their proceedings by the appointment of fasts and holidays, in which it was not lawful to transact affairs in the assembly of the People. The Tribunes, in their turn, suspended the election of Consuls, and in this were encouraged by Pompey and Crassus, who feared the effect of a choice to be made under the direction of Marcellinus, and had not yet ventured to declare their own intentions to offer themselves. But their late interview with Cæsar, and the part they had taken in consequence, had created suspicion of their views. Marcellinus put the question to Pompey in the Senate, Whether he desired the Consulate for himself? And this politician, long unaccustomed to make plain declarations, answered indirectly, That if there were no ill-disposed citizens in the commonwealth, he should have no such desire. Crassus, to the same question, made a like evasive reply, That he should be governed by what he judged best for the State. Both appear to have perceived that they were to rely for success chiefly on popular tumults; and as these would come to be employed with great disadvantage against such an able and [illegible] cellinus, they took meas[illegible] until the term of the pr[illegible] elapse *.

* Dio. Cass

They found the Tribune Caius Cato a proper instrument for their purpose, secured his negative, and employed it repeatedly to suspend the elections. The republic, upon the approach of the new year, being to lose its former magistrates, without any succession of new ones, was likely to fall into a state of great confusion. The Senate went into mourning, and discharged every member from assisting at any of the public entertainments or shows. In this state of suspense and alarm, Publius Clodius, who had for some time been at variance with Pompey, as if gained by the concurrence of measures on this occasion, was reconciled to him, and attacked Marcellinus with continual invectives.

While the year was suffered to pass without any election of Consuls; the fasces dropped from the hands of Marcellinus and Philippus, and an interregnum ensued. Pompey and Crassus then openly appeared as candidates for the vacant offices of State. Young Crassus coming from the army in Gaul, attended by a numerous body of citizens then serving under Cæsar, brought a considerable accession of votes to the party of their general, and were themselves not likely to be outstripped by their opponents in acts of sedition or violence. Domitius Ahenobarbus alone, supported by the councils of Marcus Cato, who was his kinsman, had the courage to persist in a contest with these powerful and dangerous antagonists. The time of election being fixed, this candidate went before break of day to occupy his place in the field of Mars, but found his way already obstructed by a disorderly populace, and even by men

in arms. The slave who carried a light before h... was killed. Some of his friends, particularly Marc... Cato, was wounded *; and his adherents, not being in condition to dispute the ground with such a force as was assembled against them, retired to their own houses, leaving Pompey and Crassus to be named without opposition.

In the same manner, the faction of the Triumvirate overruled every other election, procured the preference, which has already been mentioned, of Vatinius to Marcus Cato, and filled every office with their own creatures. They prevailed in the appointment of Ædiles by actual force, and at the expence of the lives of some of those who opposed them. Pompey himself having been entangled in one of these tumults, retired to change his clothes, which were stained with blood. They were overpowered in the nomination only of two of the Tribunes, Publius Acquilius Gallus and Atteius Capito, in whose election the aristocratical party prevailed.

U. C. 698. Cn. Pompeius Magnus, 2do; M. Licinius Crassus.

These events, however, were by the contest which arose on every question, deferred for all the months of winter and spring. The offices of Prætor were not filled up by the middle of May †. The elections had begun for this purpose some time before; but it being observed that Marcus Cato h... pey, under a pretence, al... stition, that he was to ...

* Plutarch. in ...

† Cicer. ad. Q...

posed to suspend the ballot. The faction employed the time which they obtained by this delay in procuring votes, and were so unguarded in giving money, that they laid themselves open to a criminal prosecution, and had reason to apprehend that whatever election they made would be disputed before the tribunals of justice. To prevent this consequence, Afranius, a person entirely under the direction of Pompey, moved in the assembly of the People for a dispensation from the statute of bribery in the case of elections then depending for the office of Prætor; and having obtained this extraordinary indulgence, secured to the party the fruits of their influence and of their money *.

Among the acts of Pompey and Crassus, in their second Consulate, are mentioned some regulations respecting the courts of justice, by which the juries, though taken in equal numbers from the Senate, the Equestrian order, and the mass of the People, were nevertheless limited to persons of considerable property. There are likewise mentioned some resolutions then passed to enforce the laws against murder, and to amend those against bribery by additional penalties, together with a sumptuary law to check the extravagance and prodigality of the age. "So "willing were these magistrates," said Hortensius, to "compensate by the laws they enacted for the defects "of their own practice, that they made laws even to "limit the expence of the table." Such professions to reform the age were probably intended to retrieve

* Cicero ad Quint. Frat.

the character which the popular leaders had lost the violence and barefaced corruption of their rec canvass, and to mark their administration with some measures that might seem to disprove the imputations of libertinism commonly laid to their charge.

Pompey, at the same time, had an opportunity to signalize his Consulate, by opening, during the present year, the magnificent theatre which he himself, or his freedman Demetrius, had erected for the accommodation of the people at the public shows. At this solemnity were brought on the stage many dramatic performances, and other exhibitions of a different sort. Among these, in the course of five days, no less than five hundred lions were let loose and killed by African huntsmen; and the whole concluded with the baiting of eighteen elephants, animals that seemed to have sagacity enough to be conscious of the indignity and the wrong which they suffered. By their piteous cries, they moved compassion in the breasts even of that barbarous rabble for whose entertainment they were slain *.

The allotment of provinces, which was the principal object of this Consulate, was for some time kept from the view of the People. Pompey continued to profess that he did not intend to accept of any province whatever. But the public did not give credit to such declarations on his part; and his own partisans were as usual prepa[illegible] they knew he wished, [illegible]

* Dio. lib. xxxix. Cicero ad F[illegible]

† Cicero ad [illegible]

Every one, therefore, in all conversations, endeavoured to accommodate him in a province, some with Syria, others with Spain and Africa; to all which suggestions, or officious projects, he affected indifference, or even aversion. Trebonius, meanwhile, Tribune of the People, made a motion, which was soon understood to be the real mind of his authors, and the actual result of their counsels, That the province of Syria should be assigned to Crassus; that of Spain, together with Africa, to Pompey; and not to fall short of Cæsar's appointment in Gaul, each of them to continue for five years, with such establishments of men and of money as the necessity of the service during that period might require. This motion was made in execution of the original plan concerted with Cæsar, and it served to bring into light the object of their late consultation at Lucca, which had so much alarmed the friends of the republic.

On the day that this arrangement was proposed in the assembly, Marcus Cato, by means of the Tribunes Atteius Capito and Acquilius Gallus, obtained leave to address the People. He endeavoured to disappoint the faction, by occupying so much of their time as to prevent their coming to any decision. Being commanded silence, and still persisting to speak, he was ordered by Trebonius into custody. In this manner, however, the time of the first meeting was spent, and the assembly adjourned to the following day.

The Tribunes Atteius and Gallus, suspecting that means might be used to exclude them from the assembly which was then to be held, took measures to

secure their admission. For this purpose, Galli
mained all night in the Senate-house, which fro
the Comitium or place of popular assembly. But
this device was turned against himself; the opposite
party having placed a guard to confine him where he
was. His colleague Atteius, with Marcus Cato, Fa-
vonius, and some others, eluded the parties that were
placed to intercept them, and found their way to the
place of assembly. When the question was put,
Cato, being lifted up into view by those of his friends
who were near him, gave an alarm that it thunder-
ed; an intimation ever held by the superstition of
the Romans to be ominous, and sufficient to suspend
their procedure in any business of State. He was,
however, on this occasion, forced from the Comitium
with the slaughter of some of his friends, who resist-
ed the force that was employed against them. Abou
the same time the Tribune Acquilius was wounde
in attempting to force his way from the Senate-house
and a great concourse of people was forming aroun
him as he stood bleeding in the streets. Violence to
the person of a Tribune was still considered with re
ligious horror, and the Consuls, in whose behalf this
tumult had been raised, fearing the consequence of
suffering such a spectacle to remain in the view of
the People, ordered the multitude to withdraw, and
affecting concern for the accident removed the Tri
bune, still bleeding of h

In the sequel of th
Crassus having obtain
themselves, and in the
fulfil their part of the

moving that his command should be continued during an additional term of five years more. "Now, indeed," said Cato, (addressing himself to Pompey), "the burden is preparing for your own shoulders. "It will one day fall on the republic, but not till "after it has crushed you to the ground."

These arrangements being made, the Consuls, in the prospect of vacating their office of magistracy in the city, proceeded to anticipate the charge of their respective trusts. Pompey, the newly named Proconsul of Spain, under pretence of a war subsisting with the Vaccæi, raised the establishment of his province to four legions, two of which, the subject of much animadversion hereafter, Cæsar, under pretence of more urgent service in Gaul, had the address to borrow from him.

Pompey either had not yet begun to perceive what Cato suggested, That the greatest difficulty he had to apprehend, in preserving the eminence to which he aspired, was the competition of Cæsar; and that the sword must determine the contest between them; or he flattered himself that, like the person who stays at the helm, he was to command the vessel; and that by remaining at the seat of government, while his associates and rivals accepted of appointments at a distance, he continued to preside as sovereign, or supreme head of the republic. Under the influence of these conceptions, although his proper station was Spain, he either procured, or at least availed himself of, a motion that was made by some of the Tribunes, to detain him in Italy; and fancied, that while he sent his own lieutenants, Afranius and

Petreius, as private agents for himself into tha vince, even Cæsar and Crassus, though in the mand of formidable armies, were to act in a subordinate station to himself, who should appear, by residing at Rome, to have the supreme direction of their operations as well as other affairs of state.

Crassus ever considered riches as the chief constituents of power, and he expected, with the spoils of Asia, to equal the military or political advantages that were likely to be acquired by his rivals in Europe. From the levies and other preparations which he made for his province, it soon appeared that he intended a war with the Parthians, the only antagonists which the Romans had left to dispute their progress even to India itself. Observing that he was likely to meet with an opposition to this design from the Senate, and from the Tribunes, who exerted their powers to interrupt his preparations, or took measures to detain him at home, he became the more impatient to set out for his province, and left Rome even before the full expiration of the year for which he was elected into the office of Consul. The Tribune Atteius endeavoured to stop him, first by his tribunitian negative, next by actual force, and last of all by solemn imprecations, devoting the leader himself, and all who should follow him on that service, to destruction.

While the Consul p
Rome, on his intended
bune, with a lighted fir
a victim to the inferna
which greatly alarmed

tined with Crassus on this expedition. This piece of superstition he might, in his own mind, have justly contemned: but it was imprudent to slight the effects of it on the minds of the People, and on the minds of his own army. In the apprehension of both he was by this form in a manner doomed to destruction, and proceeded in the war at the head of troops ill prepared to ward off calamities, which they were thus made to believe hung over them, in consequence of imprecations of which they were not disposed to doubt the effect.

CHAP. XXII.

State of the commonwealth.—Administration of the provinces.—Operations of Cæsar in Gaul, Germany and Britain.—State of Pompey at Rome.—Progress of Crassus into Syria.—Kingdom of Parthia.—Invasion of Crassus beyond the Euphrates.—Second invasion of Cæsar in Britain.

THE provincial appointments of Pompey and Crassus, with that which was at the same time prolonged to Cæsar, seemed to dismember the empire, if not to expose the republic itself to imminent danger.

Of these three adventurers, Pompey and Cæsar, apart from the evil particularly apprehended in any of the measures they pursued, were in themselves subjects of a very dangerous character: neither possessed that dignity of mind which disdains every advantage beyond that of equal justice; neither could acquiesce in the same measures of consideration or power which other Senators had enjoyed before him; neither could be at ease where he did not command as master, or appear at least as the principal personage in every scene in wh

This paltry ambition, s
been held in contempt b
or must have shrunk b
mind by which the states
besides that of high pe

public services, or before that austere virtue which confined the public esteem to acts of public utility, supported by unblemished reputation in private life. But, in the present age, there was a fashion which set such antiquated notions at defiance, controlled the authority of the State itself, and bestowed on private adventurers the attachment which belonged to the commonwealth, and the deference which was due only to the laws of their country.

In the progress of this republic, the character of parties has already repeatedly changed, and the danger to be apprehended from them accordingly varied.

In the first periods of its history, citizens were divided on the supposed distinctions of birth; and, in the quality of Patrician or Plebeian, strove for prerogative or privilege with much emulation, as separate orders of men in the commonwealth, but with little jealousy of personal interests.

In a subsequent period, when the invidious part of the former distinction was removed, citizens having no longer the same object of animosity, as being born to different pretensions, they entered more fully on the competition of individuals, and the formation of separate factions. They strove for the ascendant of aristocratical or democratical government, according to the interest they had formed to themselves in the prevalence of either. They were ready to sacrifice the peace and honour of the Public to their own passions, and entered into disputes accordingly, which were in the highest degree dangerous to the commonwealth. They thought personal pro-

vocations were sufficient to justify public disorder; or, actuated by vehement animosities, they signalized their victories with the blood of their antagonists. But, though sanguinary and cruel in their immediate executions, they formed no deliberate plans of usurpation to enslave their country, nor formed a system of evils to continue beyond the outrage into which they themselves were led by their supposed personal wrongs or factious resentments.

We are now again once more to change the scene, and to have under our consideration the conduct of men who were in reality as indifferent to any interest of party as they were to that of the republic, or to any object of State; who had no resentments to gratify; or who easily sacrificed those which they felt to the purposes of a cool and deliberate design on the sovereignty of their country. Though rivals, they could occasionally enter into combinations for mutual support, frequently changed their partisans, and had no permanent quarrel but with those who uniformly wished to preserve the republic. They were surrounded by persons who admired the advantages of wealth or of power which might be obtained at the expence of their country, and who indeed were ready to extol the virtues of any adventurer who could lead a numerous list of retainers to share with himself in the spoils of the commonwealth.

Peace had now, for some years, except in that part where Cæsar commanded, been established throughout the empire. Instead of military operations, the State was occupied in directing the farms of the revenue, in hearing complaints of oppression

from the provinces, and in appointing the succession of military governors. Besides the disputes which have been mentioned relating to the provincial appointments of Crassus and Cæsar, there arose a question on the subject of provinces to be assigned to their immediate predecessors in the Consulate, Marcellinus and Philippus. It was strongly urged, that Piso, Gabinius, and even Cæsar himself, should be recalled to make way for officers who were entitled to similar command in their turns. This measure was supported in part by Cicero, who vehemently contended, that Piso and Gabinius should be superseded; but urged the continuance of Cæsar in his station, a circumstance for which this able adventurer had taken sufficient precaution not to leave it in hazard from the issue of this debate.

Piso, the near relation of Cæsar, in the event of these deliberations, was actually recalled, and, upon his return to the city, complained to the Senate, in terms of great asperity, of the injury done to his character. Cicero had ever treated Piso and Gabinius, though in reality but the instruments of Pompey and Cæsar, as the principal authors of his own calamities; and, upon the present occasion, had pronounced against Piso that violent invective which still remains among his works, and which the subsequent conduct of the person against whom it was directed in a great measure disproved.

Gabinius had for some years enjoyed the government of Syria, and during this time had ventured to employ the force of his province in a manner which, together with some other offences, drew upon him,

at his return to Rome, the animadversion of the Senate.

It has been mentioned, that Ptolomy Auletes, king of Egypt, in exile from his kingdom, had applied to the Romans for aid in recovering his crown; that his suit had been granted, but rendered ineffectual by the regard which was paid to a supposed oracle, which forbade his being reinstated with a military force; that he had withdrawn to Ephesus, and taken sanctuary in the celebrated temple of that place, where he waited for some change of fortune in his favour. Lentulus, the governor of Cilicia, to whom the business of restoring him, though without military force, had been committed by the Senate, deliberated whether he should not venture to disregard the restriction imposed upon him; march with an army to restore the king of Egypt; possess himself of the wealth which was to be found in effecting such a revolution; and trust to the influence of his friends at Rome in procuring his pardon from the Senate, and even their approbation of what he should have done.

Upon this question Cicero advised Lentulus, if he had a force sufficient to undertake the enterprise, not to lose an opportunity of performing a service, which, though not authorised, could be afterwards vindicated. But the business still remained in suspence, when Gabinius arrived in Syria, and probably, by an advice from Pompey to the same purpose with that of Cicero to Lentulus, undertook, in opposition to a decree of the Senate and of the Augurs, the restoration of this exile to his throne. Having

received or bargained for a great sum of money in return for this service, he advanced with a fleet and an army towards Egypt, passed through Palestine, and on his way raised a contribution in that country.

Berenicé, the daughter of Ptolomy, now in possession of the crown, had married Archelaus; and, in order to strengthen her hands against her father, had assumed her husband as a partner in the throne. But the forces of these associated sovereigns were defeated by Gabinius, and Ptolomy was restored to his kingdom. Gabinius, with the treasure amassed on this occasion, hoped to be secure against the attacks, which, at his return to Rome, were likely to be made upon him, for his contempt of the Senate, and of the oracle, and for the extortion of which he was accused at the same time in Palestine, a part of his own province.

In this busy time of Cæsar's faction at Rome, he himself, upon the alarm of an invasion from Germany, had been called to defend the northern extremity of Gaul. Two separate hordes, the *Tenchteri* and *Usepetes*, pretending to be driven by superior force from the usual tract of their own migrations, had united together, and presented themselves on the banks of the Rhine. The natives on the right bank of that river instantly abandoned their habitations, and collecting all the boats that could be found to the opposite side, made a disposition to stop the passage of these invaders.

The Germans, observing the precautions which were taken to resist them, affected to lay aside the design of passing the Rhine, and, by changing their

course, made a feint to divert the attention of their antagonists. In execution of this purpose, they continued for three days to retire from the river. At the end of this time, supposing that their opponents would be off their guard, or returned to their ordinary way of life, they suddenly changed their direction, and in one night repassed the ground over which they had marched on the three preceding days, surprised a sufficient number of boats with which to accomplish their passage, dislodged the natives of the country on the left of the river before them, and from thence continued their migrations betwixt the Rhine and the Meuse, over what is now called the dutchies of Juliers, of Limburg and Luxemburgh.

These invaders amounted, by Cæsar's account, to upwards of four hundred thousand souls*; a number which exceeds that of the inhabitants of any city in Europe, besides London and Paris, and which may perhaps raise some suspicion of error in copying the text, or of exaggeration in the commentary, which was itself intended to raise the character of Cæsar at Rome. But on the question relating to the probability of so great a number, it may be observed, that those migrating nations, certainly unacquainted with many of the arts which are practised to supply and to accommodate populous cities, were likewise exempt from the want of such supplies, and acquiesced in what was necessary to mere subsistence. Such nations have less skill and industry than the manu-

* Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. iv, c. 15.

facturer and the trader in a settled and well regulated city; but they have less waste, and less misapplication of labour to superfluous and unprofitable purposes, than take place in times of luxury or refined accommodation.

The German nations of this age, although they had opportunities to observe among their neighbours the advantages of land-property, and of agriculture supported by skill and industry, yet frequently preferred the state of migration, and from policy declined making any permanent settlement, lest the care of property, and the studies of ease and convenience, should corrupt or enervate their people. Their favourite occupation was hunting, which they considered as a preparation for war. They traversed the woods and pasture lands, with numerous herds, and subsisted chiefly by milk, flesh, and game. They likewise knew the use of corn, of which they sometimes took a crop from favourable lands; but without remaining beyond the period of a single seed-time and harvest to cultivate any particular portion of ground.

They moved in great and numerous bodies, which must to a great extent have covered the face of the country over which they passed; but the multitude thus moving as one body, was distinguished into separate clans and fraternities, led by their headmen or chiefs, who kept order in their several divisions. They allowed private parties to make war beyond the limits of their own country, and to choose their leaders for this purpose. But in peace, the separate clans had no band of connection. If they had at any

time a general government which comprehended the whole of their tribes, it was but a temporary expedient, to which they had recourse in military adventures, and on other pressing occasions.

Under such equality of conditions, every individual, who was of a proper age, was obliged to labour for himself, and to subsist by what he procured; and he employed his labour only in procuring what was necessary. In these circumstances, it was not likely that commodities should accumulate; but the numbers of the people, if we may rely on the testimony of Cæsar in this place, or on the evidence o ancient history in general, was certainly great *.

The Suevi, before whom the present invaders of Gaul had retired, were said to consist of a hundred cantons, each furnishing annually a thousand men for war, and a like number for the care of their herds and domestic concerns. Such clouds gathering on the frontier of Cæsar's province, required his presence. He accordingly assembled his army, and advanced to observe them between the Rhine and the Meuse.

The Germans, in general, were accustomed to despise the Gauls, and the present invaders expected no formidable opposition on this side of the Rhine; they had ventured to divide their forces, had sent the great body of their horse upon an excursion beyond the Meuse to scour the lower parts of the country, and upon Cæsar's approach, they offered to treat of an alliance with him. "They neither sought

* Cæsar de Bell. Gal. lib. iv, vi.

" (they said) nor would they decline a war with the " Romans. It was their way to repel injuries with " the sword, not to elude them by negociation. But " in the present case, they should nevertheless con- " descend so far as to assure the Roman general, that " they had passed the Rhine from necessity, and not " with any intention to invade his province: That " if he were pleased to receive them as friends, they " were in condition to merit this title, should be " content with the ground they had gained, or ac- " cept of any other which he might choose to assign " them." Cæsar replied, " That while they remain- " ed in Gaul, he could not consider them as friends: " That if they repassed the Rhine, he had allies in " Germany, with whom he should endeavour to join " them in a league of defence against any enemy by " whom they had been thus forced to relinquish " their usual bounds."

Having received this answer, the German deputies, to make their report, and to receive the command of their nations, desired a cessation of arms for three days. But Cæsar, suspecting that they only meant to amuse him, and to gain time for the junction of all their forces, refused to comply with this request, and continued his march. Being arrived within twelve miles of their camp, he was again met by their deputies, with fresh entreaties that he would advance no farther, or, at least, that he would give to the cavalry, who made the van-guard of his army, orders to abstain from hostilities for three days: that in this time, they might have an answer from the German nations mentioned in their last conference,

and know whether such a league could be formed, as was then proposed, to give them some prospect of safety in returning to their usual haunts.

Cæsar, upon this occasion, seems to have granted a cessation of arms; though on account of what afterwards happened, he is willing to diminish the extent of his own engagement, and to impute the breach of faith which followed to his enemies. He agreed to advance no farther than four miles for the convenience of water, and sent an order to his vanguard to abstain from hostilities. This order, however, had no effect. His advanced guard, consisting of five thousand horse, had an encounter with eight hundred of the enemy.

When this encounter happened, the Germans were not yet joined by the great body of their horse. They had earnestly sued for a cessation of hostilities; it was not likely that they would have begun the attack. Yet Cæsar accused them of a design, with this small party, to surprise the whole of his cavalry.

On the day which followed this skirmish of the cavalry, or the parties advanced, the leaders and principal men of the Germans leaving their own camp, without officers, in perfect security, came in great numbers to that of Cæsar to exculpate themselves of what had passed on the preceding day, to convince him of their own pacific dispositions, and to deprecate the farther progress of his army. This he thought a favourable opportunity to cut off, by a complete surprise, this enemy entirely, and to finish the war. Having accordingly secured the persons of

their leaders, who had thus unwarily put themselves in his hands, he advanced with his whole army directly to their camp, easily overcame the few that took arms to oppose him, and without distinction of sex or age, put the whole to the sword. The country, over all the ways by which they endeavoured to escape from the camp, at which the slaughter began, to the confluence of the Rhine or Wall, and the Meuse, was strewed with the slain *.

The Roman people, though seldom sparing of the blood of their enemies, were shocked at the recital of this extraordinary massacre; and when Cæsar, on account of this victory, applied for a thanksgiving, and for the usual honorary decrees of the Senate, the whole of his conduct was questioned; he was charged with having wantonly invaded the nations of Gaul, and of having dishonoured, by a recent act of treachery, the arms of the Republic. It was proposed to deliver up his person to those injured nations, that he might expiate, by his own sufferings, so many acts of injustice and impiety, which the gods might otherwise avenge on his country.

That part of the German horse, which by their absence had escaped the calamity which befell their countrymen, appear soon after to have repassed the Rhine, and to have taken refuge with some of the hordes who lived near the sources of the Roer and the Lippe. Thither Cæsar, to spread the terror of his arms, soon afterwards pursued them; and passed

* That branch of the Rhine which falls into the Meuse, changes its name for that of Wall.

the river, not in boats and by surprise, as the Germans were accustomed to do, but in a manner which he seems to have chosen, as better suited to the dignity of the Roman State; he projected a bridge, which was executed in ten days, with much ingenuity, and some ostentation of his power and skill. This work being finished, he placed proper guards at both its extremities, and advanced with the main body of his army into the contiguous parts of Germany, where, on account of the reception given in that quarter to the cavalry who had escaped the late massacre on the Meuse, he laid the country under military execution.

Cæsar, from the place at which he had passed the Rhine, appears to have gone up the eastern side of the river, where he visited the Ubii, a nation inhabiting over against what are now the cities of Bonne and Cologne. Here he had intelligence, that the Suevi, a nation consisting, as has been observed, of a hundred cantons, and mustering two hundred thousand warriors, who were divided into two squadrons that took the field, and conducted the domestic affairs of the nation by turns, were preparing to oppose him; that they had actually sent their wives, children, and superannuated men, into places of safety, and had draughted their chosen warriors for action. These hordes having an ascendant over all the cantons of Germany, considered it as a proof of their valour, that no nation could pretend to settle on the tract of their migrations, or within reach of their excursions; and that the country, to a great distance around them, was accordingly waste. It

their own movements, they never halted above a year to raise a single crop from fields, which, to keep up the martial spirit of their nation, and to preclude the desire of property, with the other passions that accompany settlement, they successively abandoned.

Cæsar, not being prepared to enter on a war with such an enemy, and being sensible that a defeat might expose his army to ruin, while even a victory could not procure him any advantage proportioned to the risk, having remained eighteen days on that side of the Rhine, and employed no more than twenty-eight days in the whole service, chose, while he still had the reputation of victory unimpaired of his side, to repass that river, and to break down his bridge.

This singular man, whose abilities were equal to any task, and who had no occasion to court the public admiration by measures concerted on purpose to obtain it, was, nevertheless, not above ostentation, and gave way to it, not only where it might contribute to impose on an enemy, but even where it would do no more than gratify his own vanity, or increase the fame of his actions at Rome. To this motive we may venture to impute the design, which, at an advanced season of the year, and at the end of the same summer in which he had, between the Meuse and the Rhine, vanquished the numerous army of the Tenchteri and Usepetes, in which he had passed the great barrier of Germany itself, and insulted its warlike inhabitants on their own territory, he now projected the invasion of Britain,

though surrounded by the ocean, and untouched the arms of any foreign invader. To carry this design into immediate execution, as soon as he had repassed the Rhine, he continued his march through the low countries, and collected his forces in the neighbourhood of the Portus Itius and Gesoriacum *. While we perceive the features of vanity in the leader, we must admire the hardiness and vigour of the troops who could accomplish these services.

The extent of this island, the numbers and character of its people, were then unknown on the continent. Cæsar having in vain endeavoured to procure information in these particulars, sent a galley with orders to explore the coast, and to observe the countenance of the natives. He ordered all his shipping, and even those vessels which he had employed the preceding year against the Veneti †, to sail round the Cape of Britanny into the British Channel, and repair to the straits which separate this island from the continent.

On the report of these preparations, which evidently pointed at Britain, some of the natives willing to avert by negociation the storm which threatened them, sent to the Roman Proconsul a submissive message, and offered to come under his protection.

Cæsar, founding a claim to the possession of the island on these advances which were made to him, proceeded with more boldness to the execution of his enterprise. In order that the natives of the co

* Calais and Boulogne. † In the Bay of Biscay, about Vannes

try he was leaving behind him might not create any trouble in his absence, he obliged them to give hostages, and made a proper disposition of his army to keep them in awe. He had assembled at the most convenient haven on the Gaulish side, now supposed to be the Wissan, between Calais and Boulogne *, eighty transports or ships of burden, with a number of galleys to accommodate the officers of rank, and their equipage. The remainder of his shipping was yet detained, by contrary winds, in a creek at some distance, supposed to be Boulogne; thither he sent his cavalry, with orders to embark on board the ships where they lay. He himself went on board, with the infantry of two legions, at the former haven, and having found a favourable wind with moderate weather, weighed about ten at night, and reached the coast of Britain, on the following day, at ten in the morning. The cliffs, where he first approached the shore, were high and steep, and the hills were covered with numerous bodies of men, on foot, on horseback, and even in wheel-carriages, a species of machine on which the natives of this country were accustomed to make war. It being impossible to land under such difficulties, and in the face of this opposition, he bore away, as is probable, to the northward, about eight miles, with a favourable wind, to some part of the flat shore † which is contiguous to the Downs; and here, in the manner of ancient debarkations, for which the shipping of those

* See Danville's Geography of ancient Gaul.

† Planum et apertum littus. See Cæsar's Commentaries.

times was built, ran his transports aground, and prepared to land.

In the mean time, the Britons, who in their march on the hills had kept pace with the Roman galleys, came down to the strand, and advanced even some way into the water to oppose the descent. As the surf on that shore usually runs high, and the Romans, from where their vessels struck, had some way to wade in water too deep to allow them the free use of their arms, they durst not meet the enemy under such disadvantages, and remained on board. Cæsar seeing his men unusually backward, did not think proper in these circumstances to urge them farther, but ordered some of the lightest vessels, which were mounted with missile engines, or manned with archers and slingers, to row as near to the shore as they had water, on the right and the left of the landing-place, and from thence to gall the enemy. This disposition had the effect to clear the way for his men to descend from their ships, but they were still slow to avail themselves of the opportunity: until the bearer of a standard, plunging into the water, and calling aloud for those who were near, to follow if they meant to save a Roman eagle from falling into the hands of the enemy, numbers at once from different ships, and without any order, obeyed this call; and the islanders, notwithstanding the advantage of the ground, and the superiority of their numbers, both on horseback and on foot, withdrew from the landing place, and soon after disappeared. Seeing their enemy thus in possession of the land, they in a few days even offered to surrender, and were about to deliver their hos-

tages, when an accident happened, which encouraged them again to resist.

On the fourth day after the Roman infantry had landed, a second division of ships, with the cavalry, appeared in sight; but before they could reach the shore, were dispersed by a violent storm; part was driven back towards Gaul, part carried down the British Channel, and cast in distress on the contiguous coast. Even the shipping, from which the legions had disembarked, lying aground in the surf, or at anchor in a high sea and spring-tide, circumstances with which the Italians were little acquainted, were set adrift, or filled with water, many of them beat to pieces or greatly shattered, and rendered unserviceable.

By these misfortunes, Cæsar, although he had made no provision to subsist for the winter in Britain, was in danger of being obliged to remain in the island for want of shipping. The natives retracted their late submission, began to drive away the cattle, and to lay waste the country within reach of his camp. They flattered themselves that he would be obliged to depart, or must perish for want of provisions; and that they would, by the example of so vain and calamitous an attempt, deter every enemy for the future from invading their country.

Cæsar, in the mean time, while he employed all his workmen with the greatest diligence in repairing his ships, endeavoured to collect some provisions, and to form a magazine. The natives assembled in great bodies to intercept his foragers, and obliged him to cover every party employed on this service

with the force of his army. The legions were at first greatly disconcerted by the unusual effect of the British chariots, and by the want of their own cavalry; but as they prevailed in every close fight, the Britons were driven to renew their former submission, and became bound to deliver double the number of hostages they had formerly stipulated. Victorious, however, as this mighty commander has recorded himself, not thinking it proper, with shattered vessels, at the mercy of autumnal winds and stormy seas, to await the performance of this article, I ordered the hostages to be sent after him into Gaı reimbarked with his army, and with the first favourable wind repassed to the continent. At his arriv he found that the Gauls, upon the report of his l misfortunes, had revolted; that one of his transports, with three hundred men on board, having parted with the fleet, and landing at a separate place, were attacked; and that it was necessary to send the remains of his cavalry to their relief. The Morini, inhabiting what are now the districts of Calais and Dunkirk, with other nations of the Low Countries had taken arms against the officers he had stationed in his absence to keep them in awe. The campaign therefore concluded with the operations which were necessary to quell this revolt. Labienus subdued the Morini. Quintus Titurius Sabinus, and Luci Cotta, having recovered possession of the inter country, fell back to the coast.

The Roman army was soon after put into wint quarters; and Cæsar, as if sensible that he had ma his attempt on Britain with too small a force, at

whatever representation he might give of particulars, had incurred the imputation of a miscarriage, gave orders to refit his fleet, and to add, during the winter, as many more ships as possible, built upon a construction more fit for the service to which they were destined, broader, and more capacious in the hull, for the reception of men and horses, and lower in the gunwale, for the convenience of landing. The timber was probably taken from the neighbouring forests; but the materials of his rigging, it is said, were brought from Spain. Having taken these measures to enable him, at a more convenient season, to renew his expedition into *Britain*, he set out as usual for *Italy*, and his winter station in the neighbourhood of *Rome*.

Here he found Pompey and Crassus employed, as has been already related, in accomplishing for themselves, and for him, the objects which they had severally in view. Crassus had fixed his thoughts on the treasures of the East, and projected the sale of kingdoms, of which he hoped to have the disposal, in that part of the world. Pompey, still more especially, was gratified in his wishes; being stationed to act for the party, with a degree of consideration and majesty, little short of monarchy, at Rome; while he obtained a separate military establishment, and the patronage of a mighty province for himself, abroad. In this new distribution, Cæsar appears to have been least considered: but he had already provided, what he knew in the end was to decide every controversy, a great army, inured to service, and in a station which gave an easy access to Italy, and the

command of Rome. As if secure of their interests, therefore, they permitted the election of Consuls to proceed without disturbance; and suffered Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a professed partisan of the Senate, together with Appius Claudius, to be elected Consuls; Marcus Cato and Milo to be placed in the list of Prætors; and several citizens, well affected to the Senate, to be admitted into the college of Tribunes.

U. C. 699. L. Dom. Ahenobarbus, App. Claud. Pulcher.

The winter and spring, however, were inactive on the part of the aristocracy. Cato, probably, did not see any public object in which to engage with advantage beyond the duties of his office, in which he endeavoured to restrain by his authority, and by his example, the extravagance and luxury of the age. The dangerous powers which had been recently granted to persons, from whose ambition the republic had so much to fear, no doubt greatly alarmed the Senate; but this body, though led by Domitius, one of the Consuls, by Cato and Milo, two of the Prætors, and supported by many of the Tribunes, either did not think themselves entitled to dispute the validity of those grants, nor to attempt the revocation of what had been so recently confirmed by the People, or perhaps thought themselves happy in the supposed removal of so many factious adventurers from the scene of affairs at Rome.

Even in this Pompey disappointed their ho
though now master of Spain and part of Africa, w
an adequate army, still under the pretence, as
been mentioned, of his commission to furnish
public granaries with corn, remained in Italy, a

passed the greater part of his time among his country villas, executing the duties of general purveyor with the assistance of his lieutenants, and managing his intrigues in the city by means of his agents and friends. He was attended by numbers of every rank and condition, who resorted to him with the assiduity of courtiers, and with a servility, which seemed to place the sovereignty in his hands. He even maintained the appearance of a monarch in the state which he assumed, as well as in the influence he acquired. While he affected reserve and moderation, in order to appear worthy of his rank, his retainers ever treated him as a great prince, and with his connivance fomented disorders tending to shake the government of the Senate; in order that the republic might be forced to rely on him for support, while he himself affected to decline the burden.

In the management of these intrigues, and in the full hopes of their success, Pompey was now left seemingly at the helm of affairs by Crassus, as well as by Cæsar. The first, in his impatience to take possession of his government, had broken through all the impediments already mentioned that were placed to hinder his departure from Rome, made haste to Brundisium with his army, embarked, notwithstanding the unfavourableness of the season, and, with considerable loss, both of men and of shipping, in a storm, made his passage into Macedonia. The prohibition of the Tribune still sounded in his ears. He dreaded a vote of the Senate or People to recall his commission. It appears, indeed, that soon after his departure, a motion had been actually made for

this purpose; and that Cicero, though formerly on ill terms with Crassus, being taught by his late sufferings to court the favour of those who at least could hurt, if they could not protect him, appeared on this question in his favour, and claimed a share in the merit of obtaining the decision that was given to confirm the commission * under which he was already set out for the East.

But without attending to the issue of these deliberations at Rome, Crassus continued his march by Macedonia and the Hellespont into Asia. In passing through Galatia, finding Dejotarus, sovereign of that principality, then of an advanced age, occupied in a work that is becoming at every age, devising the plan of a new city, and making a settlement for increased population; he is said to have observed to this veteran, that it was somewhat too late, at his age, to be forming new projects of settlement; "nor are you "very early," replied the other, "in your undertaking of a conquest in Parthia."

Crassus was turned of sixty, and having ever considered riches as the surest means of arriving at eminence and power, now joined, to the rapacity of a youthful ambition, the avarice of age. Upon his arrival in Syria, he pillaged the temple of the Jews, and laid hold of treasure wherever else he could find it. He made a pretence of the military levies to be made in the provinces for extorting money; and afterwards, reserving the money for his own use, neglected the levies. He exacted from the diffe

* Cicero ad Famil. lib. v, ep. 8. ad Crassum.

districts of his province, and from the neighbouring allies, large quotas of men and military stores, merely that they might buy exemptions with proportional sums of money *. In the same spirit of avarice and rapacity, he invaded the Parthians without any authority from the State, and even without the pretence of a quarrel.

The Parthians, like other dynasties which before or since have arisen in that part of the world, or in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates and the Tigris, were of Scythian extraction. On the decline of the Macedonian power, about two hundred years before the present date, a swarm from the North had migrated to the lower banks of the Tigris, overran the country round Ctesiphon, continued to harass the neighbourhood by their depredations; and, at last, being commanded by Arsaces, the founder of this new kingdom, took possession of an extensive country, and though under a new name, in fact restored the monarchy of Persia †.

The Parthian, or new Persian monarchy, being yet in its vigour, was the most formidable power that now any where appeared within reach of the Roman arms. Its forces consisted almost entirely of horse. Part cased in heavy armour, and using the lance, were intended for regular charges; part mounted in a lighter manner, for expedition or swiftness, and using the bow. While in the field, they were attended by herds of spare horses, which they pastur-

* Plut. in Crasso, 11. Dio. Cass. lib. iv, c. 13.
† Justin. lib. lxi. Dio. Cass. lib. xl, xli.

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ed, or had drove in the rear of their armies. With this supply, upon any occasional loss, they new-mounted their cavalry, or, having reliefs of fresh horses, performed amazing marches, and frequently presented themselves to their enemies, where it was not expected they could appear. They had different notions of victory and defeat from other nations; they always counted it a victory, when, by their own flights, they led an enemy into hasty and unguarded pursuits *, which enabled them to return with advantage from what appeared to be a rout or dispersion of their forces.

When Crassus advanced to the Euphrates, Orodes king of Parthia, then engaged in a war with Artabazus, on the side of Armenia, sent a deputation to expostulate with the Roman general on the cause of his hostile approach. Crassus made answer, That he would give the reasons of his coming when he arrived at Seleucia. "Here," said one of the Parthian deputies (showing the palm of his hand) "hair will "grow before you shall arrive at Seleucia." Crassus proceeded in his march, passed the Euphrates, and ravaged Mesopotamia without any resistance. Having continued his operations until the end of the season, he returned for the winter into Syria †. Upon his arrival in this province, he was joined by his son Publius, who had served some years under Cæsar in Gaul, and was now detached by him with a tho

* Dio. Cass. lib. xl, c. 15.

† Dio. lib. xl. Plut. in Crasso.

sand horse, and many marks of honour, to act under his father in Syria.

This invasion of Mesopotamia, after the season was so far spent, served only to alarm and provoke the enemy, without procuring any advantage to the arms of the Romans; and hostilities were likely to proceed in the spring with great animosity, when Crassus was to prosecute the war which he had thus commenced on such dangerous ground.

Cæsar, in the mean time, found continual occupation for his troops in Gaul, or in the neighbourhood of that province. He himself, with his usual activity, having been in Italy in the beginning of winter, and having conferred with the persons with whom he intrusted the management of his affairs at Rome, proceeded to Illyricum, upon a report that this part of his province was infested by the incursions of the Pyrustæ, a warlike tribe on the frontier. Upon his arrival, the invaders of his province withdrew, and were disowned by their own nation. The Pyrustæ denied that they had ever given a commission to make war on the Roman province, became bound for the future to restrain the depredations of private adventurers, and gave hostages for the observance of this article.

Early in the spring, Cæsar returned from this expedition to the quarters of his army in the Low Countries, and found that in consequence of the orders he had given at the end of the preceding campaign, no less than six hundred transport vessels, and twenty-eight galleys, were actually built in different harbours from Ostend to Boulogne, and in a

few days might be ready for sea. He accordingly ordered them to be launched, and directed the whole to assemble at the same port from which he had sailed on the preceding year, in order to receive the army on their intended invasion of Britain. But, before his departure, being informed that certain nations on the Moselle were meditating a revolt, and were soliciting the Germans to come over the Rhine to their assistance, in order that he might not leave any enemy on foot in his rear, and that he might secure the peace of Gaul in his absence, he marched to the Moselle with four legions and eight hundred horse. Upon his arrival he had the good fortune to find the people divided between two leaders, who, being jealous of each other, made their submissions separately, and gave the necessary hostages as a pledge for their future behaviour.

With these securities, Cæsar returned to the coast, found all his armed galleys, and five hundred and sixty of his transports, actually assembled; the other forty transports had been put back by contrary winds, and were still retained in the port at which they had been built. The force intended for this expedition to Britain consisted of five legions, amounting possibly, or on the probable supposition that they were not complete, to about twenty thousand men *, together with a body of Gauls, many of their chiefs, whom Cæsar chose with his army, rather as hostages for the their countrymen, than as auxiliaries in

* The legions, at the end of this campaign, were reduced

The fleet consisted of five hundred and sixty transport vessels, twenty-eight armed galleys, with many tenders, and small craft provided by officers for their own accommodation, and for the reception of their equipages; making in all eight hundred sail.

The wind being northerly for five-and-twenty days* after the fleet was assembled, the troops still remained on shore. At the expiration of this time the wind changed, and the troops began to embark, but were suddenly interrupted by the desertion of a Gaulish chief, who, being averse to the service, thought this a favourable opportunity to disengage himself with his followers. Cæsar considered this desertion as a declaration of war, and being sensible of the danger he might incur in case of any disaster, by having such enemies in his rear, suspended the embarkation, and sent a party of horse in pursuit of the fugitive, who, being overtaken, was killed in attempting to defend himself. His followers were brought back, and obliged with others of the country to join the forces that were destined for Britain.

On the return of the party employed in this service, the embarkation proceeded, and being completed at sunset of the same day, the wind being still fair, the fleet weighed, and got into the Channel; but the wind soon after having failed, or shifted more to the west, and the tide being set to the northward, they were carried a considerable way in that direction past the port for which they had steered. At day-break they saw the land of Britain

* See Cæsar's Commentaries.

on their left, and seemed to leave some conspicuous part of the island, probably the South Foreland, astern: but with the turn of the tide, and the help of their oars, they arrived at noon at a convenient part of the coast, not far distant from the landing-place of the former year, but less exposed to the sea.

This place we may suppose to have been *Pigwell Bay*, beyond the mouth of the Stour, or the entry to Sandwich Haven*.

The Britons had assembled as formerly to oppose the descent of the Romans; but, on the appearance of so great a fleet, were intimidated, and again withdrew from the coast.

Cæsar, flattering himself that he had found a safer road for his ships than that at which he had stationed them in the preceding year, left his fleet at anchor, and guarded against any attempts of the natives, by a body of ten cohorts, and three hundred horse, who were properly intrenched on the shore. Being informed that the Britons had their forces assembled on a small river, (probably the *Stour*), at the distance of ten or twelve miles from his landing-place, he put his army in motion in the night, and

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* Mr d'Anville, on a supposition that Cæsar must have passed into Britain by the shortest possible line, fixes upon Hith, about eight miles west of Dover, as the place of his landing in his first invasion of Britain; and, consequently, on some other contiguous part as the place of his landing in the second invasion; but this does not agree, either with the description of the coast, being planum et apertum littus, or with the sequel of the story, which places some such river as the Stour to be passed in his march, about twelve miles from where he debarked. The coast at Hith, though not [illegible] and hilly, and would have exposed Cæsar to diffi[illegible] shore, which he could not possibly have omitted [illegible]

at break of day came up with them, dislodged them from their post, and obliged them to withdraw to a place of retreat in that neighbourhood, which, on occasion of their own wars, had been fortified in their manner with a mote, and ramparts of wood. To reduce them in this stronghold, he erected some works, and made regular approaches; but as he had not invested the place, the only effect of his attack was, to force the enemy to abandon their station, and to continue their retreat. He had taken his resolution to pursue them on the following day, and had begun his march in three divisions, when it appeared, that the element which so greatly favours the defences of Britain, though not always sufficient to keep its enemies at a distance, yet is subject to accidents which render the attempt of invaders abortive, and their condition, even when on shore, sufficiently hazardous. To this purpose a messenger overtook Cæsar on his march, with tidings, that all his ships, in a storm which arose in the preceding night, had been driven from their anchors, had run foul of one another, that many of them were stranded or wrecked, and all of them greatly damaged.

On this report Cæsar suspended his march, and having fixed the main body of his army in a well-fortified camp; he himself, with a proper escort, returned to the coast. At his arrival, he found that forty of his ships were irrecoverably lost; but that the remainder, though greatly damaged, might be refitted. For this purpose, he gave orders in the army, that all who had been instructed in the trade of a carpenter, should repair to the sea-port, to be

employed in restoring the fleet; he called many workmen likewise from Gaul, and gave directions for building a number of new vessels on different parts of that coast; and to guard, for the future, against such accidents as had lately befallen his ships, he ordered that they should be drawn up on shore. In this work part of the army was incessantly employed for ten days, and without intermission even in the night. The fleet, at length, being in this manner secured from the dangers of the sea, and covered by an intrenchment on the side of the land, he returned to his camp, and resumed the operations he had projected for his farther progress in the island.

It appears, that the natives of Britain, being divided into many small cantons or separate principalities, and, as usual in such cases, frequently at war among themselves, had been actually so engaged when Cæsar arrived; but, during the short respite which the disastrous state of his fleet had given them, they had agreed to suspend their own quarrels, and were assembled in greater numbers than formerly, under Cassivelaunus, a chieftain of Middlesex, or, as Cæsar describes him, a prince residing on the northern banks of the Thames, and about seventy or eighty miles from the sea.

This chieftain brought into the field a numerous army of infantry, of horsemen, and armed chariots. His knowledge of the woods enabled him to harass the Romans on their march, and, following the [illegible] that were clear of underwood, [illegible] with missiles from the thickets, [illegible]

likewise with his horsemen and chariots, even in places where the ground seemed least fitted to the movement of such bodies. Encouraged with his success in this species of warfare, he ventured to attack the Roman cavalry, which, being on a foraging party, was supported by an entire legion. But being defeated in this attempt with great slaughter, he lost courage, or was deserted by his followers, and never more attempted to face the victorious enemy.

Cæsar, finding this chieftain remit his ardour, advanced with a quicker pace. From his silence on the subject of any difficulty in passing the Medway, we must suppose him to have followed the vale of the Stour to Ashford, and from thence to have kept on the plains to Maidstone, near to which place the river Medway is every where naturally fordable; and from the length of his march, being about eighty miles from the sea, when he came upon the banks of the Thames, we may suppose him to have arrived somewhere below where it winds nearly from south to north, between Kingston and Brentford. There, he observes, that the only ford in the river was fenced and guarded; having a row of sharp stakes driven under water, and the opposite bank lined with a palisade, which was manned by a numerous body of the natives. He nevertheless proceeded to force his way, and by the impetuosity of his attack, drove the enemy from their post, and, without any loss, effected his passage, although his men were obliged to wade up to the chin.

Cassivelaunus had, for some time, made no attempt to resist the Roman army; he had contented him-

self with observing their motions, and with endeavouring to strip the country before them of every particular by which they could profit on their march. Cæsar, on his part, advanced with the precautions necessary against such an enemy, and, as they had destroyed what could be of immediate use to his army, he destroyed what was left, in order to distress the natives, and force them to submission. In this state of the war, having leisure and opportunity to observe the condition of the country, and the manners of the People, he gives the following account of both: "That on the coast there were co-
"lonies from the neighbouring continent, still dis-
"tinguished by the names of the countries from
"whence they had come; that these colonies, being
"possessed of agriculture, and well stocked with
"cattle, were extremely populous; that they had
"money coined of iron or brass; the first of which
"metals, with great quantities of tin, were found in
"their own island; the other metal was imported
"from abroad; that the winter was milder here
"than in Gaul; that the woods of Britain furnish-
"ed the same timber with those of Gaul, except
"the fir and the beech; and that the houses were
"built in the same manner in both countries."
From this account of the coast, he proceeds to observe, "That the inland parts were occup
"original natives, who, with little corn,
"chiefly by milk and the other produc
"herds; that, by a particular superstition,
"hares were numerous in the fields, and
"try well stocked with geese, and other

" the people were forbid to eat of these animals; " that they were curious in the ornaments of the " person, affected to have bushy whiskers, and long " hair; that they stained or painted their bodies of " a blue colour, and had no clothes besides the skins " of beasts; that they associated in small clubs or " fraternities of ten or a dozen in number." And, with respect to these, adds a circumstance, in which, if he were not deceived, as is common enough to foreigners, by some appearances which were not sufficiently explained to him, he gives a striking example of the diversity which takes place among mankind in settling the canon of external actions. The brothers, the father, and the son, though separately married, and reputed parents of the children brought forth by their respective wives, yet, without jealousy or imputation of evil, cohabited with those wives in common *.

Cæsar, being on the northern bank, or on the left of the Thames, made an alliance with the Trinobantes, supposed to have been inhabitants of Essex and Suffolk. The sovereign of this canton having, in some quarrel with his own people, been expelled from his kingdom, had taken refuge with Cæsar in Gaul, and was now, by force of the Roman arms, restored to his kingdom. Five other principalities made their submission at the same time. Cassivelaunus retired to his principal fortress, which, consisting of a palisade and a ditch, situate in the least accessible part of the woods, was by the natives, as

* See Cæsar's Commentaries on his last expedition to Britain.

Cæsar is pleased to express himself, called town, and was in reality, in case of alarm, a place of retreat for themselves and their cattle. Upon the approach and attack of Cæsar, Cassivelaunus retired by an outlet on the opposite side of his stronghold, leaving some herds of cattle, and many of his men, to fall into the enemy's hand.

After this defeat, the British prince endeavoured, as a last resource, to give Cæsar an alarm on his rear; and for this purpose sent an order to the four princes of Kent, to assemble their people, endeavour to force the Roman station, and destroy the shipping, where it lay on the coast. They accordingly attacked the entrenchment, but were repulsed; and Cassivelaunus himself, reduced to despair by the defection of so many of his countrymen, and by his repeated defeats, determined to make his submission. Meanwhile, the season of the year being far advanced, and Cæsar, desirous to retire with honour from a country in which he was not prepared to make any permanent settlement, accepted, on easy terms, the offer which was made to him.

A certain tribute was imposed on the nations inhabiting the banks of the Thames, hostages taken for the payment of it, and the invaders, with a numerous assemblage of captives, then the only or principal spoils of this island, re
which, not being sufficient to re
embarkation, were obliged to re
and in this way successively, wi
accident, transported the whole e
into Gaul.

CHAP. XXIII.

Death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar and the wife of Pompey.—Trial of Gabinius.—Detection of an infamous transaction of Memmius and Ahenobarbus.—Revolt of the Low Countries.—Military execution against the inhabitants of the country between the Rhine and the Meuse.—Operations of Crassus in Mesopotamia.—His death.—Competition for the consulate.—Death of Clodius.—Riot in the city.—Pompey sole consul.—Trial of Milo.

WHILE the Roman army was in Britain, there happened, by the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar, and the wife of Pompey, a great change in the condition of parties at Rome; this being a discontinuance of the relation which subsisted between those rivals in the State, and a separation of their political interests, to unite no more. The connection which then came to be dissolved, had been devised as a bond of confederacy between parties whose interfering objects of pursuit, always a subject of jealousy, must otherwise on many occasions have proceeded to a manifest breach. Neither the father-in-law, nor the son, indeed, was likely to sacrifice his ambition to mere affection; but each may have expected, that the other should be, in some degree, the dupe of his relation, or should abate a little of the jealousy to which he was, by his situation and his objects, so

much inclined. This passion, however, we may believe, was far from having been extinguished in the mind of either. The choice which Pompey made of Spain for his province, with a military command for a term of five years, sufficiently bespoke his emulation of Cæsar, and even his apprehension of a struggle, in which the force of armies was to decide. Cæsar had the advantage of being nearer the capital: but in a position to be awed by the forces of Pompey on his rear, and by the resources of a province better matured under the dominion of Rome.

Notwithstanding the effects of emulation imperfectly disguised, whilst the familiar relation of father-in-law and son subsisted between Cæsar and Pompey, and while Crassus continued to hold a species of balance in their councils, they seemed to acquiesce in a participation of popularity and of power. But the death of Julia, and that likewise of the child of which she had been delivered only a few days before her death, put an end, not only to any real cordiality in this connection, but even to any semblance of regard, and rendered them, from this time forward, more openly jealous of the advantages they severally gained, whether in respect to force in the provinces, or to state and consideration at Rome.

It is observed, that, from this date Cæsar became more than formerly attentive to [illegible] city, or watchful of his intelligenc[illegible] and that he endeavoured to gain [illegible] might be of consequence in deci[illegible]

* Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii, ep. 15, e[illegible]

which he perceived must arise. Among these he paid his court in particular to Cicero, who was otherwise likely, about this time, to devote himself entirely to Pompey, and whom he wished, at least, to keep in suspense between them: for this purpose, as appears from their correspondence, he applied, as usual, to his vanity, and, while he himself was piercing the woods of Britain in pursuit of Cassivelaunus and his painted followers *, affected to read and to admire verses composed and sent to him by Cicero, a person much more esteemed for his prose than his poetry.

The Roman army had been tempted into Britain by the hopes of finding mines of silver, but were disappointed; for, besides slaves, they did not find any booty in this island. Such probably likewise were the principal spoils of Gaul; yet we find their general, in consequence of his conquests in that country, enabled to expend great sums in supporting his influence at Rome. While Pompey procured his own appointment to the command of an army, in order to keep pace with Cæsar in the provinces, Cæsar, in his turn, projected public works at Rome, to vie with the magnificence of Pompey, and with that of other citizens, who engaged in such works as a part of their policy to gain the People. For this purpose Cæsar proposed to build a Basilica †, and to enlarge the Forum, at an expence of six millions Roman

* Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii, ep. ult. Ad Atticum, lib. iv, ep. 16.

† What the Romans called a Basilica or palace, was a kind of exchange, containing porticos for merchants, and other public accommodations.

money, or about fifty thousand pounds; to rail in the field of Mars with marble ballisters, and to surround the whole with a colonade or portico extending a thousand paces, or about an entire mile.

In these works Cæsar affected to consult or to employ Cicero in a manner which flattered his vanity, and renewed his hopes of being able to direct his councils also * in what related to matters of state.

In the mean time, parties in the city, though engaged on the side of different competitors for office at the approaching elections, were likewise intent on the cause of Gabinius, which involved, in some measure, the interest and credit of Pompey, by whom he was supported. This officer, while yet in his province, had been impeached for disobeying the orders of the Senate, and for contempt of religion in his expedition to Egypt. But having, by the joint influence of Pompey and of Cæsar, eluded this first attack, he set out for Rome in great confidence, and, on his journey, gave out, that he was to demand a triumph. But, upon his approach to the city, hearing in what manner the Senate and People w[illegible] fected towards him, he thought proper to m[illegible] entry in the night; and being arrived, on th[illegible] teenth of September, did not eve[illegible] in the Senate for ten days. No [illegible] secutions were preparing against [illegible] for extortion in his province, a[illegible] The first day on which he prese[illegible] Senate, the Consuls, when he wou[illegible]

* Cicero ad Atticum, lib. iv.

commanded him to stay. And, having called the farmers of the revenue from Syria, who attended with a complaint from the province, bid them state their charge.

An altercation ensued, in which Cicero, mindful of the injuries he had received from Gabinius, took a principal part against him, and pronounced an invective, which the other returned with the abusive appellation of *fugitive*, in allusion to his late exile *. Yet, soon after, when this criminal was brought to trial for extortion in his province, Cicero, as will be mentioned, undertook, at the solicitation of Pompey, to appear in his defence.

Before this trial for extortion took place, C. Memmius, one of the Tribunes, on the ninth of October, delivered to the People, with great force, a charge of treason against Gabinius †. The judgment of the Tribes being called for, and sentence of condemnation likely to pass, while the Lictors were preparing to seize their prisoner, his son, a young man, with much filial piety, a virtue highly esteemed by the Romans, threw himself at the feet of the Tribune, and being rudely spurned on the ground, happened to drop his ring, the badge of Roman nobility; the spectators were moved; Lelius Balbus, another of the Tribunes, interposed, and, with the general approbation of the People, commanded the process to stop ‡.

The other prosecutions nevertheless were continued against the offender. One before the Prætor

* Cicero ad Quint. Frat. iii. † Ibid. lib. iii. ‡ Val. Max. lib. viii. c. 1.

Alfius, in which, though the majority of the judges voted to acquit, there were twenty-two, out of seventy, who voted guilty*. Another before Cato, on a charge of depredation in his province, to the amount of quater millies, four hundred millions Roman money, or about three millions Sterling: in this last suit he was condemned, and forced into exile. At this trial, Pompey and Cæsar continued to employ their influence in his favour. And even Cicero, although he had hitherto treated Gabinius as the author of his own exile, being reconciled to Pompey and Cæsar, no longer continued at variance with a person, who had been no more than their tool or instrument in procuring his misfortunes, and condescended, on this occasion, though ineffectually, to plead his cause†.

After this bustle was over, the approaching elections gave rise to competitions and intrigues more connected with the state of the republic, and more an indication of the manners which then prevailed. The poorer citizens were come in a great measure to depend for their subsistence on the distribu
corn from the granaries, and on other g
which were made or procured by those who
popularity, or who aspired to
Corruption became every day m
disguised; and the laws against
their force for want of persons t
of which so many either wished

* Cicero ad Att. lib. iv, ep. 16.

† Dio. lib. xxxix, c. 63. Cicero ad Quint.

or which many were so strongly tempted to commit. To supply this defect, Cato moved in the Senate, That every one elected into office should be subjected to an inquest, even if no one should prosecute *; and actually obtained an edict, requiring the ordinary judges who were named for trials within the year, to take cognisance of the means by which candidates succeeded to office, and to set those aside who were found to have incurred the penalties of corruption †. The Tribunes interposed their negative, or suspended the effect of this resolution, until an act of the People should be obtained to confirm it. The proposal gave great offence to the parties concerned; and Cato, being attacked by the populace, narrowly escaped with his life. He afterwards, in a full assembly of the more respectable citizens, was favourably heard on this subject. But Terentius, one of the Tribunes, still persisting in his negative, this attempt to restrain the corrupt practices of those who canvassed for office, had no farther effect.

The candidates themselves, in the mean time, if each could have trusted the laws for restraining others, as well as himself, from the practice of giving money, or if any number of them could have relied upon an agreement to be entered into among themselves to refrain from it, would, it is probable, have been glad to be relieved from an abuse which rendered their pretensions so expensive and so precarious. Moved by these considerations, candidates for

* Plutarch. in Cicero ad Att. lib. iv, ep, 16.

† Cicero ad Att. lib. iv, ep. 16.

the office of the Tribune entered into an agreement not to bribe, and deposited each a sum of money * in the hands of Cato, to be forfeited by any person who should be found acting in contravention to their treaty †. One of them, however, was detected in giving money, and accordingly forfeited his pledge.

In the competition for the Consulate, corruption was carried to the greatest excess. An office was opened, at which the candidates dealt out money to the People, who came in the order of their Tribes to receive it ‡. A gratuity of ten millions of sesterces ‖, was offered to any person who should secure the vote of the first Century, or, as it was called, the *Prerogativa*. The demand for money to be employed in this species of traffic became so great, that by the first of July interest rose from four to eight *per cent* §. All the four condidates, Memmius, M. Scaurus, Cn. Domitius, and M. Messala, mutually raised prosecutions for bribery against each other; and in the course of these transactions, it appeared that Caius Memmius, once a vehement partisan of the [illegible] against Cæsar, had made his peace with this [illegible] and was now supported by his party at Rome.

Memmius, it may be remem[illegible] Prætor at the expiration of [illegible]

* Quingena, 500,000 Roman money, about L[illegible]

† Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv, ep. 15. ad Q[illegible]

‡ Ad Att. lib. iv, ep. 17. ‖ About [illegible]

§ Ad. Quint. Frat. lib. ii, ep. 15. Idibus qui[illegible] triente.

brought a charge of high misdemeanour in office against him. And Cæsar appeared for some time to resent this attack *, but was in reality as little to be diverted from his purpose by resentment, as he was by affection, and knew how to choose his friends from among those who had the resolution to provoke, as well as from among those who inclined to serve him. Cæsar accordingly, in the present ardour of competition, found means to separate Memmius from the rest of his enemies, and by his means brought to light a scene of corruption, in which Memmius himself, with other professed supporters of the Senate, had been concerned, and which furnished the supposed popular party with a great triumph against these pretenders to purity of manners and disinterested virtue.

It appeared that, among other irregularities at Rome in the administration of government, even laws, and supposed acts of the Senate or People, could be forged or surreptitiously obtained. The present Consuls, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Ap. Claud. Pulcher, entered into a compact with two of those who were candidates to succeed them, Caius Memmius and C. Domitius Calvinus: the two first, to secure their own nomination to lucrative provinces at the expiration of their Consulship; the two others now standing for this office, to secure their elections. The parties agreed to forge an edict of the Senate and of the People, fixing the consular provinces. And a sum of money was deposited by

* Ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii, ep. 15.

the candidates in the hands of the Consuls, to be forfeited, if they did not support this forgery with the evidence of three Augurs, who should vouch for the passing of the law in the assembly of the People, and two Senators of consular dignity, who should swear they were present when this allotment of provinces was confirmed by the Senate, although it was notorious that no meeting of the Senate had ever been held for this purpose.

Memmius being gained by what was called the popular party, was persuaded to sacrifice his own reputation, in order to ruin that of Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was held in esteem by the other. He laid this strange agreement, which had been drawn up in writing, together with the bonds which had been granted upon it, before the Senate. Appius Claudius braved the detection; but Ahenobarbus, professing himself to be of a party which contended for purity and reformation of manners, incurred much reproach and disgrace.

From this transaction it should appear, that, not only the assemblies of the People, as we have said, were extremely irregular and tumultuary, and might be made up of such persons as were by any party purposely brought to the Comi[illegible] the meetings of the Senate m[illegible] their proceedings were carelessl[illegible] be easily forged. The numbe[illegible] Comitium or collective body [illegible] fixed by law, any convention [illegible] Tribune presided, occupying t[illegible] sembly, might take upon them [illegible]

powers of the Roman People; and as the fluctuating sovereignty of the State by this means passed from one party to another, its orders were often surreptitious and contradictory, and every act might be considered as the mandate of a party or faction in the field, not as the will of the community *. Great as these disorders were, there were at all times numerous parties who had an interest in the continuance of them; and the age, though suffering under the most grievous abuses, was still more averse to the necessary reformations.

The infamy of this recent transaction produced a delay of the elections, until the term of the present Consuls in office was expired. An interregnum accordingly ensued. The partisans of Pompey hinted the necessity of naming a Dictator. He himself affected great reserve, in expectation that when the present troubles came to their height, the powers necessary to suppress them would, by general consent, be pressed into his hands.

In the mean time, Cæsar, whose councils were [illegible] to have so great a share in determining such [illegible] was detained in the northern parts of Gaul, [illegible] was obliged, contrary to his usual practice, to [illegible] the whole winter on this side of the Alps. On his return from Britain, finding that the harvest in Gaul had been scanty, he was tempted, in order to facilitate the subsistence of his army, to extend his quarters much farther than had been his ordinary practice. Labienus, with one division, was sent to

* Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix, c. 65.

the Moselle; Titurius Sabinus, with another, to the neighbourhood of the Meuse, near to what are now the districts of Liege and Maestricht. Quintus Cicero was posted on some of the branches of the Scheld or the Sambre, in the county of Hainault. And the whole army, by this disposition, extended from the Seine to the Meuse about Maestricht, and from the sea to the neighbourhood of Treves. The distance at which the posts were placed from each other, being observed by the natives, who still bore with impatience the intrusion and usurpation of these strangers, tempted them to form a design against each of the quarters apart, and, by cutting them off, to rid their country for ever of these imperious and insatiable guests, who acted as lords or proprietors on every territory into which they were received, and branded every act of resistance to their unjust usurpation with the name of defection and rebellion.

In execution of this design, Ambiorix, leader of the nations which were situated in the angle, above the confluence of the
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ed to disclose, with the utmost regret, a secret design, formed by the Gauls to cut off the Roman army; gave notice that a great body of Germans had already passed the Rhine to join in the execution of this purpose; that he himself had been very much averse to the project; but had been obliged to give way to the popular impetuosity of his countrymen, which he could not restrain; that all he could do was to warn the Romans of their danger, to the end that they might, in the most effectual manner, consult their own safety. If the commander at this place, while it was in his power, chose to gain the nearest station of his own people, it was possible to hinder his being molested on the march: but if he should hesitate for any time, or did not depart before the Germans arrived, it would no longer be in the power of any friend to avert the storm with which he was threatened.

This admonition, even from an enemy, after a long debate in the council of war, determined Sabinus to quit his present situation. He accordingly began a march of fifty miles towards the quarters of Quintus Cicero; and falling into a snare, which the treacherous chieftain had laid for him, perished, with an entire legion and five cohorts, of whom the greater part were put to the sword. Some got back to the station they had left, but finding no security in that place, killed themselves in despair. A very few escaped, by the woods, to Labienus on the Moselle.

The natives, thus encouraged by the success of their first operation, pushed on to the quarters of Quintus Cicero, armed and assembled the country

as they passed, and arrived with such expedition, that they intercepted all the parties which were abroad in search of wood, provisions, or forage, and made so unexpected an attack on the Roman station, as left Cicero scarcely time sufficient to man his intrenchments. The Nervii making part of this insurrection, renewed the artifice which had been practised with so much success against Sabinus. But Cicero, though unacquainted with the manner in which the legion retiring from Tongres had been betrayed, determined to remain in his camp, and with the utmost dispatch to make Cæsar acquainted with his danger. For this purpose, while he strengthened his post with additional works, he published a reward to the first person who should succeed in carrying intelligence to the nearest quarter of the Roman army.

The enemy, being about sixty thousand men, formed a circle, facing to the centre, quite round the Roman intrenchment; and, the more effectually to cut off all communication of supplies or intelligence from without, effected a line of circumvallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet w[illegible] feet high, extending ov[illegible] miles *. In this work, being [illegible] trenching tools, they were o[illegible] to cut the turf with th[illegible] their cloaks. But having [illegible] every point of a circun[illegible] was sufficient to cover, [illegible] in no more than three l[illegible]

* Cæsar de B[illegible]

From this line, which they formed by the direction of some Italian deserters, they made regular approaches to the Roman intrenchment; and, having pushed their turrets quite up to the ditch, threw, by means of their slings, red hot bullets and burning darts into the thatch with which the winter huts of the camp were covered; set them on fire; and, in the midst of the confusion which arose from this circumstance, endeavoured to scale the palisade and the parapet.

While Cicero continued, with great ability and courage, to withstand these attacks, the persons who endeavoured to carry the tidings of his situation to Cæsar, were repeatedly intercepted, and, to deter others from renewing the same attempt, cruelly tortured. The intelligence, however, was at last carried to the head-quarters of the Roman army, by a native Gaul, who, availing himself of the dress, manners, and language of his country, passed unobserved through the lines of the enemy.

Cæsar, as usual, trusting more to dispatch and rapid execution than to the numbers of his men, left a legion at Samarobriva* to guard his stores, magazines, and baggage, and with the other legions, not exceeding seven thousand men, being all that, without hazarding an improper delay, he could assemble, hastened his march to the quarter from which this alarm was brought. He, at the same time, dispatched two messengers, one to Labienus, with orders, if possible, to put the troops under his command in motion to-

* Amiens.

wards the Meuse, and another to Quintus Cicero himself, with hopes or assurances of immediate relief. The first messenger found Labienus beset with a numerous army of Gauls, and therefore unable to move; the other, having come to the foot of Cicero's intrenchment, cast the billet which contained the intelligence, wound up on the shaft of a dart, against one of the towers, where it stuck, and hung for some days unobserved; but being found at last, it was carried to Cicero, and gave notice of Cæsar's approach. At the same time, the fire and the smoke of his camp began to appear on the plain, and gave both parties equal intimation of his coming.

The Gauls, without delay, got in motion with all their force, and having abandoned their lines of circumvallation, advanced to meet Cæsar. Cicero sent him intelligence of this movement of the enemy. And the armies arrived nearly at the same time on the opposite sides of a brook running in a hollow tract between steep banks, which neither party in the presence of the other could safely venture to pass.

Cæsar, supposing that the inferiority of his [illegible] bers might inspire the Gauls with contempt, [illegible] voured, by exceeding his usual caution, to fe[illegible] presumption. He affected to choose a grou[illegible] was fit to secure his camp; and contracting its [illegible] crowded both his legions within the dim[illegible] which were usually occupied by one. In th[illegible] ture he meant to await the effects of the ene[illegible] merity, or, if they declined passing the br[illegible] proposed to avail himself of the security they were

likely to feel, and by surprise to attack them in their own camp.

The event justified Cæsar in his first expectation. The Gauls, trusting to the superiority of their numbers, thought they had nothing to dread but the escape of their enemy; and they accordingly began to scale the banks of the rivulet, in order to surround them. Upon their approach, instead of waiting to defend his camp, he poured forth his two legions at once from all its avenues, and, with the advantage of a surprise upon those who meant to assail him, and by the great superiority which the Romans ever had, when mixed sword in hand with an enemy, routed, dispersed, or forced to lay down their arms, the greater part of this multitude, which had advanced to the ground with so much ferocity and confidence.

By this victory, Cæsar not only relieved Quintus Cicero, whom he joined the same evening, but likewise dispelled the cloud which hung over the other separate quarters of his army, of which many had been at the same time invested by the natives. These insurrections, however, which kept all the inhabitants of the Low Countries in motion, even in the most unfavourable season, gave him the prospect of an early and a busy campaign, and so much disconcerted the plan which he had formed for the winter, that he was hindered, as has been now mentioned, from making his usual journey across the Alps.

During this necessary stay in Gaul, it does not appear that the interests which Cæsar commonly studied were suffering in any considerable degree at Rome. The civil government in the city was has-

tening fast to its ruin, and the longest sword was soon likely to decide the sovereignty of the empire. The office of Consul was unoccupied, and continued to be so from the beginning of January to the middle of July. In all this time there was no administration of justice *, nor any exercise of magistracy, besides that of the Interrex, who, during the five days of his appointment, was supposed to have no other object besides the elections of Consuls. This object was vainly attempted by every successive Interrex. The popular tumults were fomented by the Tribunes who were in the interest of Pompey; and some prodigy, or unfortunate presage, was continually alleged, to prevent the elections. The Senate, striving to put an end to these disorders, even ventured to commit to prison Q. Pompeius Rufus, a Tribune, who seemed to be most active in disturbing the public peace. The occasion seemed ripe for the execution of a design, which was some time a hatching, to throw the whole powers of the State into the hands of Pompey; and accordingly, another Tribune, Lucceius Hirrus, known to be in the secret of all his intrigues, moved that he should be named Dictator †. He himself, as usual on such occasions, kept aloof from the assembly, and was ready, as the case might require, to avow or to disown the measures of his party.

This motion was strongly opposed by Cato, appeared to be extremely disagreeable to all the

* Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 483.

† Plutarch. in Pompeio. D. Con. Cicero epist. ad Quint. Frat. lib. iii, ep. 9.

cipal members of the Senate *. Pompey therefore thought proper to disclaim the measure, denied his having encouraged the Tribune who made the motion, and even refused to accept of any such power, if it should be offered; adding, That he had been already called to the exercise of great powers earlier than he himself had expected; and that he had always resigned such powers earlier than had been expected by any one else †. In this was expressed the great object of Pompey's ambition; he preferred this point of estimation to the possession of power itself. The odium of the proposed measure fell upon Lucceius Hirrus, the Tribune who moved it, and had nearly brought upon him a deposition or degradation from his office. Cato, willing to gain Pompey, or to confirm him in the virtue he assumed, pronounced an encomium on this act of moderation, recommended the republic to his care, and encouraged him in the resolution he had taken, to prefer the esteem of his fellow-citizens even to the power of disposing of their lives and fortunes at his pleasure. Pompey from thenceforward joined with the Senate in bringing on the elections; and accordingly, after seven months' interval, of confusion and anxiety, Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were chosen, and entered on office in the month of July.

A. U. 700. A. M. C. Domitius, M. Val. Messala, Coss.

While Pompey was endeavouring, by his intrigues in the city, to make a species of monarchy in his own

* Plutarch. in Pompeio. D. Con. Cicero epist. ad Quint. Frat. lib. iii, ep. 9.

† Plutarch. in Vit. Pompeii.

person appear to be necessary, Cæsar was in fact providing himself with the only means which, in so distracted a state, can either acquire or preserve such a power. He was joining three additional legions to the establishment of his province; and, under pretence of his late losses on the Meuse, or of his fears of a general defection in Gaul, he had the address to bring into his own service a legion which had been recently formed in Italy under the commission of Pompey. This legion he now borrowed, and, as will appear in the sequel, either actually debauched, or rendered of doubtful fidelity, if ever it should be recalled, and destined to act against himself.

While he took these measures for the augmentation of his forces, and before the end of winter, having intelligence that the Nervii, or the inhabitants of the county of Hainault, who had such a share in the attack of Cicero's station, were holding frequent consultations together, and were about to take arms, he determined to prevent them; and for this purpose, with four legions drawn from the nearest quarters, he marched into their country, and, without meeting with any opposition, destroyed their habitations, moved away their cattle, and made many prisoners. He continued these severities, until the natives, reduced to great distress, implored his mercy, and gave hostages for their future submission.

Having, in the course of this winter, called the nations of Gaul to a general congress at an island in the Seine*, he began the operations of the following

* Now Paris.

summer by punishing some of the cantons*, who had absented themselves from that assembly, and who, by this act of disrespect, had incurred his resentment, or given him suspicion of hostile intentions. The principal object of the campaign, however, was the punishment of Ambiorix and his countrymen, by whom, as has been related, Sabinus, with a legion and five cohorts, had been circumvented and cut off in the beginning of the preceding winter.

As the Romans scarcely appear to have conceived that any people had a right to withstand their invasions, and treated as rebellion every attempt a nation once vanquished made to recover its liberties, Cæsar states it as necessary for the credit of the Roman army, for the security of their quarters, and for preventing such acts of supposed perfidy in future, that the subjects of Ambiorix should suffer an exemplary punishment. To secure this effect, he projected two expeditions; one to the right and the other to the left of this enemy's country, with intention to preclude them from any retreat or assistance on either side. In execution of this design, he penetrated into the woods and marshes on the left of the Meuse, and obliged the inhabitants to come under engagements not to assist or harbour any enemy of his, if they should attempt to take refuge in that country.

From thence, still avoiding to give any alarm to the nation which was the principal object of these operations, and having formerly sent his baggage

* The Senones and Carnutes.

under an escort of two legions to the Moselle, he now followed in the same direction with the whole of his army; and finding that Labienus had, by a recent victory, vanquished all his enemies in that quarter, he continued his march to the Rhine, constructed a bridge on that river a little way higher up than the place at which he had formerly passed, and once more set foot upon German ground.

The Suevi, and other great migrating nations of the continent, having recently moved to the eastward, leaving nothing behind them but desarts, on which no army could subsist, he contented himself with exacting hostages from the *Ubii*, and other contiguous nations, to secure their neutrality, or rather to make sure of their concurrence in the execution of his sanguinary project. And with these pledges he repassed the Rhine, broke down part of his bridge, and left a guard of twelve cohorts properly intrenched to secure the remainder.

From thence he sent forward his cavalry, with orders to make quick and silent marches into the countries he meant to lay waste, and himself followed with the infantry. Hitherto Ambiorix and his countrymen, who were the principal objects of all these operations, had taken no alarm, and had enjoyed such perfect security, that the leader himself, upon the arrival of Cæsar's horse in his quarters, narrowly escaped, and had no more than time, by a general intimation, to warn his people to consult their own safety. They accordingly separated, part hid themselves in the contiguous marshes, others endeavoured to find refuge with some neighbouring

nations, or fled to the islands that were formed at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine.

Cæsar, as if he had been forming a party of hunters, separated his army into three divisions; sent Labienus with one division to pursue those who fled to the confluence of the two rivers; Trebonius with the second up the course of the Meuse; and he himself, in pursuit of Ambiorix, directed his march to the Scheld. His orders were, that each division should put all they met to the sword, and calculate their time so as to return to the place of general rendezvous in seven days.

To render this execution the more complete, all the neighbouring nations were invited to partake in the spoils of a country that was doomed to destruction. Among the parties who were allured by this invitation, two thousand German horse had passed the Rhine, and continued in a body to ravage all the country before them, without even respecting the Roman posts. Cæsar, in making a disposition for his present march, had lodged the whole baggage of his army at the station (supposed to be Tongres), which in the preceding winter had been fortified for the quarters of Sabinus. Here the works being still entire, he left a guard with his baggage under the command of Quintus Tullius Cicero.

The Germans, in the present instance, knowing no distinction of friend or enemy, ceased to plunder the natives of the country, and turned all their thoughts on seizing the baggage of the Roman army. Their coming was so little expected, that the traders and suttlers who had erected their stalls and display-

ed their merchandise, as usual, without the intrenchment, had no time to save their effects. Numbers of the guard which were posted with Cicero to cover the baggage, were gone abroad in search of forage. The remainder with difficulty manned the avenues of their camp, and must have been forced, if the foragers, upon hearing the noise with which the Germans began the attack, had not returned to their relief, and forced their way through the enemy, who, mistaking them for a vanguard of the whole army, thought proper to consult their own safety by an immediate flight.

Cæsar, upon his return to the post at which the baggage of his army had been so much exposed, censured the officer commanding the guard for having divided his party, and for having omitted, on the supposition of any degree of security whatever, any part of the precautions usual upon such a duty. At the same time, he continued to pursue the revenge he had projected against the unhappy followers of Ambiorix, sending parties in every direction to burn the houses, and to lay waste the fields which had been formerly spared or overlooked; and this being done on the approach of winter, made the destruction complete, as the few who might have escaped the sword must inevitably perish by famine, or by the asperity of the season.

The Roman general having in this manner made an example, which he supposed was to overawe all the nations of that neighbourhood, withdrew with his army from a country in which he had made it impossible for any numbers of men to subsist; and

having stationed two of his legions on the Moselle, and the remainder on the Marne, on the Seine, and the Loire, he himself hastened into Italy, where all his views and preparations ultimately centred. The scene of political intrigue, in which Crassus had hitherto bore a part with Pompey and himself, was now, in consequence of recent events on the other extremity of the empire, about to undergo a change, which was likely, in addition to the death of Julia, to affect the conduct of parties concerned.

In the spring, Crassus had taken the field on the frontier of Syria, with seven legions, four thousand horse, and an equal number of light or irregular troops. With this force he passed the Euphrates, was joined by an Arabian chieftain, who is mentioned by historians under different names, of Acbarus * or Ariamnes, in whom, on account of his supposed knowledge of the country, the Roman general had placed great confidence. Here he expected likewise to have been joined by Artabazes, king of Armenia; but Orodes, now on the throne of the Parthians, had prevented this junction, by invading the kingdom of Armenia in person, while he left Surena, a young warrior of great reputation, in Mesopotamia, to oppose the Romans.

Crassus intended to have followed the course of the Euphrates to where it approaches nearest to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian kingdom; but was dissuaded by his guide and confident Ariamnes, who prevailed on him to direct his

* Plutarch. et Dion. Cass.

march eastward on the plains, where he might easily force the post of Surena, and at once effect his entrance into the enemy's country. Some parties, too, that were advanced to examine the route which the army should take in that direction, reported, that they had been on the tract of departing cavalry, but that no enemy was any where to be seen. Thus Crassus was induced to quit the Euphrates, and, agreeably to the directions of his guide, took the route of Carræ to the eastward. This place he fortified in his way, and occupied with a garrison. From thence, in a few marches, he arrived on sandy and barren plains, without trees, herbage, or water. While the army, though discouraged by these appearances, still continued its march, a few horsemen belonging to the advanced guard returned to the main body with signs of terror, and brought an account that their division had been surrounded by numerous bodies of horse, and to a few cut off: that the enemy was advancing apace, and must soon appear. Crassus, at first fearing to be outlined, extended his front as far as he possibly could; but recollecting that the Parthians were all on horseback, and by the rapidity of their motions might easily gain either or both his flanks, however extended, and on this account, supposing it necessary to present a front in every direction, he changed his disposition from a line to a square, having his cavalry placed on the angles.

The Roman army being thus compacted, the Parthians soon after appeared on every side, came within reach of an arrow shot, and galled them without intermission. The weapons of the Romans, in this

situation, availed them nothing; even the shield could not cover them from arrows, that showered from every quarter, and in many different directions. They stood, however, in their place with some degree of courage, in hopes that the quivers of the Parthians might soon be exhausted, and that this enemy would be obliged either to join them in close fight, or to retire. But they found themselves deceived in this expectation, observing that the enemy had a herd of camels in their rear, loaded with arrows, and that the quivers of those in the front were continually replenished from thence. At the same time, *Ariamnes*, the supposed associate and guide, disappeared, or was perceived to go over to the enemy. The desertion of this traitor, by discovering that his pretended attachment, and his counsel, which had been unhappily followed, was only a piece of barbarous treachery to draw the army into its present situation, completed the general dismay which the Romans had already begun to feel. They crowded together in despair, and, oppressed with heat and thirst, or stifled with dust, continued for a while, like beasts caught in a snare, to present a passive and an easy prey to their enemies.

In this extremity, Crassus determined to make an effort with his cavalry to drive the enemy to such a distance, as not to be able to reach his infantry with their arrows. His son Publius, accordingly, formed the Roman horse into one body, and made a general charge, to which the Parthians, according to their usual practice, gave way in seeming disorder. The young man advanced with great impetuosity as a-

gainst a flying enemy, and in hopes of completing his victory: but the Parthians, under cover of the dust which every where arose on the plain, instead of flying before him, as he supposed, were actually turning on his flanks, and even falling behind him to encompass his rear. The legions, at the same time, happy to be relieved from the attack of an enemy who galled them, quitted their ground, and for a little resumed their march, a movement which enabled the Parthians the more effectually to surround the cavalry; but the father, recollecting the danger to which he exposed his son, again prevailed on his columns to halt. In this situation, a few of the horse arrived, with accounts that they had been surrounded; that Crassus, the son, was slain, and the whole cut off, except a few who escaped to the father with these melancholy tidings.

Night, however, was fast approaching, and the Parthians, on a sudden, withdrew, sensible that their way of fighting might expose them to suffer many disadvantages in the dark. It was indeed their general practice to retire at night to a considerable distance from the enemy whom they had harassed by day, and upon these occasions they generally fled like an army defeated, until they had removed so far, as to make it safe for them to pasture their horses, and to store up their arms. Crassus apprised of this practice, took the benefit of the night to continue his retreat, and abandoning the sick and wounded of his army, made a considerable march before it was day. But the advance he had gained, was not sufficient to hinder his being overtaken by the same

flying enemy, and again involved in the same distress. Having his defeats and his flights in the same manner renewed on every succeeding day, he arrived at last at the post which he had fortified at Carræ, and there found some respite from the attacks of the enemy. At this place, however, it was not possible to make any considerable stay, as the whole provisions of the army were lost or consumed, and such supplies as the country around might have furnished, were entirely in the power of the enemy. Nor was it convenient to depart immediately. The moon was then at the full, and night was almost as favourable to the Parthians as day. In these circumstances, it was determined to wait for the wane of the moon, and then, if possible, to elude the enemy again by marches in the night.

In this interval, the army mutinied against their general, and offered the command to Caius Cassius; but he, although desired even by Crassus himself, declined to accept of the charge *. The troops of consequence no longer obeyed any command whatever, and separated into two bodies. The first went off by the plains on the nearest way into Syria: the other took the route of the mountains; and if they could reach them before the enemy, hoped to escape into Cappadocia or Armenia. The first division was accompanied or commanded by Cassius, who, though with considerable loss, led them back into Syria. The other, with Crassus himself, was pursued by Surena, and harassed on every ground where the

* Dio. lib. iv, c. 28.

Parthian horse could ply on their flank or their rear. Being exposed to frequent losses, they suffered a continual diminution of their numbers, and were not likely to be long in condition to avoid the enemy, or make any resistance.

Surena, apprehending that these remains of the Roman army might gain the mountains before he could force them to surrender, sent a deputation to Crassus, proposing at some intermediate place, between the two armies, a conference, to which they might severally bring a stipulated number of attendants. While this message was delivering, Surena himself appeared at a little distance on an eminence, waved with his hand, and in token of peace, unbent his bow. Crassus, distrusting the faith of a barbarous enemy, who was supposed to hold perfidy lawful, as a mere stratagem of war, declined the interview; but his troops, weary of continual fatigue and danger, and flattering themselves that by an accommodation an end might be speedily put to their sufferings, expressed such a desire of the proposed conference, as their general, in this situation, could not safely withstand. He put himself, therefore, with a few friends, under the direction of Surena's messengers, and submitted to be led to their general; but on the way, finding himself treated as a prisoner, he refused to proceed, and having made some resistance, was slain. The army separated into sundry divisions; a few escaped into Armenia or Syria; the greater part fell into the enemy's hands *.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xl. Plutarch in Crass.

Thus died Crassus, commonly reputed a rare instance of ambition, joined with avarice, and a mean capacity. It is not to be doubted, that in point of ambition he even rivalled Pompey and Cæsar; and it is probable, therefore, that his avarice was merely subservient to this passion. It is quoted, as a saying of *his*, that no man who aspired to a principal place *in* the republic, should be reputed rich, unless he could maintain an army at his own expence*. Such was the use of wealth, which, in place of equipages, horses, and dogs, occurred to a rich man of that age at Rome. Of his capacity we cannot form any high estimation, either from the judgment of his contemporaries, or from his own conduct †. It appears, indeed, that he owed his consequence more to his wealth, than to his genius or personal qualities of any kind. On account of his riches, probably, he was considered by Cæsar and Pompey, as a person, who, if neglected by them, might throw a weight into the scale of their enemies; and he was admitted into their councils, as a person fit to witness their transactions, and, on occasion, to moderate or to suspend their animosities. These circumstances placed him among the competitors for the principal influence at Rome, and makes his death an epoch in the history of those factions which were hastening to overwhelm the republic. By this event, his associates, Cæsar and Pompey, already disjoined by the

* Cicero de officiis, lib. i, c. 8,

† Is igitur mediocriter a doctrina instructus; angustius etiam a natura, &c. Cicero de claris oratoribus, c. 66. Ad Atticum, lib. iv, ep. 15.

dissolution of their family connection, were left to contend for the superiority, without any third person through whom they might occasionally reconcile or explain their pretensions.

The calm which had succeeded the late election of Consuls, was but of short duration. The time of electing their successors was fast approaching, and the candidates, Scipio, Milo, and Hypsæus, were already declared. Clodius, at the same time, stood for the office of Prætor. This Scipio was by birth the son of Metellus Pius, adopted into the Cornelian family by Scipio Nasica. His daughter, in consequence of this adoption, bearing the name of Cornelia, the widow of young Crassus, was recently married to Pompey, who, upon this connection, supported Scipio, his father-in-law, in his pretensions to the Consulate. Milo had a powerful support from the Senate, in whose cause he had retorted the arts and violences of the seditious demagogues against themselves. Clodius had great interest with the populace, and, from inveterate animosity to Milo and to his party, joined all his interest with Scipio and Hypsæus against him.

It is in the nature of human things to advance, in accumulating the good or evil to which they tend. And there is ever accordingly either a progress or a decline in human affairs. These competitors, in contending for the Forum, and the usual places of canvassing the People, joined to the former arts of distributing money, and of exciting popular tumults, the use of an armed force, and a species of military operations in the streets of Rome. Three parties in

arms every day were on the parade in different quarters of the town, and wherever they encountered, violence and bloodshed ensued. The opposite parties of Hypsæus and Milo had fought a battle in the *Via Sacra;* many of both sides were killed, and the Consul Calvinus was wounded in attempting to quell the riot.

These disorders continued so long to obstruct the elections, that the term of the present Consuls in office expired, before the nomination of any successors; and every legal power in the commonwealth being suspended, the former state of anarchy returned, with accumulating distractions. The Senate, and the other friends of Milo, would gladly have hastened the elections, but were hindered by the partisans of the other candidates. The populace, too, enjoying this season of gratuities, of entertainments, and of public shews, in which the competitors continued to vie with one another and to waste their fortunes, were glad to have the canvass prolonged*.

U. C. 701.

When the Senate proposed to have recourse to the remedy usual in such disorders of the State, by naming an Interrex, the only title under which any person could preside in restoring the magistracy by an election of Consuls, they were restrained by the negative of the Tribune Munatius Plancus, who was supposed to co-operate with Pompey in some design, which was not understood; but supposed to be

* Pædianus in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

favoured by the delay of every measure proposed for the restoration of order.

In the midst of this scene, which kept the minds of men in fear of some general calamity, an accident happened which brought the disorder to a height, and forced every party to accept of a remedy. On the 13th of the kalends of February, or the 20th of January, Milo, going to Lanuvium, a town about fifteen miles from Rome, of which he was chief magistrate, about three o'clock in the afternoon, met with Clodius, returning from his country-seat at Aricia. Milo was in a carriage with his wife Fausta, the daughter of Sylla, and a friend, Fusius. He had a numerous escort, amounting to some hundreds of servants in arms, and, in particular, was attended by two noted gladiators, Eudamus and Birria. Clodius was on horseback, with a retinue of thirty servants likewise in arms. It is likely that this encounter was altogether accidental; for the companies continued on their way without any disturbance, till Birria, the gladiator, unwilling to pass without giving some specimen of his calling, as he straggled a little behind his party, quarrelled with some of the followers of Clodius. A fray ensued: Clodius himself returned to quell it, or to punish the authors of it; but meeting with little respect among the gladiators, received a wound in the shoulder, and was carried to be dressed in the inn at Bovillæ, near to which place the disturbance began. Milo being told of what had passed, likewise returned to the place; and thinking it safer to end their quarrels there, than await the revenge of an enemy thus provoked, who

would not fail, at the head of his faction in the city, to rouse the fury of the populace against him, encouraged his people to pursue their advantage: they accordingly forced their way into the inn, dragged Clodius from thence, and having killed him, and dispersed his followers, left him dead of many wounds in the highway.

Sextus Tedius, a Senator, happening to pass, put the body into his own carriage, and sent his servants with it to Rome. They arrived before six at night, and proceeding directly to the house of the deceased, which stood on the Palatine hill over the Forum, laid the corpse in the vestibule.

The servants of the family, and multitudes from the streets, immediately crowded to see this spectacle. Fulvia, the wife of Clodius, stood over the body, and with loud lamentations uncovered and pointed out the wounds of her deceased husband. The crowd continued to increase all night, and until break of day, when Q. Munatius Plancus, and Q. Pompeius Rufus, Tribunes of the People, likewise repaired to the same place, and gave orders to carry the dead body naked to the market-place, and there to leave it exposed to public view on the Rostra; and at the same time accompanied this spectacle with inflammatory harangues to the people.

Sextus Claudius, kinsman of the deceased, soon after removed the body from the market-place to the Senate-house, meaning to reproach the order of Senators, as accessory to the murder. The populace, who still followed in great numbers, burst into the place, tore up the benches, and brought into a heap

the materials, with the tables and desks of the clerks, the journals and records of the Senate, and having set the whole on fire, consumed the corpse on this extraordinary pile. The fire soon reached the roof, and spread to the contiguous buildings. The Tribunes, Plancus and Rufus, who were all this while exhorting the people to vengeance, were driven from the Rostra by the flames which burst from the buildings around them. The Senate-house, the Portia Basilica, and other edifices, were reduced to ashes.

The same persons by whom this fire had been kindled, repaired to the house of M. Lepidus, who, upon the first alarm of an insurrection, had been named Interrex, forced into the hall, broke down the images of the family ancestors, tore from the looms the webs, in weaving of which the industry of Roman matrons was still employed, and destroyed what else they could reach. From thence, they proceeded to attack the house of Milo, but there met with a more proper reception. This house, during the riots in which the master of it had borne so great a part, was become a kind of fortress, and among the other arrangements made for its defence, was manned with archers, who plied the aggressors with arrows from the windows and terrace, in such a manner as soon obliged them to withdraw.

The rioters being repulsed from the house of Milo, crowded to the Temple, in which the Consular Fasces, during the Interregnum, were kept, seized them by force, and carried them to the houses of Scipio and Hypsæus, the present popular candidates for the Consulate; these, without any other form of

election, they pressed to assume the ensigns of Consular power. But not having prevailed in this proposal, they proceeded to the house of Pompey, saluting him, with mixed shouts of Consul or Dictator, according as they wished him to assume the one or the other of these titles or dignities.

From this time, for some days, an armed populace, mixed with slaves, continued, under pretence of searching for Milo and his adherents, to pillage every place they could enter *. And the partisans of the candidates, Hypsæus and Scipio, thinking they had Milo at a disadvantage, beset the house of the Interrex; and though it was not customary for the first in this nomination to proceed to the elections, they clamoured for an immediate assembly of the People for this purpose. The party of Milo, though professing likewise to join the same clamour for an immediate election, came to blows with their opponents, and protected the house and the person of the Interrex from farther violence.

Milo himself, who was at first supposed to have fled or gone into exile, hearing of the excesses committed by the opposite party, and of the general inclination of the more sober part of the citizens to check and disappoint their violence, ventured again to appear in the city, and at the head of his friends renewed his canvass. A succession of officers, with the title of Interrex, continued to be named at the expiration of every usual term of five days; but such was the confusion and distraction of the scene,

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

that no election could be made. The Senate, under the greatest alarm, gave to the Interrex, and to the Tribunes of the People, to whom they joined Pompey, who, by virtue of his proconsular commission, as Purveyor of Corn for the People, held a public character in the State, the usual charge given to the Consuls, to watch over the safety of the republic. They even recommended to Pompey to make the necessary levies throughout Italy, and to provide a military force to act for the commonwealth, in repressing the disorders which were committed by the candidates for office.

Under the protection of such temporary expedients, to restrain the violence with which all parties endeavoured to do themselves justice, some applied for redress, in the way of prosecution and civil suit. The two Claudii, nephews of the deceased Publius Clodius, demanded that the slaves of Milo, or those of his wife Fausta, should be put to the torture, in order to force a discovery of the manner in which their uncle was killed. The two *Valerii*, Nepos and Leo, with Lucius Herennius Balbus, joined in the same demand. On the opposite party, a like demand against the slaves of the deceased Publius Clodius was made by Cælius, one of the Tribunes; and a prosecution for violence and corruption was entered by Manlius Cænianus against Hypsæus and Scipio, the competitors of Milo for the office of Consul.

Milo, in answer to the demand that was made to have his slaves put to the torture, pleaded, that the persons, now demanded as slaves, were actually free-

men, having received their liberty as a reward for their faithful services in defending his person against a late attempt made by Clodius on his life. It was alleged, on the other hand, that they were manumised merely to evade the law, to preserve them from the torture, and to screen their master from the evidence which they might in that manner be obliged to give. M. Cælius and Manlius Cænianus being Tribunes, and disposed to favour Milo, had ventured to vindicate him to the People, and to load Clodius as the aggressor, and the intended assassin in the fray which cost him his life. Cicero, too, with great zeal and courage, while the friends of Milo were yet unsafe in the streets, maintained the same argument in the Senate, and before the People *. Milo, however, would have been glad to make a composition; and as Pompey had all along, in the competition for the Consulate, favoured not only Scipio, but likewise Hypsæus against him, he offered to drop his pretension in favour of those candidates, if Pompey would agree to suppress the prosecutions that were commencing against him. To these proposals Pompey refused to listen. He probably thought the election secure for his friends, and, by affecting a zeal for justice, hoped to increase his authority with the People.

The partisans of Pompey, in the midst of this wild and disorderly state of affairs, were busy in renewing the cry which they had raised in the former Interregnum, that he should be named Dictator, for

* Ascon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

the re-establishment of order, and the restoration of the public peace. Such an extraordinary remedy had never been at any time more wanted in the republic; but the times in which it might be safely applied, were no more. The name of Dictator recalled the memory of Sylla's executions, and it appeared to be uncertain against whom they might now be directed. To avoid the title more than the power of Dictator, Bibulus moved in the Senate, that all the present candidates for the Consulate should be set aside, and that the Interrex should assemble the People for the election of Pompey sole Consul. Cato, to the surprise of every body, seconded this motion. He observed, that any magistracy was preferable to none, and that if the republic must be governed by a single person, none was so fit for the charge as the person now proposed. Pompey, being present, thanked Cato for this declaration of his esteem, and said, that if he accepted the charge, it should be in hopes of being aided by his counsel. Cato made answer, in terms meant to be literally interpreted, but which, in other instances of the same kind, under an aspect of sullenness, have been intended to flatter, That he meant no favour to Pompey, and deserved no thanks from him; that his intention was to do the best that the times could allow for the republic.

It was resolved, in terms of this motion, that Pompey should be presented to the People as sole candidate for the Consulship, and that after two months were elapsed, he might propose any other

person to be joined with himself in this office *. The election was accordingly brought on by the Interrex Servius Sulpitius, on the twenty-fourth of February, and Pompey declared sole Consul †, with a commission from the Senate to arm, if necessary, the inhabitants of Italy, for the better establishment of order in the city.

Pompey sole Consul.

The first object of Pompey, in the high and unprecedented dignity which was now conferred upon him, appears to have been the framing of laws to restrain for the future such disorders as had lately prevailed, and to bring the persons convicted of such crimes to justice. For this purpose, he obtained an act to enforce the laws already subsisting against the practice of violence or corruption in the contest for office; and to regulate the form of proceeding in trials on such criminal accusations.

By the regulations now suggested, every trial was to end in four days. The examination of evidence might occupy the three first of those days; the hearing of parties, and the judgment, the fourth. The prosecutor was allowed two hours to support his charge, and the defendant three hours to make his defence. The number of advocates was restricted, and the use of commendatory characters prohibited ‡. The Quesitor, or Judge Criminal, was to be chosen from among those who were of Consular

* Plutarch. in Vit. Pomp. et Catonis. Dio. lib. xl.

† Ascon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

‡ Dio. Cass. lib. xl, c. 53.

dignity, and eighty-one judges or jurors were to be impannelled, and obliged to attend the trial. After the evidence and pleadings were heard, the parties were then allowed each to challenge and to reject fifteen of the jury or judges, or five from each of the orders of which they were composed; when the court being thus reduced to fifty-one, was to be inclosed and to give judgment *.

Corruption was become so frequent, and supposed so unavoidable in conducting elections, that it was difficult to find any one willing to prosecute the crime. To remedy this defect, a clause was enacted in the law of Pompey, by which any person formerly convicted of bribery, might obtain a remission of the penalties he had incurred, by convicting any one else of an equal crime, or by convicting two persons, though of an offence less heinous than his own. By these means, it was proposed, that a first conviction should lead to many more in succession; that conviction, in every instance, should be attended with infamy; but that the pains of law should ultimately rest only on such person as could not find another on whom to shift the burden from himself †.

Some of these regulations were made with a particular view to the trial of Milo, now arraigned on the statutes both of corruption, and of violence or assassination. They were accordingly opposed by the friends of the person whose case they were likely to affect, on the ground of their partiality as acts

* Ascon. Pæd. ibid. † Dio. Cass. lib. xl, 52.

of attainder, having a retrospect or application to matters which passed before they were enacted. Cælius the Tribune, and Cicero maintained this argument. Pompey replied with impatience, That if he were hindered to proceed in a legal way, he should employ force *. He appeared to entertain some animosity to Milo, such at least as they who love to govern, have to others who appear not to be easily governed. He either had, or affected to have, apprehensions of danger to his own person, confessed or alleged this apprehension in the Senate, and retired, as for safety, to his own house in the suburbs: there he retained, for the guard of his person, a party of armed men; and there, too, under the same affectation of withdrawing from violence, he caused the assemblies of the Senate to be held.

The Aristocratical or Senatorian party was much interested in the preservation of Milo: they had been frequently assailed by the popular rioters, who set the laws at defiance; and as the laws had not always been of sufficient force to protect their own persons, it was their interest to protect those who, on occasion, had defended them, though by means not agreeable to law. The argument, in equity, indeed, was strong on the side of Milo. During the late suspension of government, the factions were rather separate parties at war, than subjects enjoying the protection, and amenable to the jurisdiction, of any civil power whatever. They alone who procured or prolonged this state of anarchy, were chargeable with

* Ascod. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

the consequences. In this contest, which could not be maintained without force or violent measures, the friends of the Republic and of the Senate were badly circumstanced. They contended for laws, and a constitution, which might be turned against the irregularities which had been necessary to their own preservation, while the opposite faction, if defeated, might claim the protection of those very forms, which they themselves had endeavoured to subvert.

It would have been fair, perhaps, to have closed the late scene of confusion with a general indemnity, and to have taken precautions for the regular uninterrupted exercise of legal administration in future. This, however, would not have calmed the resentments of those who were aggrieved, and Pompey determined to signalize his government by a more specious appearance of justice. Domitius Ahenobarbus was chosen Commissioner for the trial of Milo, on the charge of murder; and the other judges, taken from among the most respectable of each order in the commonwealth, were impannelled in terms of the late statute. The defendant was cited to answer this charge on the fourth of April; and on the same day, to answer a charge of corruption brought against him in the ordinary court of the Prætor Manlius. Marcellus appeared for him at the bar of the Prætor, and procured a delay until the other trial should be ended.

The court, as usual, was held in the Forum or open market-place. There was a tribunal or bench railed in for the judges. The whole space was crowded with multitudes of the People. The prosecutors

began with examining Cassinius Schola, who had been in company with Clodius when he was killed. This witness gave direct evidence to the fact, and exaggerated the atrocity of the crime. Marcellus would have cross-questioned him; but the populace, and many others assembled in the crowd who favoured the prosecution, raised a menacing cry, which alarmed the accused and his counsel so much, that they claimed the protection of the court. They were accordingly received within the rails, and the Judge applied to the Consul, who had taken his station near to the place of assembly, in order to restrain, by his presence, any disorders that might arise at the trial. Pompey, who was then attended only by his Lictors, was himself likewise alarmed by that disorderly shout, and said, that, for the future, a proper force should be provided to keep the peace. He accordingly, on the following day, filled every avenue, which led to the Forum, with men under arms; and, upon some tumult among the populace, gave an order that the place should be cleared. And in the execution of this order, numbers were killed.

Under the impression made by this vigorous exertion of power, the witnesses continued to be examined for two days without any disturbance. Among these, the inhabitants of Bovillæ, the family and relations of Clodius, with his wife Fulvia, were examined on the several circumstances that fell within their knowledge, and left no doubt remaining with respect to the fact. The minds of men every day became more intent on the issue: so that, on the

fourth day, when the parties were to plead, the shops and offices were shut, and all other business was suspended in the city.

There appeared for the prosecutors Appius Claudius, M. Antonius, and Valerius Nepos. They began at eight, and spoke till ten. For the defendant appeared Q. Hortensius, M. Marcellus, M. Calidius, Faustus Sylla, M. Cato, and M. T. Cicero, of whom the last only attempted to speak. Some were of opinion, that, as the fact was undeniable, it ought to be justified on the plea of political necessity or public expedience. Cicero himself thought this too bold a plea, and therefore chose that of self-defence, alleging that Clodius was the aggressor, and intended to assassinate Milo. It is remarked of this celebrated orator, that, practised as he was, he began all his orations under considerable solicitude and awe of his audience. On this occasion, when he stood up to speak, the partisans of Clodius, who were likewise inveterate enemies to himself, endeavoured to disconcert him with clamours and menacing cries. The unusual parade of military guards, commanded by an officer who was supposed to be prejudiced against his client, it is said, so far overcame and sunk his spirit, that he spoke feebly, and concluded abruptly; and that the speech he actually made, was far short of that masterly oration which he composed, and afterwards published under the title of Milo's defence.

The accused, however, even in this alarming scene, stood at the bar with an undaunted countenance; and while every one else, in imitation of the Senators, appeared in mourning, he alone appeared in his

ordinary dress. When judgment was given, and the ballots inspected, it appeared that, of the Senators, twelve condemned, and six, or perhaps rather five, acquitted; of the Knights, thirteen condemned, and four acquitted; of the Tribune Ærarii, or representatives of the Plebeian order, thirteen condemned, and three or four acquitted. And Milo, upon the whole, was condemned by thirty-eight against thirteen.

Before sentence was pronounced, being still at liberty to withdraw, he retired into exile, and fixed his residence at Marseilles. Thither Cicero sent him a copy of an oration in his defence, composed at leisure, as an effort of his eloquence, and a specimen of what could be urged in the cause. The packet containing this writing, it seems, was delivered or read to Milo while he sat at dinner. "How lucky it was," he said, "that this oration was not actually spoken, "I should not now have been eating these excellent "fish at Marseilles*." These marks of indifference make a striking contrast to the figure which Cicero himself had exhibited in his exile. If he could have thus trifled with apparent or unmerited disgrace, that single addition of constancy and force to his character would have undoubtedly placed him as high in the order of statesman, as, by the other parts of his character, he stands in the list of ingenious men and virtuous citizens.

Milo was likewise soon after condemned, in ab-

* Asconius Pædianus et Argument. et Notis in Orat. pro Mil. Dio, Cass. lib. xl. Plut. in Pompeio, Catone, &c.

sence, by the Prætor, upon a charge of bribery and corruption. Some of his competitors, particularly Hypsæus and Scipio, were brought to trial, for the same offence. The Tribune Munatius Plancus and Pompeius Rufus were, at the expiration of their office, tried and condemned for the share which they had in the assault which was committed on the house of M. Lepidus the Interrex, and in lighting the fire which consumed the Senate-house.

CHAP. XXIV.

Conduct of Pompey in his quality of sole consul.—Pretensions of Cæsar to be admitted as candidate for the office of consul, without resigning his province.—General revolt of the Gauls.—Operations in that country.—Blockade and reduction of Alesia.—Distribution of Cæsar's army in Gaul.

POMPEY, in his dignity of sole Consul, having joined a legal authority to the personal elevation which he always affected, possessed much [illegible]luence and consideration of a real monar[illegible]ould have been happy, perhaps, for the [illegible]ould have made such a dignity heredit[illegible]ma-nent part of the constitution, [illegible] act[illegible] to the commonwealth that reasonable mi[illegible]eating th[illegible]ngly government, of which it appears to mark[illegible]od so greatly in need. In his present elevation, he rose for a while above the partialities of a factious leader, and appeared to adopt that interest or [illegible]h the well-advised sovereign ever has in the [illegible]ort of justice. He even seems to have stepped into the character of a prince, or to have considered himself as above the rank of a citizen. Among other instances of this sort, is mentioned his haughty saying to Hypsæus, late candidate for the Consulate, now under prosecution for bribery, who, as Pompey passed from the bath to supper, put himself in his way to implore his protection, "Detain me not," he said, "you only make

"supper to cool for no purpose *." In the midst of the solicitations of his courtiers and flatterers, he even ventured to dispense with his own regulations. Contrary to the rule he himself had laid down for the direction of criminal trials, he furnished Munatius Plancus, when arraigned at the Prætor's bar, with a commendatory testimony. "I cannot prefer this "writing of Pompey," said Cato, "to the law of "which he himself is the author." On account of this saying, Plancus, when the Judges came to be inclosed, thought proper to include Cato among those he rejected: the accused was nevertheless condemned †.

Besid[illegible]easures taken to punish *past* offences, o[illegible]ose who might be *inclined* to violate t[illegible]s thought *expedient* also to lessen the[illegible]rimes, by *which* the public had of late been so much aggrieved. The principal source of the late disorders appeared to be the avidity of candidates for those offices of State, which led immediately to the government of lucrative provinces. To remove this temptation, it was ordained, at the suggestion of Pompey, that no man could have a lucrative appointment till five years after the expiration of that office, whether of Consul, Prætor, or Quæstor, in consequence of which he claimed a proportionate station in the provinces.

Before the enacting of this law, however, Pompey had the address to procure for himself a prolongation of his government in Spain for five years. This cir-

* Val. Max. lib. ix, c. 5. † Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 484.

cumstance, which continued to give him the command of an army abroad, while he likewise bore the highest civil office in the State at home, set a very dangerous precedent for the commonwealth, of which Cæsar was not slow to avail himself.

The commission which was held by this adventurer in Gaul was soon to determine; and, according to the laws then in force, he must even resign it before he could aspire to the Consulate, or pretend to cope with his rival in civil preferments. It had been wisely ordained by the laws, that the persons offering themselves as candidates for the office of Consul, should appear in person to sue for it; and that no man, without resigning his military command, and dismissing his army, could enter the city, or even go beyond the limits of the province in which he had governed. By this regulation it was intended to prevent the conjunction of civil power in the State with the command of an army. Pompey, however, though vested with such a command in Spain, had contrived to be exempted from the observance of this law; and, under pretence that his office of general purveyor of corn for the Roman People did not confine him to any station, or if it did not extend to the whole empire, had at least a particular reference to Italy, he still continued to occupy the seat of general administration at Rome.

Cæsar, to keep pace with his rival, openly aspired to the same privilege which Pompey had enjoyed, and claimed, as a mere instance of equal treatment, what the other had obtained, but what, if bestowed on himself, with his other advantages, must give him

a great and immediate superiority. The army attached to his person was already in the most advantageous situation for commanding the empire. The addition of consular power at Rome, to that of general in both the Gauls, was joining Italy, and the city itself, to his provinces, and putting him at once in possession of the whole. Any opposition made to his authority as Consul, would be construed as rebellion against the State, and justify recourse to the arms which he bore at the very gates of Rome. Pompey would be driven at once from the helm of affairs to the command of a distant province, in which he, at most, could only defend himself, but not be in condition to contest the sovereignty, either in behalf of the Senate or himself.

With these objects in his view, Cæsar instructed his partisans among the Tribunes to move, That, being continually engaged in a hazardous war, which required his presence, and being necessarily detained abroad in the service of his country, he might be exempted from the law, which required the candidates for office to attend their canvass in person, and might therefore be admitted as candidate for the Consulship, without appearing at Rome, or divesting himself of his power in the province.

The proposition was sufficiently understood by the leading men of the Senate, and by the few who joined with them in support of the commonwealth. It was known to be intended that Cæsar should have a privilege of being elected Consul, without resigning his province, or dismissing his army; and they withstood the motion as of the most dangerous conse-

quence. But Pompey, who ought likewise, for his own sake, to have been alarmed at the progress of Cæsar, and at the uncommon advantage which he now attempted to gain, was either lulled into security by the artifices of his rival, or thought himself sufficiently raised above any danger from this or any other quarter. He had accepted, in his own person, many unprecedented honours, and was possibly unwilling to contend for forms, which, at some future period, might limit his own pretensions. Cato loudly renewed the alarm which he had frequently given on the subject of Cæsar's designs. Cicero could not be neutral in any dispute that should arise between Cæsar and Pompey. He had been banished by the one, and restored by the other. Besides the personal obligation he owed to Pompey, his natural bias was on the side of the Senate, and for the support of the forms which were provided for the safety of the commonwealth. On this occasion, however, he appears again willing to deceive himself, and dazzled with the court which Cæsar had paid to him for some time, with a view to this very question, he condemned the indiscreet zeal of Cato, who, in his opinion, was ruining the cause of the republic, by setting both Cæsar and Pompey at defiance, while he himself, by temporising, and by managing the inclinations of these parties, had secured them both in its interests. He stated the danger of a quarrel with Cæsar at this time, supported as he was by a powerful army, and in the bowels of Italy; but did not consider that he was then giving up, without a quarrel, all that, in the issue of any quarrel, could be extorted.

The army of Cæsar was not then so well prepared to follow him against his country, nor he himself furnished with the same colours of justice, under which, upon the recall of the privilege now granted him, he afterwards made war on the commonwealth. To temporise, therefore, in this instance, was to give an enemy the time necessary to ripen his plans for execution, or rather, in effect, to deliver up the republic, without a contest, to that fate which the councils which Cicero now flattered himself were so prudent, rendered almost inevitable. Under colour of this prudence, nevertheless, Cicero, as well as Pompey, supported the Tribunes in their motion, and obtained for the Proconsul of Gaul the dispensation he desired, to retain his army, while he offered himself a candidate for the highest office of the State at Rome.

Cæsar, immediately upon his arrival within the Alps, in the beginning of winter, observing the distractions which upon the murder of Clodius took place in the city, affected much zeal for the laws which had been so grossly violated in that instance; and, under pretence of furnishing himself with the means of supporting the State against those who were inclined to disturb it, ordered new levies in every part of his provinces, and made a considerable addition to his army; but contented for the present with the privilege he had obtained of suing for the Consulate, without quitting his province, or resigning his military power, he left the State, as before, apparently in the hands of Pompey; and in the mid-

dle of winter, on the report of a general defection of all the Gaulish nations, repassed the Alps.

Most of the nations that lay beyond the mountains of Auvergne, the original limits of the Roman province, roused by the sense of their present condition, or by the cruel massacre lately executed in a part of their country, were actually in arms. They had submitted to Cæsar, or were separately gained by him, under the specious pretence of alliance or protection against their enemies; and with the title of ally, suffered him to become their master. But the violence with which he had threatened the canton of the Carnutes *, for absenting themselves from the congress which he had formed on the Seine, and the merciless severities executed by him against the unfortunate natives of the tract between the Rhine and the Meuse †, convinced all the nations of Gaul, whether the voluntary or forced allies of Rome, that they were reduced to the condition of slaves; and that every exertion they made for liberty was to be punished as a crime. They saw the folly of their former dissentions, and suspended all their animosities to enter into a general concert for their common safety. The occasion, they said, was favourable for the recovery of their country. The Romans were distracted at home, and Cæsar had sufficient occupation in Italy. His army could not act in his absence. The present time, they concluded, was the favourable opportunity to shut out the Romans for ever

* Now Chartres. † Now chiefly Liege and Guelderland.

beyond the Cevennes, or even force them to retire within the Alps.

All the nations on the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, quite round to the coast of the British channel, received these representations with joy. They held private meetings, and instead of exchanging hostages, which would have been too public a measure, and have led to a discovery of their designs, they plighted their faith by a more secret form, commonly practised among them on great occasions, that of pressing their banners together.

The people of the Carnutes * undertook to begin hostilities; and accordingly, on a day fixed, surprised the town of Genabum †, where they put many Roman traders, together with the commissary-general of the army, to death.

It was the custom of the Gauls to convey intimation of such events by means of a cry which they raised at the place of action, and repeated wherever the voice was heard, till passing almost with the velocity of sound itself, it gave the speediest information of what was done. In this manner intelligence of what had been transacted at Genabum at the rising of the sun, was, before night, propagated in every direction to the distance of a hundred and sixty miles, and put all the nations within this compass in a ferment. Its first and principal effects, however, were produced in the country of the Arverni ‡. Here Vercingetorix, a youth of heroic spirit and great capacity, assembled his retainers,

* Chartres. † Orleans. ‡ Auvergne.

took possession of Gergovia, now Clermont, the capital of his country, and from thence sent messengers in every direction to urge the execution of the measures lately concerted for the general freedom of Gaul. He himself, in return for his zeal, being chosen the common head of the confederacy, fixed the quota of men and of arms to be furnished by each separate canton, and took hostages for the regular observance of the conditions to which the several parties had agreed.

This general, commander of the Gauls, having assembled a considerable army, sent a part of his force to act on the Garonne, and to harass the frontiers of the Roman province on that side, while he himself moved to the Loire, in order to rouse the nations of that quarter to a proper sense of the occasion; and he accordingly brought to his standard all the warriors of those cantons which lay on the left of that river. His party on the Garonne, at the same time, was joined by all the nations of Aquitania, and, in formidable numbers, threatened with immediate destruction the cities of Thoulouse and Narbonne, or such parts of their districts at least as were open to invasion.

Thither Cæsar, with all the forces he could assemble upon his return from Italy, immediately repaired; and, having put the province of Narbonne in a condition not to be insulted, proceeded to give the enemy an alarm in their own country. His object was, if possible, to effect a junction with the legions which he had left on the northern frontiers of his new acquisitions. Those legions could not be

moved from their present position to favour his junction, without being exposed to be cut off by the natives. Nor was it easy for himself, with the force under his command, to penetrate through so many enemies as lay in his way to join them. It was yet winter, and the mountains were deeply covered with snow. This circumstance, although it increased his difficulties; as it was likely to render the enemy secure, still encouraged him to make his attempt. He accordingly passed the mountains * which lay in his way, at a time when the snow, in many places, being six feet deep, was to be removed with shovels, and when that passage was supposed to be entirely impracticable. After he had surmounted this difficulty, his object being to divert the attention of his enemy, he sent his cavalry abroad in numerous parties, with fire and sword, to lay waste the country, and destroy the people, with their habitations and effects. When he thought the alarm was sufficiently spread, and must have reached the Gaulish army on the Loire, pretending that his presence was required in the province behind him, he gave the command of the troops in Auvergne to Decimus Brutus, then a young man; giving him orders at the same time to keep his parties abroad, and to continue to harass that district, as he himself had done.

Having taken these measures to fix the attention of the enemy in one quarter, Cæsar, with a few attendants, made haste to pass in a different direction to Vienna on the Rhône, where he was received by

* The Cevennes.

a party of horse, which he had appointed at that place to wait his orders; and, under this escort, without halting by day or by night, he passed by Bibracté * and the country of the Lingones †, to the nearest quarter of his army in the north; and while he was yet supposed to be in Auvergne, had actually assembled his legions which had been distributed on the course of the Seine.

Vercingetorix having notice that Cæsar, in this manner, had passed him, and that the Roman army on the Seine was in motion, and perceiving that the invasion of his own country had been no more than a feint, and that the chief force of the enemy was to be expected from a different quarter, he resumed the operations which he had intermitted on the Loire, and endeavoured to possess himself of a post in the territory of Bibracté, where the people still professed themselves to be in the alliance of Rome.

Cæsar, notwithstanding the difficulty of procuring provisions and forage so early in the season, thought himself under a necessity of opposing the progress of the enemy. For this purpose, he left his baggage, under the guard of two legions, at Agendicum ‡; and from thence, with the remainder of the army, proceeded to Genabum ‖, leaving Trebonius by the way to take possession of a town which the natives, after a little show of resistance, had surrendered.

Upon his arrival before Genabum, the Gauls, who were in arms at that place, resolved to abandon the

* Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun. † Langres.
‡ Sens. ‖ Orleans.

town; and shutting the gates against the Romans on one side, endeavoured to escape by the bridge of the Loire on the other. But Cæsar, having intelligence of their design, while they were busy in the execution of it, forced open a gate of the town in their rear, and overtook them, while crowded together in the entrance and passage of the bridge, and in the narrow streets which led to it, put the greater part to the sword, and, under pretence of revenging the massacre of the Roman traders, who had been cut off at this place, ordered that the town should be destroyed. From thence he penetrated into the country of the Bituriges *, on the left of the Loire; and, on his way to Avaricum †, the principal strong-hold in that quarter, forced every place that opposed his passage.

Vercingetorix, observing the rapid progress of the Romans, and knowing that the Gauls, being without order or discipline, could not withstand them in battle, declined an engagement, but endeavoured to distress the enemy by delays and want of provisions. He had authority enough with his countrymen to prevail on them to lay their own country waste every where within many miles of Cæsar's route. And in compliance with his orders, twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt in one day. Avaricum alone, contrary to his opinion, and at the earnest request of its inhabitants, who undertook to defend it to the last extremity, was spared.

Thither, accordingly, Cæsar advanced as to the

* Now Berri. † Bourges.

only prize that was left. He attacked the place, under great disadvantage, in the midst of a country that was entirely laid waste, and trusting for the daily subsistence of his army to the Ædui beyond the Loire, who, notwithstanding their professions, were far from being hearty in his cause, or diligent in sending their supplies of provisions to his camp. Such as they sent were intercepted by Vercingetorix, who had occupied a strong post with his army, and infested the highways with his parties. In these circumstances, the Romans were sometimes reduced to great distress; Cæsar himself, to pique the resolution of his men, affected a willingness to raise the siege, whenever they were pleased to intimate that they could not endure their fatigues any longer: "We are got into a difficult situation," he said; "but if the troops are discouraged, I shall with-"draw." To this affected tenderness for the sufferings of the army, he was every where answered, with entreaties, that he would not dishonour them, by supposing that any hardships could oblige them to forfeit the character they had acquired by the labour of so many successful campaigns. He accordingly continued the attack of Avaricum, under all the discouragements to which he found himself exposed.

The place, situate in an angle, was covered on two sides by a river and a morass, and was accessible only on the third. The walls of the town were ingeniously constructed with double frames, forming compartments or pannels of wood, filled up with masonry and large blocks of stone. The masonry

secured the timber from fire, and the frames preserved the masonry against the effects of the battering ram, which could act only on the stones contained within a single pannel or division of the frame, without ruining at once any considerable part of the wall, or effecting a breach. The Roman army had to attack this wall by methods the most laborious and difficult, then practised; having a way to make, by a mound of approach, before they could ascend to the level of the battlements, or touch the walls, a work to be begun at a considerable distance, in order to have an easy slope or ascent, and requiring a breadth of above eighty feet, to admit sufficient numbers in front *. The earth on the sides of this mound was to be supported by timbers, hurdles, and faggots, and the workmen upon it were to be covered with mantlets and moveable pent-houses. The besieged, as this fabric arose, that they might still over-top the besiegers, raised their walls by additional frames of wood, which they covered with raw hides, as a security against the arrows and burning shafts which were darted against them.

In this contest the works on both sides were mounted up to the height of about eighty feet, and the besieged still endeavoured to preserve their advantage, not only by raising their own battlements, but likewise by undermining and sinking the mound of the besiegers. They made galleries under the foundation of their own rampart to the bottom of the enemy's mound, by which they endeavoured

* The Agger.

from below to remove the earth and other materials of the mound, as fast as they were accumulated above. They came at the same time from their sally-ports on different sides of the mound, and endeavoured to set fire to the wood by which the earth was supported. In all these particulars, showing that they possessed the arts of defence in common with ancient nations*. Vercingetorix, also, continued to harass the Roman army from without, intercepted their supply of provisions, and, by passing the river or the morass, maintained his communication with the town, and sent in frequent relief.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, Cæsar by degrees brought forward and raised his mound of approach to the height of the battlements; so that by a single assault he might determine the fate of the town. And while both parties were preparing for a last effort, he took his opportunity to storm, as he frequently did, in the midst of a heavy fall of rain. The besieged, as he supposed, had taken shelter from the weather, and were in that instant put off their guard. He accordingly got possession of their defences with little resistance, and forced the parties who manned to retreat. The inhabitants, being driven from the walls, formed in the streets, and the Romans who had entered on the ramparts, extending their line to the right and the left, were about to occupy the battlements over the whole circumference of the place, when the garrison, obser-

* Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. vii, c. 22, &c. Vid. Thucydid. lib. ii, in the siege of Platæa.

ving their danger, began to escape by the gates. In the confusion that followed, the town was sacked, and could make no resistance. Of forty thousand persons who had taken shelter in it, no more than eight hundred escaped. This massacre was joined to that lately performed at Genabum; and under the pretence of completing the vengeance which was due for the murder of the Roman traders who were put to death at the breaking out of the present revolt, all the inhabitants of this place, without exception, were put to the sword.

The Gauls, as usual on every calamitous event, were greatly disheartened, and were about to despair of their cause, when their leader reminded them, that, contrary to his judgment, they had reserved this place from the general devastation of the country, and had themselves undertaken to defend it; but their loss in this instance was the effect of mistake, and might be retrieved by abler conduct. His authority, as usual, rose on the ill success of councils which he had not approved, and brought an accession of numbers to his standard.

Cæsar, finding a considerable supply of stores and provisions at Avaricum, remained some days to relieve and to refresh his army. The country around him, however, being entirely laid waste, or occupied by parties of the enemy, it became necessary for him to repass the Loire, and to open his communication with a country of which the inhabitants still professed to be in alliance with the Romans, and having had their possessions covered by the river from the incursions of the enemy in their late devastations,

were still in condition to supply his camp. As in this movement he seemed to retire, and to give up the ground he had disputed with the prince of the Arverni, he pretended that he was called to settle a dispute which had arisen among the Ædui, relating to the succession of the chief magistrate, or head of their canton. Having repassed to the right of the Loire without any loss, he made a demand on his allies of that side for ten thousand men on foot, and all the horses they could furnish.

The Romans now had enemies on every quarter, and it was good policy to keep them divided, and to occupy them separately. For this purpose Cæsar sent four legions towards the Seine; while he himself took the route of Noviodunum *, at the confluence of the Loire and Allier; and there leaving his money, spare horses, and unnecessary baggage, he continued his march on the banks of the Allier, with intention to pass that river, and to invade the Arverni, from whom this revolt had originated, and whose chief was now at the head of it. This prince, knowing that the river Allier is never fordable till autumn, and till the melting of snows on the Cevennes begin to abate, ordered all the bridges upon it to be demolished, and hoped to prevent the Romans from passing it during the greater part of summer. As soon as Cæsar marched from Noviodunum, he presented himself on the right of the Allier, and regulated his motions by that of the enemy on the opposite side. The two armies commonly decamped, marched and

* Nevers.

encamped again in sight of each other; and Cæsar never affected to elude the vigilance of the Gauls till he saw an opportunity to do so with advantage.

It happened that one of the bridges on this river had been but imperfectly destroyed; most of the piles were yet fast in the ground, and appeared above water: so that a passage might be effected in a few hours. The country around was woody, and furnished sufficient cover, or place of ambush, to any number of men. From these circumstances, Cæsar conceived the design to overreach his enemy. He put his army in motion as usual, but himself remained with a sufficient detachment in the neighbourhood of the ruined bridge, which he meant to repair. In order that the Gauls might not be led to suspect that any part of his army was left behind, he ordered that those who were to move should divide, and present the same number of separate bodies, the same distinction of colours and standards, which they were accustomed to show on a march of the whole army: at the same time, as he knew that the Gauls would endeavour to keep pace with his motions; in order to hasten and increase their distance from the place at which he meant to pass the river, he ordered his people to make a quicker and a longer march than usual. When he supposed that this feint or stratagem had taken its full effect, he began to work on the piles which were left in the river, and in a few hours repaired the bridge so effectually, that he passed with the division of the army he had reserved for this purpose, and instantly fortified a post to cover them on the opposite bank. From thence he

sent orders to recall the main body; and by the time the enemy were apprised of his design, had reunited all his forces on the left of the river.

Vercingetorix, as soon as he had intelligence that the Romans had passed the Allier, fell back to Gergovia*, the capital of his own principality, in order to take measures for the safety of that place. It being situate on a height, having an ascent of above a mile from the plain, and surrounded by other hills, which made part of the same ridge, he ordered a stone wall to be built six feet high about half way up the ascent to the town, and encamped as many as the space could contain within the circuit of this wall. He occupied the other hills at the same time with separate bodies, having communications with each other and with the town. By this disposition Cæsar found all the approaches of the place commanded, and no possibility of investing the whole by lines of circumvallation, or by any chain of posts. But he pitched his camp at some distance from the foot of the hill, and from thence in a few days got possession of a height in his way to the town, on which he posted two legions, with a line of communication, fortified on both its flanks, leading from his main encampment to this advanced station.

In this posture Cæsar foresaw, that all the heights in his neighbourhood being in possession of the enemy, while he pressed upon the town, he himself might be hemmed in, and cut off from all the supplies necessary for the support of his army. To pre-

* Now supposed to be the neighbourhood of Clermont.

serve his communication therefore with the Allier and the Loire, he ordered his allies from the opposite side of these rivers to advance with the forces he had formerly required of them, to occupy the country in his rear, and to cover his convoys. They accordingly took the field; but their leaders having been for some time inclined to favour the general cause of their country, thought this a favourable opportunity to declare their intentions. Being arrived within thirty miles of Cæsar's station, they halted; and, upon a report which was industriously spread by their leaders, that the Roman general had murdered some of their countrymen who were already in his camp, they put all the Romans who had joined them to death, and were resolved to take part with their countrymen who were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. They had not yet moved to execute this resolution, when Cæsar, having notice of what they had done, and what was intended, with his usual diligence arrived, after a march of thirty miles, with four legions and all his cavalry, in time to prevent their designs. Affecting ignorance of what had passed, he presented himself as a friend; or thinking it safest for the present to disguise his resentment, he produced into public view all the persons who were said to have been killed by his orders, convinced such as had been deceived of their error, and brought them, with the seeming cordiality of allies, to his camp. He also made a merit with the Ædui of this act of clemency towards their people; but found that the spirit of defection was not confined to these detachments; that it had pervaded the nation; that the

violence committed in the camp was an effect of the resolutions adopted by the whole people; that, in pursuance of the same measures, his purveyors and commissaries had been assaulted and pillaged even where they thought themselves secure, as in a friend's country; and that, in short, he could not any longer rely on the affections of any nation in Gaul.

The leaders of the Ædui, however, on hearing of the lenity that was shown to such of their people as were in the power of Cæsar, pretended to return to their duty; and Cæsar, not to break at once with the only supposed ally which remained to him beyond the Cevennes, affected to consider the late disorders as the effect of a mere popular tumult, and declared himself willing to rely on the wisdom of the State itself for the reparation of wrongs which a few ill-advised persons of their country had committed.

As to the immediate part he took in the war, this able commander appears, as usual on many occasions, to have trusted greatly to the superiority of his troops, as well as to that of his own reputation and conduct as a general. His confidence in both was required in the highest degree to support him in continuing, or even in attempting, a siege under his present difficulties, beset by enemies numerous, increasing, and in appearance ably conducted; while he himself was deserted by those who were reputed his friends.

In his last march to repress the defection of his allies, he had left his own camp exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and defended only by two legions against the whole force of so many nations as were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. These

did not neglect their opportunity in his absence, made a vigorous assault on his lines, and must have prevailed, if he had not returned with the utmost celerity for the relief of the few by whom they were defended.

With the same confidence in the superiority of his men, Cæsar soon afterwards made an attempt to force the wall, which, as has been mentioned, the Gauls had built on the ascent of the hill which led to the town; and having made a feint on the opposite side with part of his horse, joined by the followers of the army mounted on horseback, who showed themselves at a distance to appear like cavalry, he drew the enemy from the place he meant to attack, actually passed the wall, and made himself master of part of their camp. A few of his men penetrated even into the town; but not being supported, were surrounded and slain: even those who had succeeded at first under favour of the feint by which he had diverted the enemy's attention, were, upon the return of the Gauls to the defence of their camp, repulsed with considerable loss. In consequence of this defeat, it was no longer doubtful that Cæsar would be under the necessity of raising the siege.

In order to begin his retreat without any appearance of fear, he formed his army two days successively on the plain before his intrenchment, with a countenance which might be interpreted as an offer of battle to the enemy. On the third day he decamped; and, with the credit he derived from this species of defiance or challenge, in three days he arrived at the Allier, repaired his bridge, and repassed

undisturbed. His passage of the same river, a short time before, was esteemed as a victory, and his return, without having gained any advantage, and merely for the safety of his army, was undoubtedly to be considered as a defeat. The low state of his fortunes, checked and baffled by a Gaulish leader, yet a youth, and unexperienced, encouraged the nations on the right of the Loire, even while he was advancing towards them, to declare for the liberties of Gaul; and as a commencement of hostility, they carried off or rifled the treasure he kept for the pay of his army, and seized all the spare horses and baggage which he had left in Noviodunum *, as a supposed place of security, at the confluence of two rivers, the Allier and the Loire.

He himself, being yet inclosed between these two rivers, having enemies on every side, and no magazines or stores for the supply of his army, deliberated whether he should not fall back on the province of Narbonne; but the danger to which he must expose Labienus, commanding a division of the Roman army on the Seine, the difficulty of passing the mountains of Auvergne, then occupied by his enemies, and the discredit which his arms must incur from such a retreat, prevented him. He determined therefore to advance; passed the Loire by a ford above its confluence with the Allier; found a considerable supply of provisions and forage in the country of the Ædui, and continued his march from thence to the Seine.

* Nevers.

Labienus, with the troops he commanded in that quarter, had besieged Lutetia, the original germe from which the city of Paris has grown, then confined to a small island in the Seine, and had made some progress in the siege, when he heard of Cæsar's retreat from Gergovia, of the defection of the Ædui, and of preparations which were making by the nations on his right against himself. In these circumstances, he laid aside his design on Lutetia, and ascended by the left of the Seine to the country of the Senones, through which Cæsar was now advancing to meet him. In passing the river at Melodunum *, he was attacked by the enemy, but obtained a considerable victory; and, with the credit of this event in his favour, continued his march to a place which is now called Sens, near to which he was soon afterwards joined by Cæsar.

While the Romans were thus reuniting their forces on the Seine, Vercingetorix had passed the Loire, and held a general convention of the Gaulish nations at Bibracté. He was attended by deputies of all the cantons from the Moselle to the Loire, except the Treviri, Remi, and Lingones †. The first stood in awe of the Germans, who kept them in continual alarm. The two last professed an attachment to the Romans, who were still masters of the field in their neighbourhood.

The leader of the Gaulish confederacy being at this meeting confirmed in his command, made a requisition for an augmentation of force, chiefly of ca-

* Now Melun. † Now Treves, Rheims, and Langres.

valry, and accordingly increased this part of his army to fifteen thousand. To the end that he might give the Romans sufficient occupation in their own defence, he projected two separate invasions of the province of Narbonne: one to be executed by the nations which lay between the Rhône and Garonne, towards Toulouse; the other, from the Soane and the upper parts of the Loire, towards Geneva and the left of the Rhône. He himself, though still determined to avoid any general action, was to harass the enemy in their movements, and to cut off their supplies of provisions.

Cæsar, on his part, wished to open his communication with the Roman province, that he might have access to cover it against the designs of the enemy, and to avail himself of its resources for the subsistence of his army. For this purpose it was necessary for him to return, by the Soane and the Rhône, through a level country which was in possession of the enemy, to whom he was greatly inferior in cavalry. He therefore sent into Germany for a reinforcement of horse; and the natives of that part of the continent being already sensible, that wherever they were admitted to act as soldiers of fortune, they were qualifying themselves to act as masters, without scruple bestowed their services for or against any cause; two thousand of them joined Cæsar, but so ill mounted that he was obliged to supply them with horses, by borrowing such as belonged to his officers of infantry, and as many as could be spared from his cavalry. To compensate their defect in horses, the men were brave, and, in many of the operations which

followed, turned the event of battles, and determined the fate of the war.

The Roman army being thus reinforced, Cæsar began his march to the southward; and having passed the heights at the sources of the Seine, found the Gauls already posted in three separate divisions, contiguous to the different routes he might take, and prepared, with numerous flying parties of horse, to harass him in any movement he should make in their presence. By continuing his march, he soon gave their leader an opportunity to try his fortune in a sharp encounter, in which the whole cavalry of both armies came to be engaged. The Gauls were routed chiefly by the valour and address of the Germans, to whom even Cæsar himself ascribed his victory. This event was decisive in respect to the cavalry, that part of both armies on which it was supposed that the fate of the war must turn. And Vercingetorix, not to expose his infantry to the necessity of a general action, instantly retired to the heights from which the Seine, and a number of other rivers which mix with it before its confluence with the Marne, have their source. Cæsar, no longer apprehensive of the enemy's horse, resumed the confidence with which he always pursued his advantages, and followed his flying enemy into the ground he had chosen for his retreat.

Vercingetorix, with his very numerous assemblage from all the cantons of Gaul, took post at Alesia, a place raised on a hill at the confluence of two rivers; the point on which it stood being the termination of a ridge which separated the channels by which these

rivers descended to the plain. The fields on one side were level, on the other mountainous. The Gauls were crowded together on the declivity of the hill of Alesia, under the walls of a town, and in that position thought themselves secure from attack. But not aware of the resources, enterprize, and genius of their enemy, while they endeavoured to render themselves inaccessible, they forgot that they had got into a place in which they might be cooped up; and Cæsar, unrestrained in his motions, immediately began to surround them, making a proper distribution of his army, and employing working parties at once on a chain of twenty-three posts and redoubts.

Vercingetorix, though too late, perceiving the disadvantage of his own situation, and the enemy's design, sent his cavalry to collect what provisions could be found in the neighbouring country; but these troops, in consequence of their late defeat, not being able to keep the field against the Roman and German horse, he proposed to diminish the consumption within his own lines, by dismissing them altogether, giving them instructions to make the best of their way to their several cantons, and there to represent the condition in which they had left the army, and the necessity of making a great and speedy effort from every quarter to relieve it. He had eighty thousand men under his command, and might be able to subsist them for thirty days, and no longer.

Cæsar, from the enemy's having sent away their cavalry, concluded that they meant to act on the defensive, and to remain in their present position until

they could be relieved. With little apprehension of disturbance, therefore, from an enemy so blocked up, he continued his operations; at once to secure his prey, and to cover himself against any attempts which might be made to rescue them. This great commander owed many of his distinguished successes to the surprising works which he executed; so far exceeding the fears or apprehensions of his enemy, that they found themselves unexpectedly forced into difficulties with which they were not prepared to contend.

The Roman armies in general, and those which served under Cæsar in particular, had learned to make war with the pickaxe and the shovel, no less than with the javeline and the sword, and were inured to prodigies of labour as well as of valour. In the present case, they were made to execute lines of circumvallation and countervallation over an extent of twelve or fourteen miles. They began with digging, quite round the foot of the hill, a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular sides, in order to prevent any surprise from the town. At the distance of four hundred feet from this ditch, and beyond the reach of the enemy's missiles, was drawn the line of countervallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart twelve feet high, furnished, as usual, with a palisade. At a proper distance from this first line which fronted the town, so as to leave a proper interval for the lodgment and forming of his army, he drew another line, consisting of the same parts and dimensions, fronting the field. From the nature of the ground, part of these works were

upon the hills, and part in the hollows or valleys; and the ditches, wherever the level permitted, or could not carry off the water, were allowed to be filled.

As he had reason, as soon as the distress of a blockade began to be felt, to expect from a garrison, which exceeded his own army in numbers, attempts to sally from within; and, by the united exertions of all the Gaulish nations in behalf of their friends, every effort that could be made to relieve them from without; and as his own army, consisting of no more than sixty thousand men, could not equally man throughout all the works of so much extent; he thought it necessary to cover his lines with every species of outwork then practised in the art of attack or defence, the *Cippi*, *Liliæ*, and the *Stimuli*.

The first were forked stakes, or large branches of trees cut short and pointed to wound those who should attempt to pass them; they were planted in rows in the bottom of a ditch five feet wide, and bound or lashed together to prevent their being separately pulled up.

The second, or liliæ, consisted of single stakes sharpened and made hard in the fire, planted in the bottom of tapering or conical holes, of which there were many rows placed in quincunx; so that a person who had passed in the interval of any two must necessarily fall into a third. This device was commonly masked or concealed with slender brushwood covered with earth.

The last, or the stimuli, were wooden shafts set in the ground, and stuck thick with barbed hooks, to

fasten or tear the flesh of those who attempted to pass them in the night, or without the necessary precautions.

All these* several works, it appears, the Roman army completed considerably within the thirty days for which Vercingetorix had computed that his provisions might last. Both parties concerned in this blockade, without any attempt to hasten the event, seemed to wait for the several circumstances on which they relied for the issue. Cæsar trusted to the effects of famine, and the Gauls to the assistance of their friends, who were in reality assembling in great numbers from every quarter to effect their relief. They are said to have mustered at Bibracté* no less than two hundred and forty thousand foot, with eight thousand horse. But if these numbers are not exaggerated, they may be considered as a proof how far those nations were ignorant of the circumstances on which the fortunes of armies really turn. The supreme command of this multitude was given to Comius, a chieftain of one of the northern cantons, who having some time made war in conjunction with the Romans, owed the rank which he held in his own country to the favour of Cæsar, but could not resist the contagion of that general ardour with which his countrymen now rose to recover their freedom.

While this great host was assembling, the unhappy garrison of Alesia received no tidings of relief. Their provisions being near exhausted, they

* Autun.

began to despair of succour. A council was held to deliberate on the part they should take, and to form some plan of escape. Some were of opinion that they ought to surrender themselves, and to implore the victor's mercy. Others, that they should make a general sally, endeavour to cut their way through the enemy, and escape or perish with swords in their hands. Critognatus, a warrior of rank from the canton of the Arverni *, treated the opinion of those who proposed to surrender as mean and dastardly; that of the second, as brave rather in appearance than in reality. "Bravery," he said, "does not consist "in sudden efforts of impatience and despair, but in "firmly enduring, for any length of time, what the "circumstances of war may require. Shall we think, "merely because we have no communication with "our friends, that they have deserted us, and do not "intend to make any effort to save us? Against "whom do you think Cæsar hath constructed so "many works in his rear? Against whom does he "man them in your sight with so much care? He "has intelligence, although you have not, that a "powerful army is preparing to relieve you. Take "courage, and wait the coming of your friends. "Even if your provisions should fail, the example of "former times will point out a resource. Your an-"cestors, being surrounded by the armies of the "Cimbri and the Teutones, rather than surrender "themselves, fed on the bodies of those who were "unserviceable in the war; and by this expedient

* Auvergne.

"held out till the enemy was obliged to retire. And "yet, on that occasion, our ancestors had less cause "than we have to make every effort of constancy "and fortitude. *Their* enemies were passing, and "meant only to plunder a country which they were "soon to abandon; *our* enemies come to bind us in "perpetual chains, and to establish a dominion at "which human nature revolts."

The Gauls kept their resolution to hold out, but rejected the means that were proposed to supply their necessities, or reserved them for a time of greater extremity. The proposition of Critognatus is, by Cæsar, who was himself the unprovoked author of so much distress, and who continued, without remorse, to gratify his ambition, at the expence of so much blood, mentioned with horror as an act of nefarious cruelty *. So much are men affected with appearances which shock the imagination more than with the real measure of what is hurtful to mankind. What followed, however, was probably no less cruel on the part of the Gaulish army, than it was on the part of Cæsar himself; the first, to lessen the consumption of food, turned out the women, children, and unarmed inhabitants of the town, to the mercy of the enemy; and Cæsar, in order to accumulate the sufferings of the besieged, would neither relieve nor suffer these helpless victims to pass. From this circumstance we may presume, although it is not mentioned, that they must have perished a spectacle of

* Nec prætereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter ejus singularem ac nefariam crudelitatem. De Bell. Gall. lib. vii, c. 76.

extreme suffering and anguish in the presence of both armies.

In the midst of these extremities, Comius, with the united force of the Gaulish nations, at last appeared for the relief of Alesia, and with their multitudes covered the neighbouring hills. Being favoured by the nature of the ground, they were enabled to advance within five hundred paces, or less than half a mile of Cæsar's lines. On the following day the cavalry on both sides began to act. The Gaulish horse, trusting to their superiority in numbers, or to the defensive plan which the Romans were likely to follow on the present occasion, drew forth on the plain below the town, and proposed to encourage their friends by braving the enemy. Cæsar thought it necessary to repel this species of insult, and sent his cavalry to accept the challenge. An action began about noon, and lasted till the setting of the sun, when the Gaulish horse, who till then had maintained the fight with great obstinacy and valour, being taken in flank by the Germans who were in the service of Cæsar, were obliged to give way. Both sides, on this occasion, had mixed parties of infantry with their horse; and the Gaulish foot who were engaged in this action, being now abandoned to the swords of the enemy, fled in the utmost confusion to the rear of their own army.

After this action, nothing passed for a day and a night; but it appeared, that during this interval, the Gaulish army in the field were collecting faggots and hurdles to fill up the trenches of Cæsar, and preparing grapplings to tear down the palisade and

the parapet; and that they only waited till these preparations should be finished to make a vigorous effort to open the way to their friends, or raise the blockade. They accordingly came down in the middle of the night, and, with a great shout, the only signal they supposed could be understood by those who were shut up in the town, gave a general assault on Cæsar's line of circumvallation, as far as their numbers could embrace it, and without any choice of place.

Cæsar had assigned to every legion and separate body of men their station, and, to render them familiar with the disposition he had made, had repeatedly roused, and taught them to repair to their posts of alarm; he had placed Mark Antony and Trebonius, with a body of reserve, to succour any part of the lines that might be in danger of being forced. So prepared, he now received, without any surprise, the general assault of the Gauls. His men suffered considerably from the first shower of missiles that came from so numerous an enemy; but as soon as the assailants advanced to the outworks, and felt themselves entangled in the snares which had been laid for them, and against which they had taken no precaution, they were sensible that they fought at a great disadvantage, and desisted at once from this rash and inconsiderate attempt.

Meanwhile the besieged, in anxious expectation of what was to pass in the field, having heard the shout that was raised by their friends, and having returned it to make known their own intention, to cooperate in every attack, instantly began to employ

the preparations which they likewise had made to fill up the trenches, or force the lines. They continued, during the greater part of the night, to cast such materials as they could throw into the broad ditch or moat which covered the enemy's works; but, when day appeared, seeing that their friends had retired, without making any impression on the exterior line, they too, not to expose themselves in an attempt in which they were not to be seconded, withdrew to their station on the hill.

From this disappointment the Gauls, both within and without the blockade, were sensible of their error in having made an attack before they had examined the enemy's cover. To correct this mistake, they visited the whole circumference of Cæsar's lines. They observed, in a particular place, that the exterior intrenchment was interrupted by a hill which it could not embrace without making a great circuit: That Cæsar, to avoid so great an addition to his labour, and so much outline to defend, had stationed two legions in that place with their usual encampment, forming a kind of fortress on the summit of the hill, sufficient to compensate the discontinuance of his lines on that side.

This place was chosen by the Gauls for a second and better concerted attempt than the first; and they determined, instead of the night, to make their attack at noon-day, when the enemy were most likely to be off their guard. Five-and-fifty thousand men were selected for this service; and they began their march early in the night, arrived at their ground before break of day, and lay concealed under a ridge of

hills till noon. At this time they came forward, furnished not only with grappling-irons to tear down the palisade, which was formed on the parapet, but with hurdles and faggots to fill up the ditch, and to smother the stimuli from which they had suffered so much in their former attacks.

Cæsar, though not thrown off his guard, either by the time of the day, or by his former success, was sensible, that he was now attacked in his weakest place. He ordered Labienus instantly, with six cohorts, to support the legions that were posted in that station; and as he had reason to expect, at the same time, a general assault, both from within and from without his lines, to favour this principal attack, he ordered every separate body to its post of alarm; and he himself, with a considerable reserve, took a station from which he could best observe the whole, and be ready to sustain any part that was pressed. He had given Labienus instructions, in case he found that the intrenchment of the camp could not be defended, to sally forth, and bring the action to that issue in which the Romans were generally found to have an advantage, by mixing with the enemy sword in hand.

The Gauls, who were shut up on the heights of Alesia, being prepared to second the attempts of their friends in the field, began the action on their part nearly about the same time; and the Romans being alarmed with hostile cries and shouts, at once both in their front and in their rear, were in danger of being seized with a panic, from which the best troops, on occasion, are not exempted.

Labienus was so much pressed where the Gauls made their principal effort, that Cæsar successively detached two several parties from his reserve to sustain him. First, a body of six cohorts under Decimus Brutus, and afterwards a body of seven cohorts under Fabius. At length, upon receiving information that Labienus had not been able to prevent the enemy from passing the intrenchment, but that he meant, with all the troops who had joined him from different stations, amounting to nine-and-thirty cohorts, to make a general sally according to his instructions, and to mix with the enemy sword in hand; Cæsar himself instantly moved to support him.

He had by this time observed, that the enemy, by a gross misconduct, had made no feint or no attempt on any other part of the lines to favour their principal attack; and he therefore, with those he still retained as a body of reserve, not only left the post of observation he had taken in the beginning of the action, but ventured even to unfurnish some other parts of the line as he passed, and advanced with great rapidity to join in the sally which Labienus was about to attempt. In his coming he was known from afar by the conspicuous dress which he generally wore in time of action; and his arrival on this occasion, with the reinforcement which he brought, greatly animated that part of his army, which had begun to despair of the event. He had, in this critical moment, with his usual genius and presence of mind, ordered his cavalry to pass the intrenchment; and, with a circuit in the field, while the foot were engaged in front, to take the enemy in flank or in

the rear. If the event had been otherwise doubtful, this movement alone, it is probable, must have secured it in his favour. The Gauls, although in the attack they had advanced with ardour, yet lost courage entirely, when they found themselves assailed and put upon their defence. Without any attempt to resist the cavalry, which came upon their flank or rear, they took to flight, and were pursued with great slaughter.

This flight at once decided the fate of both attempts; whether of the Gauls, who were shut up in Alesia, or of their countrymen, who had come to their relief. During the night, those in the field, discomfited by their repulse, were separating, and leaving their chieftains, or dispersing in different directions. Many fell a prey to the parties who were sent in pursuit of them. Those from within the lines, who had suffered so long a blockade, now seeing all their hopes of relief at an end, were no longer disposed to contend with their fate. Vercingetorix, having assembled the leaders together, told them, That, as he had undertaken this war, not from motives of private ambition, but from an earnest desire to restore, if he could, the freedom of his country, so he was now ready to become a sacrifice for the relief of his countrymen, and in any manner they thought proper to dispose of him, whether alive or dead, was willing to be made the means of appeasing the victor's rage.

At this consultation it was determined to surrender; and Vercingetorix suffered himself to be delivered up. With respect to the treatment he recei-

ved, Cæsar is silent; but it is probable, that, like other captive chiefs, on such occasions, he was destined to grace the future triumph of his conqueror; though, upon a fair review of the parts they had severally acted, likely to furnish a comparison not altogether to his advantage, and in some respects fit to obscure his glory.

The prisoners in general, except those who belonged to the cantons of the Ædui and Arverni, underwent the ordinary fate to which captives, in those times, were destined, being exposed to sale, or distributed as plunder among the troops. As for the prisoners of the Ædui and Arverni, they were reserved by Cæsar, on the present occasion, as hostages for the submission of their respective cantons, and for an immediate supply of provisions exacted from thence.

CHAP. XXV.

Cæsar remains in Gaul.—Pompey assumes Scipio for colleague in the consulate.—Succession of Servius Sulpicius and M. Claudius Marcellus.—Arrangement for the provinces.—Motion to recall Cæsar.—Continued debates in the senate.—Operations of Cæsar in Gaul.—Intrigues in the city.—Affairs in the other provinces.—Campaign of Cicero.—Succession of consuls.—State of parties in the city and in the senate.—Arrival of Cæsar in Italy in the spring.—Return to Gaul.—Parts with two legions to Pompey and the senate.—Alarm of Cæsar's march.—The consul Marcellus commits his sword to Pompey.

THE seventh, and the most difficult campaign of the war in Gaul being now at an end, Cæsar sent Labienus, with two legions, beyond the Soane*; Caius Fabius, with two more, to the sources of the Marne and the Meuse; other officers with separate bodies, amounting in all to three legions, into different stations beyond the Loire, and towards the Garonne; Quintus Tullius Cicero, with some other officers, to a station allotted them on the Soane, to superintend the formation of magazines and the supply of provisions, which were chiefly transported by the navigation of that river.

* The Arar.

Cæsar himself, not having any immediate object of equal importance with that of securing the possession he had gained of a country so extensive and populous, and which, though with the title only of a Roman Proconsul, gave him the state and resources of a great monarch; determined to pass the winter on this side of the Alps. His exclusion from the Consulate, whilst he retained his province with the command of an army, was dispensed with: But the time was not yet come for him to avail himself of his privilege; and he was willing, by remaining at a distance, to shun the notice of parties, who were known to observe his steps, and to state every advance he made to power as matter of public alarm. He nevertheless did not suffer any thing of moment to pass in the city, without taking some part in it by means of his agents and partisans, and was continually employed in gaining to his interests all those who were likely to come into office, or who, by their personal consideration, were of any importance in the State, and ever strove to exclude from the magistracy all such as were disinclined to favour his own pretensions, or who could not be gained to his party.

Pompey had now, for some months, exercised the office of sole Consul. In that time he had, in some measure, restored the energy of government, and had employed his own power with moderation, as well as vigour. He had shown himself qualified to act the part of an excellent prince, though ill qualified to endure the equality of pretension, which is claimed by the citizens of a commonwealth. His continual

desire of unprecedented distinction, was one of the evils that distressed the republic. This evil, however, was partly mitigated by the facility with which he resigned the powers to which his vanity, more than his love of dominion, made him aspire. Having enjoyed his present dignity from the first of March to the beginning of August, he took for colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio, suspending the prosecution under which this Senator then lay, for bribery, in soliciting votes at a preceding election.

The newly-elected colleague of Pompey, desirous to signalize his Consulate by some act of reformation, moved and obtained the repeal of the law, in which Clodius had so greatly circumscribed the power of the Censors; and he attempted to revive the authority of this magistracy, but in vain. Few citizens, now in public view, could bear the rigorous inspection of this once awful tribunal, as few had the courage to undertake or to exercise its trust. The institution accordingly had fallen into disuse, as being ill suited to the times. There being few of the People who were either fit to censure, or who could bear to be censured, it was not in the power of laws to revive what the general sense and manners of the age had abolished.

Disorders arising from the weakness of government had come to that extreme at which states must either correct themselves, or undergo some fatal change. The example of punishments inflicted, and of prosecutions still carried on against persons lately in public station, for the illegal methods employed at elections, deterred many from offering themselves

for any of the offices of State; and the late law, debarring Consuls, Prætors, or other magistrates, from any provincial appointments for five years after the expiration of their term, removed one powerful motive by which citizens were induced to seek for such honours.

At the elections for the ensuing year, only three candidates appeared; M. Marcellus, Servius Sulpicius, and M. Cato: all of them supposed to be of the Senatorian party; but very differently considered by those who now endeavoured to rule the State. Marcellus had, in fact, recommended himself to Pompey; and Sulpicius, as afterwards appeared, had been gained by Cæsar; and the interests of these candidates were warmly espoused by both their powerful patrons, in the present contest, in opposition to Cato, whose success might have proved a considerable obstruction to the designs of either.

It is observed of this competition, that it was carried on without bribery or tumult. As the competitors were supposed to be all of the Senatorian party, the Senators thought their interest secure whichever of the candidates should prevail. And as the Senatorian party divided upon the occasion, the influence of Cæsar and Pompey united against Cato, easily cast the balance on the side of Sulpicius and Marcellus. Their antagonist, during the competition, continued in the same habits of friendship as usual with both; and when the choice was decided in their favour, instead of withdrawing from public view, as was common under such disappointments, from the place of election, he passed to the field of Mars,

stript, went to exercise as usual, and continued from thenceforward to frequent the Forum in his common undress. To those who condoled with him, or pressed him to continue his suit for another year, as he had done when first disappointed of the Prætorship, he made answer, That he thought it was the part of a good man to undertake the public service, whenever he was intrusted with it, and to make his willingness known, but not to court the public for employments as a favour to himself. "The People," he said, "at the time that they refused me the Prætorship, were under actual violence: in this case, "they have made a free choice, and it appears that "I must either violate my own mind, or renounce "their suffrage. My own mind is of more conse-"quence to me than their favour; but, if I retain "my character, I shall not be so unreasonable as to "expect consideration from persons to whom it is "not agreeable*."

When the new Consuls were received into office, their immediate predecessors being by the late act precluded for five years from holding any provincial government, it became necessary to fill stations of this sort with those who had formerly been in office, and who hitherto had not been appointed to any commission abroad. Accordingly Bibulus, who had been the colleague of Cæsar in his Consulate, was appointed to the government of Syria, vacant by the death of Crassus. Cicero was named to succeed Appius Clau-

U. C. 702. Serv. Sulpicius, M. Claud. Marcellus, Coss.

* Plutarch. in Caton. p. 268.

dius in Cilicia and Cyprus, Atius Varus was appointed Prætor in Africa, and P. Cornelius Spinther in Achaia. Pompey, who had hitherto enjoyed a dispensation from the law, in continuing to hold by his lieutenants the government and command of the army in Spain, while he held the dignity of Consul in the city, now professed an intention to take possession of his Spanish province in person, and he actually took his departure from Rome for this purpose; but was induced to suspend his journey by a motion, which was made in the Senate by Marcellus, soon after his accession to the office of Consul, on which he was then entered.

This motion related to Cæsar, who was now in possession of a very important privilege, entitling him to sue for the Consulate, without resigning the command of his army. His view in coveting this privilege; his continual augmentation of the troops in his province; his address in attaching the army to himself; his insinuation; his liberality; his assiduity to gain every person that could be won, and to preclude from power every one likely to oppose himself: the whole tendency of his conduct, and the enormous power he had acquired, began to be noticed by the most inattentive, and gave a general alarm. What Cato had so often represented, without any effect, began to be generally perceived; and persons, who had formerly temporised, or thought to conciliate Cæsar by concessions, were desirous now to recall their gifts, or to remove him from the post of enormous advantage he had gained.

Many members of the Senate had become remiss

in their attendance, and regardless even of their own political interests. The few who exerted themselves, were distracted with personal jealousies and distrust of each other. Cicero, in particular, who before his banishment had been strenuous on the side of public order, now grown timorous from the sufferings he had incurred, was chiefly attentive to his own safety, which he studied by paying his court to the prevailing powers. There was no bar in Cæsar's way, beside the great consideration and the jealousy of Pompey, who had been hitherto subservient to his designs, and even assisted him in procuring his privilege to stand for the Consulate in absence, but now saw its tendency, and wished to withdraw it. It was probably, therefore, with the approbation of Pompey, though after his departure from Rome, that the Consul Marcellus, while the Senate was deliberating on other removes and appointments in the provincial governments, proposed that, the war in Gaul being finished, Cæsar in particular should be recalled; or, if his friends insisted on his being continued in his command, that he should not be admitted on the list of candidates for the Consulate, until he complied with the law, and presented himself personally for this purpose.

This motion gave rise in the Senate to warm debates, which were frequently adjourned, and as often resumed. The Consul Sulpicius, supported by such of the Tribunes as were in the interest of Cæsar, opposed the motion. Pompey himself, under pretence that he waited the issue of these debates, stopped short in his journey to Spain, passed some time at

Ariminum, in reviewing the new levies which were destined to reinforce the troops of his province; and at last, being summoned to attend the Senate on the fifteenth of August, to consider of the provincial arrangements *, he returned to Rome.

On this day, Pompey affected to censure the violence with which it had been proposed to recall, before the expiration of his term, an officer legally appointed. He at the same time acknowledged his opinion, that Cæsar ought not to unite the government of a province, and the command of an army with the dignity of Consul; but dissuaded the Senate from taking any immediate resolution on that head. The debate was adjourned to the first of September †. Then no meeting of the Senate could be formed; but as soon as the subject was again resumed, the late Consul, Cornelius Scipio, the father-in-law to Pompey, proposed, that on the first of March, when the persons destined to succeed the present Consuls must have entered on office, a day should be fixed specially to consider of the province of Gaul; and moved that this question should be then resumed in preference to any other business whatever ‡. Marcellus accordingly prepared, and laid before the Senate a decree for this purpose on the last of September. By the first clause of this decree, the Consuls elected for the ensuing year were required, on the first of March, to move in the Senate the consideration of the consular provinces, to admit no other business to pre-

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* Cicer. Epist. ad Familiar. lib. viii, ep. 4. Dio. Cass. lib. iv, c. 58, 59.
† Cicer. ad Familiar, lib. viii, ep. 9. ‡ Ibid.

cede or to be joined with this, and to suffer no interruption in the meetings of the Senate, even on account of the assemblies of the People. By the same clause, it was resolved, That the three hundred Senators, appointed judges for the year, might be called off from their sittings in the courts to attend the Senate on this business; and if it should be necessary to make any motion on this subject in the assemblies of the People at large, or of the Plebeians * separately, that the Consuls Sulpicius and Marcellus, the Prætors, the Tribunes, or such of them as shall be named for that purpose, should move the people accordingly.

To this clause were prefixed, in the usual form, the names of twelve Senators, as the authors or movers of the act.

By a second clause, bearing the same names, a caution was entered against any obstruction to be given in this business by persons empowered to control the Senate's proceedings; and it was resolved, That whoever should put a negative on this decree, should be declared an enemy to his country; and that the Senate, notwithstanding any such negative, should persist in recording its own act, and in carrying its purpose into effect. In the face of this resolution, the Tribunes C. Cælius, L. Venicius, P. Cornelius, C. Vibius Pansa, interposed their negatives.

By another clause, the Senate resolved, That on the same day, the case of the armies of the republic should be taken into consideration, and all who claim-

* Ad Populum Plebemve ferrent. Ibid.

ed their dismission, either on account of the length of service, or any other consideration, should be heard; and that this likewise should be entered on the journals of the Senate, notwithstanding any negative interposed to the contrary. Here the Tribunes C. Cælius and C. Pansa again forbade the decree. The last clause related to the mode of carrying into execution the purpose of the Pompeian law, with respect to the nomination of Pro-prætors to the province of Cilicia, and the other eight Prætorian provinces; and on this clause likewise, the two last-mentioned Tribunes entered their negative *.

Thus the resolutions of the Senate, though preserved on their own records, were, by the continual interposition of the Tribunes, prevented from having any real effect. And Cæsar, from the disputes which had arisen on his own account, had sufficient warning, if this had been necessary, to prepare himself for an approaching conflict. It is indeed likely, that though in action the principal characters of his mind were decision and rapidity, yet no man ever laid his designs more deep, looked forward to consequences more remote, or waited with more patience the proper time for the execution of his projects. He had now, by the unremitted application of eight years, acquired the advantage, for the sake of which he had coveted the command in Gaul; he was at the head of a numerous army, which he had gradually augmented from two or three legions, the establishment of his province, to twelve, well inured to service, and

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii, ep. 8.

attached to his person. He was in possession of a privilege to stand for the Consulate, without disbanding his army; and when he should unite the first civil and political authority in the State, with an army at the gates of the capital, there is no doubt that he might be considered as sovereign of the empire. His apparent right to the advantages he had gained was such, that the resolutions of the Senate against him, however necessary to the preservation of the commonwealth, might have the semblance of injustice, and were likely to engage both his own army and the populace of Rome in his quarrel. He himself prepared for the issue, by removing every cause of embarrassment in his province, and by farther attaching the legions under his command with gratifications and bounties.

He had dispersed or destroyed all the great armies, which the utmost efforts of the Gaulish nations, in the preceding campaign, had been able to assemble against him; but he had not reconciled the spirits of that people, nor inured them to his government. In this therefore he had a plausible ground, from which to refute the allegations of the Senate, who proceeded in their resolutions to recall him, on a supposition, that the war in his province was ended; and at the same time, had a fair pretence to gratify his army with the spoils of the country. For these purposes, soon after he had placed the legions in separate quarters, he had intelligence, or affected to believe, that the war was likely to break out afresh in his province; and under this pretence, he took occasion to carry different bodies successively into action. Lea-

ving M. Antony to command at Bibracté* on the right of the Loire, he himself, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, passed that river, took the canton of the Bituriges by surprise, plundered their habitations, carried many of the people into captivity, and continued to lay waste the country, until they and all the neighbouring cantons on the left of the Loire, to avert these calamities, surrendered themselves at discretion.

From this expedition, in which he spent forty days, he returned to his quarters, and ordered the two legions, which had been thus employed, a gratuity of two hundred sestertii, or about thirty shillings a man to the private soldiers; and of about two thousand sestertii, or sixteen pounds to the Centurions. This money, it is observed by the historian †, was not immediately paid; but was retained by Cæsar as a pledge in his own hands, or remained as a debt due to the army, giving to every individual a special interest in the safety and success of his general, on whom he depended for this and other emoluments.

About eighteen days after this first division of the army had returned to its quarters, other two legions were employed on a like expedition between the Loire and the Seine‡. The inhabitants of this tract were to suffer military execution, upon a complaint that they infested the recent acquisitions of Cæsar beyond the Loire. He accordingly marched to protect his new allies; and being arrived in the country, from

* Afterwards Augustodûnum, now Autun. † Hirt. de Bell. Gallico.

‡ To the country of the Carnutes.

whence they were said to be invaded, found the supposed enemy, by the devastations of the preceding campaign, which had ruined their towns and villages, reduced to live in temporary huts, in which they withstood with difficulty the inclemency of the season, and were rather objects of pity than of hostile resentment. On the approach of the Romans, they fled to the woods, where they perished in great numbers, from the effects of famine and cold. To force them to an immediate surrender, or to cut off all hopes of advantage from delay, Cæsar made a disposition to prevent their having any respite from their present sufferings. For this purpose, he ordered the ruins of Genabum * to be repaired as a place of arms, quartered his legions there, and kept the horse and irregular infantry in the field to pursue the natives, to seize their persons, or otherwise to multiply the evils to which they were exposed. In this service, too, it was likely that the army was rewarded by the distribution of captives, and were allowed to have a claim upon Cæsar for gratuities equal to those which had been granted to the eleventh and twelfth legions.

These operations led on to the spring, when a more real service took place on the frontiers of the Low Countries. From that quarter, the people of the Remi † had given information, that the Bellovaci, or inhabitants of what is now called the Beauvois, with other cantons on the right of the Oise, were actually arming, and meant to make war on the Romans and their allies.

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* Now Orleans. † Rheims.

On this intimation, Cæsar thought proper again to call forth the eleventh legion into service; and it is remarkable that this legion, though now in its eighth campaign, is expressly said to have been thus employed out of its turn, in order to improve a discipline, in which, when compared to the older legions, they were deemed to be still defective. The eighth and ninth legions, the one from the station of Fabius, and the other from that of Labienus, were ordered to join them in the country of the Suessones*, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne. With this force Cæsar passed the Oise; but arrived too late to stifle the intended commotion. The Bellovaci†, with some of their neighbours, apprehending, from the fate of the nations on the Loire, that they could not rely for safety on their own innocence, nor on the care which they had taken to avoid giving offence to the Romans, had already taken arms for their own security, and with all their effects had retired to a strong post. They had a hill in their front, beyond which there lay a morass, and in that situation they thought themselves sufficiently secure without any artificial work.

Cæsar posted himself in their neighbourhood: and supposing, as in some former instances of the same kind, that the superiority of their own numbers would inspire the enemy with confidence, he took measures to augment their presumption, and to derive some advantage from the errors they were likely to commit, under the effects of this disposition.

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* The Soissons. † The Beauvois.

For this purpose he affected unusual caution, fortified his camp with uncommon care, scarcely ventured abroad to cover his foragers, and seemed to be entirely occupied in securing himself.

The Gauls, however, continued to avoid any general action, and were satisfied with the successful war they were suffered to make on the foraging parties which were sent from the Roman camp. Being joined by five hundred German horse, they attacked and destroyed the cavalry which had come to the assistance of Cæsar from the cantons of the Remi and Lingones *, and on which he chiefly relied for covering the avenues to his camp. By this loss he might have been in a little time reduced to great distress, or even forced to retire, if he had not procured a speedy reinforcement, by ordering Trebonius, with the two legions lately stationed at Genabum †, and a third from Avaricum ‡, to join him without delay.

The Gauls, on hearing of this great accession of strength to their enemy, and recollecting the fatal blockade and ruin of their countrymen at Alesia, determined to change their ground. They began to execute this resolution in the night, by removing their sick, wounded, and baggage; but had made so little progress at break of day, that their intention was discovered, and Cæsar, before they began their march, had time to pass the morass, and to take possession of the rising ground in their front. This he did with the greatest dispatch; and though he

* Rheims and Langres. † Orleans. ‡ Bourges.

did not think it expedient to attack them in their present position, he had it in his power to take advantage of any movement they should make, and accordingly continued to awe, and to keep them in suspense.

The Gauls, therefore, instead of being able to depart, as they expected, in the night, were obliged to remain a day in presence of their enemy, to cover the retreat of their wounded and baggage. They still flattered themselves, that the Romans, seeing them remain on their ground, would think proper to fall back to their former camp; but observing, that while the greater part of the legions continued in readiness for action, others began to intrench themselves where they stood, they had recourse to a stratagem, under cover of which they might themselves retire. For this purpose they brought forward the wood and straw, which remained, as usual, on the ground of their late encampment, laid them in a continued train along the front, and having set them on fire, produced such a line of smoke, as darkened the fields between the two armies. Under this cover they began their retreat, and before Cæsar could venture to penetrate the cloud of smoke in pursuit of them, had gained a considerable distance. On the first sight of this uncommon appearance, he suspected their intention, and began to advance; but the precautions, which he was obliged to take, in order to guard against any possible ambuscade or surprise, gave the Gauls the time which they wanted to effect undisturbed the first part of their movement.

Before night they halted again, about ten miles

from their former station, and with their flying parties recurred to the same means they had hitherto employed to distress the Roman army. They succeeded in most of their attempts on the small parties which were sent abroad by Cæsar to procure him provisions; and having reduced him to the necessity of depending entirely for the subsistence of his army on what a single district in his rear could supply, they formed a design, with the choice of their army, to surround and to cut off the parties, which they expected he must employ on that particular service. Cæsar had intelligence of their design, and prepared, in his turn, what seldom fails to succeed, a counter surprise. He placed his army in a proper position to cut off or command their ambuscade; and having thus taken or destroyed the flower of their army, obliged the remainder, who were thrown into despair by so great a loss, to surrender themselves at discretion. In consequence of this surrender, the Romans had entire possession of all the cantons in that neighbourhood.

The Belgic nations being thus finally subdued, and Cæsar having no longer any enemy to oppose him in the field, except a few desperate bands from different parts of the country, who, either from fear of his severity, or aversion to his government, had deserted their own settlements, he determined to act against the refractory in different quarters at once, and to cut off the retreats, which, in case of distress, this remnant of the nations who lately opposed him mutually gave to one another. He sent C. Fabius, with twenty-five cohorts, to act on the left of the Loire;

the twelfth legion, towards the sources of the Garonne, with orders to cover the approaches to Narbonne from the incursions of any stragglers, whom his intended severities might force upon desperate attempts on that side. He himself, with Labienus and Mark Antony, proceeded to the Meuse, where the territories of the late unfortunate Ambiorix *, beginning to be repeopled, and the nation reinstated under its former leader, were become again the object of his vengeance. To convince this unhappy people, that they were not to enjoy peace under the government of a prince who had presumed to circumvent and to destroy a part of the Roman army, he renewed his military execution against them, issuing his orders, as in the former instance, to spare neither sex nor age.

While Cæsar himself was employed in this manner, C. Fabius being arrived at the place of his destination, between the lower parts of the Loire and the Garonne, found a considerable force in arms against Caninius Rebilus, the Roman officer who was stationed in that quarter. The natives had besieged a fortress which was in possession of the Romans; but alarmed by the approach of Fabius, they withdrew, and endeavoured to pass the Loire to the northward. In this attempt, being intercepted in their march, and obliged to fight the Roman detachment, they were defeated with great slaughter. After this calamity, about five hundred, who escaped from the field under Drapes, a prince of that country, formerly dis-

* Now Liege, Juliers, and Guelderland.

tinguished in the war, took their flight in the opposite direction, and proposed to attack the Roman province of Narbonne, in order, with its spoils, to compensate the losses which they themselves had sustained.

Meantime, Fabius, in consequence of his victory, received the submission of all the nations from the Loire to the Seine, and quite down to the sea-coast. And having taken measures to secure his conquest, followed Drapes to the southward, overtook him beyond the Garonne, and obliged him, being no longer in condition to make any attempt on the Roman province as he proposed, to take refuge at Uxellodunum *, a place of strength, situated on a steep rock, at the confluence of some of those streams, which, falling from the Cevennes, form the Garonne by their junction.

Here Caninius and Fabius, having joined their forces together, made dispositions to invest their enemy; but before their works were completed, Drapes, while he had yet access to the fields, willing to spare the magazines which he had made up in the fortress, ventured abroad with a detachment, at the head of which he was surprised and taken. The natives, however, who remained in the place, being supplied for a considerable time with provisions, resolved on a vigorous defence; and, by baffling the Roman army for some time in its attack, began to raise up anew the hopes and expectations of the nations around them. Cæsar thought the reduction of this place an

* Supposed to be Cadenau.

object that called for his own presence. Having therefore sent Labienus to the Moselle, and having left M. Antony to command in the Low Countries, he himself, with his usual dispatch, traversed great part of Gaul, and appeared on the Garonne, equally unexpected by his own people, and by the enemy, who were besieged in the fortress of Uxellodunum.

The place being strong by nature, and in no want of provisions, could be forced only by intercepting its supply of water. For this purpose Cæsar lined the banks of the river with archers and slingers, and effectually prevented the besieged from supplying themselves from thence. He proceeded next to exclude them from the use of a spring which burst from the rock, in the approach to their town; for, having got the command of the ground, he pushed a mine to the source from which the water came, diverted it from its former direction, and, by depriving the besieged of this last resource, obliged them to lay down their arms, and trust to his mercy. In this, however, they experienced what the author *, from whom these accounts are taken, considered as more than the usual severity of ancient war. Cæsar, according to this historian, having given proof of his clemency, bethought himself now of an example of justice; and for this purpose, ordered such as had carried arms in defence of Uxellodunum to have their hands struck off †. And this refined act of

* Hirt. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii, c. 44.

† Cæsar quum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret. Omnibus qui arma tulerant manus precidit. Vitam concessit quo testatior esset pœna improborum. De Bell. Gall. lib. viii, c. 44.

cruelty being joined to the many barbarous executions with which the conquest of that country had been achieved, thus ended the war in Gaul.

The usual time of putting the troops into winter quarters not being come, Cæsar thought proper to visit the nations upon the Adour, or what is now called Gascony*; the only part of his new conquests in the acquisition of which he had not acted in person. He marched through this country at the head of two legions, and was every where received with the most perfect submission. From thence he repaired to Narbonne, the capital of his original province, held the usual conventions for the dispatch of civil affairs, and made a disposition for the quarters of his army during the winter. By this disposition two legions were stationed in the high country, towards the sources of the Garonne and the Loire, or in the territories of the Limovaci and Arverni†: two at Bibracté between the Soane and the Loire; two between the Loire and the Seine‡; and the remaining four under the command of Trebonius, Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius Cicero, in different parts of the Low Countries. To this quarter of his new conquests he himself repaired, and fixed his residence at Nemetocenna‖, in the centre of his northern stations.

By this distribution of his army, Cæsar formed kind of chain from the frontier of his original province, quite through the heart of his new acquisitions to the Meuse and the Scheld. And by his seemir

* Aquitania. † Limoges and Auvergne. ‡ At Tours and Chartres
‖ Supposed to be Arras.

anxiety for the safety of his northern extremity, and still more by his own distance from Italy, he probably lulled for a while the vigilance or jealousy of his principal opponents at Rome. His own attention, however, to the state of politics in the city, was never less remitted or slack.

Mark Antony, a person notoriously profligate and dissipated; but when the occasion required exertion, daring, strenuous and eloquent, as will appear on occasion in the sequel of this history, now began to be employed by Cæsar in the affairs of the city; and, under pretence of standing for the priesthood, was sent from Gaul, where he had recently served in the army, to bear a principal part among the agents and emissaries of his general at Rome. These agents were continually busied in extolling the merits of their employer, and in gaining to his interest every person of consideration who could in any degree advance or obstruct his designs. In the conquest of Gaul, they alleged that he added to the patrimony of the Roman People a territory of no less than three thousand miles in circumference, and a revenue of forty millions Roman money *. They took care at the same time, in his name and by his directions, under the pious pretence of celebrating the memory of his daughter, the late wife of Pompey, to cajole the people with public entertainments and feasts; and proceeded to execute, at a great expence, the splendid works which he had formerly ordered.

* Plutarch. in vit. Catonis, p. 268. Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 25. Between about three and four hundred thousand pounds.

Cæsar himself, at the same time, was careful to secure the affections of the army; doubled their pay, and was lavish in all the other articles which were derived from his bounty. Besides his occasional liberality to the legions in time of the war, he gave, or engaged himself to pay, to each particular soldier, what to persons of that condition was a considerable object. In the city he even entered into the secrets of every family, and, as has been mentioned, gained the master by courting the mistress or favourite slave. His purse was ever open to gratify the covetous with presents, to relieve the necessitous, and to silence the creditors of those who were oppressed with debt. He encouraged the prodigal to squander their patrimonies, and freely lent them the aids which their extravagance rendered necessary to them. He kept a correspondence at the same time with dependent and foreign princes; and took upon him the protection of provincial towns, in order to secure their attachment and their confidence *.

While the Proconsul of Gaul was thus extending his influence in the empire, he had amused Pompey, by assigning to him, in all their arrangements, what was apparently the place of honour and of importance at the head of affairs at Rome; as he had gratified Crassus likewise, by leaving him to choose the most lucrative government, while he himself submitted to be employed as a mere provincial officer to explore a barbarous country, and to make war with its natives. But by thus yielding the suppose

* Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 26, 27, 28.

preference of station to his rivals, he actually employed them as the willing tools and ministers of his own ambition. The former, with all his disposition to emulation and jealousy, for some time the dupe of these artifices, imagined that Cæsar had risen in the State by his permission, and that the present condition of parties was the fruit of his own address. As he himself, for the most part, endeavoured to obtain his ends by means indirect and artificial, he was the more easily duped by those who affected to be deceived, and who by that means were able to overreach him. Although it was impossible for him now to remain any longer insensible to the superiority which Cæsar had acquired, or to those still more important objects at which he was aiming, yet he had not hitherto taken his part openly nor directly against him, but contented himself with employing others in placing ill-concerted and ineffectual obstructions in his way, which he sometimes disowned, and always feebly supported. At last, and in the prosecution of the measures of which we have observed the beginning in the Senate, he hazarded the whole authority of that body against Cæsar, without having provided any military power to enforce their commands.

Pompey himself, while most under the influence of ambition, and when he had it most in his power to trample on the civil constitution of his country, had shown a respect for the commonwealth, which kept him within bounds that were consistent with this species of government; and he imagined that no man could presume to surpass himself in pretensions

to rise above the ordinary level. In the course of debates relating to the present state of affairs, he generally spoke ambiguously, or affected to disbelieve the designs that were imputed to Cæsar; but finding, on the last motion which was made to recall him from Gaul, that the eyes of the whole Senate were turned upon himself, he was forced to some explanation; in which, with apparent embarrassment, he said, that although it was his opinion, that the Proconsul of Gaul could not, in consistence with justice, be instantly recalled, yet that after the first of March he should have no difficulties on the subject. "But," says one of the Senators, "What if "this motion should then have a negative put upon "it?" "I shall make no distinction," replied Pompey, "between Cæsar's refusing to obey the order of "the Senate, and his procuring some one here to for- "bid that order."—"But what if he persist in de- "manding the Consulate, while he retains his pro- "vince and his army?" "What," replied Pompey, "if my own child should offer me violence*?"

After the attempt which had been made to fix the question of Cæsar's recall for the first of March, Pompey, being at Naples, was taken ill, and supposed to be in danger. His recovery gave a general satisfa- tion, of which he had afterwards very flatterin proofs in his progress through Italy. He was eve where met by processions, found the ways strew before him with flowers, and was received by mul

* Cicer. Epist. ad Familiares, lib. viii, ep. 8.

tudes, who appeared to be frantic with joy for the return of his health.

Whatever part Pompey himself or his emissaries may have had in procuring these demonstrations of respect and affection, it is probable he was highly flattered with them, and either mistook them himself, or hoped that others should mistake them, as the proofs of a consideration and power which no attempt of his rival could overset or impair.

The principal attention of all parties, during this summer and autumn, as has been mentioned, had been turned to the affairs of Cæsar, and the dangerous tendency of the course he pursued: and they were but for a little while diverted from this object by an alarm on the side of Syria. The Parthians, encouraged by their late success against Crassus, passed the Euphrates with a great army, commanded by Pacorus, son to Orodes, under the direction of Osaces, a veteran or experienced leader. They had, during the preceding winter, made an alliance with the king of Armenia, and in this invasion were to be joined by his forces. The disaster of Crassus had rendered the Parthian name terrible at Rome; and this intelligence struck a momentary panic in the city, as if an enemy were already at the gates. Some proposed to give Pompey the command in Syria; some to send Cæsar thither; and others, to send both the present Consuls to the army, with a proper reinforcement *.

But before these measures could be adjusted, or before any reinforcement could be ready to join the

* Cicer. ad Familiares, lib. viii, ep. 10.

army in Syria, the people were relieved of their fears by Caius Cassius, the general then commanding under Bibulus in that province. This officer having obliged the Parthians to withdraw from Antioch; in their retreat attacked and routed them with great slaughter. Osaces in that action received some wounds, of which, in a few days afterwards, he died; and the Parthian army remained inactive during the following year in their retreat beyond the Euphrates; sensible, in their turn, that a war carried over the wastes of that desolated frontier might be ruinous to any power by whom it was attempted.

Bibulus, the Proconsul of Syria, soon after the defeat of the Parthians, arrived in his province, and, according to the established practice of the Romans, laid his pretensions to a triumph for the victory which, under his auspices, though before his arrival, had been obtained by his lieutenant.

This invasion of Syria, as well as some disturbances in his own province, furnished Cicero, at the same time, with the occasion of some military operations, of which we have a particular account in his letters, and which, though not material to the military history of the times, are not unworthy of notice, as they relate to this eminent personage. He had taken possession of his command in Cilicia, and however better fitted by his habits for the Forum and the political assemblies at Rome than for the field, possessed qualities to qualify him for any station, put himself at the head of an army, and prepared for the defence of his province. He had set out from Rome in May; and having had a confer-

ence with Pompey at Tarentum, arrived at Brundisium on the twenty-first of that month*.

The military establishment of Cilicia being no more than twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, Cicero applied for an augmentation of it, and on the fourth of June was still at Brundisium, waiting for an answer to this application. But finding that his request, having been opposed by the Consul Sulpicius †, was unsuccessful, he set sail from that place, arrived at Actium on the fifteenth of that month, and, passing through Athens, reached his province on the last of July. Here he found the troops, in consequence of a mutiny which had recently broke out amongst them, separated from their officers, dispersed in places of their own choosing; the men of entire cohorts absent from their colours, and considering themselves as exempt from any authority or government whatever. In these circumstances, the new governor, trusting to the respect that was due to the name and commission of Proconsul, ordered M. Annius, one of his lieutenants, to assemble as many as he could of the mutinous troops, and to encamp at Iconinm in Licaonia. There he joined them on the twenty-fourth of August; and, having intelligence of the Parthian invasion, took measures for the security of his province; marched, without loss of time, to Cybistra, on the frontier of Cappadocia; took under his protection the king Ariobarzanes, who was then, by a powerful faction in his own kingdom, threatened with a revolt, and

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. iii, ep. 3. † Ibid

by receiving him as a prince in alliance with the Romans, dispelled the storm which had been gathering against him. He accepted, at the same time, of the offers which were made by Dejotarus to join him with all his forces; and being in this situation when he received accounts that the Parthians had presented themselves before Antioch, he supposed that his presence might be wanted to cover his own frontier on the side of Syria. He accordingly moved to that quarter, in order to secure the passes of the mountains. Here, however, he learnt, that the storm had blown over; that the enemy, obliged to withdraw, had sustained a considerable loss in their retreat; and that Bibulus was then at Antioch. This intelligence he communicated to Dejotarus, intimating, at the same time, that his assistance was no longer necessary.

The province of Cilicia had been for some years subject to the Romans; but the inhabitants of the mountainous parts had never acknowledged their authority, nor even that of their own national sovereigns. Cicero, being now with an army in the neighbourhood of those mountains, and finding that the people had retired to their strongholds, with a resolution to oppose his authority, formed a design to surprise them; and, for the better execution of his project, made a feint to withdraw to Epiphania, where he halted for a day, as if to refresh his troops. On the day following, which was the eleventh of October, in the evening, he put his army again in motion towards the mountains, and before morning arrived in the midst of his enemies, who by this time

had returned to their usual habitations; cut them off separately, pursued such as fled, forced their strongholds, and in about sixty days reduced to submission a number of towns, and a considerable tract of country, which had never before acknowledged the Roman government.

The troops, on this occasion, saluted their commander with the title of Imperator; which being usually given to victorious leaders *, was commonly understood as the suffrage of the army for obtaining a triumph. Cicero himself, accordingly, on this circumstance, together with the service which gave occasion to it, afterwards grounded his claim to that honour. This claim, indeed, he scarcely seems to have seriously entertained; he even treats it as a jest in some of his letters; yet the triumph being in these latter times considered rather as the means of acquiring a certain rank in the commonwealth, than as a measure or acknowledgment of military service, he submitted his pretensions to the Senate, and urged his friends to support them. His conduct as governor of a province, at a time when this station was supposed to give a licence to every species of rapine and oppression, did honour to his own disposition, and to those literary studies in which he was taught to choose the objects of his ambition and his habits of life. In this character he declined, both for himself and for his attendants, all those presents, contributions, and even supply of provisions, of which custom or law had authorised Roman officers of State

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv, ep. 4.

to avail themselves in passing through the provinces. In his command he distinguished himself by his humanity, condescension, and disinterestedness; was easy of access, and hospitable; open, in particular, to all persons of reputed ingenuity, whom he entertained without ostentation. In such situations, Roman officers, though of great merit, indulged themselves in what was the custom of their times; they drained the provinces to accumulate their own fortunes, or placed their money there at extravagant interest. He was governed by different maxims, and wished to rise above his contemporaries by the fame of his disinterestedness, as well as by that of his ingenuity and civil accomplishments. Other citizens might possess greater steadiness, and force or elevation of mind; but his fine genius, his talents, and preference of reputation to profit, of which his weakness indeed often prevented the full effect, still rendered him an important acquisition to either of the parties in the commonwealth. And as they endeavoured to gain, so they even seemed to acquire, his support in their turns.

Whilst the concerns of State in the provinces were thus administered by the commanders to whom they were intrusted, the usual time of elections at Rome being arrived, L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Claudius Marcellus, were elected to succeed in the Consulate of the following year.

Soon after these elections, attempts were made though without effect, to carry into execution some of the regulations devised by Pompey, in his late administration, to check the corruption of the times

Calidius had been engaged in the last competition, and, immediately upon his disappointment, was brought to trial for illegal means employed in his canvass. He was acquitted; but, in return for the prosecution he had undergone, retorted the charge on Marcellus, and wished to annul his election; but *failed* in the attempt.

Of those who were now elected, Caius Marcellus, as well as his relation and immediate predecessor Marcus Marcellus, was understood to be in the interest of Pompey. Æmilius Paulus, a Senator of high rank, and of course interested in the preservation of the republic, the honours of which he was so well entitled to share, was expected to support the measures of the Senate, and adhere to the established forms. And thus, together with internal peace, the government seemed to recover its ancient severity. Appius Claudius, late Proconsul of Cilicia, and Calpurnius Piso, were appointed Censors, and seemed to have authority sufficient to carry into execution the powers lately restored to this office by the ordinance of Scipio. It was particularly expected that these Censors would hold an even balance between the factions. Appius favoured Pompey, but Piso, from his relation of father-in-law to Cæsar, was intrusted to check the partiality of his colleague. The hopes of the Senate were likewise considerably raised by the unexpected nomination of Caius Scribonius Curio to be one of the Tribunes. Servius Pola, after being elected into this office, had been convicted of bribery; his election therefore was set aside, and that of Curio was sustained. This young man being of an

honourable family, and possessing talents which qualified him for the highest preferments, naturally set out on a foot of independence, and indifference to party, or joined only with those who professed to maintain the freedom of the commonwealth, and their own equal pretensions to preferments together with power. Being active and bold, as well as eloquent, the Senators were fond of a partisan who was likely to take upon himself much of that fatigue and danger which too many of them were willing to devolve upon others, even where their own estates and dignities were at stake.

U. C. 703. L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Claudius Marcellus.

The new magistrates, accordingly, entered on office with high expectations that the dangerous pretensions of ambitious citizens, particularly those of Cæsar, would be effectually checked. The Consuls were in possession of a decree, requiring them to proceed to the business of Cæsar's province by the first of March. This recall wanted only the consent of the Tribunes to render it a formal act of the executive power, of which this branch was by the constitution lodged in the Senate. But one of the Tribunes having forbid the proceeding, M. Marcellus, late Consul, moved that application might be made to this officer to withdraw the negative, which prevented the effect of what the Senate had resolved. But the motion was rejected by a majority * of the Senate itself; and many other symptoms of Cæsar's great influence even over this order of men, soon after appeared.

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii, ep. 13.

This able politician, probably that he might not seem to have any views upon Italy, had fixed his quarters, and that of his army, chiefly in the Low Countries, or at the farthest extremity of his recent conquests. And, instead of seizing every pretence, as formerly, for making war on the natives of Gaul, endeavoured to quiet their fears, and to conciliate their affections *; but while he kept the whole province in a state of profound tranquillity, he collected money, provided arms, and completed his legions, as if preparing for a dangerous and important war. His distance from Italy lulled the jealousy of his opponents, and enabled him to carry on his operations unobserved. He spared no expence in gaining accessions to his interest; and when those he would gain, accepted of promises, he seemed to make them with unbounded confidence in the means on which he relied for performance. In this he acted as on the eve of a great revolution, the event of which was to raise him above the want of resources, or above the necessity of a scrupulous faith with private persons. He actually remitted at this time great sums of money to Rome; and no less than fifteen hundred talents, or about L. 289,500, to the management of the Consul Æmilius alone, who was intrusted to lay out this money in erecting public buildings for the decoration of the city. But not being superior to corruption, at least not to that sort of insinuation which was addressed to his vanity, and which was now artfully practised in his nomination as agent and trustee

* Hirt. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii, c. 49.

for so popular a leader as Cæsar, he disappointed the hopes of his friends, and in all the contests which arose during his Consulate *, became an active partisan for the person who had honoured him with so flattering a trust.

It was likewise very early observed in these debates, that the zeal of Curio, who set out with violent invectives against Cæsar, began to abate; that he for a while endeavoured to divert the attention of the public to other objects †; and at last fairly withdrew himself from the support of the Senate, and espoused the interest of Cæsar in every question.

This interest was now likewise strengthened by the accessions brought to it in consequence of the disputes of the Censors. These magistrates concurred in expunging from the rolls of the Senate such as were of servile extraction, and some even of noble family, on account of any infamy or blemish in their character. But Appius, having carried his affectation of zeal beyond what the age could bear, and being suspected of partiality to Pompey's friends, gave offence to Piso, who, by protecting many citizens who were stigmatised by his colleague, gained them to the interest of Cæsar. From these several causes, this party became very numerous even in the Senate, and continued to suspend any decrees that were proposed to deprive their leader of his command, or to recall the extraordinary privilege with which he had been formerly vested.

It was afterwards discovered, in the sequel of these

* Appian. Plutarch. † Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii, ep. 6.

transactions, that Curio, some time before he openly declared himself for Cæsar, had been actually gained by his liberalities. This young man, with the youth of that age in general, had dissipated his fortune, and incurred amazing debts. His popularity was the effect of his profusion; and the load of his debts made him a very uncertain friend to that order of things, and to those laws, which supported the just claims of his creditors against himself. He readily listened to Cæsar, who offered to relieve him of this burden, and actually paid his debts to a great amount *; according to some reports, to the amount of ten millions Roman money †; according to others, of six times that sum ‡.

Curio, even after he took his resolution to join Cæsar, continued to speak the language of his former party, and to persist in their concerts, until he should find a plausible excuse for breaking with them. Such a pretence ‖ he sought by starting many subjects of debate without consulting them, and by making proposals in which he knew that the leading men of the Senate would not concur. To this effect he devised a project for the reparation of the highways, offering himself to have the inspection of the work for five years. And when much time had been spent in fruitless debates on this subject, he insisted, that a considerable intercalation should be made to

* Plutarch. Dio. Sueton. Appian.

† Velleius, lib. ii, c. 48.—L. 80,729. See Arbuthnot's Tables.

‡ Valerius Maximus, lib. ix, c. 1.

‖ Dio, Cass. lib. xl, c. 61. Appian. de Bello Civile.

lengthen the year of his Tribunate, that he might have sufficient time to ripen his projects. Being opposed in this by the College of Augurs *, he employed his Tribunitian power to obstruct all other business, and separated himself entirely from his late friends in the Senate. Having in this manner withdrawn himself from his former party, he did not at once openly join their opponents; but, with professions of independence, affected to reprobate the errors of both; and, by this artful conduct, seemed to have received the instructions, or to have imitated the policy of his leader.

When the great question of Cæsar's recall was revived, Curio inveighed, as formerly, against the exorbitant powers which had been committed to this general, and urged the necessity of having them revoked; but subjoined, that the powers granted to Pompey were equally dangerous, and proposed, that both should be ordered to disband their armies, and return to a private station. The partisans of Pompey observed, that the term of his commission was not yet expired; nor that of Cæsar's, replied Curio. If either is to be disarmed, it is proper that both should be so; of two armies, if one invade, the other may defend us; but if only one be disbanded, we are certainly the slaves of that which remains.

There were probably now three parties in the State; one devoted to Cæsar, another to Pompey, and a third that wished to support the republic against the intrigues or violence of either. The lat-

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii, ep. 6.

ter must have been few, and could not hope to be of much consequence, except by joining such of the other two, as appeared by the character of its leader least dangerous to the commonwealth. Cæsar had shown himself in his political course a refractory subject, and an arbitrary magistrate. In the first of these characters, he had supported every party that was inclined to commit disorder in the State, or to weaken the hands of government. In the second, when Prætor, it had been necessary to suspend his functions; when Consul, he had violated the treasures of the commonwealth, and alienated the most valuable part of its demesne, to insure the support of a disorderly faction against the laws of his country; and it was the general opinion of considerate persons, that his thirst of power and emolument was not to be satiated without a total subversion of all civil or political institutions: that if, in the contest which seemed to impend, his sword should prevail, a scene of bloodshed and rapine would ensue, far exceeding what had ever been exhibited in the prevalence of any faction that oppressed the republic. The description of his adherents *, and the character of persons who crowded to his standard, justified the general fear and distrust which was entertained of his designs. All who had fallen under sentence of the law, all who dreaded this fate, all who had suffered any disgrace, or were conscious they deserved it; young men who were impatient of government; the populace who had an aversion to order; the

* Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii, ep. 7.

bankrupt, to whom law and property itself were enemies; all these looked for his approach with impatience, and joined in every cry that was raised in his favour.

Pompey, the leader of the opposite party, had indeed never ceased to embroil the State with his intrigues, and even invaded the laws by his impatience for extraordinary and unprecedented distinctions; yet, when possessed of power, he had employed it with moderation, and seemed to delight in receiving these singular trusts by the free choice of his country; not in extorting them, not in making any illegal use of them, nor in retaining them beyond the terms prescribed by his commission. It appeared, that in nothing he had ever injured the commonwealth so deeply, as in caballing with Cæsar while he rose to his present elevation, from which he was not likely to descend, without some signal convulsion in the State *.

This comparison of the parties which were now to contend for power at the hazard of the republic, made it easy for good citizens to choose their side. But they nevertheless naturally wished to prevent the contest from coming to extremities; as in the event of a war, which they dreaded, it was scarcely possible to avoid a military government. They considered the proposal of Curio as a mere pretence to justify Cæsar in keeping possession of his army: but they saw that there was no force in the republic sufficient to resist him. They wished to arm Pompey for this

* Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii, ep. 3.

purpose; but were prevented, either by the confidence which he still gave them of his own superiority, or by their fear of precipitating the State into a civil war, by seeming to take any precautions against the danger with which they were threatened.

Cæsar would have considered every attempt to arm the republic as a declaration of war against himself; and was ready to commence hostilities before such a measure could be carried into any effect. The proposal for disarming at once both Cæsar and Pompey, in the mean time, was extremely acceptable to the popular party, who perpetually sounded the cry of liberty against the Senate, and lately, too, against Pompey himself, who, on account of the spirit of his administration when last in office, and the severity of his prosecutions against bribery and other offences, which are not odious to the vulgar, was become in a considerable degree unpopular, and supposed to aim at a tyranny. With such powers as Pompey already possessed, it was reckoned an effort of courage to brave his resentment. And Curio, in coming from the Senate, with the lustre of having acted so bold a part, was received by the populace with shouts and acclamations, was conducted to his own house over ways strewed with flowers, and, like a victor in the Circus, presented with chaplets and garlands, in reward of his courageous, patriotic and impartial conduct. This happened about the time that Pompey, as has been observed, was making a shew of his great popularity in the country towns, where he was received with feasts, processions, and acclamations, on occasion of his recovery from a supposed dangerous

illness. Cæsar, too, had a like reception in the towns of the Cisalpine Gaul; but it is likely, that of these three pretenders to popularity, Pompey was most elated with his share of the public favour, and the most likely to mistake these appearances of consideration for the stable foundations of power. Under this mistake probably it was, that when one of his friends asked him, with what force he was to oppose Cæsar if he should march into Italy with his army? "In Italy," he answered, "I can raise forces with a "stamp of my foot." He was, however, greatly alarmed by the motion which had been made by Curio, and by the reception it met with, whether in the approbation of the Senators, or in the acclamations of the People. He wrote a letter, on this occasion, to the Senate, in which he acknowledged the services of Cæsar, and mentioned his own. "His late "Consulate," he said, "was not of his seeking; it "was pressed upon him to save the republic in the "midst of great dangers: for the present command "he bore, it had devolved upon him in consequence "of his having been Consul, and was given for a "term of years, yet far from being expired; but he "was ready, nevertheless, without waiting for the "expiration of his term, to resign with alacrity what "he had accepted with reluctance." He continued, on every occasion, to repeat the same professions, adding, "That he made no doubt his relation and "his friend Cæsar would cheerfully make a like "crifice to the fears and apprehensions of his fello "citizens; and that, after many years of hard stru "gle with warlike enemies, he would now hasten

"retire with honour, and to solace himself in the "midst of family endearments, and domestic repose."

Pompey, for the most part, inclined to dissemble his sentiments, and advanced to his purpose by indirect means; he was therefore, like most artful men, easily overreached by persons who affected to be thrown off their guard, while they penetrated, and took measures to thwart his designs: on the present occasion, probably, he was the only dupe of his own cunning, and a prey to the artifices which were employed against himself. Curio, in the Senate, openly attacked this part of his character, insisting that actions, and not professions, were now to be regarded; that the army of Cæsar was, to the republic, a necessary defence against that of Pompey; that, nevertheless, under pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, enemies to their country, both should be ordered to disband; and that an army should be instantly levied to enforce these orders. "Now," said he, "is the time to reduce this assuming and "arrogant man, while you have a person who can "dispute his pretensions, and who can wrest those "arms out of his hands, which he now affects to re-"sign, but which he never would have willingly "dropped."

The friends of Cæsar, in the Senate, offered to compromise the dispute; and, provided Pompey retired to his province, and Cæsar were allowed to retain the Cisalpine Gaul with two legions, they proposed, in his name, to disband the remainder of his army, and to resign the other part of his provinces. "Observe the dutiful citizen and good subject," said

Cato, " how ready he is to quit the northern parts of " Gaul, if you only put him in possession of Italy " and of the city; and how ready to accept of your " voluntary submission, rather than employ your own " army against you to enforce your surrender *."

In the result of these debates, the Senate, upon the motion of the Consul Marcellus, came to a vote on the following questions, which were separately stated, relating to the appointments both of Cæsar and of Pompey. On the first question, Whether Cæsar should disband his army? the *Ayes* were general throughout the house. On the second, relating to Pompey, the *Noes* greatly prevailed. Curio and M. Antony insisted, that the questions were not fairly put, and that they did not collect the sense of the Senate: that the majority might be of opinion, that both should disband; and that both, therefore, should be included in the same question. To this purpose, accordingly, a third question was put; and the Senate having divided, a majority of three hundred and seventy *Ayes* appeared against twenty-two *Noes* †. Whether these proceedings of the Senate were annulled by any informality, or were deprived of effect by any other circumstance, does not appear. It is probable, that neither of the parties wished to have them carried into effect. And the only immediate consequence they seem to have had, was an order to Pompey and Cæsar, requiring each of them to march a legion to reinforce the army in Syria, where

* Plutarch. in Catone.

† Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. Plutarch. in Cæsar. p. 734.

the Parthians, though repulsed from Antioch in the preceding year, had wintered in the Cyrrhestica, a district of that province, and threatened to repeat their invasion in the present spring and summer; and this appears to have been no more than a feeble attempt on the part of Pompey or his friends, to strip Cæsar of two legions, of which, when it came to be executed, he well knew how to disappoint the effect.

While the subject of Cæsar's appointments occupied all parties at Rome, he himself, with his army, passed a quiet season in Gaul; and at the end of winter, or early in the spring, set out for Italy. He employed, as a pretence for this journey, the election to a vacant place in the College of Augurs, which was fast approaching, and for which his friend Mark Antony was a candidate. Many votes were to be procured in the colonies and free cities bordering on that part of his province which was within the Alps; and he made his journey with uncommon speed to secure them: but being informed, on the road, that the election of Augurs was past, and that his friend Antony had prevailed, he nevertheless, with the same diligence as before he received this information, continued his journey, saying, It was proper he should thank his friends for their good offices, and request the continuance of their favour in his own competition for the Consulate, which he proposed to declare on the following year. He alleged, as a reason for this early application, that his enemies, in order to oppress him, or to withstand his just pretensions, had placed C. Marcellus and P. Lentulus in the magis-

tracy of the present year, and had rejected the pretensions of Galba, though much better founded.

He was met in all the provincial towns and colonies of Cisalpine Gaul with more than a king ception, with sacrifices and processions every made by innumerable crowds, who were asser to see and admire him. Having made the circ this province, and sounded the dispositions of ... People, he returned with great dispatch to his quarters at Nemetocenna *, in the Low Countries, where he likewise wished to know the disposition as well as the state of his army; and, for this purpose, ordered the whole to assemble on the Moselle. He foresaw, that the Senate might possibly pass a decree to supersede him; and that he must then depend upon the humour of his legions, and make war, or submit, as he found them inclined: in this, however, it is probable that he was already in a great measure resolved, or had no doubt of their willingness to become his partners in a military adventure for the sovereignty of the empire.

In this state of affairs, he assigned to Labienus his station within the Alps; and seeming to have conceived a suspicion of this officer, or rather knowing that he was not disposed to follow him, in case his commission should be withdrawn by the Senate, nor to co-operate in any act of hostility against the republic, he wished to prevent the disputes which might arise on such an occasion, and to avoid the difficult task of determining how he should deal with a

* Arras.

zen, who being an offender against himself, was nevertheless in his duty to the State, and who either, by his impunity or by his sufferings, might start dangerous questions, and divide the opinions and affections of the army itself. He detached him, therefore, from the legions in the northern Gaul, to command on the Po, a station from which, if he should be so disposed, he could easily quit the province, and join the forces of the republic; and by this means rid him at once of a person on whom he could not rely, and whom he would scarcely dare to punish for defection. But in whatever manner we understand this separation, it is noticed, that while Cæsar himself remained with the army upon the Moselle, and made frequent movements merely to exercise the troops, to change their ground, and to preserve their health, a rumour prevailed, that his enemies were soliciting Labienus to desert him, and to carry off the troops that were under his command. At the same time it was reported, that the Senate was preparing a decree to divest Cæsar of his government, and to disband his army. These rumours he affected to treat as groundless; observing, that he could not believe such an officer as Labienus would betray his trust; and that for himself, he was at all times ready to submit his cause to a free Senate. The proposals of Curio, and his other friends, he said, had been so reasonable, that the Senate would have long since adopted them, if that body had not been under the improper influence of his enemies.

In these dubious times of jealousy and suspense, Cæsar received the famous order of the Senate, to

detach a legion from his province to reinforce h
army of Syria, now threatened with invasion f
the Parthians. And at the same time had a den
from Pompey, to restore the legion which, as for
ly mentioned, he had borrowed from the new l
which were made for the service in Spain. T
orders and demands in the present circumstances
a suspicious aspect; and although Cæsar affe
with cheerfulness, to comply in every particular,
he afterwards complained of this measure, as he term-
ed it, on the part of his enemies, as a mere artifice to turn his own forces against him. In obedience to the orders of the Senate, he sent the fifteenth legion, then upon the Po, and relieved it by one from his present camp in the northern Gaul. In restoring the legion he had borrowed from Pompey, he was at pains to ingratiate himself, and under pretence of gratitude for services past, was most lavish of his caresses and thanks; as an earnest of future liberality, he ordered each private man a gratuity of two hundred and fifty denarii *. By this artful conduct, while he parted with the men, he took care to retain their affections, and, together with the fifteenth legion, which he still called his own, he sent them, as at best but an uncertain and precarious accession of strength, to his enemies †.

The officers, who were sent on this commission, with instructions to conduct these troops into Italy, brought to their employers a very flattering repo

* About L. 5.

† Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii. Plutarch. in vita Pompeii, p. 455.

the state and disposition of Cæsar's army: that they longed to change their commander; had a high opinion of Pompey; and, if marched into Italy, would surely desert to him: that Cæsar was become odious on account of the hard service in which he had so long, and without any adequate reward, employed a Roman army, and still more on account of the suspicion that he aimed at the monarchy *. It is in the highest degree probable, that their crafty leader employed proper persons to hold this language to the commissioners of the Senate, and to the officers of Pompey; and to utter complaints of their commander, and of the service, on purpose that they might be repeated in Italy. His own preparations were not of more importance to him than the supine security into which he endeavoured, by this and every other artifice, to lull his enemies.

On the approach of winter, he conducted his army back to their quarters in the Low Countries, or the interior parts of Gaul. Trebonius was stationed with four legions on the Scheld and the Meuse; Fabius, with other four legions, between the Soane and the Loire, or in the canton of Bibracté, now Autun. This disposition, like that of the former winter, was calculated to avoid giving any alarm to his opponents in Italy. He himself intended to winter within the Alps, but had no troops on that side of the mountains that could give rise to suspicion; one veteran legion only is mentioned, the thirteenth, which he had sent to replace the fifteenth; which, upon pre-

* Plutarch. in vita Cæsaris, p. 733. et in vita Pompeii, p. 486.

tence of the Parthian war, had been called away from his province. Upon his arrival in Italy, he affected surprise in being told, that the two legions lately demanded from him had not been sent into Asia, were kept in Italy, and put under the command of Pompey. He complained, that he was betrayed that his enemies meant to disarm and circumvent him. "But while the republic is safe, and matters "can be made up on amicable terms, I will bear," he said, "with any indignities offered to myself, "rather than involve the State in a civil war *."

While the factions that were likely to divide the empire were in this situation, C. Marcellus, now third of this name in the succession of Consuls, together with Publius Lentulus, were elected for the following year. Before they entered on office, a rumour arose, that Cæsar, with his whole army, was actually in motion to pass the Alps. On this alarm Marcellus, Consul of the present year, assembled the Senate; laid the subject before them, and moved, that the troops then in Italy should be prepared to act, and that new levies should be ordered. A debate ensued, in which Curio contradicted the report, and, by his tribunitian authority, forbade the Senate to proceed in any resolution to disturb the peace of the empire.

On this interposition of the Tribune, the Consul Marcellus dismissed the assembly, pronouncing, together with other expressions of impatience, the following words: That if he were not supported by

* Hirtius de Bello Gallico, lib. viii, c. 46.

Senate, in the measures which were necessary for the preservation of the commonwealth, he should put the exercise of his power into hands more likely to make the State be respected: and having spoken these words, he repaired, together with Lentulus, one of the Consuls elected for the ensuing year, to the gardens where Pompey resided; being obliged, on account of his military command, to remain without the city; and presenting him with his sword, bid him employ it for the defence of his country, and with it to assume the command of the forces then in Italy. To this address from the Consul, Pompey, with an air of modesty, made answer, "If "nothing better can be devised for the common-"wealth."

CHAP. XXVI.

Return of different officers from their provinces.—Decree senate to supersede Cæsar.—Forbidden by the tribu Commission to the consuls and to Pompey.—Their resolu —Flight of the tribunes Antony and Quintus Cassius.— Speech of Cæsar to the legion at Ravenna.—Surprise of Ariminum.—March of Cæsar.—Flight of Pompey and the senate, &c.—Approach of Cæsar.—Embarkation and departure of Pompey from Brundisium.—Return of Cæsar to Rome.—Passes by Marseilles into Spain.—Campaign on the Segra.—Legions of Pompey in Spain conducted to the Var.

In this posture of affairs, the officers who had been sent in the preceding year to the command of provinces, were returned to Rome, and some of them, soliciting the military honours to which they thought themselves entitled by their services, remained with their ensigns of magistracy in the suburbs. Bibulus, though he had not been present in the action in which Cassius defeated the Parthians, yet being then governor of the province, and the advantage gained under his auspices, with the number of the enemy slain coming up to the legal description of those vices for which the triumph was usually obtained, he entered his claim; and accordingly, upon the motion of Cato, who probably wished him this consolat

for the mortifications he had received in his Consulate, he was found to be entitled to this honour. It had been long appropriated as the specific reward of victories, obtained by the slaughter of a certain number of enemies, and would have been preposterous in the case of any other merit. Cicero, nevertheless, now likewise applied for a triumph, partly in emulation to Bibulus, of whom he expresses some jealousy: and partly, that he might have a pretence for his stay in the suburbs, and for absenting himself from the Senate, or the Assemblies of the People, being very much perplexed how to steer between the parties of Cæsar and Pompey, who had both applied to him by letters to join them in the present dispute *. He had, some time before his departure from Cilicia, on his return to Rome, sent an account of his military operations to Cato, and to some others of his friends, with an earnest request, that a thanksgiving might be appointed for the victory he had obtained. In this he was gratified, as one of the greatest honours which a Roman officer could receive in absence, and which might lead to a triumph. To his letter Cato had replied in terms that were polite; but carrying some degree of indirect reproof for the improper ambition which Cicero betrayed in this request, and reminding him that his merit was not so much that of a warrior, as of a humane, upright, and able magistrate; saying, at the same time, that he had moved the Senate to pass a decree to this purpose in his favour, as thinking it more honourable than a thanks-

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. vii, ep. 1.

giving, which always had a reference to some event, depending on fortune or the valour of an army; at that, since Cicero had chosen to put his services the last footing, he himself had a double satisfact that of having done what he thought his duty, that of finding that the desire of his friend resp ing the thanksgiving was gratified*.

Cicero at first received this declaration of Cat a proper expression of friendship, and in the hig degree honourable to himself†; but on hearing of the military honours which, upon Cato's motion, were decreed to Bibulus, he was greatly provoked, and considered this conduct as partial to his rival, and invidious to himself‡. He was instigated or confirmed in these sentiments by Cæsar, who gladly seized the opportunity to incite him against Cato. "*Observe*," he said, in one of his letters, which is quoted by Cicero on this subject, "*the malice of the* "*man; he affects to give you the commendations of cle-* "*mency and integrity, which you did not desire, and* "*withholds a piece of common respect, which you had* "*asked.*"—"This conduct," continues Cicero to Atticus, "bespeaks the envy from which it proceeds. "It is not sufferable, nor will I endure it. Cæsar, "in his letter to me, has not failed in the proper re- "marks." Such were the concerns which distracted the mind of this ingenious but weak man, even while he himself foresaw an immediate conflict, in which

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv, ep. 5. † Ibid. ep. 6.
‡ Cicero ad Att. lib. vii, ep. 5.

the republic itself, and all the honours it could bestow, were probably soon to perish.

In the present situation of affairs, every resolution which the friends of the republic could take was beset with danger, and every day increased their perplexity. To leave Cæsar in possession of his army, and to admit him with such a force to the head of the commonwealth, was to submit, without a struggle, to the dominion he meant to assume. To persist in confining him to one or other of these advantages, was to furnish him with a pretence to make war on the republic. The powers which were necessary to repel the present danger, might be equally fatal to the republic in the possession of Pompey, as they were in the hands of Cæsar himself. The only person on whom the State was now to rely, even while his own consideration, with that of every other Senator, was at stake, did not seem disposed to act, until all the distinctions that were wanting to gratify his vanity should be united in his own person. With an appearance of ease and negligence, he went upon parties of pleasure through Italy, while every one else apprehended that Rome itself, as well as Italy, must soon become a scene of blood. At an interview with Cicero, whom, on his way to the city, he met near Naples, he himself spoke of a civil war as unavoidable *. Upon his return to Rome, on the twenty-sixth of December, he even seemed averse to any accommodation of parties. He declared his mind openly, that if Cæsar should obtain the Consulate,

* Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 8.

even upon laying down his arms, the State must be undone; that, in his opinion, whenever a vigc opposition appeared, Cæsar, in making his op would choose to retain his army, and drop his tensions to the Consulate; but, continued he, i should persist to run headlong, and bring matte the decision of the sword, how contemptible mus appear, a mere private adventurer against the au rity of the State, supported by a regular army u my command.

To justify this security, or presumption on the part of Pompey, who was surely a warrior of the first order, it must be remembered, that while Cæsar was forming an army in Gaul, Pompey, by means of his lieutenants, likewise formed a great army of six complete legions, and many auxiliaries, in Spain; and must have foreseen, that if Cæsar should make any attempt upon Italy, he should then be in condition to order his army to pass the Pyrenees as fast as that of Cæsar could pass the Alps, occupy his province, cut off his resources, and while Pompey himself received him with the forces of Italy, that the Spanish army should press upon his rear, and place him at once between two such formidable attacks. It ought likewise to be considered, that although few troops were then actually formed in Italy, yet this was the great nursery of soldiers for the whole empire, and multitudes could, on any sudden emergency, be embodied in every part of the country *.

Pompey, with these securities in his hands for

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi, ep. 12.

final success of his views against Cæsar, suffered this rival to run his career, leaving the Senate exposed to the dangers which threatened them, and under the influence of apprehensions, which he expected would render them more tractable, than he had generally found them in times of greater security, and more ready in every thing to comply with his own desires.

In the same strain of policy, Pompey had frequently ventured to foment or to connive at the growing troubles of the republic, in order to render himself the more necessary, and to draw from the Senate and the People offers of extraordinary trust and power. By the address of Cato, and of other active men in the Senate, he had been obliged on a late occasion, when he aimed indirectly at the powers of Dictator, to be content with those of sole Consul. It is probable, that he had entertained the same views on the present occasion, and permitted the evils to accumulate, until the remedy he wished for should appear to be necessary. He continued accordingly, with votes and resolutions of the Senate, to combat Cæsar, who was at the head of a numerous army, ready on the first plausible pretence to fall upon Italy, to seize the seats of government, and of consequence to wrest from his opponents, that name and authority of the republic, on which Pompey himself so greatly relied, for the ascendant which he hoped to preserve.

U. C. 704. Claudius Marcellus & L. Cornelius Lentulus.

Meantime, the new year commenced, and C. Claudius Marcellus with L. Cornelius Lentulus, entered on their office as Consuls. Both parties were prepared for a decisive resolution on the subject of Cæsar's claims. He him-

self for some years had wintered near to the northern extremity of his provinces. He was now at R[illegible]-na, the nearest station of his army to Rome [illegible]ut without any troops, besides what appear to have the usual establishment of the Cisalpine provi that is, the thirteenth legion, which, as we have had been sent thither to replace the legion, which he had been required to reinforce the arm Syria, and, together with these three hundred ca ry detached, making in all between five and six thousand men *. Soon after his arrival at Ravenna, he had been visited by Curio, who, at the expiration of his Tribunate, made this journey to receive his directions in respect to the future operations of the party; and after their conference, returned to Rome with a letter from Cæsar, addressed to the Senate, and which was accordingly presented on the first of January, at the admission of the new Consuls into office †.

On this occasion the Consul Lentulus moved, that prior to any other business, the state of the republic, and that of the provinces, should be taken under consideration; and alluding to the resolutions which were already on record, relating to Cæsar's province, said, that if the Senate stood firm on this occasion to their former decrees, his services should not be wanting to the commonwealth. He was seconded by Scipio, and was applauded by the general voice of the Senate; but Cæsar had procured the admission of Mark Antony and of Quintus Cassius, two of his

* Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii, p. 447. Plut. in Cæsare.
† Dio. Cassius, lib. xli, c. 1.

most noted and determined partisans, into the College of Tribunes. These could procure insurrections, furnish the pretence of violence in the city, whenever the military designs of their patron were ripe for execution: they were to be the instruments of what had been concerted with Curio, or whatever else should be thought proper to promote the designs of their leader. They began with threatening to stop all proceedings of the Senate, until Cæsar's letter was read; and prevailed on this meeting to begin with that paper. It was expressed, according to Cicero, in terms menacing and harsh *, and contained in substance a repetition of the proposals which the party had been all along making through Curio, and its other adherents at Rome, "That Cæsar should not "be disturbed in possession of the honours which "the Roman People had bestowed upon him; that "he should be left upon a foot of equality with other "officers, who were allowed to join civil office at "Rome with military establishments in the provin-"ces; and that he should not be singled out as the "sole object of their distrust and severity †."

This letter was considered as an attempt to prescribe to the Senate, and unbecoming the respect due to their authority. It was by many treated as an actual declaration of war. The debates were renewed on this subject for some days successively, from the first to the seventh of January. On the last of these days, a resolution was framed, ordering Cæsar

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

† Suetonius in Cæsare, c. 29.

to dismiss his army, and by a certain day to retire from his provinces, or in case of disobedience, claring him an enemy to his country. The Tribu Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, interposed their negative.

The hands of the Senate being thus tied up by prohibition or interdict of the Tribunes, it was ved that the members should go into mourning order to impress the People with a deeper sens the calamity which was likely to ensue from the contumacy of these factious officers. This likewise the Tribunes forbad; but the Senate being adjourned, all the members, as of their own accord, returned to their next meeting in habits of mourning, and proceeded to consider in what manner they might remove the difficulty which arose from this factious interposition of the Tribunes. In the conclusion of this deliberation, it was determined to give to the Consuls and other magistrates, together with Pompey, in the character of Proconsul, the charge usual in the most dangerous conjunctures,—*To preserve the commonwealth by such means as to their discretion should appear to be necessary.*

This charge suggested to the minds of the People, what had passed in the times of the Gracchi, of Saturninus, and of Catiline. The Tribunes who had occasioned the measure, either apprehended, or affected to apprehend, immediate danger to their own persons: they disguised themselves in the habit of slaves, and, together with Curio, in the night fled from Rome in hired carriages *. The Consuls repaired to Pom-

* Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii. Dio. Cass. lib. xli, c. 3. Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi, ep. 12.

pey in the suburbs; and, agreeably to the order of the Senate, claimed his assistance in discharging the important duties with which they were jointly intrusted. It was agreed, in concert with him, that they should support the authority of the Senate with a proper military force; that they should proceed to make new levies with the greatest dispatch; and in order to give effect to these preparations, that Pompey should have the supreme command over the treasury, and all the forces of the republic, in every quarter of the world.

Winter was now *set in*, or *fast* approaching. The season, *although nominally in* the month of January, *being only* about fifty days past the autumnal equinox, or about the twelfth of November, Cæsar had few troops on the side of Italy; the force of his army was yet beyond the Alps, and the officers now intrusted with the safety of the commonwealth flattered themselves that much time might be found to put the republic in a state of defence, before his army at this season could pass those mountains, even if he should be so rash as to make war on the commonwealth; a supposition which Pompey did not even, in this state of affairs, appear to have believed.

When Cæsar received accounts of the Senate's resolution, he drew forth the troops then at Ravenna, and in a harangue enumerated the wrongs which, for some years, he alleged had been done to himself; complained that his enemies had now found means to excite against him even Pompey, a person whose honour he had always promoted with the warmest affection; that the interposition of the Tribunes, in

behalf of the army and of himself, had been defeated by means of threats and of actual force; that their sacred persons had been violated, in order to oppress him; that resolutions, which had never been ta/ but in the most dangerous and threatening conj tures, to prevent ruinous laws from being carrie insurrection and violence, were now formed ag peaceable magistrates, and in times of profound tranquillity: he therefore now called upon his audience to maintain the honour of an officer, together with whom they had now, for nine years, faithfully served the republic; with whom they had gained many victories in Gaul and in Germany, and reduced a most warlike province into a state of absolute submission. He was answered with a shout of applause, and a general acclamation from the ranks, that they were ready to avenge the injuries done to their general, and to the Tribunes of the People.

On receiving these assurances from the troops then present, Cæsar immediately dispatched an express to the quarters of the twelfth legion, which, from the time at which it afterwards joined him, appears to have been already within the Alps, with orders to march. The remainder of his army, in the mean time, being supposed in the Low Countries, or in the interior of Gaul, it would not have appeared to an ordinary capacity, that, even in case of hostilities, any decisive operation could take place before the spring. By the return of that season, indeed, the measures now taken by both parties seemed to threaten a dangerous convulsion; but it is not to be doubted, that Cæsar had foreseen, or prepared, many of the most

important circumstances of the present conjuncture; that he had already brought his affairs into that posture, in which he had projected that hostilities should commence; and that the seeming neglect with which he suffered himself to be taken with so small a force on the side of Italy, was probably the best concerted preparation he could have made for the war. For while he brought no alarming force towards Rome, his antagonists continued secure, and made no effectual provision to resist even the small force with which he was to begin his attack. He apprehended more danger from the legions which Pompey had formed in Spain, than from any force then subsisting in Italy; and he made his disposition against those legions, by having the strength of his army to be exerted between the Pyrenees and the Alps. There the troops he had formed in Gaul, served him sufficiently in his design against Italy, by securing him from any interruption on that quarter. And when the war actually broke out, being well aware that the effects of surprise are often greater than those of force, even if he had wished for more troops in Italy, it is probable that he would not have awaited their coming.

On the very day that he delivered the harangue just mentioned to the legion which was quartered at Ravenna, he ordered parties of chosen men, in the manner of stragglers roving for pleasure through the country, and armed only with swords, to take the road separately, and without any appearance of concert, to Ariminum, the first fortified place of Italy beyond the Rubicon, which was the limit of his pro-

vince; there to remain, and at a certain time of the night to seize upon one of the gates. He likewise ordered a party of horse to parade at some distance from Ravenna, and there to wait for an officer who was to deliver them his further commands. He himself passed the day, as usual, in forming combats of gladiators, and in attending the exercises of the legion; at night he went to supper at the usual hour, and after he had taken his place at table, pretending business, or some slight indisposition, which called him away from the company, he mounted a carriage that waited for him, drove through a gate opposite to that of Ariminum, and having travelled for a little time in that direction, turned into the road on which he had posted the party of horse; and having joined them, marched about thirty miles before break of day, entered Ariminum by a gate of which the parties he had sent before him in the night were in possession, and thus, without any resistance, became master of a fortress which opened his way towards Rome.

It was of importance, that the first report of hostilities in the city should carry an account of his success; not merely of his having made an attempt. This circumstance may justify the measures which he took to surprise a place which, without so many precautions, might have been easily reduced, though at the hazard perhaps of delay for a few days. He himself, indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no mention of any such measures, nor of the doubts and hesitations under which he is said to have halted on the banks of the Rubicon, by the passing of which

he was to enter into a state of war with the commonwealth, a subject on which his doubts were probably long since resolved.

At Ariminum his little army, on the following day, arrived from Ravenna, and the Tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius joined him from Rome. He presented them to the army in the disguise in which they affected to have escaped from the violence of a tyranny then established in the city. "Observe," he said, "to what extremities persons of "noble birth, vested with the sacred character of "Tribunes, are reduced, for having supported their "friend, and for having pleaded the cause of an in-"jured army *." The occasion was suited to popular eloquence; and this eminent master of every art did not neglect the opportunity. He is said to have acted his part with great vehemence; to have torn open his vest from his breast, and to have shed tears; frequently held up to view the hand on which he wore his ring, the well-known ensign of noble birth among the Romans, and declared, that he would sacrifice all the honours of his rank to reward those who were now willing to support the public cause, and who adhered to himself on the present occasion. From these signs, and the display of his ring in particular, where he was not distinctly heard, it was supposed that he had promised the honours of nobility, and a large sum of money, to every soldier in his army †.

Lucius Cæsar and the Prætor Roscius, who, while

* Appian. de Bell. Civile, lib. ii. † Sueton. in Cæs. c. 33.

the decree against Caius Cæsar was depending in the Senate, made offer of their good offices to treat with him, and bring matters to an amicable issue, were now come without any public commission, probably to hinder their friend from taking any desperate resolution. They brought, at the same time, a private message from Pompey, with some expressions of civility, and an apology, taken from the necessity of the public service, for the hardship which he supposed himself to have put upon Cæsar. Pompey, in this message, protested, "That he himself had always preferred the public to private considerations;" and subjoined, "That he hoped Cæsar "would not suffer any passion to carry him into "measures hurtful to the State, nor, in avenging "himself of his private enemies, stretch forth his "hand against the republic."

Such professions had little credit with Cæsar; but if they were to be of any weight with the public, he was not likely, in his turn, to fail in the use of them. He desired those persons, by whom Pompey had favoured him with this message, to carry for answer, "That the republic had always been to him dearer "than his fortune or his life; but that he could not "suffer the honours which the Roman People had "bestowed upon him in public, to be contemptuously torn away by his private enemies. His commission, he said, would have expired in six months; "his enemies, in their eagerness to degrade him, "could not bear even with this delay, but must recall him immediately. The Roman People had "dispensed with his attendance at the elections, yet

" he must be dragged to town at that time, to show " the superiority of his enemies, and to gratify pri- " vate malice. These personal insults he had pa- " tiently borne for the sake of the public; and be- " ing resolved to disarm, requested the Senate only " that others should disarm as well as himself; that " even this was refused, and while he was command- " ed to dismiss the troops of his province, new levies " were ordered in Italy; that two legions which had " been called off from his army, under pretence of " the Parthian war, were now retained against him- " self; that the whole State was in arms; for what " purpose but for his destruction? that, neverthe- " less, he would suffer any thing for the good of the " commonwealth. Let Pompey repair to his pro- " vince; let all parties disband, and no army what- " ever be assembled in Italy; let no one pretend to " overawe the city; let the Assemblies of the People " and of the Senate be free; and, in order the more " speedily to terminate these disputes, let the parties " meet and confer together; let Pompey say where " he will be waited on, or let him name a proper " place of meeting; at a friendly conference every " difficulty may soon be removed *."

From this time forward Cæsar affected, on every occasion, to have no object in view but to prevail on his enemies, by some reasonable accommodation, to save the republic from a ruinous war, and to stop the effusion of innocent blood †. He continually

* Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. 1.

† Cæsar. Appian. in lib. viii. ad Atticum. post ep. 15.

repeated his proposals of peace, while he urged his military operations with uncommon rapidity. He ordered new levies at Ariminum, and sent Antony to occupy Arretium *, a pass in one of the branches of the Flaminian Way through the Apennines; and as fast as troops could march, he seized Pisaurum Fanum, Auximum, with the town of Ancona, and all the places necessary to give him the command of that district, or to open his way to Rome.

A general consternation spread in the country before him; the people fled from their habitations, and communicated the alarm, with every sort of exaggeration, to the city. Pompey had relied much on the name and authority of the commonwealth, and no less on his own. Others thought themselves secure while this renowned and experienced commander gave them assurances of safety. Now, like a person awake from a dream, he seemed to perceive the whole was illusion. Cæsar paid no regard to the authority of the Senate, nor stood in awe of the State. He was at hand, with the reputation of a general equal to Pompey, at the head of troops fresh from service, and inured to blood. The republic was but a name; and they who composed it, though respectable at a distance, were, on the approach of an enemy, irresolute, disunited, and incapable of the exertions which such an occasion required. Orders had gone forth to raise troops in every part of Italy; but no great progress in so short a time could yet have been made in that service. Besides the two legions which had

* Arrego. † Pisaro, Feno, and Osimo.

served so long under Cæsar himself, there were not any forces actually embodied in the country. These were justly suspected of inclining to favour their former general; and, instead of enabling Pompey to meet the danger which threatened the commonwealth, furnished him, at the head of such troops, with particular reasons for his keeping at a distance from the enemy. In a letter to Domitius Ahenobarbus, "I sent you word," he writes, "that with these "two legions I did not like to be near Cæsar*. If "I should retreat, therefore, at his approach, be not "surprised †."

Domitius had been appointed to succeed Cæsar in the government of Gaul; and, with some other officers in the Picenum ‡, had made some progress in raising troops. Their numbers, perhaps, surpassed those of Cæsar. If Pompey, therefore, had thought it possible to defend the city, he must have hastened to that quarter, and have put himself at the head of those troops. But he was timorous in hazarding his own reputation, a weakness from which Cæsar was altogether exempt, and which was unworthy of the great military talents of either. Pompey seldom committed his fame where the prospect was unfavourable, or events extremely uncertain. Cæsar, on such occasions, never chose to trust his affairs in any other hands than his own.

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* Meaning probably that he did not choose to give them an opportunity to desert.

† Cicero ad Atticum, lib. viii, ep. 2, ad Domitium.

‡ March of Ancona.

Pompey, acting under these motives, assembled the Senate, and informed them that it was necessary to abandon Rome; that he would meet them at Capua, where he proposed to assemble his forces; that he should consider all those who remained in the capital to countenance or to witness the usurpation of Cæsar, as equally guilty with those who should be found in his camp.

It being unlawful for the officers of the republic to absent themselves from the city during their term in office, the Senate passed an act to dispense with their attendance at Rome, and to enable them to exercise the powers of magistracy wherever the necessities of the State might require their presence. These preparations for dislodging the government, together with the actual flight of Pompey himself, damped all the courage that yet remained in any order or class of the People. It made Cæsar appear at once more odious and more terrible *. It was generally expected †, that he would exceed either Cinna or Sylla in rapacity and cruelty ‡; and that the city, if he should surprise his opponents there, would become a scene of blood. The Consuls, and most of the other officers of State, set out with their ensigns of power. All night the gates were crowded with Senators and other persons of rank who fled on this occasion; some with their families and most valuable effects, others alone, and distracted by the general panic,

* Cicero ad Att. lib. vii, ep. 11.
† Ibid. ep. 12. 22.
‡ Ibid. lib. vii, ep. 7.

without knowing whither they were to retire, or to what fate they were leaving their families.

Cæsar in the mean time, making a rapid march through Umbria, or what is now the dutchy of Urbino *, and the Picenum, or March of Ancona †, not only took possession of every place as he passed, but gained daily accessions of strength by the junction of the new levies which were raising to oppose him. Soldiers are averse to the loosing side; and Pompey's flight put an end to his military power in Italy. The Prætor Thermus had, with five cohorts, amounting, if complete, to twenty-five hundred men, taken post at Iguvium ‡, among the Apennines, on the Flaminian Way. Observing that Pompey's party in general was retreating, and that Curio was advancing towards him with a party of Cæsar's forces, he resolved to abandon his post; but as soon as he began to execute this purpose, and was on the road to Rome, the troops deserted him on the march, returned to the post from which he had removed them, and declared for Cæsar.

The dispositions of the towns of which Cæsar had got possession, made it unnecessary for him to leave any garrison behind him, and permitted him to advance with all his force. Auximum ‖ declared for him before his arrival, and obliged Atius Varus, who held that post for the republic, to abandon it. This officer was overtaken by Cæsar's advanced parties, and, like Thermus, was deserted by his people.

At Cingulum, in the Picenum, Cæsar was join-

* Umbria. † Picenum. ‡ Gubio. ‖ Osimo.

ed by the twelfth legion, to which, on his first motion from Ravenna, he had sent orders to march. With this accession of force, he advanced [illegible] lum * on the Fronto; and having dislodg[illegible] thence Lentulus Spinther, who commande[illegible] horts, the greater part of these troops deserte[illegible] The remainder put themselves under the com[illegible] Vibullius, who was just arrived from Pompey, port the hopes of the cause in that quarter.

As Cæsar made his principal push on the [illegible] side of the Apennines, the troops that were suddenly raised for the republic were, without any well-concerted plan, drawn together upon that coast. And Pompey himself had not yet openly laid aside the design of making head against Cæsar in those parts. Vibullius having assembled in all about fourteen cohorts, fell back to the Aternus, now called the Piscara, and joined L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, a pass in the Apennines that commanded the Valerian Way to Rome. This officer having assembled twenty-five cohorts, meant to have joined Pompey wherever he should be found, and had ordered Thermus to follow with five cohorts more †; but imagining probably that Pompey still intended to cover Rome from the incursions of Cæsar, and that Corfinium was an important post for this purpose, he determined to observe the motions of the enemy from that place.

Pompey by this time had moved from Capua to Luceria, and seemed to have taken the resolution not

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* Oscula. † Pomp. ad Cicer. in lib. ad Att. post. ep. 11.

only of abandoning the posts that covered the access to Rome, but even all Italy, to Cæsar. The Consuls, the greater part of the magistracy, and the Senate, had followed him to Capua. Here was received the message which Cæsar had given to Roscius and to L. Cæsar. It contained several reflections and insinuations in the highest degree provoking to Pompey; and to this circumstance Cæsar probably trusted, that he should not be bound by any of the offers he had made, and that the odium of rejecting the peace would fall upon his enemies. But the friends of the commonwealth, deeply impressed with the necessity of their own affairs, gladly listened to any terms of accommodation. They objected indeed to the proposed interview between Pompey and Cæsar, remembering the dangerous concerts which at their meetings had been formerly entered into against the commonwealth.

Pompey himself was so sensible of the disadvantage at which he was taken, that he dissembled his resentment of the personal reflections cast on himself, and consented to conditions which he had hitherto rejected with disdain. It was agreed accordingly, that he should repair to Spain, and that, his province being in profound peace, he should reduce his military establishment. Cæsar, on his part, besides the conditions he himself had offered, was required to evacuate all the towns which he had lately seized in Italy; and it was proposed that the Consuls, Magistrates, and Senators, should return to the city, and from the usual seat of government give all the sanction of public authority to these arrangements. From

such appearances, it was not doubted that an accommodation must follow. And in this belief Cato, though appointed to command in Sicily, chose to abide by the Senate while the treaty remained in suspense. And Cicero, with all his penetration, yet acquainted with the parties concerned, though agreement almost concluded. "The one," he to his friend Atticus, "begins to repent of his "cipitation, and the other is sensible he has "force sufficient to support such a war*." In this probably, his notion of Pompey was correct, but fell greatly short of the views and apprehensions of Cæsar.

This politician, however, so far as the propositions he made were adopted, was himself likely to be caught in the snare he laid for his enemies, or obliged to lay aside the disguise which he had assumed in affecting such earnest desires of peace. To avoid either of these inconveniences, he objected to some of the conditions which the opposite party had subjoined to his proposals, and complained of the silence which they kept on others, as proceeding from a deliberate purpose to circumvent and betray himself. "Pompey will repair to Spain," he said, "but when? "I am required to evacuate all the towns of Italy, "while Pompey and the whole State continue in "arms against me, and while my enemies not only "make new levies, but employ for my destruction "legions which they have actually taken away from "my own army. If Pompey be sincere in desiring

* Ad Att. lib. vii, ep. 14.

peace, why does he decline the personal interview which has been proposed for that purpose?"

Cæsar had, by this time, advanced with hasty marches to Corfinium, drove in a detachment from the garrison, which he found breaking down a bridge about three miles from the town, sat down under the walls, where he employed three days in fortifying his camp, and in filling the magazines with corn from the neighbouring country. Being joined by the eighth legion and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies from Gaul, with three hundred auxiliary horse, he ordered proper posts to be seized on every side of the town, and effectually shut up those who were within from any relief, or from any communication with their friends. When the works he was executing against the place began to appear, Domitius published a reward to any one who should carry letters to Pompey. Different messengers were dispatched for this purpose, and brought for answer, that Pompey disapproved of his having allowed himself to be invested by Cæsar, had foretold him the bad consequences of this measure, and now earnestly exhorted him, if possible, to extricate himself; for that it was not in his power, as he again repeated, with these doubtful legions, which had been so lately drawn from Cæsar's army, or with new levies so recently made, to force the hardy and veteran legions of the enemy *.

This answer Domitius endeavoured to conceal

* Pompeius ad Domitium, lib. viii. Et ad Atticum, post ep. 12. Cæs. de Bell. Civ.

from those who were under his command; raged them with hopes of a speedy relief from pey, and seemed intent on the defence of the while he was actually taking measures to get person, without any hopes of preserving the he had assembled for the commonwealth. The sign being suspected, the troops surrounded his ters in the night, secured his person, and, to pa court to Cæsar, while they delivered up their ge ral and surrendered the town, made offer of their services in prosecution of the war.

In consequence of these movements in the night, Cæsar took possession of the gates, manned the walls, and gave orders that no person whatever from his army should enter the place before it was day. This being the first instance in which he met with any show of opposition, or had any pretence to act as an enemy; it gave him an opportunity to disprove or confirm the alarming reports which had gone abroad respecting the atrocity of the part he was to act; and as we have occasion to observe, in many other instances, in this he neither mistook nor neglected what was proper. Knowing, that besides Domitius and Vibullius, there were many Senators and Roman Knights now shut up in the town, these he ordered in the morning to be brought before him, expostulated with them on the subject of their enmity to himself, and their precipitation in hurrying the State into this unnatural war. He then dismissed them with the respect that was due to Roman citizens of their rank; and being told that a considerable sum of money, amassed at Corfinium for the support of

the troops, had been seized by his people, to complete this scene of unexpected munificence, by an exhibition of disinterestedness as well as of clemency, and as afraid to defile his hands by the touch of what was not his own, he ordered this money to be restored to Domitius. The fame of this wonderful mildness and generosity, as he expected, was every where spread abroad; and though by overacting his part in abstaining from the public money, he furnished every thinking person with a sufficient comment on the other parts of his conduct; yet many were happy to understand, that, in this alarming contest, their lives and properties were, from any motives whatever, to be spared.

Rome was now open to Cæsar; but he thought the possession of the city of no moment, until he had suppressed the military arrangements that were making throughout all Italy, and had decided who was to have the possession of the country. He therefore, on the very day on which he became master of Corfinium, detached to Sicily, under the command of Curio, the troops by whom he had been joined in gaining possession of this place *. He himself set out for Apulia, and, before sunset, accomplished a considerable march; but while he thus urged the war with unremitted energy and diligence, he continued his messages to the leaders of the opposite party, with the mildest professions of friendship and overtures of peace. To this effect, immediately after the reduction of Corfinium, he dispatched Balbus, an of-

* Cæsar de Bello Civ. lib. i. c. 25.

ficer in his army, with a letter to the Consul, containing earnest entreaties that this man would return to Rome, and prevent the disorders which were likely to arise from the suspension of government. To induce him to comply with this request, Balbus had secret instructions to assure the Consul of Cæsar's interest in procuring a proper appointment in the provinces at the expiration of his year in office. The bearer of this message, at the same time, declared it as his private opinion, that Cæsar desired nothing so much as to join Pompey, and to make peace with him on any equitable terms. And the father of this young man, one of Cæsar's retinue, wrote, at the same time, to Cicero, that Cæsar had no object but to enjoy peace and security under Pompey *. But while the fame of his clemency at Corfinium, and of this wonderful disposition to peace was gone abroad, and had pacified the minds of many to whom he had been till then an object of terror †; and while he hoped to amuse his enemies, or to relax the diligence of their military preparations, he advanced with so much rapidity, that, in order to avoid him, they had no more than the time which was necessary to cross the mountains from Capua to Luceria, to fall back from thence to Canusium, and from this last place, without a halt, to Brundisium.

Whilst Pompey moved in this direction, and had sent Metellus Scipio, with his own son Cnæus, into

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii, ep. 9.

† Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii, ep. 13. "Si mehercule neminem occidet, nec cuiquam quicquam ademerit, ab his qui eum maxime timuerant, maxime diligetur."

Syria, to provide and assemble the necessary shipping to embark his army *; his intention to abandon Italy began to be suspected, and shook the great authority which he still derived from his military reputation. His officers were every where deserted on the march by the new levies, who hastened to offer their services to Cæsar. His own presence kept the other parts of the army together, and brought them safe to the port from which it was suspected they were to take their departure from Italy. Soon after his arrival at this port, he effectually verified these suspicions, embarking a great part of his army with the Consuls, while he himself, not having sufficient shipping to transport the whole, remained with a second division to wait for the return of his ships.

Such was the posture of Pompey, when Cæsar, with six legions, four of veteran troops, and two newly raised or completed from those who came over to him on the march, arrived at the gates of Brundisium. Even here, he never dropt the project of amusing his enemy with proposals of peace. Cn. Magius, an officer in the service of the commonwealth, having been taken on the march, was dismissed with great courtesy, and a message to Pompey, containing a request, that he would admit Cæsar to an interview. Differences, it was observed, are soon made up at a conference, which otherwise might occasion many journeys and messages, without effect.

This pacific address, as in other instances, only coustituted a part in the military plan of Cæsar, and

* Plutarch. in Pompeio.

was accompanied with the most effectual prep[illegible] for a blockade and a siege. It did not as yet appear, whether Pompey meant to transport all his troops, and to abandon Brundisium, or to keep possession of this post, in order to retain a passage into Italy, and to command both sides of the gulf. Cæsar, to sound his intentions, and either to shut him up, or to hasten his departure, observing, that the entrance of the harbour was narrow, and might be obstructed, began an alarming work for this purpose. He employed numerous parties to throw stones, earth, and other heavy materials, into the passage between the two moles, and expected, in a little time, to be able to join them, and thus effectually to shut up this port from all communication with the sea.

In this work the besiegers advanced, for some time, with a sensible progress; but being come into deeper water, where the materials they threw in were absorbed, did not settle, or were displaced by the motion of the sea, they found it necessary to change their plan, and endeavoured to close the harbour by means of floating rafts and hulks firmly anchored in the passage. But in executing this project, they were disturbed and interrupted by a continual discharge of arrows, stones, and other missile weapons, from vessels properly placed, and on which the necessary engines were mounted for this purpose.

While the parties were thus, without intermission, engaged at the entrance of the port, Cæsar again made a show of proposing a treaty. As he had received no answer to his former message by Magius, he affected to despair of making any progress by di-

rect applications to Pompey himself, and sent into the town Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, who, being in great intimacy with Scribonius Libo, had directions to make application to him, and, in Cæsar's name, to entreat his good offices in bringing on a negotiation; particularly, if possible, in procuring an interview between Pompey and himself; representing to Libo, that if an interview were obtained, some way might be found to stop the issues of blood, a blessing which, in that case, would for ever be mentioned as the effect of so essential a service performed by Scribonius Libo to his country.

Pompey, upon receiving these proposals, which, though addressed to Libo, were carried directly to himself, made answer, That, in the absence of the Consuls, he could not treat. In this instance, he perceived, no doubt, the insincerity of Cæsar's pacific declarations, and was not tempted to remit the vigilance of his defence, or the ardour with which he now at last prepared for the contest: yet he could not altogether prevent the principal advantage which Cæsar meant to reap from these repeated professions of moderation and desire of peace, that of appearing, in the eyes of the People, not the author of the war, but a person forced into these extremities by the violence and obstinacy of his enemies.

After the works at the mouth of the harbour of Brundisium had been continued three days, and were considerably advanced, the transports which had carried the first division of the army returned from Dyrrachium, and, as the passage at the entrance of the harbour was still open, the ships were admitted, and

preparations made to embark the remainder. But the inhabitants of the town, being disaffected to Pompey, were likely to give intelligence of all his motions; and he himself made no doubt, that as soon as he should withdraw his guards, the people would throw open their gates, and expose him to be attacked in his rear, and possibly endanger the loss of such part of his army as might be overtaken on shore. To provide against this event, and to retard the entrance of Cæsar into the town, he built up the gates with masonry or solid stone and mortar, and traversed the streets with walls and large ditches replenished with sharp stakes, which were masked or hid with a slight covering of brushwood and earth.

When the troops began to move towards the harbour, the rear guard still endeavoured to present the usual appearances on the ramparts, by occupying every post with archers, slingers, and other light infantry. These being to remain in their post while the main body was embarking, had orders, at a signal given, to abandon the walls, and to repair on board the transports which were ready to receive them.

Measures to evacuate the town being thus begun in the night, and Cæsar, having immediate intelligence of what was passing, brought forward his scaling ladders, and, as soon as the ramparts appeared to be deserted, began to ascend them at once in several places, and effected one part of his purpose, by gaining the battlements without opposition; but when he was about to descend from thence into the streets, having notice of the snares and obstructions

which were placed in his way, he was obliged to halt, or to advance with so much precaution, that the greater part of the enemy had time to put off from the mole, and got under sail. Only two transports, which struck and were aground on the banks that had been formed or begun at the mouth of the harbour, fell into his hands. The remainder, with the greater part of the Senate, attended by the officers of State and the ensigns of magistracy, proceeded in their passage to Epirus; thus leaving Cæsar in possession of Italy and of the seats of government, from which the world could scarcely disjoin, in their idea, the right to command in the empire.

Cæsar having, in this manner, surprised the republic, and in sixty days obliged all his opponents to evacuate Italy, and to leave him sole master even of the forces which began to be mustered against himself, it is probable, notwithstanding the question he states relating to the expedience of following his enemy into Epirus, that he had already taken his resolution to consider the reduction of Spain, next to that of Italy, as the object of greatest importance. In that province, which was full of resources, a regular army of seven or eight legions had been some time on foot, with an evident purpose to keep him in awe. He was threatened, therefore, with the most immediate danger from thence. Some arrangements, too, were yet wanting for the security of Italy. The professions which he had made of pacific dispositions, and of zeal for the commonwealth, were to be confirmed by showing a proper respect to the forms of the republic, and by affecting a concern to

restore a government which he had actually overthrown.

For these reasons, this successful adventurer contented himself, for the present, with having ordered shipping to be provided at the port of Brundisium, that he might amuse the enemy with appearances of his intending to continue the war on that side, that he might be actually ready to do so, when he had elsewhere accomplished the purpose on which he was bent. Notwithstanding his pacific declarations, and his ostentation of clemency on every occasion, the People still trembled when they saw almost every citizen of reputation and honour obliged to fly from the seats of government, and, in their place, collected from different quarters of Italy, every bankrupt, every outlaw, and every person of infamous character *. These being at variance with the laws of their country, had flocked to Cæsar, and were received by him under the denomination of the injured and the oppressed citizens, whose wrongs he was come to redress.

With this company still multiplying around him, having given orders to secure Brundisium from the sea, and having posted there, and at Sipontum and Tarentum, each a legion, and having ordered ships from every part of the coasts of Italy and Gaul, he set out for Spain, intending, while the troops, with whom he had overrun Italy, took some repose in

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix, ep. 19. "Cave autem puteis quemquam hominem in Italiam turpem esse, qui hinc absit. Vidi ipse Omniis universos," &c.; et Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix, ep. 1. "Qui hic potest se gerere non perdite vita mores ante facta ratio suscepti negotii, socii," &c.

quarters, and while those who were destined for the service in Spain were on the march, that he himself should visit the city, and observe the aspect of his party at Rome. His father-in-law, Culpurnius Piso, though, by his relation to Cæsar, hindered from following Pompey, yet would not countenance his son-in-law so far as to remain in the city to receive him. Marcus Lepidus, then Prætor, was the officer of highest rank who remained in his place; and beside the Tribunes who had been the instruments in kindling this war, was the only magistrate who resigned himself entirely to the victor's disposal. Among the Tribunes, Cæcilius Metellus, though disposed to have followed the Senate, being detained in the city by the sacred duties of his function, had taken his resolution to employ the negative with which he was intrusted, in restraining the violations of law and government, which were to be expected in such a scene as was now to be opened in the capital.

Cicero, upon the commencement of hostilities, having still the ensigns of Proconsul, was appointed to inspect the levies and other affairs of the republic on the coasts of Campania and Latium. Upon Pompey's retreat, he remained in this station, with a mind overwhelmed with perplexity and irresolution. He affected respect and gratitude to Pompey, though he surely owed him no obligation, bore him no real affection, and blamed him highly for his flight from Italy; but in the last, perhaps he only meant to justify himself for not having immediately joined him in his retreat, and for not having embarked with

more decision in the cause. He sincerely lamented the state of the republic, of which he now certainly despaired, and only wished to steer a course, the safest he could for his own reputation and his person.

Cæsar, in the beginning of this contest, had contributed much to perplex the resolution o
who, ever after what he had suffered fron
trigues of party, generally saw so many
every question of state, that it was difficult
to decide between them. He had been some time kept undetermined by means of a flattering correspondence, in which Cæsar affected to request his good offices towards preventing the present troubles. Being now on his way from Brundisium to Rome, he was made to expect a personal interview; at which, says Cicero to his friend Atticus, I shall study rather to appear an object of his respect than of his liking. He accordingly, on that occasion, resisted the flattery of Cæsar, and withstood his entreaties to attend a meeting of the Senate, which had been ordered to assemble by a messenger dispatched from Formiæ. Cæsar appeared to be piqued at this refusal: "It will be supposed you condemn me," he said, "and others will be led by your example." Cicero replied, "That his case was different from "that of others, who had less connection with Pom-"pey." "Come, then," continued Cæsar, "and "treat of an accommodation with Pompey."—"Shall "I be at liberty to do so in my own way?"—"Who "will restrain you?"—"Shall I move the Senate, "then, that the war shall not be carried into Spain,

"nor into Greece? Shall I lament the treatment "which Pompey has received?"—"That, indeed," said Cæsar, "I shall not like to have said."—"I "thought so," replied the other, "and chose to ab- "sent myself." At parting, Cæsar desired him to consider of the matter. "If you desert me," he said, "I must have recourse to other counsels, and "know not what I may be forced to do *."

Upon the arrival of Cæsar in the suburbs of Rome, such of the Senators as were in the city, or in the neighbourhood, assembled at his summons. He opened the meeting, by enumerating the wrongs he himself had received, and by loading his opponents with the guilt of the present war. "He never had aspired," he said, "to unprecedented honours. The "office of Consul was now again open to him by "the laws of the commonwealth; and the Roman "People had dispensed with his personal attendance "in suing for it. An act to this purpose," he said, "had been obtained in the fairest and most legal "manner. Ten Tribunes had concurred in proposing "it. His enemies, particularly Cato himself, had "been heard at full length against it, and had prac- "tised his usual artifice for disappointing the Senate "or the People, by prolonging the debates. Pom- "pey himself was Consul when this act was passed. "If he disapproved of the act, why did he not op- "pose it then? If he approved of it, why rob him "now of the privilege it bestowed? He reminded "this meeting of the moderation with which he him-

* Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ix, ep. 18.

" self had offered to resign his command, while " others were so tenacious of theirs; or while they " imposed conditions on him, to which they them- " selves would not submit, and chose to throw the " State into confusion, rather than abate the least of " their own pretensions. He observed, that his ene- " mies had made use of a false pretence [illegible] " two legions from his army; that they had [illegible] " the sacred character of the Tribunes, [illegible] " guilty of no offence, but that of protecting [illegible] " against the oppression of his enemies; that they " had rejected all offers of an accommodation, or " even of a conference.

" He now exhorted the Senate not to desert the " commonwealth, nor to oppose such as, in concert " with him, might endeavour to restore the govern- " ment; but if they should shrink in this arduous " task, he should not press it upon them. He knew " how to act for himself. If his opinion were fol- " lowed, deputies should be now sent from the Se- " nate to Pompey, with entreaties that he would " spare the republic. He knew, that Pompey had " formerly objected to his having any such deputa- " tion sent to himself, considering such advances as " a concession of right in him to whom they were " made, or of fear in those who made them. These," " he said, " were the reflections of a narrow mind; " for his own part, as he wished to overcome his " enemies in the field, so he wished to excel them in " acts of generosity and candour."

Such were the colours in which this profound and artful man endeavoured to disguise his cause; and

while he took effectual measures to maintain it by force, employed likewise an insinuation, and an eloquence, not less dangerous than his sword. The proposals of a treaty were received in this meeting with joy; but no man was willing, after having assisted at such a meeting of the Senate, to hazard his person in Pompey's camp: For, while Cæsar, to reconcile all men to his cause, affected clemency even to those who were taken in arms against him, Pompey, supposing himself intrusted with the powers and severities of the law, had threatened to employ those powers and severities to the utmost extent against every person who staid behind him at Rome. *Proscription* and *massacre* of those who abandoned the commonwealth, were the ordinary language at his quarters *. He proposed to operate in this case by fear alone, and had forgotten, that legal government itself, on certain occasions, with all its authorities and powers, stands in need of insinuation and of popular arts.

Cæsar, in taking the opposite tone, and in affecting to commit his affairs to the issue of a fair negotiation and treaty, on which he by no means wished to enter, still relied for an evasion on the difficulties which were likely to occur in the conduct of any such business; and he presumed upon these evasions in making offers which he trusted that his enemies would not accept. His intention was to load his antagonist with the blame of a war, which, it is probable, he had a long time been devising. If he had

* Cicero ad Attic. lib. viii, ep. 11. *Syllaturit* is the expression with which Cicero marks this conduct in another place.

really meant to renew his former concerts with Pompey, he would have employed again the same concealed methods by which those concerts had been formerly obtained, and would not have intrusted the mediation betwixt them to the Senate, a body which, however composed, had a natural claim to authority and might have carried their negotiation [illegible] either of the parties approved. He ha[illegible] tained a serious aversion to the name an[illegible] of the Senate. Being altogether indifi[illegible]nt t[illegible] lic interests of every sort, the mediocr[illegible]rts, that must ever appear in the majority of such a body, was to him an object of contempt. He had espoused the cause of every faction, of every tumult, of every criminal against them; and, at one time, rather than be subject to their authority, had proposed, that Pompey himself should transport his Army from Asia to usurp the government. Even the few Senators, who, upon the present occasion, from indifference to public questions, or from a disposition to favour his cause, had remained in the city, became the objects of his disgust. Many of them, though willing to be his instruments, were not yet formed for his purpose. When he affected to treat them with respect, they received his addresses as matter of right to themselves; when he proposed any measure, they took the matter into consideration, and affected to deliberate of what was to be done. "He detests the "Senate," said Curio to Cicero, "now more than "ever; he will leave them no authority. I meant "to have held my commission by a fictitious decree "of that body: but he said, I should hold it of him,

"and that every honour, and every power, should "henceforward be derived from himself *."

Cæsar, however, meant to make this remnant of a legal assembly the tools of every ungracious or improper measure he had occasion to adopt, and, in particular, to avail himself of their authority in seizing the public money. Pompey, before he left Rome, had been authorised to draw from the treasures of the commonwealth whatever money he wanted for the service. At his departure, he ordered the whole to be removed; and the Consul Lentulus was about to execute this order, when a sudden alarm of Cæsar's approach obliged him to desist, and left him time only to carry away the keys of the public repositories. Cæsar now moved the Senate, that the doors should be opened; and that the public money should be issued from thence to defray the expence of the war †. To this motion the Tribune Metellus Celer opposed his negative; and Cæsar, disdaining any longer to wear a mask which subjected him to the observance of insignificant forms, proceeded to the treasury, and ordered the doors to be forced. The Tribune had the boldness to place himself in the passage, and was about to reduce Cæsar to the disagreeable alternative of being disappointed of his purpose, or of incurring some measure of popular abhorrence, by violating the sacred person of a Tribune, from a veneration to which, he himself professed to have undertaken the war. On this occasion, contrary to his usual character, he appeared to have lost his temper, and threatened Metellus with immediate

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. x, ep. 4. † Dio. Cass. lib. xli, c. 17. & 18.

death. "This," he said, "is easier for me to exe-
"cute than to utter." It was thought, that if the Tribune had persisted, not only this officer, but numbers of Senators, and many of the more respectable citizens, whom he considered as enemies and promoters of the Tribune's contumacy, would hav
ved in a general massacre. "Think not
in relating these particulars to Cicero,
"mency proceeds from temper, or is s
"by any real disposition of his mind.
"effect of his policy; he is naturally indifferent to
"blood, and, if he is provoked, will make it to run
"in the kennels *."

The Tribune Metellus, however, when matters were coming to this extremity, suffered himself to be removed. The doors were forced open, all the money was taken from thence: even the sacred deposite was now carried off, though supposed to have remained from the time of the rebuilding of Rome after its destruction by the Gauls, and still kept as a resource for the utmost exigency of the State, in case of similar invasion or danger. I have subdued the Gauls, said Cæsar, and there is no longer any need of such provision against them. He is said, on this occasion, to have carried off, in bars, 25,000 lb. † of gold, 35,000 lb. ‡ of silver, and in coin, 40,000,000 Roman money §.

* Cicero ad Atticum, lib. x, ep. 4.

† According to Arbuthnot, chap. 18.

	L.	678,125	0	0
‡		94,937	10	0
§		322,916	13	4
	L.	1,095,979	3	4

Vid. Plin. lib. xxxiii, c. 3.

After this act of violence, it appears that Cæsar distrusted the affections of the people. He had proposed to harangue them in a public audience, which had been appointed for that purpose; but apprehending that he might be exposed to insult from some one in the crowd, he declined that solemnity, even avoided the public view altogether, and having passed but a few days at Rome, set out for Spain sullen and displeased. It was no longer a doubt, that his victories led to the subversion of the republic, and of every species of civil government whatever *.

Marcus Emilius Lepidus, who, as has been observed, was at this time Prætor, and the officer of highest rank then at Rome, was left to govern in the city. Mark Antony had the command of Cæsar's forces in Italy; and by the use which he made of his power, treating persons of the most respectable condition with great insolence, and indulging himself in all the extravagance of debauch, for which his temperament appears to have been peculiarly fitted, increased the disma apprehensions of the public. He is said to have travelled through Italy himself in an open litter, with Citheride, a celebrated actress, followed by seven other carriages replenished with female attendants, including Fulvia, the widow of the late famous Clodius, and now his wife, who, to enjoy her present husband's state, and partake with him in the licence of his military power, connived at his infidelities, and made a part in this scandalous train †. The whole, a lively display of the object for

* Cic. ad Att. lib. x, ep. 4. † Ibid. lib. x, et xiii.

which the accomplices of Catiline, and many of the followers of Cæsar, wished to be masters of the republic, and a foretaste of the brutal caprice with which this overgrown community, so long a prey to outrageous faction, was now likely to be made the subject and the sport of a military usurpatic

Soon after hostilities had commenced
been sent to command for the republic
and Cato to watch over its interests in Si
islands appeared to Cæsar, when about to carry the war into Spain, of considerable importance, and he wished, if possible, to get the possession of them, as well as to reduce Pompey's forces in every other part of the empire. Having stationed Dolabella, with C. Antonius, on the coast of Illyricum, he ordered Valerius, with a proper force, into Sardinia, and Curio, with three legions, to prevent the establishment of Cato in Sicily. The Sardinians, hearing that one of Cæsar's officers was appointed, in his name, to take possession of their island, declared for his interest, took arms against Cotta, and obliged him to fly into Africa, where he joined Atius Varus, who had occupied that province in the name of the republic.

Cato, some time after his nomination to command in Sicily, and while there were any hopes of a negotiation, remained at Capua, then the quarters of Pompey, in order to give his assistance in forming an accommodation, the least ruinous that could be obtained for the commonwealth. But on Pompey's retreat into Apulia, he went into Sicily, and the province being unprovided with every means of defence, gave

orders to repair, or to build ships in all the ports of the island, and in those of the neighbouring coast of Italy. He had likewise ordered all the towns to furnish their quota of troops; but had not been able to collect any considerable force, when Curio landed at Messina, with the two legions destined by Cæsar to take possession of the island. Sensible that any attempts to resist would only expose the lives of a few well-affected citizens or subjects, who might on this occasion be disposed to support him as an officer of the republic, he discontinued his military preparations, and withdrew from the island.

This officer had often disapproved of Pompey's conduct; and on this occasion, particularly complained of the defenceless state in which he had suffered the republic to be surprised in all its possessions. Cæsar, who no doubt wished to have the suffrage of so respectable a person, and of his own enemy, against Pompey, represents Cato as complaining that he was betrayed, that the Senate had been deceived, and that the war itself was unnecessary*. The conduct of Pompey, no only as a citizen, but as an officer of State and as a soldier, has been censured in many parts of this memorable contest; and there can be no doubt that in the outset, either from design to extort from the Senate the more ample powers of Dictator, or from too much confidence in himself, as he supposed, at the head of the republic, he suffered the State to be surprised or taken at a disadvantage on every quarter. Cæsar himself is said to have cen-

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. xxx.

sured him for abandoning Italy; and, it is probable, would have respected him more, if, in executing this resolution, instead of passing into Macedonia, he had gone to the head of his army in Spain. His celebrated saying, in leaving Brundisium, when he was about to carry the war into that country, opinion to this purpose, "We go," he sa "this general who has no army, to an army that has "no general."

Cæsar's own distribution of his forces, as has been already mentioned, in assigning what appeared to have been the reasons of his conduct, had been made with the greatest ability. The disposition, indeed, on which Pompey relied was plausible: but that of Cæsar profound; and the more, that it gave him the appearance of a person acting without design, and suddenly forced to the measures he pursued. In talking of ordinary men, we may err in imputing too much to design and concert; but with respect to Cæsar, the mistake to be dreaded is that of not perceiving the whole extent of his foresight and plan. He at once armed himself with a military force, and artfully guarded the appearances under which he was to use it. When the Senate passed their resolution against him, he seemed to be caught unprepared to resist; but the Senate was still less prepared to attack. He had artfully avoided giving them any cause of suspicion, by an unnecessary assemblage of forces on the side of Italy, while he had sufficient strength to take the full benefit of the consternation into which they were to be thrown by his first alarm. Thou[illegible] long meditating the invasion of Rome wit[illegible]

an army, he contrived an incident, in the flight of the Tribunes, to make it appear the effect of a sudden provocation, and of his zeal in a popular cause. When we consider Mark Antony as the person who was to furnish this pretence of a Tribune's flight from violence, there is no doubt that Cæsar had his choice of the time at which the occasion should present itself.

At this conjuncture, the greater part of his army still remained beyond the Alps, but in the precise situation in which they were most likely to be wanted, to encounter the first considerable difficulty that would probably arise in the war. This difficulty was to come from the veteran legions which had been levied for Pompey, and which were stationed under Afranius and Petreius in Spain. If these legions had attempted to pass the Pyrenees, the army of Cæsar was stationed in Gaul to intercept them, and he was accordingly secure of being able to finish the war in Italy, without any interruption from thence. When this service was effected, his army in Gaul remained in the most advantageous position, from which to enter upon it was likely to become the second object of his enterprise, the reduction of Spain.

The antagonists of Cæsar, without any apprehension from the measures he had taken, and perfectly secure until the moment that hostilities commenced, were completely surprised, overwhelmed, and routed in every quarter on which they attempted to make a defence. Armies indeed had been formed in Italy, according to the saying of Pompey, *at the stamp of his foot*; but they were armies that served the pur-

pose of his enemies, not that of the republic, or his own; and though raised to secure Italy against Cæsar, became in the reduction of Italy itself an accession to his force, and were ready to be sent in separate divisions to occupy different provinces of the empire in his name; insomuch, that while Cæsar himself, with the strength of the veteran legions with which he had conquered Gaul, hastened into Spain to reduce what was the most formidable part of his rival's power, his officers were detached with separate bodies of these newly acquired troops, to the easier conquests of Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa.

Pompey, although he had never visited his government in person, nor sought for occasions of war, as Cæsar in order to discipline his army or enure them to service had done in Gaul, had nevertheless formed a great military establishment, consisting of seven Roman legions, with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry, equal in number to eight legions more; and Cæsar had reason to believe, that this great force, if the war could have been protracted in Italy, would have come upon his rear, cut off his resources in Gaul, or obliged him to defend himself on the north of the Alps. He accordingly, instead of bringing into Italy the legions that lay in the Low Countries, or the interior parts of his province, had moved them only to the neighbourhood of Narbonne, to be near the confines of Spain, from which this storm was to be dreaded; and meant, if the success of his affairs in Italy should admit of it, that these legions should cross the Pyrenees, and

fix the scene of the war amidst the possessions of his rival.

Spain had been formerly divided into two provinces, under two separate Roman governors; but the whole being united under Pompey, was committed by him to three lieutenants, Varro, Petreius, and Afranius. The first commanded from the river Guadiana westward to the extremities of Lusitania* and Gallicia; the second, from the Guadiana eastward to the mountains of Murcia; and the third, from thence to the Pyrenees.

Soon after the war broke out in Italy, Pompey sent Vibullius into Spain, with orders to these officers to assemble their forces, and to prepare for the defence of their province. Of the three, Varro affected indifference in the quarrel, or an equal regard to the opposite parties concerned in it. An accident, he said, had placed him under the command of Pompey; but he had an equal attachment to Cæsar. The other two, from regard to the commonwealth, or from fidelity to their commander-in-chief, engaged with more zeal in the cause. They determined, in concert with Vibullius, to leave Varro in the western province, while they themselves drew the principal part of their force towards the eastern frontier; and by occupying the passes of the mountains, or some advantageous post on the Ebro, endeavoured to defend the country intrusted to their care, until Pompey should either arrive in person to take the command on himself, or until, having rallied his forces

* Portugal.

in Macedonia, he should bring the scene of the war again into Italy. For this purpose, they took post at Ilerda *, a place of strength on the Segra, and about twenty miles above the confluence of this river with the Cinea; Afranius with three legions, Petreius with two more, together with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry.

Such were the dispositions that were making in Spain, when Cæsar, having expelled his rival from Italy, took possession of Rome, and having passed a few days in that city, in the manner above related, set out for his army in the province of Narbonne.

Being to pass by Marseilles, he intended to take possession of that city; but the inhabitants were already disposed to favour his antagonists, and shut their gates against him. These ancient Greek colonists, after having long defended their settlement against the rude tribes in their neighbourhood, had placed themselves at last under the protection of the Romans; but with a reserve of all their own immunities, and an exemption from all the burdens of a Roman province. Cæsar proposed to have entered their city as a neutral place, and to prevail on the People to receive him, cited the examples of Rome itself, and of all the other cities of Italy, which had opened their gates, and given a passage to his army, without taking any part in the present disputes. To this proposal, the citizens of Marseilles made answer, That in every case where the Romans were divided among themselves, every ally in their situation must

* Now called Lerida.

THEATRE
of the
CAMPAIGN
on the
Sagra or Sicoris.
Camp of Fabius
Camp of Cæsar
Ilerda
Sagra el Sicoris
Octogesa

so far preserve their neutrality, as not to receive the forces of either party within their walls; and that in the present case particularly, they lay under such high obligations to the leaders of both parties, that they must carefully avoid giving offence to either.

It soon after appeared, however, that this plausible answer was intended merely to gain time. Vibullius had passed by Marseilles in his way to Spain, and had delivered to the people of that place a message from Pompey, with assurances of support; on which they fully relied. The receipt of this message was followed by a resolution, to admit the officers and men of Pompey's party into their town, and to exclude his antagonists.

Domitius Ahenobarbus, after he had been dismissed from Corfinium, nowise affected by the ostentatious clemency of Cæsar, had, in pursuance of the Senate's appointment to the government of Gaul, repaired to that province, raised some troops, with which he was expected to take possession of Marseilles, and actually, in a few days after this answer was given [illegible] Cæsar, entered the harbour of that place with [illegible] ships, and some land forces on board. Upon [illegible] arrival, the people of this republic called into the [illegible] assistance the force of some neighbouring cantons from the mountains; repaired their own fortifications; replenished their magazines; employed many hands in fabricating arms; and took every other precaution that was necessary, in case they should be attacked, to enable them to make a vigorous defence.

By this conduct on the part of Marseilles, Cæsar

being greatly provoked, invested the town with an army of three legions; and having ordered some ships to be built on the Rhône, in its neighbourhood, prepared to assail it at once by sea and by land. He committed the attack by land to Trebonius; and that from the sea to Decimus Brutus. While he was making these preparations, a report prevailed that Pompey was passing the seas into Africa, and intended, with the troops which were in that province, and a body of Numidian cavalry, to reinforce, and to take the command of his army in Spain. It is probable that Cæsar, in like circumstances, would have even taken a shorter road to the head of his army. He appears at least to have believed this report of his enemy, or to have thought it extremely probable, and to have been somewhat alarmed. As if the prospect of meeting with Pompey, having under his direction a well-appointed and regular force, had rendered him doubtful of the affections of his own men, he mentions an artifice practised by himself on this occasion, which may be considered as a specimen of his address, and of the influence which he employed with his army. He borrowed money from the officers, and gave it in gratuities to the soldiers; thus taking a pledge for the fidelity of the [illegible] and purchasing that of the others by his bounty.

While Cæsar was yet employed in opening the siege of Marseilles, he ordered Fabius, who commanded his forces at Narbonne, to advance into the Pyrenees; and if the passes were open or slightly guarded, to penetrate into Spain, and occupy some advantageous or leading position in the avenues to

that country. This officer, accordingly, having forced the passes of the mountains, probably near to what is now called Urgel or Fort Louis, knowing that the enemy were posted on the Segra, to dispute his passage, appears to have taken his route by the right of this river, from near its source, to where the army of Afranius and Petreius were encamped at the town of Ilerda. He had by this means frustrated their intention of disputing the passage of the Segra, and, having his army on that side, could at leisure open his communication with the more fertile parts of Catalonia, on the other, in order to receive his supplies and reinforcements from Gaul by the ordinary route. For this purpose, soon after his arrival, he constructed two bridges in the rear of his camp, at the distance of about four miles from each other, forming an immediate communication with Catalonia, for the supply of his army, and for the junction of reinforcements by the more frequented access from Gaul; but as the enemy also had a passage by the bridge of Ilerda to intercept these supplies, it was necessary to cover every convoy and foraging party with numerous and powerful escorts. After he had been some time in this position, two entire legions, under the command of Plancus, had marched to cover his foragers, and were to be followed by a body of cavalry. After the infantry had passed, and the cavalry was entered on the bridge, it broke down, and deprived those who were already over, of any communication with the camp. The timber and wreck of the bridge floating by the town of Ilerda, gave the enemy intimation of what had happened, and

suggested the design to scour the country on the left of the Segra with a powerful detachment, in order to intercept any parties who might by this accident be cut off from the main body of their forces. For this purpose, Afranius marched with four legions, and might have taken or destroyed those who remained under Plancus on the left of the river, if this officer had not retired to a height, on which he was able for some time to resist the superior numbers of his enemy. In the mean while, Fabius, suspecting the danger to which his detachment was exposed, dispatched two legions more by the other bridge to support the former. On the appearance of this reinforcement, Afranius, whose plan in the present campaign was altogether defensive, thought proper to retire, without hazarding an action, in which he might be exposed to a too hasty decision of the cause.

Two days after this adventure, or about the 2d of May, Cæsar, with an escort of nine hundred horse, arrived, by the remaining bridge, in the camp of Fabius. Having examined the situation of both armies, and ordered the bridge which broke down to be rebuilt, he proceeded as usual to act on the offensive, and to occupy the enemy's attention with successive operations against them, by which, in his usual way, he left them no leisure to form any designs of their own. It was his fortune, indeed, in this and other periods of the present war, to need a speedy decision, which made him take measures that forced his enemies to remain on the defensive, and inspired his men with a notion of their own superiority; an opinion

which, after it has been some time entertained, seldom fails to verify itself.

In a few days after his arrival, he advanced with his army in three divisions to the foot of the hill on which the Spanish army was encamped, and while they continued to observe, and endeavoured to penetrate his intentions, he began to break ground, and to make a lodgment for himself in that place. That his purpose might not be known, until the work was somewhat advanced, his army being formed in different lines, he kept the first and second under arms, and ordered the third, without raising a parapet, or planting their palisades, to sink a ditch fifteen feet wide, and of a sufficient length to cover his front. This being done, he retired with his whole army behind it, and ordered them to lie upon their arms all night. Under cover of this temporary intrenchment, he on the following day completed the usual fortifications of his camp, and brought forward the tents and baggage of the army, which till then had remained under a proper guard on his former ground.

Being now in possession of a post within four hundred paces, or less than half a mile of the enemy's station; and having a view of the ground which lay between their camp and the town of Ilerda, extending about three hundred paces, and mostly plain, with a small swelling or height in the middle of it, he formed a project to seize this ground; and by means of a post in that situation, knowing that the enemy had lodged their magazines and stores in Ilerda, proposed to cut off their communication with the town. In this view, having advanced three legions

into a proper position, from which to execute his purpose; he ordered the front rank * from one of those legions to start from their colours, and with the utmost speed to gain the height which he intended to occupy. The sudden movement of this body explained his design to the enemy, and they instantly put all the piquets and extraordinary guards of their camp in motion to prevent its effects. Having a nearer way, and the advantage of the ground, they got a-head of Cæsar's party; and being in possession of the height before them, repulsed and beat them back to their main body. Here, too, they pursued their advantage; and as they rushed with little regard to order, but with an appearance of undaunted courage, on the flanks as well as the front of the legions which Cæsar had advanced, they put the whole in some degree of confusion, and forced them back from the plain to the heights in their rear.

While the leaders of the Spanish army probably committed an error in not redoubling their blow, or remained in suspense, Cæsar issued from his camp with a fresh legion to support the flying division of his army, obliged the enemy to retire in their turn, and having overtaken them before they could reach their camp, obliged them to take refuge under the walls of the town.

The ground at the foot of these walls was steep, and the access to it was by lanes and narrow ways. Thither the troops, at whose head Cæsar had renewed the action, flushed with victory, had followed the

* Unius legionis Antesignanos. Cæsar. de Bell. Civil. lib. i, c. 43.

enemy, and got into a situation in which they neither could gain any advantage, nor retire without loss. The parties, however, so situate, continued to skirmish during five hours, and being continually reinforced from their respective armies, a general engagement was likely to ensue on ground extremely unfavourable to Cæsar, but from which he could not retire without an appearance of defeat and absolute rout.

In order to extricate himself with the least possible shew of disgrace, he ordered a general charge, and having drove his antagonists before him to the foot of the wall, he sounded a retreat from thence, and brought off his men before the enemy could rally in any considerable force, or return to the pursuit.

In this manner, Cæsar withdrew to his camp with considerable loss, and foiled in his design; but, on account of the last impression he made on the enemy, with some pretensions to a victory, of which, to support the courage of his troops, he did not neglect to avail himself.

In a few days after this miscarriage, the army of Cæsar suffered a worse and more alarming disaster, in a circumstance to which their situation exposed them. The summer being far advanced, and the snow on the Pyrenees melting apace, all the rivers which are supplied from thence, rose of a sudden to their greatest height. The Segra carried off both the bridges erected by Fabius, and baffled all the endeavours that were used to preserve or restore them. As often as any attempt was made for this purpose, the work was interrupted by the enemy from the oppo-

site bank, or the materials were swept away by the flood. Neither the Segra nor the Cinca were passable, and the country between them, though, at that distance from their confluence, extending in breadth about thirty miles, being exhausted, could no longer furnish the necessary supply of provisions to Cæsar's camp.

About the time that the army began to feel their inconvenience, a convoy which arrived from Gaul, consisting of many carriages, escorted by a large body of Gaulish horse, and accompanied with many officers and persons of distinction, who came to witness the glories of this campaign, the whole, together with their attendants and equipage, amounting to about six thousand men, were attacked by Afranius, dispersed, and with great loss obliged to take refuge in the neighbouring mountains.

In consequence of this disappointment, or under the sense of present, and apprehension of future scarcity, the modius * of corn sold in Cæsar's camp for fifty denarii, or at the rate of about thirty shillings a peck. All their attempts to procure a supply were frustrated by the difficulties of their situation, or by the vigilance of the enemy. As the height of the floods was a permanent effect of the season, in swelling every river which descends from mountains that retain their snow in the summer, Cæsar would have no immediate prospect of relief; and as the enemy were plentifully supplied from their magazines in the town of Ilerda, or had, by the bridge of that place,

* Little more than a peck.

an open communication with the fertile country on the left of the Segra, Nature seemed to have decided the war in their favours. The Spanish army accordingly triumphed in their good fortune, sending exaggerated accounts of their advantage to all parts of Spain, to Italy, and to Macedonia. Many persons, who had hitherto hesitated in the choice of their party, were now determined. Varro began to exert himself in his province, and levied two entire new legions in the name of Pompey. Many hastened from Italy into Macedonia, to be the carriers of such agreeable tidings, or to have the merit of declaring themselves of the party of the republic, while the issue of the war yet remained in any degree of suspense.

The triumphs, however, which anticipate events are often deceitful; and, by the overweening security and confidence which they inspire, give an able enemy some advantage, in surmounting his difficulties, or facilitate the changes of fortune in his favour. Afranius and Petreius, while they trusted to physical circumstances, and the ordinary course of the seasons, were not sufficiently upon their guard against the superior resources of so able an adversary. They suffered him to build, unobserved, a number of boats, upon a construction which he observes was learned in Britain; having a keel in the ordinary form, and some timbers of strength on the sides; but, instead of plank, finished between these timbers with basket-work, and covered with hides. These vessels being of easy carriage, were transported by land about twenty miles above Cæsar's camp; and in a first embarkation ferried over a party sufficient to make a lodg-

ment on the opposite bank. Cæsar continued to reinforce this party, until, having an entire legion intrenched on that side, he ventured to employ his pioneers openly in constructing a bridge, which they began at once from both sides of the river. This work was completed in two days, and again gave him access to the left of the Segra, where, in his turn, he surprised some of the enemy's parties, and procured immediate relief by a supply of provisions to his own camp.

About the time that Cæsar had effected this change in the state of his army, he had news of a naval fight on the coast of Gaul, in which his fleet, under Decimus Brutus, had defeated that of the enemy, and given a speedy prospect of the reduction of Marseilles. This report, together with the disappointment he had recently given to the hopes of his enemies, had at once all the effects of victory, and made him appear more formidable than he was supposed to be, even before the distresses which he had lately experienced. His antagonists, from a state of sanguine expectation, sunk into a proportional degree of despondency, and became so much in awe of his superior ability, that they abandoned the most fertile part of the country to his foragers, and never ventured, except in the night, to go abroad for the necessary supplies of their own camp. These events affected the natives in a still higher degree, and brought them from every quarter to make a tender of their services in supplying Cæsar with provisions, or in co-operating with his military plans.

In conjunction with the inhabitants, who were now become his allies, Cæsar again found himself in condition to act on the offensive, and to devise new alarms for the enemy. His first object was to render the passage of the river at all times practicable; and as he had failed in his purpose of separating the Spanish army from the town of Ilerda, he now proposed to extend his command of the country, and to form a chain of posts, by which he might circumscribe the town itself, together with the enemy's camp, which depended upon it for subsistence.

The bridge which he had lately built was at too great a distance, and he experienced the insecurity of such communications over torrents, which came with such force and so much inequality from the mountains. Instead, therefore, of attempting to erect any more bridges, he proposed to render the river fordable, by separating its course into many different channels; and for this purpose made a number of cuts, through the bank, of about thirty feet deep, passing over the plain, to receive as much of the waters of the Segra as might sufficiently drain the principal stream.

The enemy, as soon as they understood the purpose of these operations, were greatly alarmed. They foresaw that Cæsar, having the passage of the river secured, might command its opposite banks below, as well as above the town of Ilerda, block up the bridge of that place, and, with the aid of the country around him, which, since the late defection of its inhabitants, was ready to support him in all his designs, might have it in his power to prevent their

own supplies, and distress them, in their turn, i
want of provisions.

That they might not be exposed to incur so g
a calamity, they resolved, while Cæsar's work was yet incomplete, to abandon their present station, and to retire beyond the Ebro, where the people, either from fear or affection, were still in their interest. They proceeded to the execution of this purpose with much seeming precaution and foresight. Having fixed upon a proper place at which to lay a bridge over the Ebro, they ordered all the boats, within a certain distance on that river and on the Segra, to be collected together for that purpose. They placed a proper garrison in Ilerda, to check the motions of the enemy in their rear, or, if he attempted to reduce that place, to occupy his forces until they themselves should have effected their retreat, and made their arrangements in the new position they intended to take.

As their first movement in departing from their present encampment, and in passing through the town of Ilerda, encumbered with all their baggage, was likely to detain them some time in presence of the enemy, or expose them to the attacks of his cavalry and light troops, they projected no more, on the first day of their march, than to file off by the bridge; and they fixed on a post at which they might halt on the left of the Segra, and make the proper dispositions to execute the remainder of their plan. This post they sent two legions before them to occupy and to secure.

Having taken these preparatory steps, they decamped, defiled without molestation through the town

of Ilerda, and came to the ground on which they had taken care to secure a proper lodgment; but here they halted only until the middle of the night, when they again were in motion. They had a plain of some miles before them, bounded by a ridge of hills, which they were to pass in their way to the Ebro. They might be exposed to Cæsar's light troops in crossing this plain; but as soon as they reached the mountains, they could, by securing the passes in their rear, effectually prevent any further attack from the enemy. Thither they accordingly directed their march; but Cæsar, who had observed their intentions, and who had so far succeeded in his operations on the river as to be able to ford it with his horse, had sent the greater part of his cavalry, in the beginning of the night, with orders to hang upon the rear of the enemy, and by all possible means to retard their progress.

This service the cavalry performed with so much success, that at break of day the Spanish army, in consequence of the frequent interruptions they had suffered, were still to be seen from Cæsar's camp. The cavalry, as often as the enemy got in motion, were observed to attack them, but when the enemy halted, appeared to stop or retire, and were pursued in their turn. The army of Cæsar, being spectators of this scene, became extremely impatient, and with the greatest ardour pressed to be led against the enemy. Even officers crowded to their general, and begged they might be allowed to try the ford; they observed of what consequence it was, that an enemy

who had been driven with so much labour from o[illegible] post, should not be suffered to retire in safety [illegible] another situation, from which they might renew the war.

Cæsar, affecting to be moved by these representations, and to be prevailed upon to do what it is probable he earnestly desired, instantly made his dispositions to pass the river. He selected the least firm and vigorous men of every cohort for the guard of the camp; placed lines of horse in the river above and below the ford, to break the force of the stream, and to save those who might be overpowered by the strength of the current; in this manner he passed his infantry between the double lines of cavalry without the loss of a man. They had a circuit of six miles to make, in order to avoid the town of Ilerda; but notwithstanding this delay, and the advantage which Afranius and Petreius had gained by beginning their march at midnight, and by their not being discovered until it was day, such were the interruptions given by the cavalry, and the speed with which the legions of Cæsar advanced, that they overtook the enemy's rear about three in the afternoon, and occasioned at once a general halt in every part of their column.

Petreius and Afranius, stunned by the unexpected arrival of Cæsar at the head of his whole army, formed on a rising ground to receive him; and both armies seemed to prepare for immediate action. But Cæsar, knowing the necessity which the enemy were under of continuing their retreat, and the pro-

object he had of increasing his advantage on the march, did not think it necessary to attack them when in order of battle: he took his ground, however, so near them *, that he could profit by every opportunity they gave him, and, in every attempt they should make to change their situation, could push them into all the disorders of a general rout.

From this position of the two armies, the Spaniards having some time remained in order of battle, were tempted again to resume their march; but having soon experienced the inconvenience of being to retire with an enemy at their backs, and being faint with hunger and the fatigue of so many tedious and fruitless operations, they determined to halt, and wait for the return of night. They had now no more than five miles to pass on the plain, and hoped, by a rapid motion in the night, to traverse this space before Cæsar could overtake them, or before he could oblige them to halt any where short of the mountains, where they looked for a perfect security.

Both parties appeared to be fixed on their ground for the night, when some prisoners that were brought to Cæsar, gave information that the enemy were in motion, and must in a little time be so far advanced as to reach the hills before he could give them any effectual obstruction. On this sudden emergence, although his army was by no means ready to move, he ordered every trumpet to sound a march, as if he were actually in motion. This feint, however slight,

* The want of cannon or fire-arms enabled a superior army to remain almost in contact with that it intended to harass.

had its effect; the enemy believed that they were to be instantly attacked, or closely pursued when they ordered on their way, and encumbered with baggage; to avoid these disadvantages, they desisted from their intention, and gave the signal to halt.

Afranius and Petreius, thus baffled in the execution of the first part of their plan, which had been so reasonably formed, began to lose courage, and remained on this ground all night, and the following day, perplexed with irresolution and various counsels. So far, however, they determined, that before so vigilant an enemy it was safer to march by day than by night; and in this mind they remained yet a second night in the present position.

In this interval, Cæsar, having leisure to visit the country over which they were to pass, found it practicable to turn their flank, and get to the hills before them. He accordingly moved in the night, and at break of day, before the enemy judged it safe to decamp, he appeared at some distance on their right; but seemed to retire, and to leave them at liberty to continue their retreat. So long as his march had this appearance, they were pleased to think he had discontinued the pursuit, and applauded themselves for having patiently waited so joyful an event. But as soon as he had got a sufficient way to his left, he changed his direction, and pushed with all possible speed to arrive at the mountains. They were no longer at a loss to perceive his design, or the danger with which they themselves were threatened. And they instantly, without striking their tents or pack-

ing their baggage, moved in the greatest haste to prevent him.

In this operation, Cæsar was now become certain of one or other of two great advantages; either that he should reach the pass of the mountains before the enemy, and so cut off their retreat; or, if they got there before him, that he should be left in possession of their camp and their baggage. He prevailed, however, in the trial of speed, got the first of these advantages, by being before them at the ascent of the mountains, where he found a ledge or terrace that was sufficiently capacious to receive his army, and which gave him entire command of the pass.

Afranius, on seeing Cæsar in possession of this ground, sent a considerable party to try the ascent of the mountains at a different place, and to gain the summits behind him; in hopes that, if this were practicable, he might follow with his whole army, and descend from thence to the Ebro. But the party he employed on this service was, in presence of both armies, surrounded by Cæsar's horse, and put to the sword. The rest of the army, without making any attempt to rescue their friends, beheld this scene with a kind of torpid dejection. They dropped their arms, and staggered in their ranks. The troops of Cæsar, who well understood these signs of dismay, became to a degree of mutiny impatient for action; and he himself was sensible that the enemy might in that moment be attacked with the greatest advantage; but as he now thought himself sure of being able to reduce them without a blow, he was unwilling to furnish an opportunity, however unlikely to

avail them, of making their escape by the chance of a battle. While he endeavoured accordingly to restrain the unseasonable ardour of his own men, the leaders of the Spanish army had time to retire with theirs, and led them back to the camp which they had left in the morning, and to the melancholy possession of tents and of baggage, which they had been willing to abandon, in order to effect their escape.

Cæsar having left proper guards to secure the passes of the mountains, returned on the track of the enemy, and took post, as before, so near them, that they could not move without being exposed to his insults.

In this position of the two armies, the sentinels and advanced guards had an opportunity to talk together; they mutually regretted the unhappy quarrel in which they were engaged, and both officers and men becoming by degrees more familiar, met between the lines, and even exchanged visits in their opposite camps. Officers of the Spanish army proceeded so far as to talk of an accommodation, and got over their scruples in treating without proper authority, by proposing to stipulate in the treaty of peace which they were about to conclude, some honourable terms for their generals.

Cæsar was apprised of this correspondence, and however irregular, connived at a circumstance which he hoped his superior popularity and the splendour of his fortune would turn to his own advantage. He flattered himself, that as he had been able to seduce the troops of Pompey in Italy, so he might now de-

prive his antagonists of the mighty army they had formed in this province against him.

The Spanish generals, being intent on a work they were executing to secure their access to water, remained for some time unapprized of the disorderly intercourse subsisting between the two armies; and Afranius, when he came to the knowledge of what was passing, seemed to observe it with some degree of indifference; but Petreius was greatly alarmed, ran with the officers and the guard which usually attended his person to the space between the lines, dispersed all those who were found in conference together, and put all the soldiers of Cæsar's army who fell in his way to the sword. From thence he went through the camp, and with tears exacted from every legion apart fresh oaths of fidelity to Pompey. He afterwards assembled the whole at the usual place of audience, before the general's tent; and in a speech, composed of insinuation mixed with reproach, endeavoured to confirm them in their duty; and, to the end that he might effectually cut off all hopes of conciliation, ordered all the soldiers of Cæsar's army that could be found within his intrenchments to be brought before him and slain.

Cæsar, at the same time, having many officers and men of the Spanish army in his camp, might have retaliated these acts of severity; but he chose rather to contrast the character of clemency he himself had assumed, with the austere and merciless policy of his enemies; and for this purpose gave their freedom to such officers or men as chose to return to their own party, and rewarded with preferments and honours

such of them as were inclined to remain in his service.

Afranius and Petreius, by the timely discovery of these irregular practices, having escaped the disgrace of being delivered up to the enemy, to be treated at his discretion, or to be spared only as objects of pity at the intercession of their own army, continued the operations in which they were engaged; but by persevering in their plan of resistance, they only enabled their adversary to give still more evident proofs of his superior skill and address. They were sensible that their present post could not be long maintained; it had been taken, in their haste to reach the mountains, from necessity, as an immediate respite from the assaults of an enemy who annoyed their march; and, besides other inconveniences, had a difficult access to water; the brook or river from which they were to be supplied being exposed to the discharge of arrows, darts, and other missiles from the enemy. Their bread, which they had calculated to serve them on their route to the Ebro, was nearly exhausted, and they had no immediate prospect of supply. They entered therefore into anxious deliberation on the choice of some other retreat, by which they might soonest get beyond the reach of an enemy who pressed them with such unremitted alarms. They hesitated whether they should return to Ilerda, where they still had some magazines, or should attempt to reach Tarraco* in the opposite direction, though at the distance of about fifty miles.

* Tarragona.

The length and difficulty of the way, in which they would be exposed to Cæsar's attacks, determined them against the last; and they chose the first, as promising the nearest and most immediate relief from their present distresses. They accordingly, without any precaution, decamped, and directed their march to Ilerda.

The Spanish infantry were now more exposed than they had been on any of their former marches; for their cavalry had been so often discomfited, and had lost courage so much, that they could not be kept to their place in the column, and were now actually received for safety into the centre of the infantry; the rear was therefore cruelly annoyed by Cæsar's horse, supported by the whole force of his legions. In ascending the heights, which were frequent in their way, they had the better of the enemy, by throwing their javelins and darts on those who attempted to pursue them from below; and with this superiority they made a stand on every ascent, to force their pursuers back to some distance; but in descending the hills, the same advantage being taken against themselves, they generally ran in great disorder to the plains. And in this manner, the ground being uneven, their march consisted of alternate stops and precipitate flights, extremely fatiguing, and likely to end in a general rout.

The leaders of the retiring army, to prevent this fatal consequence, thought proper again to form upon a rising ground, and attempted a stratagem to amuse the enemy, and to gain some advance on the march before him. For this purpose, affecting to make

some permanent lodgment in the place where t[illegible] halted, they threw up a breastwork, but neit[illegible] pitched their tents nor unloaded their baggage, [illegible] were ready to depart the moment their pursuers g[illegible] them an opportunity, by quitting the order of march. Cæsar, trusting to the effects of his late attacks, and to the appearances which the enemy presented, had no suspicion of their purpose, gave orders to pitch, and even suffered his cavalry to go abroad in parties to forage. This was no sooner observed from the Spanish army, than they instantly resumed their march. It was then about noon, and they made some way undisturbed.

Cæsar seeing himself thus overreached, instantly put his legions in motion, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, and leaving orders for the cavalry to follow him as soon as they could be assembled, moved on with the foot as near as he could on the enemy's rear. He was in this situation when the cavalry rejoined him, and, by renewing with double ardour their former attacks, obliged the Spanish army again, in a kind of despair, to suspend their march. In order to have some respite from the repeated charges of cavalry with which they were harassed, they halted in a field, which they had no time to examine, and in which they were actually very much exposed.

In this situation, Cæsar had again a fair opportunity of proceeding to a general action, and, with little doubt of the event, of terminating the war by a battle; but he persisted in his purpose of forcing these unfortunate legions to surrender, without any

loss or hazard to himself. In this mind he continued to observe them with a degree of insulting indifference. They soon became sensible of the great disadvantage of the place in which they had halted, and endeavoured to change their position, without exposing themselves, if possible, to the enemy, who was so near as to be able to disturb them in every motion they openly attempted to make. For this purpose, they broke ground for a new intrenchment in their rear, and proposing to retire under cover of successive and contiguous intrenchments, as besiegers advance in the attack of a fortress, they passed from one fortified camp as soon as they had prepared another to receive them *.

In these slow and toilsome operations they persisted all the night and the following day, and may have become by their labours less exposed to the enemy; but subject to a fresh inconveniency, till then unobserved, in the great distance to which they were removed from water.

As soon as this defect was perceived, which was probably not till after the soldier had consumed what he commonly carried in his flask, they discontinued their fatiguing operations; but no man ventured

* Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i, c. 81. "Illi animadverso vitio castrorum, tota nocte munitiones proferunt, castraque castris *convertunt*." This passage is differently read in different editions; for *convertunt* we have *conferunt*. And a very learned, as well as intelligent, military commentator, supposing that Cæsar meant to say, that they joined their intrenchment close to his own, pretends to see in this some plausible means of retreat; but as this exceeds the author's comprehension, he has preferred the first reading, and though the meaning of *convertunt* is not clear, he has ventured to give it the sense in the text. *Vid. Commentaires, &c. et Antiquités Militaires, par Mons. Guichard, tome premier.*

abroad for water, and they remained all night under dreadful apprehensions of what they might suffer from the want of this necessary of life. On the following day the whole army turned out in array to the watering place, and, at the hazard of a general action, proceeded to supply themselves from thence. They were thus suffered to obtain a temporary relief in this article; but none attempted to procure any food, and they soon after, in order to supply their own immediate wants, and to lessen their consumption of water and forage, killed all the beasts of burden in their camp. But while they endeavoured, by means of these pitiful expedients, to await the event of any change that might offer in their favour, Cæsar, with his usual boldness of enterprise, formed a design to cut off all their hopes at once by a line of circumvallation. In conducting or covering this work, his legions were commonly under arms. And the enemy, sensible of the extremity to which they were soon likely to be reduced, advancing in front of their own camp to interrupt him; by a sudden attack might have decided their fate in a battle upon equal terms. But courage does not arise from distress, or the apprehension of suffering: the habit of acting upon the defensive had already impressed this army with a sense of inferiority, and their frequent miscarriages had made them distrust the conduct of their officers. Though now immersed in difficulties, from which nothing but victory could extricate them, and suffering insults which nothing but the blood of their enemies could avenge, they, without

making any effort for either purpose, retired again within their intrenchment.

In that situation, however, their distresses apace were becoming insufferable. After four days had passed in their camp without any supply of water or provisions of any sort, their leaders desired an interview with Cæsar; and, not to expose themselves in so humbling a state to the troops of either army, begged that their meeting might be held apart from both. The proposal of a conference was accepted; but Cæsar would not allow it to be held in any private place: he insisted that Afranius and Petreius should meet him in the space between the two armies; and having previously demanded, as an acknowledgment of his victory, that the son of Afranius should be delivered up as an hostage, he came to the place of meeting, surrounded by multitudes, who crowded from both armies in anxious expectation of the issue.

Afranius pleaded in behalf of the troops he commanded, that they had done no more than their duty to the officer under whose auspices they had been levied, and no more than the service of the province in which they had been stationed required; but acknowledged the distresses to which they were now reduced, and implored the victor's clemency.

Cæsar, in return, upbraided the leaders of that army with their obstinate animosity to himself, and with their late cruelty to innocent men, who had committed no other offence than that of having embraced their fellow-citizens as friends, and that of being desirous to terminate this unnatural quarrel in

an amicable manner. "That army," he said, "had "been raised and kept on foot for the sole purpose "of making war upon him. For this purpose nu- "merous fleets had been equipped in times of pro- "found peace, and seven entire legions, under able "and experienced officers, had been kept in this "peaceable province, where there was not the least "pretence of a war; that every measure was con- "certed for his destruction; that in order to raise "one citizen to uncommon honours and powers, a "new species of arrangement had taken place, by "which a person remaining at the gates of Rome, "even governing in the city and in every district of "Italy, might likewise have the command in two "warlike provinces, and be allowed a great military "establishment in time of profound peace; that, on "the contrary, in order to distress himself, the ordi- "nary rules of the service had been set aside; and "that to him alone had been denied, what had al- "ways been granted to every citizen who faithfully "served the republic, the privilege of retiring, if not "distinguished with honours, at least without being "loaded with injuries and affronts; that he had "borne these indignities, however, with patience, "and mentioned them now, not as a prelude to any "severities which he meant to inflict, nor as an ex- "cuse for any singular advantage he meant to take "of their present distresses; that he demanded no "more than peace; his antagonists should go un- "hurt, provided they left the province, and became "bound not to serve his enemies for the future "against him; that no one should be forced to take

"any active part on his side; that all who commit-
"ted no injury against him should be considered as
"friends; and that every man now in his power
"should have his liberty, without being subject to
"any other conditions than these."

It is difficult to determine whether the sword or the tongue of this singular man were most dangerous to the state he attacked. It is probable that many of his present audience were as much convinced by his eloquence, as they had been subdued by his military skill, and thought him a person no less forced to his present extremities by the wrongs he had suffered, than able to do himself justice by the force of his arms. His speech was received by the late partisans of his rival with evident signs of pleasure. To be discharged after a certain period of the most faithful services, was all that a Roman soldier, in the ordinary times of the republic, could claim. To receive this favour at the hands of a victorious enemy, by whom they expected to be treated as captives, gave sudden and unexpected joy.

After the material articles were adjusted in this manner, some questions arose with respect to the time and place in which the vanquished army should be dismissed from their colours. Numbers of them, though Roman citizens, had been inlisted in Spain, and were natives or settlers in that province; others had been transported from Italy, and wished to return to their country. It was determined, therefore, that the first should be disbanded immediately; the others march to the Var, where they should be set free, and not be subject to be pressed into any

service whatever. Cæsar undertook to supply them with provisions on their march. He ordered the effects of private persons, if found in his camp, to be restored to them. He paid his own soldiers a hig price for what they were in this manner desired to restore. By this measure he gained several advantages; he lightened the baggage of his own army, made a gratification to his own men, without the imputation of bribery; and he gained his late enemies by an act of generosity. The vanquished army accordingly came to Cæsar with all their complaints, and appealed to him even from their own officers. It was impossible for mankind to resist so much ability, insinuation, and courage.

About a third of the captive army were dismissed from their colours in Spain; the remainder passed the Pyrenees, preceded by one part of Cæsar's army, and followed by the other; who, being thus separated to the van and the rear, and always encamping close to their prisoners, led them, in terms of the capitulation, to the frontiers of Cisalpine Gaul *.

While the main body of Cæsar's army thus conducted the remains of the Spanish legions to the place of their destination, Varro yet remained in the western province of Spain; and Cæsar, in order either to effect a conjunction which had been concerted between them, or to force him to surrender, sent Quintus Cassius with two legions to that quarter, and himself followed with an escort of six hundred horse. Upon the report of his approach, the natives, as usual,

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. i.

having taken their resolution in favour of the successful party, declared for the victor. One of the legions of Varro that lay at Gades *, advancing in form with their colours, came forward to Hispales to receive him, and made offer of their services. Varro himself agreed to make over the forces he commanded, both by sea and by land, and was received at Corduba. Here Cæsar held a general convention of the province; and having thanked the people for the favours they had shewn to his cause, he remitted the contributions, and withdrew all the burdens which Varro, acting under the authority of Pompey, had imposed upon them. In this, as in other examples, he endeavoured to dispel the fears which his irruption into the province had occasioned, and secured the attachment of the people by a sense of the ease and the exemptions which his success had procured them. The fleets and armies which joined him upon every conquest he made, enabled him to station troops for the security of his new acquisitions, without dividing the forces on which he was to rely for the farther operations of the war. He accordingly, in the present instance, left, under the command of Quintus Cassius, five legions, consisting chiefly of the troops which had been levied by Varro; and he himself embarking on board a fleet which had been fitted out for his enemies, went by sea to Tarraco, now Tarragona, and from that place by land to Narbonne and Marseilles.

* Now Cadiz.

CHAP. XXVII.

The siege of Marseilles continued.—Its surrender.—Cæsar named Dictator.—Return to Rome.—Mutiny at Placentia.—Cæsar with Servilius Isauricus, consuls.—Forces and disposition of Pompey.—Departure of Cæsar to Brundisium.—Transports the first division of his army to Acroceraunus.—His message to Pompey, and their respective operations.—The lines of Dyrrachium. Cæsar baffled in his attempt to invest Pompey.—Action and defeat of Cæsar.—His retreat.—March of both armies into Thessaly.—Battle of Pharsalia.

THE city of Marseilles had not surrendered to the forces which Cæsar had left to besiege it, under the command of Trebonius and Decimus Brutus. The last of these officers, according to the disposition which had been made to block up the place by sea, as well as by land, was stationed under the island at the mouth of the bay. His squadron consisted of twelve ships, but so hastily built, that no more than thirty days had elapsed from the felling of the timber to the launching of the vessels. They were manned, however, with the choice of Cæsar's legions; and, in order to frustrate any advantage which their antagonists might have in the construction or management of their ships, they were furnished with an apparatus to grapple, and could make fast their gun-

wales to those of the enemy, in order to decide the contest, as on solid ground, with their swords.

The Marseillians had equipped ten galleys, of which the greater number, though not all, were decked. These, under the command of Domitius, who had been named by the Senate to succeed Cæsar in Gaul, were joined with the seven ships which this officer had brought into their harbour; and being manned from the neighbouring coasts, came abroad into the bay, in order to force Brutus from his station, and to open their communication with the sea. In the beginning of the action, the Marseillians being superior to Cæsar's fleet in the number of their ships, and in the skill of their mariners, had a considerable advantage. But as soon as they suffered themselves to be entangled by the grapple, the Gaulish seamen, though of a very hardy race, could not withstand the arms and discipline of the legionary soldiers, and were defeated with the loss of nine of their ships.

This was the victory already mentioned, and which contributed so much to the reputation of Cæsar's arms, while he lay before Ilerda, and which, joined to the other circumstances of his good fortune, procured him the alliance of so many nations in Spain.

While Brutus thus kept his station in the bay of Marseilles, Trebonius practised all the usual methods of attack to reduce the city. The place being covered on three sides by water, and on the fourth accessible only by an isthmus or neck of land, which was defended by walls and towers of a great height; he opened two separate attacks, probably on the right and the left of the isthmus, and at each of these at-

tacks appears to have employed the sloping mound or terrace *, which, in the sieges of the ancient where the defence depended on the height of battlements, corresponded to the sap of the moder and was calculated to conduct the besiegers, by gradual ascent, to the top, as the other conducts th to the foot of the walls. This work was supported on the sides chiefly with timber, and built up with fascines, hurdles, and earth, rising in the present case to an elevation of eighty feet, and in breadth, as was formerly observed in that employed against the Bituriges †, probably no less than three hundred and fifty feet, so as to receive a proper column of infantry in front, and to embrace a proper extent in the walls. The workmen employed in the front of this laborious approach were covered with screens, mantlets, and penthouses of great length; and such was the consumption of timber in the construction of the whole, that the neighbouring country is said to have been cleared of its woods.

A mere trading city, long disused to war, or accustomed to rely on foreign aid for protection, we may suppose to have been ill provided for such an attack, either in the state of its arsenals, or in the spirit of its citizens. But this little republic, yet bearing the character of an independent state, and being in some measure accustomed to the presence of an enemy in the barbarous hordes of their neighbourhood, who still looked upon its wealth as a tempting prize, for the security of which it had been necessary to

* Agger. † Bourges.

keep its walls in repair, and to replenish its arsenals, was by no means unprovided for its own defence; and the people, although long inured to peace, still kept in mind the duties which the necessities of war might oblige them to render to their country. They were now supported by the presence of a Roman Proconsul, and had hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey himself, whom, in opposition to Cæsar, who was in rebellion against the legal government of his country, they considered as head of the commonwealth. They accordingly persevered in defence of their walls; and by a continual discharge from the battlements, and by frequent sallies, in which they set fire to the works of the besiegers, greatly retarded the progress of the siege. They had engines of a peculiar force, from which they flung missiles of a monstrous size and weight, being beams twelve feet long, proportionally thick, and pointed with iron, forming a species of arrow, which none of the skreens or coverings, usually employed in making approaches, could resist; and Trebonius was accordingly obliged to proportion the strength of his timbers and penthouses, and the thickness of his parapets, fascines, and earth on his terrace, to the weight of these enormous weapons.

While such efforts were made on both sides at this memorable siege, Pompey had detached Nasidius with sixteen galleys from the coast of Macedonia to endeavour the relief of Marseilles. This squadron had entered the straits of Messina by surprise, and, having cut out of the harbour a ship which belonged to Curio's fleet, proceeded on their destination to the

coast of Gaul. Being arrived in the bay of Tauroentum, now La Ciotat, in the neighbourhood of Toulon, they sent intimation of their coming, in order to concert operations with those in the harbour of Marseilles.

The besieged were greatly animated with the hopes of relief; and having already drawn from their docks as many ships as supplied the place of those they had lost in the late engagement, they now manned them with the choice of their citizens, and determined once more to try their fortune at sea. When this fleet was about to depart, numbers of women and many citizens, who, on account of their age, could not take part in the service, crowded to the shore, and with tears exhorted the soldiers and mariners to be mindful of their own honour and the preservation of their country, on the eve of becoming a prey to their enemies. Multitudes of people, at the same time, drew forth in procession, and crowded to the temples with prayers and supplications for the success of this last effort they were to make in defence of their commonwealth.

This bustle in the streets of Marseilles, with the motion of the shipping in the harbour, being observed from the camp of Trebonius, which was situated upon a height, and which had a view into the town, gave sufficient intimation of what was intended; and Brutus was warned to be upon his guard: but the Marseillians, having found a favourable wind, had the good fortune to clear the bay, and, without any interruption from his squadron, joined Nasidius at Tauroentum. In consequence of this junction, an

action soon after ensued, in which the Marseillians made great efforts of valour; but were ill supported by Nasidius, who, unworthy of the command with which he had been intrusted, withdrew at the beginning of the action, and fled to the coast of Spain. The Marseillians, being left to sustain the contest alone, lost nine of their ships, of which five were sunk, and four were taken.

These tidings were received at Marseilles with inexpressible sorrow; but did not alter the resolution of the inhabitants to persevere in their defence, and in the use of every possible method that could be employed to protract the siege, and to give Pompey time to devise more effectual means for their safety. They accordingly, with great vigour and success, counteracted the ordinary operations of the siege, burning and demolishing a considerable part of the works which were raised up against them, and obliging the besiegers frequently to renew their labours.

The first attack, against which the besieged were not able to find an adequate defence, came from a work which had not been a part in the original plan of the siege, but had been devised by the soldiers who had succeeded each other on the guard of the agger, or mound of approach, as a lodgement or cover to secure themselves from surprise. It was at first no more than a space of ten yards square, inclosed with a brick wall five feet thick; but so situate, that if it were raised to a proper height, it might cope with the battlements, and greatly annoy the besieged. To give it this consequence, masons were

employed to raise the wall, and great efforts of ingenuity were made to protect them in their work. A moveable penthouse, of great thickness in roof, and screened on the front and sides with a work made of cables, or the strongest ropes, raised on beams or rafters of a proportional strength, and contrived to be hoisted up by machinery, to keep pace with the building, and to cover the workmen as they rose on the successive courses of masonry which they laid. With these precautions, a tower was gradually raised on the foundation of the original brick wall, to the height of six stories; and being furnished with ports or embrasures on every floor, gave the besiegers, by means of their missiles, the command of all the space from thence to the ramparts. They accordingly, under the cover of engines, which were employed to make a continual discharge from this tower, filled up the ditch, and pushed up a gallery to the foot of the wall. In this position, notwithstanding all the efforts of the besieged, by a continual discharge of heavy stones from above, to destroy or overwhelm the supports of their gallery, they undermined the foundation of the rampart, and brought some part of it in ruin to the ground.

The inhabitants, greatly alarmed at the sight of a breach, which might soon be enlarged to admit of being stormed, made some signals of truce, and sent to beseech Trebonius that he would suspend his operations, and wait for the arrival of Cæsar, in whose clemency they hoped to find some protection against the fury of troops, who, it seems, had already threatened the inhabitants with a massacre.

Trebonius, accordingly, moved by these entreaties, and by the instructions he had received from Cæsar himself, not to deliver up the town, in case it fell into his hands, to the rage of the soldiers, suspended his operations, and supposing the petition of the inhabitants equal to an offer of surrender on their part, intrusted his works to slender guards, who, in their turn, relying on the submissive professions of the people, were proportionally remiss in their duty. The citizens, tempted by the opportunity which was thus offered them to strike an important blow, and to throw back to a great distance all the posts of the enemy, made a vigorous sally from the town, and being favoured by a high wind, which blew directly on the works of the besiegers, set the whole on fire, and reduced to ashes, in a few hours, what had been the labour of many months to erect.

As Trebonius had already exhausted the greater part of the materials which the country around him could furnish, it appeared difficult to resume the attack. But he himself, as well as the troops under his command, being greatly exasperated by the late breach of faith in the town, made every effort of ingenuity and courage to repair their losses. They substituted brick-work for timber in supporting the sides and galleries of their terrace; and advanced with so rapid a progress in their new approach, that the besieged now greatly spent with toil, and disappointed in their hopes of relief, were struck with fresh and more alarming apprehensions of what they might expect from the resentment of troops whom they had incensed with a recent and just provoca-

tion; and they returned to their suit for mercy, with more humble and more sincere intentions of submission.

While messages were passing to this effect, mitius Ahenobarbus, sensible that he could no lo serve the cause of his party at this place, embarked with his attendants and friends on board of three galleys which still waited his orders in the harbour. Having the opportunity of a high and favourable wind, which made it unsafe for the squadron of Brutus to weigh, or to quit their anchors in pursuit of him, he endeavoured to escape from the bay. In this attempt two of his vessels were taken, but the third with himself on board, got off, and reserved him to take that share which yet remained for him in the growing misfortunes of his party throughout this disastrous war.

Such was the state of affairs when Cæsar arrived from Spain, and expecting, in the present contest for empire, to profit as much by the reputation of his clemency, as by the terror of his arms, listened to the supplications of the people of Marseilles, and took possession of the town without any act of resentment or severity whatever. While he was yet at this place, he had accounts from Rome, that his party in the city had procured an act of the People to vest him with the power of Dictator. The ceremony of his nomination had, in the absence of both Consuls, been performed by Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, then Prætor in office, who, though a person of mean capacity, was, by the chance of his situation, involved in many of the greatest affairs that followed; and,

though but a single accomplice in the crimes of this guilty age, passed unhurt through all the scenes of its violence, to become almost the only example of an ignominy and disgrace, which so many others had merited no less than himself.

Cæsar, being thus raised, though by an irregular step, to a legal place in the commonwealth, hastened to Rome, in order to be invested, for the first time, with the ensigns and powers of Dictator. In his way he was stopped at Placentia by some disorders which threatened a mutiny among the troops who were assembled in that place. The legions, elated by victory, and filled with a sense of their own importance in a contest for the sovereignty of the empire, were become impatient of discipline, and in haste to avail themselves of that military government which they were employed to establish. In entering Italy, they treated Roman citizens as their subjects, and the country as their property. Being restrained, they resented the severities which were practised against them, entered into cabals, and even talked of abandoning Cæsar, and of declaring for Pompey. Here, however, the usual courage and ability of this singular man supported him. He brought the mutinous troops, under arms, before him, put them in mind how much he had ever coveted, and been anxious to obtain, the affections of the soldiers; but assured them, that it was no part of his intention to earn those affections by making himself an accomplice in their crimes. "Shall we," he said, "who "profess to be the deliverers of our country from op- "pression, become ourselves the greatest oppressors?

" Shall I, who am intrusted with the command of a
" Roman army, become the patron of licentiousness,
" and, in order to indulge for a moment the passion
" of my soldiers, suffer them to ruin their own fo
" tunes for ever? What should induce me?—The
" fear of violence to my person, or the danger to
" which my life may be exposed?—If my life were
" attacked, there are enow to defend it. But what
" is life compared to the honour of a Roman officer,
" which I am concerned to maintain? There are per-
" sons who have said, That they will desert my cause,
" and go over to Pompey. Let them. They shall soon
" have an opportunity to do so. If Pompey be my
" enemy, what is there I should more earnestly wish,
" than to find his cause intrusted to such hands as
" these? men who make war on their friends, and
" disobey their officers. He had been slow," he said,
" in proceeding to the fatal extremes which were
" now become necessary. The guilty," he continued,
" had been long known to him; but he had endea-
" voured to conceal their offences, in hopes that re-
" morse and shame, or the fear of justice, would have
" made the actual application of punishment un-
" necessary; but that he must now, though with the
" greatest reluctance, proceed to the last of remedies."

In order that he might not involve the whole of those who were present in the same desperate cause, he affected in this harangue to treat the offence he was to punish as the crime of a few. They were now to be set apart, he said, and their punishment should purge the army, and retrieve its honour. In pursuance of this plan, he affected to believe, that those

of the ninth legion were the principal authors of this mutiny. He ordered a few of them for immediate execution, and boldly dismissed the whole of the legion from his service. The remainder of the army, having thus obtained an implied exculpation, in token of their own innocence, vied with each other in applauding the justice of their general. Even the legion which was dismissed from the service, detesting, as a punishment on themselves, what they had threatened to execute as an act of resentment against their commander, beset him with humble and earnest entreaties, that he might be pleased to receive them again into his service. He affected great difficulty in granting this request; but after much solicitation, suffered himself to be gained by their professions of penitence *.

With a considerable accession of authority, acquired by his success in quelling this mutiny, Cæsar proceeded to Rome, where he assumed the title and ensigns of Dictator; being the first example of any person, since the abdication of Sylla, intrusted with this alarming power. It was said to be conferred upon him, however, merely in compliance with form; and that there might be a proper officer, in the absence of both the Consuls, to preside at the elections. His own object, at the same time, being to gain to his party the authority of legal government, and, in his conduct, to give proofs of clemency and moderation, without any intention, for the present, to per-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xli, c. 27.—35. Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii, p. 547. Sueton. in Cæs. c. 69. Lucan. lib. v, 244.

petuate or even to exercise any of the high powers of Dictator, he proceeded to hold the elections, and was himself, together with Servilius Isauricus, chosen Consul for the following year. In the interval that followed before their installation, he continued to assemble the People in the character of *Dictator*, and obtained some laws respecting the times, and the distracted state of the public affairs. Credit and trade were at an alarming stand; he procured an act to facilitate the recovery of debts, by delivering the effects of the debtor to be divided among his creditors, upon an estimate of what the different subjects might have been sold for at the time that the war broke out.

Many being supposed to hoard great sums of money, as the only means of preserving it from the violence of the times, or being unwilling to lend on such securities as were then to be had, Cæsar procured another act, by which any person was forbid to have in his possession, at once, above sixty thousand Roman money *.

He obtained a general act of indemnity, from which Milo alone was excepted, restoring persons of every denomination, who, at the breaking out of the war, lay under the censure of the law, and were in exile for corrupt practices in the State; and, in pursuance of this measure, procured a pardon for all the disorders which had been committed in opposition to the late government, but for none of the irregular efforts that had been made in support of it. He

* About L. 500.

opened the city at once to all the inhabitants of the Cisalpine Gaul, and by a single vote gave them a title to be enrolled with the People of Rome as members of the republic *. In these, and in other affairs of less moment, while his troops were in motion through Italy, he passed a few days in the city, and being ready to depart, resigned the power of Dictator. This resignation, made by a person possessed of a military force, and hitherto victorious, was considered as an evidence of his moderation, and served to dispel the fears of those who expected to see the immediate establishment of a military government. He was now about to assume the office of legal magistrate, and to appear in the character of Roman Consul, against those who lately, trusting to the name and authority of the republic with which they were vested, had treated himself and his adherents as rebels; but who now, in their turn, were about to incur all the disadvantages of that imputation which he was about to retort upon them; and with the additional charge of an attempt to dismember the empire, and to arm so many of the provinces against the sovereignty of the State.

The competitors in this famous contest were arrived at or but a little past the prime of life: Pompey was fifty-seven, and Cæsar fifty. The first had been early distinguished as an officer, and for many years had enjoyed a degree of consideration, which far exceeded that of any other Roman citizen of the present or any former age. His reputation, how-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xli; c. 36, 37, 38. Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

ever, in some measure, had sunk, and that of Cæsar had risen, on the first shocks of the present war; but the balance was not yet absolutely settled, and the minds of many were yet held in anxious suspense. The fortune of Cæsar, wherever he acted in person, had always prevailed; but where he himself was not present, his affairs wore a less promising aspect.

His forces under Curio had acquired an easy possession of Sicily; and this officer, encouraged by his first success, transported two legions into Africa, found Varus encamped near Utica, obliged him to retire into the town, and was preparing to besiege it, when he received intelligence that Juba, king of Numidia, was advancing to its relief with all the powers of his kingdom. This prince had been induced to take part in the war by his attachment to Pompey, and still more by his personal animosity to Curio, who, in his Tribunate, had moved for an act to deprive him of his kingdom.

Curio, upon this intelligence, wisely withdrew from Utica to a strong post in the neighbourhood, and sent orders into Sicily to hasten the junction of the troops he had left behind him in that island. While he waited their coming, some pretended deserters from the Numidian army arrived in his camp, and being instructed to mislead him with false intelligence, reported that the king had been recalled to defend his own dominions; and that only Sabura, one of his generals, with a small division, was come to give what support he could to the party of Pompey in Africa.

Upon this information, Curio formed a design to intercept this division of the Numidians before they could be joined by Varus; and for this purpose, leaving a guard in his camp, he marched in the night to attack the enemy, where he was informed that they lay on the banks of the Bagrada. His cavalry being advanced, fell in first with the Numidian horse, whom they defeated. Encouraged by this advantage, he himself hastened his march to complete the victory: Sabura, by whose art the last intelligence had been conveyed to him, likewise, after a little resistance, fled before him. And by these artifices, Curio was gradually insnared into the midst of Juba's forces, was surrounded, and attacked on every side. He attempted, in vain, to take refuge on a height which he had in his view, and in so doing, with the greater part of his army, was put to the sword. The few who escaped, together with those who had been left in the camp, endeavoured to find a passage into Sicily, and, being disappointed, surrendered themselves to Varus, by whom they were treated with clemency; but being observed, and distinguished by Juba, from whom they had escaped, and who himself arrived at Utica on the following day, were claimed as his captives, and put to death.

About the same time, Dolabella, to whom Cæsar had given the command both of his sea and land forces on the coast of Illyricum, was, by Marcus Octavius and Scribonius Libo, expelled from thence; and Caius Antonius, attempting to support Dolabella,

was shut up in a small island on the same coast, and, with his party, made prisoners *.

The principal storm, however, with which the new government was threatened, appeared on the side of Macedonia. In this country, Pompey himself was now at the head of a great force. He had transported five legions from Italy; and, since the middle of March, when his last division sailed from Brundisium, he had been in the quiet possession of Greece, Macedonia, and all the eastern and more wealthy and populous parts of the empire. He had sent his father-in-law, Cornelius Scipio Metellus, into the provinces of Asia and Syria, to collect the forces and the revenues of those opulent countries; and dispatched his own son Cneius with instructions to assemble all the shipping that could be found on the coast. He likewise sent general orders to all the Roman officers in different parts of the East, and to the allies or dependants of the Roman People, to join him with every power they could raise. Seven thousand citizens of rank had followed him from Italy †. Numbers of veterans, who had been settled in Thessaly, repaired to his standard. He was joined by one legion from Sicily, by another from Crete, and two from Asia. He had two legions under Scipio in Syria, had assembled three thousand archers, and as many slingers; had hired, in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, two thousand foot and seven thousand cavalry. Dejotarus sent him six hundred horse; Ariobarzanes five hundred; Cotus, a Thracian prince,

* Dio. Cass. lib. xli, c. 41, et 42. † Plutarch. in Pompeio.

five hundred; the Macedonians furnished two hundred; five hundred, being the remains of Gabinius's army, had joined him; his son brought eight hundred from his own estates; Tarcundarius three hundred; Antiochus Commagenes two hundred: amounting to fifty-five thousand legionary troops, eight thousand irregular infantry, and ten thousand six hundred horse. In all seventy-three thousand six hundred effective men *.

He had likewise assembled a numerous fleet; one squadron from Egypt, of which he gave the command to his son Cneius; another from Asia, under Lelius and Triarius; one from Syria, under Caius Cassius; that of Rhodes, under Caius Marcellus and Coponius; that of Achaia and Liburnia, under Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius: the whole amounting to above eight hundred galleys, of which Bibulus had the chief command, with orders to guard the passage from Italy to Greece, and to obstruct all the communications the enemy might attempt by the Ionian Sea.

Pompey had likewise formed large magazines of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, and Cyrene. The principal resort of his land forces was at Berrhœa, on the fertile plains between the Axius and Haliacmon, that run into the Bay of Thermæ. The Roman Senate was represented at Thessalonica by two hundred of that body, who, together with the two Consuls, held their assemblies, and assumed all the functions of the Roman State. The Roman

* Cæsar de Bello Civile, lib. iii.

People were likewise represented by the concourse of respectable citizens, who repaired to the army, or to this place*. But though so many members of the government, thus violently expelled from Rome, considered themselves as the real constituents of the commonwealth, they suffered the usual time of elections to elapse, and did not attempt to preserve in their retreat a succession of the usual officers, in opposition to the elections that were made at Rome. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, at the expiration of their year in office, took the several commands allotted to them, as usual, under the title of Proconsul.

The general had been extremely active in forming, as well as in assembling, this powerful armament. He intended, early in the spring, to take possession of Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other towns on the coast, probably with a view to fall upon Italy, with a weight which now appeared sufficient to ensure the high reputation as a commander, which his successes, on other occasions, had procured him.

Cæsar, on his part, had drawn all his army to the coast in the neighbourhood of Brundisium; but it was not likely that he would attempt to pass a sea which was commanded by the enemy's fleet, or venture upon a coast where he had not a single port, and in the face of a superior army, now completely formed and appointed, under the command of an officer, whom no man was ever supposed to surpass. The formality of entering on the office of Consul, to

* Dio. Cass. lib. xli, c. 43.

which Cæsar had been elected, it was supposed, might detain him at Rome till after the first of January; and Pompey accordingly made no haste in taking his intended stations on the coast of Epirus, from which he might either act on the defensive, or invade Italy as the occasion required *.

It was difficult, however, to foresee what such an enemy as Cæsar might attempt. Having staid no more than eleven days at Rome, while he acted in the character of Dictator, and obtained his election as Consul, without waiting for his admission into office, a formality which his antagonists vainly supposed was to detain him, he set out in December for Brundisium. At this place twelve legions and all his cavalry, were already, by his order, assembled. He found the numbers of his army considerably impaired by disease, being come from the more healthy climates of Spain and Gaul to pass the sickly season of Autumn in Apulia. In any other hands than his own, an army so reduced would have scarcely been fit for the defence of Italy against such forces as were assembled to invade it; and his march to Brundisium would have appeared altogether a defensive measure, or intended to counteract the operations of his enemy from beyond the seas. The season too appeared extremely unfavourable to any hostile attempts on Greece. But these were in fact encouragements to Cæsar, as they were likely to put the enemy off his guard, and instead of a commanding invasion of Italy, to lie under the disadvantage of a defensive war in his own quarters.

* Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii.

No more transports were collected in the harbour of Brundisium than were sufficient to receive about twenty thousand foot and six hundred horse. Cæsar nevertheless, immediately on his arrival, informed the troops of his intentions to embark, and of his resolution to fix the scene of the war in Greece. He cautioned them not to occupy transports with unnecessary baggage and horses, and exhorted them to rely on the consequences of victory, and on his own generosity, for a full reparation of any loss they might sustain by leaving their effects behind them. He embarked seven legions in the first division, and with these he himself sailed on the fourth of February. He turned from the usual course, and steering unobserved to the right, arrived next day, where the enemy, if they had really been apprised of his embarkation, were least likely to expect him, on what was reputed a very dangerous part of the coast, under a high and rocky promontory, that was called the Acroceraunus.

U. C. 705. C. Julius Cæsar, P. Servilius Isauricus.

As soon as the fleet had come to an anchor, Cæsar having Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's officers who was taken in Spain, till now detained as a prisoner, dismissed him with a message to his general in the following terms: "That both parties had already "carried their obstinacy too far, and might learn, "from experience, to distrust their fortunes; that "the one had been expelled from Italy, had lost Si- "cily, Sardinia and Spain, with one hundred and "thirty cohorts (or thirteen legions)*; that the other

* The armies of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, &c.

" had sustained the loss of an army in Africa, cut off " with its general *, and had suffered no less by the " disasters of his party in Illyricum; that their mu- " tual disappointments might instruct them how lit- " tle they could rely on the events of war; that it " was time to consult their own safety, and to spare " the republic; that it was prudent to treat of peace " while the fortunes and the hopes of both were near- " ly equal: if that time were allowed to elapse, and " either should obtain a distinguished advantage, " who could answer, that the victor would be equal- " ly tractable as both were at present?

" But since all former endeavours to procure a con- " ference, or to bring on a treaty between the lead- " ers themselves, had failed, he proposed, that all " their differences should now be referred to the Se- " nate and People of Rome; that, in the mean time, " each of them should solemnly swear, at the head " of their respective armies, That, in three days, they " should disband all their forces, in order that, being " disarmed, they might severally be under a neces- " sity to submit to the legal government of their " country; that he himself, to remove all difficulties " that might be suggested on the part of Pompey, " should begin with dismissing all the troops that " were under his own command, whether in garrison " or in the field †."

It appears that Cæsar, if these declarations had been accepted, might have been somewhat embarrass-

* The army of Curio and C. Antonius.

† Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

ed for evasions; but equally bold in all his measures, he risked this event, or rather foresaw it could not happen, as he was sure that this offer of peace, like the former, would be rejected; and the rather, that it would be considered as an effect of his weakness, and of the danger into which he had fallen by his supposed rash debarkation with so small a force. At any rate, there is no doubt that his message was intended, in the usual strain of his policy, to amuse his enemy, or to remove the blame of the war from himself. As he usually accompanied such overtures of peace with the most rapid movements and the boldest resolutions, the moment Vibullius set out, he disembarked his troops, and in the night dispatched the transports on their return to Brundisium to bring the remainder of his army.

His landing on the coast was the first intimation received by the enemy of his intention to pass a sea, which they supposed sufficiently guarded by their fleets, or of his daring to carry the war into a country, in which they thought themselves secure by the superiority of their numbers, and of their other resources. Bibulus, upon this alarm, put to sea, and came in time to intercept about thirty of the empty transports on their return to Italy. These he burnt; and, sensible of his own remissness in suffering so great a body of the enemy to pass, he distributed his ships along the coast, and determined, for the future, to keep the sea in the face of every difficulty, and under every distress.

In the mean time, Cæsar marched directly to Oricum, where Lucius Torquatus, on the part of Pom-

pey, was posted, with orders to maintain his position to the last extremity. But Cæsar, as soon as he appeared in the character of Roman Consul, preceded by the ensigns of office, prevailed on the garrison to desert their commander, and to surrender the place. Without stopping here, he proceeded to Apollonia, was received in the same manner by the inhabitants, in opposition to the officer who commanded for Pompey. In consequence of these examples, he was acknowledged by all the towns of Epirus, and continued his march with the greatest dispatch towards Dyrrachium, where Pompey had collected his military stores, and formed his principal magazines. By his unexpected arrival he had hopes of being able to surprise that important place, and to make himself master of it, before a sufficient force could be assembled to resist him.

Pompey, in execution of the plan he had formed, was on his march from Macedonia towards the coast of Epirus, when he was met by Vibullius, and received from him the first intelligence of Cæsar's landing. He was not amused with the message which this officer brought him, nor did he attempt to retort the artifice, by affecting to be deceived. He even expressed himself in terms harsh and impolitic, "That "he neither chose to return to his country, nor to "hold his life by the concession of Cæsar;" and, without returning any answer, detached some parties towards the coast where the enemy was landed, with orders to lay waste the country, break down bridges, destroy the woods, and block up the highways with

the timber they felled *. He sent expresses to Scipio, with an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and with orders to hasten his passage into Europe, with all the forces he had been able to assemble in Asia. He himself advanced with great diligence; and being informed on the march, that Oricum and Apollonia had already fallen into the enemy's hands, he hastened to save his magazines and stores at Dyrrachium, and without stopping, night or day, marched in such disorder, that many deserted as from a cause already ruined or desperate. He arrived, however, in time to prevent the designs of Cæsar on Dyrrachium; encamped under the walls, sent a squadron of ships immediately to retake or block up the harbour at Oricum, and ordered such a disposition of the fleet as was most likely to prevent the passage of a second embarkation from Italy.

Cæsar, finding himself prevented at Dyrrachium, halted on the Apsus; and, in order to cover Epirus, and wait for the second division of his troops from Italy, prepared to intrench himself on the banks of that river. Having accordingly secured the main body of his army in this post, he himself returned with a single legion to receive the submission of the towns in his rear, and to provide for the supply of his camp.

In the mean time Bibulus, on the part of Pompey, blocked up the harbour at Oricum, and obstructed the passage from Italy with his fleet.

Calenus, on the part of Cæsar, who had orders to

* Appian. lib. ii.

lose no opportunity of transporting his army from Brundisium, actually embarked and put to sea; but being met by a packet from Cæsar, with intelligence of the dispositions which had been made by the enemy to intercept him, he returned, suffering one of the vessels that had accompanied his fleet to keep on her way, in order to carry an account of his motions; but she was taken by the enemy and destroyed.

Bibulus, who commanded the fleet which lay before Oricum, being precluded from the land by the parties which Cæsar had posted along the shore, forced to bring his daily supplies of wood, water, and other necessaries at a great disadvantage from Corcyra, and reduced to great distress, endeavoured, under pretence of a negotiation, to obtain a cessation of arms. But Cæsar, who came in person to Oricum, on hearing of this proposition, supposing that the design of Bibulus was to find an opportunity, under cover of the truce, to procure some supply of provisions and water, rejected the offer, and returned to his camp on the Apsus.

Pompey had advanced from Dyrrachium, and took post on the opposite bank of that river. Dion Cassius and Appian agree that he made some attempt to pass the Apsus, and to force Cæsar in this post; but that he was prevented by the breaking of a bridge, or by the difficulties of a ford. According to Cæsar's own account, the armies continued to observe each other, and the troops, separated only by a narrow river, had frequent conferences from the opposite banks. It was understood that in these interviews no hostilities should be offered. Of the two parties,

that of Cæsar was the more engaging to soldiers: notwithstanding his own affectation of regard to the civil constitution of the republic, his military retainers still hoped to remain in possession of the government. He therefore encouraged the communication of his men with those of the opposite party. On this occasion Vatinius, by his direction, went forward to the bank of the river, and raising his voice, complained of the harsh treatment lately offered to Cæsar, in the contempt shown to all his overtures and advances to peace. May not one citizen, he said, send a message to another, when he means only to prevent the shedding of innocent blood? He proceeded to lament the fate of so many brave men as were likely to perish in this quarrel; and was listened to with profound silence by many of both armies, who crowded to the place.

These remonstrances on the part of Cæsar, delivered by an officer of high rank, and appearing to make so deep an impression on both armies, when reported at Pompey's quarters, appeared of too serious a nature to be slighted. An answer, therefore, was given by the direction of Pompey, that on the following day A. Varo should be sent to any place that should be agreed upon as safe between the two armies, and there receive whatever propositions should be made to him. The parties accordingly met at a place appointed, and multitudes from both armies crowded around them. Pompey considering the whole as an artifice to gain time, or to find an opportunity to debauch his men, probably gave instructions to break up the conference, in a way that for the future should

keep the troops at a greater distance from each other. Soon after the officers met, some darts, probably by his directions, were thrown from the crowd. Both sides being alarmed by this circumstance, they instantly parted, and withdrew under a shower of missiles, in which numbers were wounded.

The fate of the war seemed to depend on the vigilance of the fleet, and on the difficulties with which Cæsar had to contend in bringing any reinforcements or supplies from Italy. Bibulus, from the effect of fatigue, was taken dangerously ill; but could not, upon any account, be persuaded to leave his station, and died on shipboard. There being nobody appointed to succeed him in the command at sea, the leader of each of the separate squadrons acted for himself without any concert. Scribonius Libo, with fifty galleys, set sail from the coast of Epirus, steered towards Brundisium, where he surprised and burnt some trading vessels, one in particular laden with corn for Cæsar's camp. Encouraged by these successes, he anchored under the island which covered the mouth of the harbour: from thence he kept the town in continual alarm; landed, in the night, parties of archers and slingers, with which he dispersed or carried off the patroles which the enemy employed on the shore; and thus, master of the port of Brundisium, expected fully to obstruct that outlet from Italy, and to awe the neighbouring coast. To this purpose he wrote to Pompey, that the other divisions of the fleet might go into harbour; that his squadron alone, in the post he had taken, was sufficient to cut off from Cæsar all reinforcements and

further supplies. But in this he presumed too much on the first effects of his own operations. Antony, who commanded the troops of Cæsar in the town of Brundisium, by placing numerous guards at every landing-place on the contiguous shore, effectually excluded the squadron of Libo from any supply of wood or water, of which his ships, for want of stowage, could not have at any one time a considerable stock; and he reduced them to such distress for want of these articles, that they were obliged to abandon their station, and to leave the harbour again open to the sea.

In the mean time, pressing orders arrived from Cæsar to hasten the embarkation of the troops. Dion Cassius and Appian relate, that he himself being impatient of delay, embarked alone in disguise on board of a barge, with intention to pass to Brundisium; that, after he had been some time at sea, the weather became so bad, as to determine the master of the vessel to put back; but that being prevailed upon by the entreaties of Cæsar, he continued to struggle with the storm for many hours. They farther relate, that the mariners being likely to faint, the passenger at last discovered himself, and encouraged them to persist, by telling them that they carried Cæsar and his fortunes; that, nevertheless, he was forced to give way, and afterwards intrusted his orders to a messenger; but that he returned to camp before it was known that he had been absent. He himself says, that some months being past, and the winter far advanced, he suspected that some opportunities of effecting the passage of his second division had

been lost; that he was become highly impatient, and wrote to hasten the embarkation; informing his officers, that they might run ashore any where between Oricum and Apollonia; as the enemy's fleet, having no harbour in those parts, were frequently obliged, by stress of weather, to depart from the coast.

Upon these orders, the troops with great ardour began to embark. They consisted of four legions and eight hundred horse, under the command of Mark Antony and Calenus. The wind being at south, and no enemy appearing in the channel, they set sail, and steered for the coast of Epirus, but were drove to the northward; and on the second day passed Apollonia, but were discovered by the enemy from Dyrrachium. As they were far to the leeward of that part of the coast on which Cæsar had instructed them to land; and as it was vain for them with this wind to attempt getting to the southward; they chose to give way at once, and steer for some convenient harbour northward of all Pompey's stations. But in following this course, as they passed by Dyrrachium, they were instantly chased by Quintus Coponius, who commanded Pompey's squadron at that place, chiefly consisting of Rhodian galleys. The wind at first being moderate, Coponius expected easily to weather the head-lands that were to leeward of his post; and, though the gale increased after he set sail, he still continued to struggle against it. As soon as Antony observed this enemy, he crowded sail, and made for the nearest harbour; being in the

bay of Nympheus, about three miles beyond Lissus*, on the coast of Dalmatia. This bay opened to the south, and was very accessible, though not secure with the present wind. He chose, however, to risk the loss of some ships, rather than fall into the enemy's hands; and made directly for this place. Soon after he entered the harbour, the wind shifted to the south-west, from which his ships were now sufficiently covered, and he debarked without any loss. At the same time, the wind, in consequence of this change, blowing more directly on the land, and more violently, bore hard on Coponius, forced him upon the shore, where the greater part of his galleys, being sixteen in number, were stranded and wrecked.

Such of Antony's transports as got safe into the bay of Nympheus, landed three veteran legions, with one of the new levies, and eight hundred horse. Two of his transports, one with two hundred and thirty of the new raised troops, the other with somewhat less than two hundred veterans, being heavy sailers, fell astern; and it being night before they arrived, mistook their way, and, instead of the bay of Nympheus, came to an anchor before Lissus. Ottacilius Crassus, who was stationed by Pompey with a body of horse in that place to observe the coast, manned some small boats, surrounded these transports, and offered the troops who were on board favourable terms if they would agree to surrender. Upon this summons the new levies accordingly struck; but the veterans ran their vessels ashore, and

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii, c. 26.

having landed, fought their way, with the loss of a few men, to Nympheus, where they joined the main body of their army that was landed with Antony.

The colony at Lissus had been settled by Cæsar, as a part of the province of Illyricum, and now appeared to favour his cause; Ottacilius therefore thought proper to withdraw with his garrison; and Antony having stationed some of the transports at this place, to enable Cæsar to embark his army for Italy, if, as was reported, Pompey should attempt to remove the scene of the war into that country; and having sent the remainder back for the troops which were still left at Brundisium, he dispatched messengers to Cæsar, with the particulars of his voyage, and an account of the place at which he had landed.

The fleet, with this division of the army under Antony, had been seen on the coast, from the stations both of Pompey and of Cæsar, steering to the northward; but it was not known for some days what was become of them. Upon the arrival of the intelligence, that they had effected a landing to the northward, both parties determined to move to that quarter. Pompey decamped in the night, and knowing the route which Antony was likely to take, placed himself in his way, giving orders that the army, without lighting fires or sounding their trumpets, should remain in profound silence. Antony, however, having intelligence of this disposition of the enemy, did not advance. Cæsar, in the mean time, to favour his junction, was obliged to make a considerable circuit, ascended on the banks of the Apsus to a ford at which he passed; from thence continued

his march to the northward, and seemed to advance on Pompey's right, while Antony remained in his front. In this situation, Pompey, apprehending that he might be attacked on different sides at once by Cæsar and by Antony, thought proper to quit his station; and leaving their armies to join, fell back to Asparagium, a strong post about a day's march from Dyrrachium.

Cæsar, having obtained this great reinforcement, was no longer so anxious as he had hitherto been for the preservation of his possessions upon the coast. His enemies, by the superiority of their fleets, could prevent his receiving any regular supply of provisions from the sea. It was necessary for him, therefore, in order that he might have some other resource, and be in condition to act on the offensive, to extend his quarters by land, and to cover some tract of country from which he could subsist his army. For this purpose he removed from Oricum the legion that was stationed at that place; taking such precautions as were necessary to secure his shipping in the port from any surprise by sea. For this purpose, he drew the greater part of the vessels on shore, sunk one in the mouth of the harbour, and placed another at anchor near it, mounted with a considerable tower, and manned with a proper force. Being thus secured on the coast, he sent numerous detachments in different directions: L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, into Thessaly; C. Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts and a party of horse, into Ætolia; Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, into Macedonia; giving

strict charge to each of these officers, that they should collect all the forage and provisions which those or the neighbouring countries could furnish.

As Pompey had relied much on the authority of government, with which he was vested at the beginning of the war, and which he believed gave his party a dispensation from the exercise of those popular arts, with which Cæsar thought proper to recommend his cause, he threatened to punish the refractory, more than he encouraged or rewarded the dutiful; and he often therefore extorted services from the provinces, neglecting the necessary attention to conciliate their affections; and such were the effects of this conduct, that the detachments which now appeared on the part of Cæsar were every where favourably received. Sabinus made himself master of Ætolia. Longinus found the people of Thessely divided, and was joined by one of the parties. Calvinus, upon his arrival in Macedonia, had deputations from many towns and districts of the province, with assurances of favour and submission; and by these means the possessions of Cæsar, even in those countries on which his antagonists had chiefly depended, began to be equal to theirs.

It was thought an unpardonable error in Pompey, thus to suffer his quarters to be overrun by an enemy who had but recently acquired a footing on the coast, and whose army was, in number of cavalry and light infantry, as well as of regular foot, greatly inferior to his own. Pompey, however, knowing the interest which Cæsar had in bringing the contest to a speedy decision, did not choose to divide his forces, and he

relied for the security of the southern and inland provinces, on the legions which were soon expected to land from Asia on the eastern shores of Macedonia or Thessaly.

Scipio, being the father-in-law of Pompey, had been employed in assembling the forces of Asia, and had, by severe exactions, availed himself of the resources of that opulent province. He was still occupied in this service at Ephesus, when he received from Pompey an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and an order without delay to transport his army into Europe. He accordingly, soon after the arrival of Cæsar's detachments at their several places of destination, debarked in the Bay of Thermé, or of Thessalonica, and penetrated into Macedonia, directing his march towards the quarters of the two legions which Cæsar had sent thither under the command of Domitius Calvinus, and gave a general alarm on his route; but being arrived within about twenty miles of Domitius, he turned on a sudden into Thessaly, as thinking Longinus, who was stationed in that country with one legion of raw troops, might be made an easier prey.

To lighten his march, he left his baggage under a guard of eight cohorts, commanded by Favonius, on the Haliacmon, a river which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, and proceeded with great dispatch towards the quarters of Longinus. This officer, greatly alarmed at his sudden approach, and mistaking, at the same time, for an enemy a body of Thracian horse which were coming to his own assistance, hastily

withdrew by the mountains, and continued his retreat to Ambracia. Scipio was about to pursue Longinus on the route he had taken, when he was recalled by earnest representations from Favonius, the officer he had left to guard his baggage; informing him, that his post was in the utmost danger of being forced by Calvinius, who was on his march through Macedonia for that purpose. Scipio accordingly returned with all possible dispatch to the Haliacmon, and arrived at the post of Favonius, after the dust which arose from the march of the enemy had appeared on the plain; and thus came barely in time to sustain his party, and to rescue his baggage.

The armies continued to occupy the opposite banks of the Haliacmon; and as Scipio, by the flight of Longinus, was become master of all Thessaly, Calvinus continued in possession of Macedonia, and from thence secured a considerable source of supply to Cæsar's army.

It would have been of great moment to Pompey's affairs, and not inconsistent with the dilatory plan he had formed for the conduct of the war, to have risked an action between these separate bodies on the Haliacmon, rather than to have suffered his enemy to retain the command of so many posts of consequence; and Scipio accordingly passed the river with a view to bring on an engagement; but after some stay on the plain, finding no opportunity to attack the enemy with any hopes of success, he repassed the river, and having occupied his former station, there passed some partial encounters between such as were

advanced on the different sides, but without any considerable event.

While so many large bodies, detached from the principal armies, were thus contending in Thessaly for the possession of the country, Pompey remained to cover the ground, which was of greater importance to him, in the neighbourhood of the sea, and the port of Dyrrachium. Having, at the distance of about a day's march in his rear, this town and harbour as a place of arms, at which he had deposited his magazines and stores, and from which he received his ordinary supply of provisions, he had taken his measures to protract the war; and trusting to his own superior resources, both by sea and by land, did not doubt that by waiting until the countries which Cæsar had occupied should be exhausted, he might force him to retire from the contest without the risk of a battle. To hasten this event, he endeavoured every where to straiten his quarters in the country, and to block up or destroy all the harbours he had on the coast.

Cnæus, the eldest of Pompey's sons, commanding the Egyptian fleet, in execution of this plan which had been laid to harass the enemy, without exposing their cause to a general hazard, attacked Cæsar's principal naval station at Oricum, raised the vessel that had been sunk at the mouth of the harbour, forced the armed galley that was stationed before it, and carried off or destroyed all the ships that were laid up in the port. From thence he proceeded to Lissus, burnt thirty transports which Antony had

eft in the harbour; but having made an attempt on the town, was repulsed with loss.

Cæsar, on the opposite part, sensible of the interest which he had in bringing the war to a speedy decision, advanced upon Pompey, forced a place of some strength that covered his front, and encamped in his presence. The day after he had arrived in this position, either to bring on a general action, or to gain the reputation of having braved his antagonist, he formed his army on the plain between the two camps; but as Pompey continued firm or unmoved by this insult, and as the recent losses which Cæsar had sustained in his shipping, and on the coast, rendered his prospect of future supplies or reinforcements every day less secure, he projected a movement, by which he proposed either to force an engagement, or to preclude the enemy from all his resources in the town and harbour of Dyrrachium.

For this purpose, and that Pompey might the less suspect any important design, he decamped in the day, when having a large circuit to make, he at first took a route which led away from Dyrrachium, and was thought to retire for want of provisions; but having wheeled in the night, he directed his march with the utmost speed to the town. Pompey, having intelligence of the change which Cæsar had made in his route during the night, perceived his design; and having a nearer way to Dyrrachium, still expected by a rapid march to arrive before him. But Cæsar having prevailed on his men, notwithstanding the great fatigues of the preceding day, to continue their march in the night with little interruption, although

he could not enter the town, which was fortified against him, was in possession of the only avenue which led to it, when the van of Pompey's army appeared on the hills.

Pompey, thus shut out from Dyrrachium, where he had placed his magazines and stores, and from the only harbour he had on the coast, had recourse to the Petra, a small promontory which covered a little creek or bay not far from the town, and there endeavoured to supply the loss of the principal harbour, by bringing ships of burden to unload, and by bringing supplies in boats from his magazines and stores in the town; and in this manner was still in condition to avoid any immediate risk of his fortunes by the chance of a battle.

Cæsar, on the other hand, being disappointed in the design he had formed to exclude the enemy altogether from their magazines in the town of Dyrrachium, and seeing no likelihood of being able to bring the war to a speedy decision, his own communication with Italy being entirely cut off, and the fleets he had ordered from thence, from Sicily, and from Gaul, having met with unexpected delays, sent an officer, named L. Canuleius, into Epirus, with a commission to draw into magazines all the corn that could be found in that or the neighbouring districts, and to secure them at proper places for the use of his army. This, however, in a country that was mountainous and barren, itself commonly supplied with corn from abroad, and lately on purpose laid waste by the enemy, was not likely to furnish him with any considerable supply, or to enable him for any time to support a dilatory war. His genius was

therefore at work, by some speedier course, to harass his enemy, or to hasten the contest to an end.

In these circumstances, however, he did not neglect his usual artifices to amuse and distract his antagonists with professions of moderation, and overtures of peace. On hearing of Scipio's arrival in Europe, affecting to have despaired of obtaining a treaty by any further direct applications to Pompey himself, and pretending an appeal to the reason of the father-in-law against the obstinacy of the son, he sent Clodius, supposed a common friend, with letters and instructions, to inform Scipio of the great pains he had taken to obtain an equitable accommodation, "all of which," he said, "he was willing to "believe, had failed, through the unhappy timidity "of those he intrusted with his messages, who, be- "ing persons of inferior rank under Pompey, had "not the courage to deliver them properly to their "general. But subjoined, that, through the media- "tion of Scipio, who could act with so much free- "dom; who could advise with so much authority; "and who, being at the head of a great army attach- "ed to his own person, could even enforce what was "just, he might expect a different issue to proposi- "tions so fair and so advantageous to all concerned: "And that, in this event, Scipio would have the ho- "nour of being the restorer of peace and good order "to Italy, of renown to the provinces, and of pro- "sperity to the whole empire." Clodius was received with respect; but on delivering his message, it appears that all further communication was refused him, as a person who came to insult, or only to amuse

with false pretences. Cæsar, indeed, was himself, as usual, so far from trusting to the effect of these propositions, or so far from remitting his own operations in order to confirm his pacific professions, that he even redoubled his efforts in that very quarter which was intrusted to Scipio himself; and as he had already taken possession of Epirus, Acarnania, and Ætolia, he carried his views still farther on that side, sent Fusius Calenus to be joined by Longinus and Sabinus, and with their united forces to endeavour, by the isthmus of Corinth, to penetrate into Achaia.

He himself, at the same time, conceived a design, which, to those who do not recollect the ordinary intrenchments of a Roman camp, or the works occasionally executed by Roman armies, particularly by that of Cæsar himself, will appear romantic, and exceed belief. This was no less than a project to invest Pompey, though with a superior army, in his station, and, under the apprehension of having his communication with the country cut off, force him to recede from the coast. For this purpose, a line of countervallation was to be carried over an extent of many miles; beginning with redoubts on some of the heights between the two armies, joining these with intrenchments across the valleys, and, as the work advanced, presenting a chain, which, if suffered to proceed, must amount to a complete investment and exclusion from any intercourse with the surrounding country.

Pompey, to counteract this alarming project, took possession of some heights in his turn, fortified and joined them in the same manner, and while the one

endeavoured to contract, the other endeavoured to enlarge, the compass of his works. The archers and slingers on both sides, as in the operations of a siege, were mutually employed to annoy the workmen. The armies lay under arms, and occasionally fought in detail for the possession of advantageous grounds. When forced from the height which they attempted to occupy in one place, they seized upon another contiguous, and still continued their line, though obliged to change its direction.

In these operations, a campaign which was opened in January, with the landing of Cæsar on the coast of Epirus, already drew on to the middle of summer, both parties had undergone great labour, and were exposed to peculiar distress. Cæsar's army, already inured at the blockade of Alesia, and the sieges of Marseilles and of Avaricum, to toils like those in which they were now engaged, flattered themselves with a like glorious issue to their present labours. They were in want of bread, and obliged to substitute a kind of root boiled up with milk; but were comforted under this hardship with the prospect of fields on which the corn was nearly ripe, and presented a plentiful harvest. They not only continued their circumvallations with incredible toil, but turned or interrupted all the rivulets or springs that formerly watered the grounds to which the enemy was now confined.

Pompey's army, on their part, were less inured to such toilsome operations; and though they had plenty of bread, which came to them with every wind, from the different coasts that were still in their pos-

session, they were in great distress for want of water and forage: many of their horses had died; the men, too long restricted to the same ground, and to the same air, which was infected with filth, and the exhalation of putrid carcases, and being reduced to the use of bad water, were become sickly, and overrun with infectious diseases.

Pompey, nevertheless, held his enemy at some disadvantage by the superiority of his numbers, or by the extent of line which he obliged him to form and to defend; and it appears that he availed himself of these advantages with all those abilities of a great commander, which he was justly supposed to possess. He not only forced Cæsar, *without hazarding a general action*, to withdraw from many of the heights which he attempted to occupy, and obliged him, with great labour, to widen the compass of his lines; but harassed him likewise with repeated attacks on the works which he had already completed, in some places forced open the bars which the enemy had placed in his way, and recovered his own communication anew with the country before him. But as Cæsar could present his whole army in many places to cover the works he was executing, it was impossible, without risking a general action, which Pompey avoided, entirely to stop his progress.

In the course of these operations, it appears, from the text of Cæsar's Commentaries, though mutilated in this place, that the armies changed the ground of their principal encampments, as well as the disposition of some separate posts that they mutually attempted to surprise, and gave frequent alarms. And,

Cæsar mentions no less than six capital actions which happened in one day at the field intrenchments, or under the walls of Dyrrachium; and in most of them it is probable that Pompey had the advantage, as he acted on the chord, or interior circle, while his antagonists moved on the curve or the wider circumference.

Pompey completed his own line of circumvallation to a circuit of fifteen miles, having a chain of four-and-twenty redoubts on the different hills over which it was carried. By this work he obliged Cæsar, by receding some furlongs beyond him, to extend his compass to above seventeen miles in circumference.

The extremities of both their works terminated on the shore; and Cæsar, having no boats or ships to oppose to the numerous craft of his enemy, ought, perhaps, by this consideration alone, to have been diverted at first from his project. But as he sought merely for occasions of action, he was contented with the hopes of finding them even under such disadvantages. While he was obliged to remain with the strength of his army at that end of his line which was nearest the town of Dyrrachium, in order to prevent the access of Pompey to the magazines he had in that place, he proposed to fortify the other extremity of it with double works, and had already thrown up, at the distance of two hundred yards from each other, two intrenchments, consisting of a parapet ten feet high, and of a ditch fifteen feet wide; one facing the lines of Pompey, the other turned to the field, in order to guard against any surprise from parties which, coming by water, might land on his

flank or in his rear. He was likewise about to join these intrenchments by a traverse or curtain, to defend the extremity of his lines from the sea.

Before this traverse was finished, Pompey made a disposition to force his way at the opening it was intended to close, and of consequence to take his enemy in the rear over the whole extent of his works. For this purpose he brought in the night six entire legions, or sixty cohorts, to that part of his own intrenchments which faced this place. He embarked a numerous body of archers, slingers, and other light troops, having their helmets and shields masked, as it seems was the custom, with basketwork, to break the force of the stones which were likely to shower from the elevated sea-bank, or from the enemy's parapets, and was prepared to make way for the army to pass, having quantities of fascines and other materials proper to fill up the ditch. This embarkation was effected in the night; and the officer who commanded it had orders to land part of the troops in the rear of both Cæsar's intrenchments, and another part in the space betwixt the two lines, where the work was still incomplete. These separate divisions were to be supported by the whole force of the legions in front, who were to take advantage of any effect which the missiles from their boats might produce on the flank or the rear of the enemy.

These attacks were accordingly made at the dawn of day, in three different places at once, and had all the consequences of a complete surprise. They fell with the greatest effect upon the station of the ninth legion, of which the piquets and other guards being

instantly routed, the whole legion was put under arms to support them, but, soon infected with the panic, was carried off in the flight. Antony, who occupied the nearest station on the heights, appearing in that instant with twelve cohorts, and a better countenance, stopped for a while the pursuit of the enemy, and furnished a retreat to the troops who were routed.

The alarm was conveyed to Cæsar himself, by fires lighted on all the hills, and he hastened to the ground with as many cohorts as could be spared from the posts in his way; but he came too late. Pompey had already forced the intrenchments, had burst from his confinement, and was beginning to encamp in a new position, where, without losing his communication with the sea, he rendered abortive for a long time Cæsar's purpose of excluding him from the supplies of necessaries or conveniences which were to be derived from the land, and was now in a posture to command a free access to water and forage, from the want of which he had been chiefly distressed in his late situation.

Thus Cæsar, far from reaping the fruits which he expected from the labour of so many months, began to incur the censure of a visionary projector, who presumed to practise on the ablest captain of the age the arts with which he had succeeded against ignorant barbarians, or, at most, against generals of mean capacity.

These circumstances, however, probably made not any impression on Cæsar himself, nor greatly altered the confidence of his army; he presented himself

again before the enemy in their new position, and pitched his camp in their presence, still determined to act on the offensive, even in the sequel of attempts in which he had failed. An action accordingly followed, of which the result is evident, although it is difficult, from the imperfect text of his Commentaries, to ascertain the detail. It appears that both armies had changed the ground which they had taken immediately after the last action; that in this remove Pompey had taken possession of the camp which Cæsar had left; and, as his army, being more numerous, occupied more ground than that of Cæsar, he made a second intrenchment, quite round that which had been formerly occupied by the enemy. This camp was covered by a wood on one side, and by a river, at the distance of four hundred paces, on the other.

While Pompey lay in this position, he had thrown up a line of communication from his flank to the river, in order to cover his access to water. But after he had taken this precaution, he thought proper to change his ground, and had moved about the distance of half a mile on his march to occupy a new situation, when, for some purpose that is not explained, he thought proper to send back a legion, or large detachment of his army, to resume the possession of the ground he had so recently left.

Cæsar, on his part, being occupied in fortifying a camp in the last situation he had taken, and observing this returning detachment from Pompey, thought it gave him a favourable opportunity, by cutting it off, to recover part of the credit he had

lost in the late action. While, to amuse the enemy, he ordered his men to continue the work in which they were engaged, he himself marched with twenty-three cohorts, in two divisions, under cover of the wood, came to the ground unobserved, and with the division which was led by himself, mixed with the enemy, who had already taken possession of the exterior lines, and with great slaughter drove them from thence to the interior intrenchment. The other division being in the mean time to attack the same works at a different place, mistook the line of communication which covered the access from the camp to the river for the main intrenchment of the camp itself, and *before* they perceived their mistake, had run along this line to a great distance in search of an entrance; when observing, at last, that the line along which they ran was not defended, the infantry went over it first, and were followed by all the cavalry: but the time which they had lost by their former mistake, gave Pompey an opportunity to come to the relief of his detachment. As soon as he appeared, Cæsar's cavalry, finding themselves entangled between the line of communication, the intrenchment of the camp, and the river, began to retire with great precipitation, and were followed by the foot, who fell into great confusion. That part of Pompey's detachment, which, in the beginning of the action, had been defeated by Cæsar, now finding themselves likely to be supported, rallied in the rear-gate of the camp; and the party which Cæsar himself commanded against them, observing the precipitant retreat of the other division, saw dangers and

difficulties accumulating on every side. Imagining that they were about to be surrounded, or shut up within the enemy's works, they betook them to flight, crowded back to the ditch, and, in attempting to repass it, were killed in such heaps, or were trodden under foot in such numbers, that the slain filled up the ditch, and made a passage for those who followed.

In this state of general confusion and terror, the presence and authority of Cæsar, which, on other occasions, used to be of so great effect, were entirely disregarded. The bearer of a standard, upon Cæsar's catching it, and endeavouring to stop him, quitted his hold, and continued to run without it; a rider, whose horse he had seized by the bridle, dismounted and ran off on foot. The rout was complete; but the ditches and works, amongst which the action began, as they embarrassed the flight of the one party, so they retarded the pursuit of the other; and Pompey, who did not expect such a victory, remained in suspence. He mistook the flight of Cæsar for a feint, to draw him into some ambuscade. In this he was governed, probably, by the high estimation for discipline and valour to which Cæsar's army was so justly entitled, but which no troops can uniformly support at all times; and if it be true, as is probable, that the flight of an army in actual rout may be always distinguished from a concerted retreat, he on this day committed an unpardonable error; and Cæsar, who may be inclined to exaggerate the oversights, though not the advantages, of his enemy, owns that he himself lost about a thousand men,

with about thirty standards or colours, and owed the preservation of his army to the excessive caution or incapacity of his enemy. He himself acted indeed like a person defeated, instantly abandoned all his famous lines of Dyrrachium, and all his outposts, and, to make head against the victor, brought all the scattered parts of his army together.

Pompey, in the mean time, lost the opportunity, or was not sensible of his fortune till after the time for improving it was past. But this victory, although it had not been perceived in the moment at which a signal advantage might have been made of it, was immediately afterwards greatly exaggerated. Pompey had from his own army the usual salutations of triumph, or received the title of Imperator, which he continued in the usual form to assume, and sent his accounts of the action, by expresses, to every part of the empire; but had the moderation, however, to abstain from the practice which was common in the case of victories obtained over foreign enemies, that of binding his fasces and his dispatches with laurel.

Cæsar, by carrying the war into Macedonia, had put himself in a very arduous situation. He had passed over a sea on which the enemy were masters, and had invaded a country of which they were in possession, with forces greatly superior to his own: but this daring adventure, which, even in its first successes, excited astonishment, now exposed him to censure, and his attempt to invest so great an officer as Pompey, at the head of an army superior to

his own, appeared altogether wild and extravagant. The merit of all his former campaigns, as is common upon reverses of fortune, began to be questioned by those who, after the event, can instruct and correct every general; and the glory he had gained in the former part of the war was entirely obscured. He was even said to have gained the Spanish army by corruption, and to have purchased with money the surrender which he pretended to have forced by his address and his sword. People returned to their first apprehensions, that Pompey was the greatest general which any age or nation had ever produced; that he had effectually put an end to the present contest, and had left nothing for his party to do but to reap the advantage of a victory he had obtained for them.

Some time before this event, and while the minds of men were yet in suspense, Cato, in one of the councils which had been summoned by Pompey, observed that Cæsar had acquired much popular favour by his ostentation of mercy, and by the hopes of protection which he held out to every man who did not actually take arms against him; while Pompey and his followers, by publishing threats against all who did not actually espouse their cause, had rendered the army of the republic an object of terror: he therefore moved, that a proclamation should be issued, containing assurances, that every town not actually in arms should be protected, and that no blood should be shed but in the field of battle. A resolution to this purpose had been accordingly pub-

lished at that time*; but in the present exultation of victory was forgotten. The times were said to require exemplary justice, and to justify executions and forfeitures, not only of those who were actually in arms against their country, but of those likewise who had betrayed its cause by a mean and profligate neutrality. The favourites of Pompey already, in imagination, sated their revenge, and gratified their avarice, at the expence of the opposite party and of its abettors †. Every one considered the use which he himself was to make of the victory, not how it might be secured or rendered complete.

The shock which Cæsar had received in so critical a time and situation, was, not without reason, supposed to be decisive; he had abandoned all the ground for which he had fought. His army appeared to sink under the weight of their misfortunes. Inferior to the enemy in numbers, greatly reduced by their losses, and fallen in their own estimation, they were not soon likely to recover the courage required to contend for the field again with so renowned and so superior an adversary.

Cæsar, however, was not overwhelmed by these appearances; he knew what was the force of an army which had been taught, by the experience of many years, to repose the utmost confidence in themselves and in their general, and which was not likely to sink, without hopes of recovery, under any single event. He considered their apparent dejection as a symptom of indignation, and of rage, more than of

* Plutarch. in vita Pompeii, p. 494. † Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii, c. 88.

fear or debasement; and, instead of blame or reproach, soothed them with consolation, and with the apologies which he industriously framed for their late miscarriage. He bid them recollect their former actions, and not be dismayed by a single accident which befell them in the midst of a career sustained with a spirit so much superior to that of any enemy they had ever encountered: "If fortune has crossed "us for once," he said, "we must retrieve our losses "by diligence and resolution. Difficulties only ex- "cite the brave, and awaken their ardour; you have "formerly experienced difficulties, and every soldier "who was with me at Gergovia will remember the "effects of perseverance and courage."

He was sensible, however, that some particular officers had set a shameful example; and he supposed, that by singling out these for punishment, he might seem to exculpate the soldiers, and reinstate them in their own esteem. For this reason he dismissed, with infamy, some bearers of standards, who, he alleged, had misled the troops, whose object it is never to part from their colours. By these means the sullen dejection of the legions was changed into rage, and an ardent impatience to retrieve their honour *. They did not presume to importune their general to intrust them so soon again with his fortunes; but they imposed voluntary tasks, by way of penance, on themselves, saying, they deserved no better. Many of the superior officers gave it as their opinion to Cæsar, that whatever resolution he might have taken for the

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

future plan of the war, so favourable a disposition in the army, and so fair an opportunity of yet ending the contest with honour on the very ground on which they had incurred their disgrace, should not be neglected, nor suffered to escape. Cæsar, however, could not be persuaded to stake his fortunes on the effect of a feverish ardour, which still had some mixture of consternation or dismay, nor to rely on a fury which had more of despair than of rational confidence, against the impetuosity of a superior enemy recently flushed with victory. Nor was he safe to remain in his present situation, without any posts in his rear to secure his communication with the country, and without any immediate prospect of supply for the subsistence of his army. For these reasons, he determined, without loss of time, to decamp, and to remove to some distance from the enemy *. In the first night after this resolution was taken, and as soon as it was dark, the sick and wounded, with all the baggage, under the escort of a legion, were sent off, with orders that they should not halt till they reached Apollonia, being a march of about thirty miles. At three in the morning, the main body of the army, observing a profound silence, turned out of the camp by different gates, and took the same route. Two legions yet remained for the rear-guard. These, after a proper interval, being ready to depart, sounded the usual march, to make the enemy believe the van of the army was then only beginning to move; and the whole being thus already on their

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

way, and without any incumbrance, they soon gained a considerable distance from those who were likely to pursue them.

Pompey, as soon as he was apprised of this retreat, drew forth his army and followed with great expedition. After marching a few miles, he overtook, with his cavalry, the rear of Cæsar's army at the passage of the river Genusus; but being received by the horse, interlined with infantry, made little impression, and saw them effect the passage of the river without any considerable loss.

Cæsar, having thus completed an ordinary march, took possession of the lines which he had formerly occupied at Asparagium; but not intending to remain in that station, gave orders to the legions only to rest on their arms. And, in order to deceive the enemy, sent forth his cavalry by the front gate in their sight, as if with intention to forage; but with orders to wheel under cover of some rising ground, and to re-enter the camp again on a different side, and to take post in the rear of the infantry, then about to resume their march. Pompey, supposing that the enemy's cavalry were actually foraging, or from every appearance convinced that Cæsar had determined to halt for the night, and that the business of the day was over, followed his example, pitched in the same lines, which he likewise had formerly occupied at this place, and suffered his men to stray in search of forage and wood; many also who, in the hurry with which they decamped in the morning, had not time to make up their package, were now

allowed to lay down their arms, and return to Dyrrachium in search of the effects they had left.

Cæsar, who waited only until the measures he had taken should so far mislead the enemy, again put his army in motion about noon, and without interruption, on the same day completed a second march of eight miles; while Pompey's army, having already laid aside their arms and encamped, were not in condition to follow. Cæsar having gained so much ground a-head of the enemy, continued his retreat during some of the subsequent days in the same order, having his baggage advanced some hours before him: and Pompey, having fallen so far behind by the delay of the first day, and having harassed his army in attempting to regain what he lost; on the fourth day, entirely discontinued the pursuit.

This respite gave to both parties some leisure to deliberate on the plan of their next operations. Cæsar continued his march to Apollonia, that he might lodge his sick and wounded, pay off the arrears of his army, and make a proper disposition for the security of the places he held on the coast. And having already one cohort at Lissus, placing three at Oricum, and four at Apollonia, he proceeded on his route from thence to the southward. He proposed, without delay, to penetrate into Thessaly, and to occupy, for the subsistence of his army, as much as he could of that fertile country. He flattered himself, that if Pompey should follow him thither, or remove to a distance from his own magazines and his supplies by sea, the war might be continued between them upon equal terms. If he attempted to retake

Oricum and the towns on the coast, he must expose Scipio and the body under his command, in the eastern parts of Macedonia, to be separately attacked; or, if he wished to preserve Scipio and his army, he would be obliged to quit his design upon Oricum in order to support him. If he should pass into Italy, it was proposed to follow him by the coasts of Dalmatia. And this last alternative of carrying the war into Italy, from the difficulties, the delays, and the discredit to which it might have exposed Cæsar's cause, appears to have been the preferable choice for Pompey. It was accordingly debated in council, Whether, being master of the sea, and having abundance of shipping, he *should not transport* his army, regain the seats of government, and strip his antagonist of that authority which he derived from thence? or, whether he should not stay to finish the remains of the war in Macedonia? The advantages likely to result from his return to Rome with the ensigns of triumph, after he had left it with some degree of disgrace, were obvious. But the war appeared so near to its end, that it was reckoned improper to leave any part of it unfinished. It was argued, that, by quitting the present seat of the war, Cæsar would be left to recover his forces in a country yet full of resources, and would only exchange the western part of the empire for the east, from whence Sylla had been able, and from whence Pompey himself was now about to recover the city and the possession of Italy.

But, what weighed most of all in these deliberations, was the safety of Scipio, which required the

presence of Pompey in Macedonia. If the last should remove his army from thence, the former, with the forces recently arrived from Asia, would fall a sacrifice to the enemy.

Upon these motives, Pompey, as well as Cæsar, having their several detachments, or separate bodies, to be sustained or rescued from the dangers with which they were threatened, determined to march into Thessaly, concerting their respective movements, so as to protect their own parties or to cut off those of the enemy. Cæsar, by his march to Apollonia, had been turned from his way; and having the discredit of a defeat, or being supposed on his flight, was harassed or *ill received* by the country as he passed. The messengers, whom he had dispatched to Domitius, were intercepted; and this officer, while both armies were advancing, having made some movements in Macedonia, in quest of provisions, and having, with the two legions he commanded, fallen into Pompey's route, narrowly escaped, and only by a few hours, being surprised and taken.

Cæsar, having arrived in time to rescue Domitius, and being joined by him as he passed the mountains into Thessaly, continued his march to Gomphi. The people of this place having refused to open their gates, he scaled the walls, gave the town to be pillaged; and intending, by this example, to deter others from retarding his march by fruitless resistance, he put all the inhabitants to the sword. When he arrived at Metropolis, the people, terrified by the fate of Gomphi, received him as a friend; and Cæsar, to contrast this with the former example, gave them his protec-

tion. From hence to Larissa, where Scipio, having fallen back from the Haliacmon, then lay with a considerable army, the country was open, and Cæsar, or his parties, were every where permitted to advance without opposition. Having passed all the lesser rivers which fall into the Peneus, he took post on the Enipeus, which runs through the district of Pharsalia. Here he commanded extensive plains, covered with forage and with ripening corn; had a very fertile country to a great distance in his rear; and being joined not only by Domitius, but probably likewise by the legion which Longinus commanded in Ætolia, in all amounting to ten legions, he was in condition to renew his offensive operations.

Pompey, at the same time, directed his motions likewise towards the same quarter; but although he had the more direct route, and was every where received as victor in the late action, was still on his march. Scipio had advanced from Larissa to receive him; and being joined, they took post together on a height near the village of Pharsalus, and in sight of Cæsar's station, at the distance of no more than thirty stadia, or about three miles *. The armies being some time fixed in this position, Cæsar drew forth, in the front of his intrenchment, to provoke his antagonist. It was evidently not the interest of Pompey to give an enemy, whom he had brought into considerable straits, an opportunity of relief by the chance of a battle. But as this was a defiance, and had some effect on the minds of the soldiers, it was proper to

* Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

return it; and both sides, during many days, continued to turn out in the front of their respective lines. Cæsar advanced, on each successive day, still nearer to Pompey's ground; but there were some difficulties in the way of his farther approach, in which he was unwilling to engage himself in the presence of an enemy, nor was Pompey inclined to quit the eminence on which he had hitherto formed his line of battle.

The summer being far spent, and much of the forage and corn of the neighbouring plains being consumed, Cæsar began again to suffer for want of provisions, and having no hopes of bringing the enemy to a battle on *this ground*, he determined to change *it*, for some situation in which he could more easily subsist his own army, or, by moving about, harass the enemy with continual marches, and oblige them perhaps to give him an opportunity to fight them on equal terms. Having resolved on this plan, and having appointed a day on which the army should move, the tents being already struck, and the signal to march given, while the van was passing through the rear-gate of the camp, it was observed, that Pompey's army, being formed according to their daily practice, had advanced farther than usual in the front of their lines. Cæsar immediately gave orders to halt, saying to those who were near him, "The time we "have so earnestly wished for is come; now let it "be seen how we are to acquit ourselves." He immediately ordered, as a signal of battle, a purple ensign to be hoisted on a lance, at the place where his

own tent had been recently struck *. Appian says, That he likewise ordered the pales to be drawn, and the breast-work to be levelled in the front of his camp, or towards the enemy, that his army might not hope for a retreat, nor have any intrenchments within which to retire †.

It was evidently Pompey's interest to avoid a battle, and to wait for the effect of the distresses to which Cæsar's army must have been exposed on the approach of winter. But this is the most difficult part in war, requiring great ability in the general, together with unalterable courage and discipline in the troops. A commander may be qualified to fight a battle, but not dexterously to avoid an antagonist who presses upon him: an army may have that species of courage which impels them in action, but not that degree of steadiness or constancy which is required to support them long unemployed in the presence of an enemy. In whatever degree Pompey himself was qualified for the part which the service required of him, he was attended by numbers of Senators and persons of high rank, who, thinking themselves in a civil or political capacity equal with their general, bore the continuance of their military subordination with pain. They said, he was like Agamemnon among the kings, and protracted a war that might have been ended in a day, merely to enjoy his command. Nursed in luxury, and averse to business, petulant in safety, useless in danger, impatient to be at their villas in the country, and their

* Plutarch. in vita Pompei. † Appian. de Bello Civ. ii.

amusements in the town, and anticipating the honours and succession to office which they imagined due to their rank and their merits in the present service, they railed at the conduct of their leader, affected courage by urging him to fight, whilst in reality they only wished to terminate the suspense and anxiety of a campaign, which they had not the resolution to endure. Many of the allies, then also present in the army, who were princes of high state in their own dominions, were impatient of so much delay; and the troops of every denomination, led by the example of their superiors, were loud in their censures of a caution which they thought themselves in condition to dispense with.

Pompey, thus urged by the clamours of his army, felt himself under a necessity of coming to a speedy decision, and had prepared for action on the morning of that very day on which Cæsar was about to decamp. Although he was sensible, that, in this conjuncture, it was not his interest to hazard a battle, it is probable that he did not think the risk was great. He too, as well as others of his party, had become elated and confident upon his late success *. His numbers greatly surpassed those of Cæsar, especially in horse, archers, and slingers; and he trusted, that, by this part of his army, he should prevail on the wings, and carry his attack to the flank, and even to the rear of the enemy. Having the Enipeus, a small river with steep banks, on his right, which

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. vii, ep. iii.

sufficiently covered one of his flanks *, he drew all the cavalry, amounting to seven thousand, with the archers and slingers to his left, expecting that the event of the battle would be determined on this wing. He himself, therefore, took post to second the operations of the cavalry, still keeping under his immediate view the two famous legions which he had called off from Cæsar at the beginning of the war. Scipio was posted in the centre, with the legions from Syria, having the great body of the infantry divided on his right and his left. The right of the whole was covered by a Cilician legion, and the remains of the Spanish army which had joined Pompey under Afranius. *The whole* amounted to one hundred cohorts, or about forty-five thousand foot, drawn up in a line of ten men deep †.

Cæsar, observing this disposition, formed his army in three divisions; the left was commanded by Antony, the right by Sylla, and the centre by Cn. Domitius. The tenth legion was posted on the right, and the ninth on the left of the whole. He had eighty cohorts in the field; but these so incomplete, as not to exceed above twenty-two thousand men. He saw the disparity of his cavalry and irregulars on the right, having no more than a thousand horse to oppose to seven thousand of the enemy. But in order to reinforce and support them, he draughted a cohort from each of the legions on the right to form

* Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. iii.

† Frontinus de Stratagematis. *N. B.* This is the only instance in which depth of the Roman column or line is mentioned.

a reserve, which he placed in the rear of his cavalry, with orders to sustain them, or to repel the enemy's horse, when they should attempt, as he expected, to turn his flank. This body formed a fourth division of his army, not placed in the same line with the other divisions; but facing obliquely to the right, in order to receive the cavalry that was destined to turn upon that side, and instead of a flank to present them with a front which they did not expect. He passed along the lines of his right, and earnestly entreated them not to engage till they got the signal from himself. He reminded them of his continual attention to the welfare of his men, desiring them to recollect with what solicitude he had endeavoured to bring on a treaty, in order to save both armies to the republic; and how far he had always been from any disposition wantonly to shed the soldiers blood. He was answered with shouts that expressed an impatience to begin the action. Pompey had directed the cavalry and archers assembled on his left to begin the attack; and instructed them, as soon as they had driven Cæsar's horse from the plain, to fall upon the flank and the rear of his infantry.

These dispositions being completed, a solemn pause and an interval of silence ensued. The same arms and the same appearances presented themselves on the opposite sides. When the trumpets gave the signal to advance, the sounds were the same; many are said to have shed tears *. Being so near, that they had only space enough in which to acquire

* Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 58.

that rapid motion with which they commonly shocked, Cæsar's army began to rush forward, while Pompey's, agreeably to orders he had given them, remained in their places, expecting that the enemy, if they were made to run a double space in coming to the shock, would be disordered, or out of breath. But the veterans in Cæsar's line, suspecting the intention of this unusual method of receiving an enemy, made a full stop; and, having drawn breath, came forward again with the usual rapidity. They were received with perfect order, but not with that resistance and equal force which motion alone could give. The action became general near about the same time over the whole front. Pompey's horse, as was expected, in the first charge, put Cæsar's cavalry to rout, and, together with the archers and slingers, were hastening to turn the flank of the enemy. But as soon as they opened their view to the rear, being surprised at the sight of a regular body of infantry, which was drawn up in firm order to oppose them, and the confusion into which they were thrown by the push and wheel they had made, disqualifying them to meet such an enemy, they instantly gave way; and although no one was in condition to pursue, fled to the heights. The archers and slingers, being thus deserted by the horse, were put to the sword. And Pompey's left, on which he expected the enemy could not resist him, being flanked by the cohorts who had defeated his cavalry, began to give way. Cæsar in order to increase the impression he had made, brought forward fresh troops to the front of his own line; and while his reserve turned upon the

flank, made a general charge, which the enemy no longer endeavoured to withstand.

Pompey, on seeing the flight of his cavalry, an event he so little expected, either thought himself betrayed, or, despairing of the day, put spurs to his horse, and returned into camp. As he entered the prætorian gate, he called to the guards to stand to their arms, and to provide for the worst. "I go the "rounds," he said, "and visit the posts." It is likely that surprise and mortification had unsettled his mind. He retired to his tent in the greatest dejection, and yet he awaited the issue *. His army, in the mean time, being routed, fled in confusion through the lanes of *their own* encampment. It was noon, and the victors, as well as the vanquished, were greatly fatigued; but Cæsar seldom left any refuge to a flying enemy, not even behind their entrenchments. He ordered Pompey's lines to be stormed, met with some little resistance from the guards that were placed on the parapet, but soon prevailed. The rout and the carnage continued through the streets and the alleys of the camp, to the rear-gate and passages through which the vanquished were crowding to recover the fields, and from which, without any attempt to rally, they continued their flight to the neighbouring hills.

When Pompey's army drew forth to battle, their tents were left standing, as in full confidence of victory; and the plate, furniture, and equipage of the officers were still displayed, as if intended for show.

* Cæs. de Bello Civile, lib. iii. c. 94.

Notwithstanding this circumstance, Cæsar had authority enough to restrain his troops * from plunder, and continued the pursuit. Seeing crowds of the vanquished had occupied a hill on the rear of their late station, he made haste to surround them, and to cut off their farther retreat. But they themselves, having observed that the place was destitute of water, abandoned it before they could be prevented, and continued their flight. Cæsar having ordered part of the army to keep possession of the enemy's camp, another part to return to their own, he himself, with four legions, endeavoured to intercept those who continued to flee in their way to Larissa. He had the advantage of the ground; so that after a hasty march of six miles, he got before them; and, having thrown himself in their way, obliged them to halt. They took possession of a height over a stream of water, from which they hoped to be supplied. Night was fast approaching, and the pursuers were spent with fatigue; but Cæsar yet prevailed on his men to throw up some works to prevent the access of the enemy to the brooks; when, overwhelmed with toil and distress, these remains of the vanquished army offered to capitulate; and while the treaty was under deliberation, many among them who were Senators and persons of rank, withdrew in the night, or made their escape; the rest surrendered at discretion. Persons of distinction, who had been formerly prisoners, and experienced a clemency which was no longer neces-

* The spoils of an enemy were commonly secured by the Romans in a regular manner, to be equally divided.

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of the CAMPAIGNS in
MACEDONIA &
THESSALY.

sary, were now put to death. Some, in a manner to be afterwards quoted, were spared at the intercession of their friends, to whom Cæsar permitted, that each should save one of the prisoners *. The private men took oaths of fidelity to the victor, and were inlisted in his army. Cæsar, having ordered such of his men as had been on service all the night, to be relieved from his camp, he himself continued his march with a fresh body the same day to Larissa.

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* Dio. Cass. lib. xli, c. 62.

END OF VOLUME THIRD.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PROGRESS AND TERMINATION

OF THE

ROMAN REPUBLIC.

By ADAM FERGUSON,

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IN the [illegible]rious battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar lost no more, by his own account, than two hundred men, among whom were thirty Centurions, officers of distinguished merit. There were killed of the enemy fifteen thousand, taken twenty-four thousand, with a hundred and eighty stand of colours, and nineteen Roman eagles or legionary standards; and on this occasio were cut off a number of Senators and

many of the equestrian order *, the flower of the Roman nobility, in whose fall the sinking fortunes of Rome were now deprived of their most likely support.

Pompey, when he was told that Cæsar's troops had already forced his entrenchments, changed his dress, mounted on horseback, and having passed through the rear gate of the camp, made his escape to Larissa. On the road he fell in with about thirty horsemen of his own army, who joined him. At the gates of Larissa he received what he wanted for his journey, but declined entering the town, saying, that he would do nothing to make a breach betwixt the inhabitants of that place and the victor †. From thence he passed by the valley of Tempé to the coast, where he rested only one night in a fisherman's cottage. Next morning he put off from the shore in a small boat, with a few of his attendants, and coming in sight of a trading vessel, made signals, and was taken on board. In this ship he steered for the bay of Strymon, came to an anchor before Amphipolis, and, probably to conceal his further intentions, issued a proclamation addressed to all the districts of Macedonia, and requiring new levies to be made, and all the youth of the province to assemble. But having received some supplies of money, he remained only one night at this place. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus, the youngest of his sons, being at Mitylené, in the island of Lesbos; thither he proposed to sail, and, without having settled his plan any farther, was

* Appian de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. † Dio. Cass. lib. xlii, c. 2.

anxious to save this part of his family from falling * into the hands of his enemies. Having taken them on board, and being joined by some galleys of the fleet, after a delay of some days, occasioned by contrary winds, he set sail, continued his voyage to the coast of Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. He meant to have landed in Syria; but being informed that the people of Antioch, upon the news of his defeat, had published a resolution to admit none of his party, he dropt that intention, and contented himself with what aids and reinforcements he obtained on the coasts of Cilicia and Cyprus. There he seized the money which was to be found in the coffers of the farmers of the revenue; and having borrowed, or otherwise procured, considerable sums, armed two thousand men, and having shipping sufficient to transport them, continued his voyage to Egypt.

The late king, Ptolomy Auletes, had been indebted for his restoration to the Romans and the patronage of Pompey; and the kingdom being now on a respectable footing, having a considerable military force in the field, this Roman leader, though of the vanquished party, flattered himself, that in the gratitude of the Egyptian court he might find some means to reinstate his affairs.

On the death of that Ptolomy, who had been restored to his throne by Gabinius, two factions had arisen in Egypt. The king leaving four children, Ptolomy the elder, Cleopatra, Arsinoë, and Ptolomy the younger, had by his will bequeathed his crown

* Cæsar, Appian, Plutarch.

to Ptolomy the eldest of his sons, together with Cleopatra the eldest daughter. This brother and sister being by the laws permitted, and by the father's will destined, to marry, were in the capacity of husband and wife associated on the throne. But the council of the young king, not satisfied with a mere participation of sovereignty, proposed to set aside the will by excluding Cleopatra. In execution of this design, having obliged her to leave the kingdom, and to fly for protection into Syria, they had taken post with a great army at Pelusium to prevent her return, she being said to have assembled a numerous force in Asia for that purpose *. Pompey, observing the ensigns of a royal army upon the shore, concluded that the king was present, came to an anchor, and sent a message to announce his arrival, and his desire to join his forces with those of Egypt.

The council of Ptolomy consisted of three persons; Achillas, who commanded the army; Photinus, an eunuch, who had charge of the finances; and Theodotus of Samos, who was the preceptor or literary tutor of the young king. These counsellors, knowing that the Romans had been named executors of the late king's will †, and in this capacity might restore Cleopatra to her share in the throne, and that Pompey, in name of the republic, might assume the supreme direction in Egypt, were greatly alarmed upon receiving his message, and came to a resolution to have him destroyed. By this atrocious action they expected at once to rid themselves

* Cæsar de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. † Cæsar, ibid.

of a dangerous intruder, and to merit the favour of a rival, who, by this decisive stroke, was to become sovereign of the empire, and fully able to reward those who should take a seasonable part in his quarrel.

With this intention Achillas, with a few of his attendants, came on board in a small boat, and delivered a message from Ptolomy, inviting Pompey to land. In the mean time some Egyptian galleys, with an intention to secure him, drew near to his ship; and the whole army, with the king at their head, were drawn out on the shore with great ostentation of pomp to receive him. The diminutive size of the boat, and the mean appearance of the equipage which came on this errand, seemed disproportioned to the rank of Pompey; and although Achillas made an apology, alleging, that deeper vessels could not go near enough to land on that shallow part of the coast, Pompey's friends endeavoured to dissuade him from accepting of an invitation so improperly delivered; but he answered, by quoting two lines from Sophocles, which implies, that *whoever visits a king, though he arrive a free man, must become a slave.* Two of his servants went before him into the boat to receive their master; and with this attendance he put off from the ship. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus the youngest of his sons, with some other friends, remained upon deck, sufficiently humbled by the preceding strokes of fortune, anxious for the future, and trembling under the expectations of a scene which was in acting before them.

Soon after the barge had left the ship, Pompey, looking behind him, observed among the Egyptian

soldiers a person whose countenance he recollec
and said to him, Surely, fellow-soldier, you ar
have somewhere served together. While he turned
to speak these words, Achillas beckoned to the
other soldiers, who, understanding the signal to put
the Roman general to death, pierced him with their
swords. Pompey was so much prepared for this
event, that he perceived the whole of his situation
at once, and sunk without making any struggle, or
uttering a word *. This was done in the presence
of the king of Egypt and of his army, who were
ranged on a kind of amphitheatre formed by the
shore. The vessel in which the unhappy Cornelia
with her family was left, and the little squadron
which attended it, as if they had received a signal to
depart, cut their cables and fled.

Thus died Pompey, who for above thirty years en-
joyed the reputation of the first captain of his age.
The title of *Great*, originally no more than a mere
expression of regard from Sylla, continued, in the
manner of the Romans, to be given him as a name
of distinction, or a memorial of the occasion on
which he received it. He attained to more consi-
deration, and enjoyed it longer than any other Ro-
man citizen; and was supplanted at last, because,
for many years of his life, he thought himself too
high to be rivalled, and too secure to be shaken
his place. His last defeat, and the total ruin wh
ensued upon it, was the consequence of an overwe
ing confidence, which left him altogether unpre

* App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. Plut. in Pom. Livii epitome, lib. cxii.

red for the first untoward event. The impression of his character, even after that event, was still so strong in the minds of his enemies, that even Cæsar himself overlooked all the other remains of the vanquished party to strike at their head, and seemed to think his victory still incomplete, while such a person was yet alive to renew the conflict.

The accounts which Cæsar received at Larissa made him believe that Pompey must have passed into Asia; and he accordingly, on the third day after the battle of Pharsalia, set out in pursuit of him with a body of horse, ordering a legion to follow. In passing the Hellespont, he was saluted by some galleys which guarded the Straits, under Lucius Cassius *. These surrendered themselves, and, with their leader, made offer of their service to the victor. From thence he continued his march by the coast of Ionia, receiving the submission of the towns in his way. And being come into Asia, he had intelligence of Pompey's operations in Cyprus, of his departure from thence, and of his continuing to steer for the coasts of Egypt. In order to be in condition to follow him thither, he put into the island of Rhodes, where he provided transports sufficient to embark the legion which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, and another from Achaia, with eight hundred horse. To these he joined a convoy of ten armed galleys of this island, and some Asiatic ships †.

* This person is sometimes taken, but erroneously, for Caius Cassius, destined to act an important part in the sequel of this History.

† Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

With this force Cæsar set sail for Alexandria, and arrived after a passage of three days *. Here he learned the catastrophe of Pompey's life; and had presented to him by the courtiers of Ptolomy, who were impatient to recommend their own services, the head of the deceased severed from the body, with his seal, which was known throughout the empire, being that with which his signature was usually put to all letters, acts, and public writings: but Cæsar either really was, on this occasion, or affected to be, seized with a momentary compunction; he is said to have turned away from the sight, and to have wept †. This able actor probably had tears, as well as words, at command; and could sanctify, under the most specious appearances, the evils which his ambition had produced. From this event, however, which he thus affected to bewail, and no sooner, he became secure, and seems to have dated the termination of the war. He accordingly landed without precaution, and being detained at first by the usual periodical winds of the season, became entangled in difficulties, or engaged in pleasures, which occasioned a very unaccountable stay, suspended the expectations of the whole empire, and gave to those of the opposite party leisure to rally their forces, or to consult their own safety in different ways.

In this interval, Cato, who, upon the march of Pompey into Thessaly, had been left to command

* App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. The two legions which he led in this service amounted only to three thousand two hundred men; so much had the army in general suffered in their late campaigns. † App. Ibid.

on the coast of Epirus, and whose quarters, after the battle of Pharsalia, became a place of retreat to many who escaped from the field, or who, at the time of the action, had been detached on different services, assembling great part of the fleet at Corcyra, and, with his sea and land forces united, still preserving the aspect of a vigorous party, was joined by Cicero, Cnæus the eldest son of Pompey, Afranius, Labienus, and other persons of distinction. Among these Cicero, as being the first in rank, was offered the command; and having declined it, narrowly escaped with his life from the fury of young Pompey, who considered his refusal as a desertion of the cause, and as an act of perfidy to his father, whose fate was yet unknown *. But Cicero, being protected by Cato and others, who were present, escaped into Italy; and declining the command of an army, reserved, for scenes in which he was better qualified to act, talents which had, on former occasions, procured him so much consideration with his fellow-citizens. It appeared that Cato had even disapproved of Cicero's having at all appeared in arms, or having joined either party in this war, and that he wished him to have devoted his *life* and his abilities entirely to those duties of a civil nature, which he was better qualified to render to his country, in the Senate, and in the popular assemblies, than in the field.

It is probable that Cato had already taken his own resolution not to submit to Cæsar, nor to survive the fall of the commonwealth; but he treated with great

* Plut. in Vita Ciceronis. Dio. Cass. lib. xlii, c. 10—12.

candour such as chose to make their peace, and retire from the storm which had overwhelmed the republic. Having staid a sufficient time at Corcyra, to receive on board such of the vanquished army as chose to take refuge in the fleet; and having afterwards, for the same purpose, put into Patræ, near the entrance of the Gulf of Corinth, he still gave every one his option to continue in arms, or to retire. He seems to have supposed that Pompey was gone into Egypt, and he determined to follow him; hoping, that after the junction of this great reinforcement, he might, either there or in the province of Africa, renew the war with advantage. Being, in pursuance of this design, arrived in the African seas, but west of the frontier of Egypt, he met the unhappy Cornelia, with the young Sextus Pompeius, who had recently beheld the death of the husband and the father near the shore of Pelusium. The account which he received of this event, determined him not to continue his voyage any farther to the eastward; but to return towards the Roman province of Africa, where the friends of the republic under Varus, in consequence of the defeat of Curio, and the alliance of Juba, still kept the ascendant, and had lately received an accession of strength by the junction of Scipio and of Labienus, who had escaped from Pharsalia. But the periodical winds which about the same time began to detain Cæsar at Alexandria, made it impossible, or at least dangerous, for him to continue his voyage along a coast that was covered to a great extent by the famous shoals and sand-banks of the Syrtes. For these, per-

haps, and other reasons which are not mentioned, Cato landed at Berenicé; and from thence conducting his army, then consisting of ten thousand men, in small divisions, through the deserts of Barca, and round the bay of the Syrtes, and having, during thirty days, encountered with many difficulties from the depth of the sands and the scarcity of water, he at last effected his march to the frontier of the Roman province *.

Cæsar, at the time when he passed with his army into Macedonia, had left Italy and the western provinces in a state not likely, in his absence, to create any trouble. But the uncertain, and even unfavourable, aspect of his affairs, for some time after his landing in Epirus, had encouraged those who disapproved of his usurpation, to question the validity of his acts, and to disregard his arrangements. The army in Spain having mutinied, deserted from Q. Cassius, and put themselves under the command of M. Marcellus Æserninus, who, however, did not openly declare himself for either party, till after the event in Pharsalia was finally decided in favour of Cæsar.

At Rome it is probable that, upon the late remove of the Senate and Consuls, few citizens of any note had remained besides those who were inclined to Cæsar's party, or at least such as were indifferent to either; and that some persons, even of the last description, thought they had an interest in his success, as being their only safety against the menacing declarations of his adversary, who, in all his proclama-

* Strabo, lib. xvii, p. 836.

tions, treated neutrality between the parties as treason to the commonwealth. But the uncertain condition of Cæsar's fortunes, while the event of the war remained in suspense, and still more after his defeat at Dyrrachium, encouraged or tempted numbers, even in the city of Rome, to declare for Pompey. Marcus Cælius, who, in the preceding year, had, upon disgust, or hopes of promoting his own fortune, gone with Antony and Curio to join Cæsar, and who was now, by the influence of the prevailing party, elected one of the Prætors; being moved by a fresh disgust taken to the party he had joined, or by its apparent decline in the field, openly declared himself against Cæsar's measures, offered protection to debtors against the execution of his laws relating to bankrupts, drove his own colleague Trebonius by force from the Prætor's tribunal, and gave such an alarm, as that such of the Senate as were then at Rome, thought themselves under the necessity of giving the acting Consul, Isauricus, the usual charge to guard the commonwealth as in times of extreme danger. Upon this decree, the Consul took arms to preserve the peace, and Cælius was obliged to leave the city. About the same time Milo, who still lay under sentence of banishment, ventured, at the head of an armed force, to land on the coast of Campania, and attempted to make himself master of Capua. While he was engaged in this enterprise, he was joined by Cælius; but both were soon after surrounded and cut off by the forces which Cæsar had left for the protection of Italy *.

* Liv. Epitome, lib. cxi. Dio. Cass. lib. xlii, c. 22—26.

These disturbances, and every appearance of opposition to the party of Cæsar, were again easily suppressed upon the news of his victory in Pharsalia. The populace, who generally range themselves on the victorious side, and who are equally outrageous in every cause they espouse, celebrated this occasion, by pulling down the statues of Pompey and of Sylla. There was either no regular Senate, and no assembly of the People to resist the torrent with which fortune now ran on the side of military government, or the names of Senate and People were, without debate or difference of opinion, put to decrees, by which the supreme power of life and death, over the supposed adherents of the vanquished party, was committed to the victor. By these decrees, the power of making war or peace, and of naming commanders and governors in all the provinces, was committed to Cæsar alone. He was, by a new and unheard of resolution, which laid that foundation of imperial sovereignty, which we shall find so often repeated, made Consul for five years, Dictator for twelve months, and vested with the sacred character of Tribune for life. He alone was appointed to preside in all public assemblies, except those of the tribes, in which the other tribunes bore an equal part with himself.

When these decrees were presented to Cæsar, then in Egypt, he assumed the ensigns and power of dictator, and appointed Antony, then stationed in Italy, general of the horse, or second in command to himself in the empire. The reputation of Cæsar's clemency had encouraged many, who had recently opposed him, to lay down their arms, and to return

to their habitations, trusting to this character of the victor, or to other considerations specially applicable to themselves. Cicero, in particular, returned into Italy, and in the neighbourhood of Brundisium, waited for Cæsar's arrival. Caius Cassius, whom we must always distinguish from his namesakes Quintus and Lucius, and who commanded the fleet which had been assembled for Pompey from the coasts of Syria and Cilicia, having sailed to Sicily, while the army yet lay in Pharsalia, surprised and burnt the shipping, amounting to thirty-five vessels, of which twenty were decked, which Cæsar had assembled at Messina, and was about to have forced that town to surrender, when he was informed of the defeat of his party in Thessaly, desisted from his enterprise, and set sail for the coast of Asia. Here he waited for Cæsar at the mouth of the Cydnus, without being determined whether he should attempt to destroy or submit to the victor. From the correspondence of Cassius with Cicero, it appears that, like this distinguished senator, he was about to withdraw from the ruins of a party which he could no longer support. Cicero, nevertheless, afterwards ascribes to him a design of killing Cæsar at this place, if the prey had not escaped him by going to a different side of the river from where he was expected to land. Upon this disappointment Cassius made his submission, and delivered up his fleet *. Quintus Cicero went to Asia to make his peace with Cæsar; and many, expecting him in Italy, resorted thither on the same errand. In

* Cæsar de Bello Civil. lib. iii.

this number, it was reported, though without foundation, that Cato and L. Metellus meant to present themselves as persons who had done no wrong, and who came openly to resume their station in the commonwealth. Upon this report, Cæsar, apprehending the difficulties that might arise to himself from the presence of such men; that they might greatly embarrass his government by opposing it, or that, in order to rid himself of such troublesome guests, they might reduce him to the necessity of pulling off the mask of moderation and clemency, which he had hitherto assumed; chose rather to prevent their coming, than to contend with them after they were come; and sent positive orders to Antony, to forbid Cato, Metellus, or any other person, to whom he had not given express permission, to set their foot in Italy *.

U. C. 706. C. Julius Cæsar Dict. Iterum M. Antonius Mag. Eq.

Such was the state of affairs at the end of the year of Rome 705, and at the beginning of the following year, which is dated in the Dictatorship of Caius Cæsar. While he himself still remained in Egypt, the government of Italy continued in the hands of Antony. There was no longer any apparent difference of opinion at Rome. All orders of men vied in demonstrations of joy for the success of the victor, and for the ascendant which his party had gained. Many still probably hoped to have the form of the republic preserved, while no more than the administration of it should pass from the ruined party to those who were now in power; but in the first steps of the pre-

* Cæsar de Bello Civil. lib. iii, ep. 6. et 7.

sent government they found themselves disappointed. The usual election of magistrates, which, even in the height of the war, had never been omitted, now, at the end of it, and when no enemy any where appeared to disturb the ordinary course of affairs, were all of them, except that of the Tribunes, entirely suspended or laid aside. All government centered in the person of Antony, and the administration of course was altogether military. He himself, immersed in debauch, passed the greatest part of his time in the company of buffoons and prostitutes; frequently shifted the scene of his frolics from the town to the country, and travelled through Italy with a field equipage, and a numerous train of carriages, for the accommodation of his female attendants. In these processions he himself is said to have sometimes appeared in a chariot drawn by lions *. And in the midst of such petulant affectations, as he was ungracious and arrogant to citizens of the highest rank, so he was indulgent to the troops under his command, and deaf to all the complaints which were made of their violence or rapine. Being equally apt to indulge disorder and license in others, as he was to set the example in his own practice, his retainers frequently alarmed the city with outrages, whether of rape, robbery or murder, and stunned the pacific inhabitants of Italy with terror, in apprehension that, upon the arrival of Cæsar, the number of such disorderly masters, destined to sport on the ruins of the commonwealth, was to be still farther increased.

* Plut. in Vit. Antonii, p. 74, 75.

The worst men, as usual, were the most forward in paying their court to the prevalent party: And among these, the nearest relations became spies or informers against one another. Fears or complaints uttered in private were reported as crimes. A general silence and distrust ensued, and all parties wished or dreaded the arrival of Cæsar, according as they expected to lose or to gain by the suppression of former establishments. In this interval of gloomy suspense, men discovered their sad apprehensions, by propagating the fiction of strange and supposed ominous appearances, or by magnifying things natural, into prodigies and alarming presages *.

Meanwhile, the daily expectation of Cæsar's arrival, for some time suspended all the usual operations in the city, and suppressed the hopes and designs of his opponents in all parts of the empire: but his unexpected stay at Alexandria, and the unfavourable reports of his situation, which were sometimes brought from thence, began to turn the tide of popularity at Rome, and encouraged the remains of the late republican party, now forced to take refuge in Africa, again to lift up its head †.

Dollabella, a young man of Patrician extraction, observing the road which others had taken, by becoming Tribunes of the People, to arrive at power in the commonwealth, procured for himself, in imitation of Clodius, an adoption into a Plebeian family, to the end that he might be legally qualified to hold this office; and having accordingly succeeded in this

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlii, c. 26. † Cicero ad Attic. lib. xi, ep. 16.

design, he proceeded to revive the wild projects which the worst of his predecessors had endeavoured to debauch the lower ranks of the People. Among these, he proposed a reduction of house rents, and even an abolition of debts. Being opposed by Tribellius, one of his colleagues, their several retainers, as usual, exhibited a scene of violence in the streets; and although the Senate passed a decree to suspend every question or subject of debate until the arrival of Cæsar, these Tribunes continued to assemble the People, kept them in a ferment by opposite motions, and filled the public places with tumult and bloodshed *. And to finish an interlude so congenial to the peace, Mark Antony, now representing the person of his absent commander, under pretence that such disorders could not be restrained without a military force, took possession of the city with an army; and, while he sometimes favoured one party, and sometimes the other, continued to govern the whole at discretion †.

The troops about the same time became mutinous in their quarters; and these disorders rose or fell according to the reports that were propagated from Asia or Egypt relating to the state of Cæsar's affairs. The spirits and hopes of the late Republican party, which yet had some footing in Africa and Spain, likewise fluctuated in the same manner. It is highly probable, that if Cæsar had pressed on the other remains of those who opposed him with the same ardour with which he pursued their unfortunate leader,

* Eight hundred citizens were killed in these frays.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xlii, c. 29.

or if he could have returned to the capital immediately on the death of his rival, that party never would have attempted, or would not have been able to renew the contest; but the leisure which he left them, and the dubious aspect of his own affairs for some time in Egypt, encouraged and enabled them to recover a strength, with which they were yet in condition to dispute the dominion to which he aspired.

Cato, who, with the remains of the republican army and fleet from Epirus, had arrived on the coast of Africa, being informed that Varus still held the Roman province on this continent in the name of the Republic; that Scipio was there; and that the king of Numidia persevered in the alliance he had formed against Cæsar, determined to join them. At his arrival, Scipio and Varus being on bad terms, the command of the army was, by the general voice, made over to him. But as at Rome all the gradations, whether civil or military, were blended together, and Scipio was of consular rank, while Cato had been no more than prætor, he rejected such a trespass on the order which was established, and made a part in a system which they all exposed their lives to preserve. His acceptance indeed might have tended more to increase than appease animosities. Neither Pompey nor Scipio ever considered him as their personal friend; his services they knew were intended to the Republic, not to themselves, and would turn against them whenever they came to make that use of their advantages to which it is likely they were both inclined. Pompey was accordingly ever suspicious of Cato, and in the last part of the campaign

in Thessaly, left him behind on the coast. Scipio adopted the same conduct with respect to this partizan of the commonwealth, and joined to the motives of distrust, which actuated Pompey, a jealousy excited by the preference which the army had recently given him. In order that this supposed rival might not interfere in his counsels, he assigned or suffered him to take a separate station at Utica, where, though in appearance retired, he continued to be the principal support of the cause. The inhabitants of this place were obnoxious to the successors of Pompey; having formerly received Curio with the forces of Cæsar, and ever favoured his interest, they were now by the opposite party doomed to destruction, and saved only at the intercession of Cato, who, in this extremity of political evils, ever set himself against every measure that tended to increase the sufferings of mankind by unnecessary acts of revenge or cruelty.

The spirit of the Republic thus apparently reviving in Africa, and the party being in condition to receive all those who fled to them for protection; with the alliance of Juba, the most powerful prince of that continent, they soon became formidable both by sea and land; and if they could have resolved to invade Italy, were probably in condition, while Cæsar was absent, to have regained the capital of the empire. Young Pompey, in this state of affairs, having passed into Spain, was favourably received by his father's adherents or clients in that province, and profiting by the misconduct of Quintus Cassius on the

part of his enemies, was likely to assemble a considerable force.

Gabinius, who commanded for Cæsar on the coast of Illyricum, attempting to penetrate by land into Macedonia, was cut off by Octavius, who had assembled a remnant of Pompey's army on the confines of that kingdom. Domitius Calvinus, whom Cæsar had appointed to command in Bithynia, had received a defeat from Pharnaces the son of Mithridates; and, in general, the state of his affairs in other parts of the empire was such, while he himself continued unheard of in Egypt, as to raise a suspicion of some misfortune, supposed to be the only way of accounting for so long stay in that country, and for the seeming neglect of all the advantages he had gained by a conduct hitherto in every instance so decisive and rapid. Pompey it was said had fallen by treachery in Egypt, and so might Cæsar. It was now the middle of June, and there was no intimation received in Italy of the time at which he might be expected to return. He had written no letters since the middle of December, nor had any one come from his quarters at Alexandria since the middle of March *.

The imperfect accounts which remain of what passed in Egypt during this interval, are as follows: Cæsar, at his arrival, had found Ptolomy the young king, and Arsinoë, one of his sisters, under the direction and in the keeping of Ganimedes and Pothinus, two eunuchs, who had the care of their education. From his manner of receiving the present of

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi, ep. 16, et 17.

Pompey's head, these officers conjectured that they had gained nothing by the murder of one of the rivals, who were engaged in this contest for the Roman empire; and that this action, although it freed Cæsar of an enemy whom he respected and feared, was not to be publicly avowed or rewarded by him. They dreaded, therefore, the interposition of this dangerous man in their affairs, even more than they had dreaded the usurpation of Pompey.

The troops now in Egypt were the remains of that army with which Gabinius had restored the late King, Ptolomy Auletes, and which were left to secure his establishment. They were recruited by deserters from the Roman provinces, and by banditti from Syria and Cilicia. They retained the form of the Roman legion; but had precluded themselves from any prospect of return to the Roman service by mutiny, in which they had murdered two Romans of high rank, the sons of Bibulus, then Proconsul of Syria. Numbers of the men were married, and had families in Egypt; they held the lives and properties of the people at discretion, and were in the habit of disposing of the offices at court, and even of the crown itself, at their pleasure. A party of this insolent rabble, then in garrison at Alexandria, and in the character of guards to the person of the present king, took offence at the parade with which Cæsar landed, and were offended with the number and show of his lictors, by which he seemed to encroach on the majesty of their sovereign; and to threaten them with all the severities of a Roman discipline, which they had violated. Frequent tumults arose on this

account, and numbers of Cæsar's attendants were murdered in the streets. The westerly winds were then set in, and he finding himself detained in a place where he was exposed to so much insult, ordered a reinforcement of troops from Asia, and had called upon Mithridates of Pergamus in particular to bring all the forces he could assemble in that quarter to his relief. At the same time, the party of Cleopatra, the exiled sister of Ptolomy, applied to Cæsar for protection. She herself, being still in Syria, ventured to pass into Egypt, came to Alexandria by sea, and is said to have been carried into the presence of Cæsar, wrapped up in a package of carpet.

In this manner, it is pretended that Cæsar became first acquainted with the person of this celebrated woman, then in the bloom of youth, and possessed of those allurements by which she made different conquerors of the world, in their turns, for a while renounce the pursuits of ambition for those of pleasure. She is supposed at this time to have become the mistress of Cæsar, and to have made him, though turned of fifty years, to forget the empire, the republic, the factions at Rome, and all the armies which in Africa and Spain were assembling against him. Under the dominion of his passion for this celebrated woman, he took a resolution to carry into execution the destination which had been made by the late king, and, in the quality of Roman Consul, and representative of the Roman people, to whom this office had been intrusted by the will, he commanded both parties to lay down their arms, and to submit their claims to his own arbitration.

Pothinus, fearing the total exclusion of the young king, his pupil, in favour of Cleopatra, called Achillas with the army to Alexandria, in order to defeat Cæsar's purpose, and in order to oblige him to leave the kingdom. This army consisted of twenty thousand men, inured to bloodshed and violence, though long divested of the order and discipline of Roman troops. Cæsar hearing of their approach, though not in a condition to meet them in the field, without regard to their threats seized and fortified a quarter of the town, in which he proposed to defend himself. The young Ptolomy being in his power, was prevailed on to dispatch two persons of distinction with a message to Achillas, signifying the king's pleasure, that he should not advance; but the bearers of this message, as being supposed to betray the interest of their master, in whose name they appeared, were by the orders of Achillas seized and slain. Cæsar, however, being still in possession of Ptolomy's person, represented Achillas as a rebel and an outlaw, and still, in name of the king, issued repeated orders and proclamations against him.

Achillas being arrived at Alexandria, entered the city, and endeavoured to force Cæsar's quarters; but being repulsed, took possession of that part of the town which was open to him, and blocked up the remainder both by sea and by land. The city being thus divided, the Egyptians and Romans fought in the streets, and from the houses which they severally occupied. Cæsar, as he despaired of being able to receive any succours by land, endeavoured to keep open his communication by sea, and sent pressing or-

ders to Syria, Cilicia, Rhodes, and Crete, for reinforcements of men and of ships. Having early discovered that Pothinus, who was still in his power, corresponded with the enemy, he ordered him to be put to death; continued to strengthen his division of the town by additional barriers; and in order to prevent surprise, demolished and cleared away many of the buildings adjoining to his works. Achillas, unacquainted with such an antagonist as Cæsar, finding so much unexpected resistance, sent for reinforcements, and a supply of stores and warlike engines, from every part of the kingdom. He traversed, with breast-works, the streets leading to Cæsar's quarters, and demolishing the houses in his way, effected a chain of works parallel to those of Cæsar, having a parapet and covered way, with frequent elevations and towers. He exhorted the Egyptians to exert themselves for the independency of their kingdom; observing, "That the Romans were gradually assuming the sovereignty of Egypt; that Gabinius had come as an auxiliary, but acted as a master; that Pompey, on being defeated in Thessaly, came into Egypt *, as to a property which he had a right to employ in repairing his ruined fortunes; that Pompey had fallen in vain, if Cæsar were tamely suffered to succeed him; that if this intruder were allowed to keep possession of the city, until his succours should arrive from Asia, all Egypt for the future must expect to be enslaved by the Romans."

* Hirtius de Bello Alexandrino.

The danger to which Cæsar was exposed, arose less from the remains of the republican party now assembling against him in Africa, than it did from the force with which he was actually assailed in Egypt. If Scipio had been apprised of his condition in this country, he might in a few days have transported a body of troops by sea to Alexandria, and, in conjunction with the Egyptians, who would now have accepted of any assistance against Cæsar, have possibly recovered the fall of their party at Pharsalia; but the best opportunities are sometimes lost, because it is not supposed that an enemy could be so ill advised, or so rash as to furnish them.

The scene in Egypt was frequently changing by the intrigues and the treachery of different parties in the court. Ganimedes, who had the charge of the young princess Arsinoë, being hitherto, as well as the young king, lodged in the quarters of Cæsar, found means to make his escape, together with his ward; and finding the troops disposed to lay hold of Arsinoë as a branch of the royal family, employed assassins to put Achillas to death; and, in the name of the princess, took on himself the command of the army. His abilities as an officer, which were very considerable, and his bounty, secured to him the affection of the soldiers. He continued the attack on Cæsar's quarters in all the ways which were already begun by his predecessor. The town being furnished with water by subterraneous passages from the neighbouring heights, he uncovered the conduits which led to Cæsar's division of the town; and, to render the water unserviceable, forced into the reservoirs great

quantities of brine from the sea. The loss, however, was soon made up from wells, in which, at a moderate depth, the besieged found a tolerable supply of water.

While Cæsar thus counteracted the arts which were employed to distress him, the eighteenth legion, with a considerable supply of provisions, military stores, and engines of war, being arrived on the coast, but unable to reach Alexandria on account of the winds, he thought proper himself to embark and put to sea, in order to cover this reinforcement, while they made for the port. On this occasion, he was attacked by the Egyptian fleet; but gained a victory, destroyed a great part of the enemy's ships, and brought his own reinforcement safe into harbour. The Egyptians, with great ardour, set to work in all the docks on the Nile, to repair the loss they had now sustained, and were soon masters of a fleet, consisting of twenty-two vessels of four tier of oars, five of five tier, and many of smaller dimensions. Cæsar had to oppose them, nine galleys from Rhodes, eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from the coast of Asia. Five were of five tier of oars, and ten of four tier. The remainder were of smaller dimensions, and most of them open, or without any deck. With these forces, having once more engaged off the mouth of the harbour, the Egyptians were again defeated, with the loss of one galley of five tier of oars, another of two tier taken, and three sunk. The remainder retired under cover of the mole, and of the towers of the Pharos.

Soon after this action at sea, Cæsar attacked the

Pharos, forced the enemy to fly from thence; most of them swimming across the harbour, many were killed, and six hundred taken. He forced them at the same time to abandon the tower, which commanded the entrance of the mole on that side. As he pursued them in their flight, and as the mole itself became crowded with his soldiers, who advanced to push the attack, or who came unarmed from the ships, and all the stations around, to witness the scene; the Egyptians seeing these crowds, laid hold of the opportunity, mounted the mole, threw those who were upon it into confusion, forced them over the quay into the water, or into their boats. Cæsar himself endeavouring to escape in this manner, and finding that the boat into which he had stepped, being aground and overloaded, could not be got off, he threw himself into the water, and swam to a ship. In this tumult, he lost four hundred men of the legions, and an equal number of the fleet. The Egyptians recovered all the ground they had lost, got possession again of the tower at the head of the mole, and of the island which secured their ships.

In such operations, with various events, the parties in Egypt passed the winter and spring. Cæsar still retained the person of Ptolomy in his possession, and made use of his name to countenance his own cause, or to discredit that of his enemies; but the king being extremely averse to have this use made of his authority, and desirous to recover his liberty, entered into a concert with some officers of his army, to find a pretence for his release. In pursuit of their design, they conveyed secret intimation to

Cæsar's quarters, that the troops were greatly disgusted with Ganimedes, and that if Ptolomy should make his appearance in person, they would certainly submit to his orders, and commit the whole settlement of the kingdom to the arbitration of Cæsar. The king was instructed to affect a great dislike to this proposal, and with tears entreated that he might be allowed to remain in the palace. Cæsar, either being deceived by these professions, or believing the name of the king to be no longer of much consequence, consented to let him depart; but this artful boy, as soon as he was at liberty, laid aside his disguise, laughed at the supposed credulity of those he had deceived, and urged the attack on the Roman quarters with great animosity.

While affairs at Alexandria were in this situation, accounts were brought that Mithridates of Pergamus, whom Cæsar had commissioned to procure succours from Asia, was actually arrived at Pelusium with a considerable force; that he had reduced that place, and only waited for instructions from Cæsar how to proceed. These accounts were brought to both parties about the same time, and both of consequence determined to put their forces in motion. Ptolomy, leaving a proper guard on his works, embarked his army on the Nile, having a considerable navigation to make by the different branches of that river. Cæsar, at the same time, put his army on board in the harbour, and, having an open course by the coast, outstript the king, and arrived at Pelusium before him. There, being joined by Mithridates, he was in condition to take the field, and to contend with all

the forces of Egypt. Ptolomy, to prevent the retu. of Cæsar by land to Alexandria, had taken a stro. post on one of the branches of the Nile; but here, after a few skirmishes, he was attacked, defeated, and driven from his station. Endeavouring to make his escape by water, the barge * which carried him being overloaded, it sunk, and he himself, with all his attendants, were drowned.

Immediately after this action, in which the Egyptian army was routed and dispersed, Cæsar, escorted by a small party of horse, returned to Alexandria, and having received the submission of the inhabitants, made such arrangements as he thought proper in the succession to the kingdom. He placed Cleopatra on the thone, in conjunction with her younger brother; and, to remove any further occasion of disturbance to this settlement, he ordered her sister Arsinoë to be transported to Rome. He left great part of the army to support this new establishment in Egypt, and he himself, after this singular episode, in the midst of the conquest of the Roman empire, marched with the sixth legion by land into Syria. At Antioch he received such reports of the state of affairs, as required his presence in different quarters. Nine months were elapsed, since any orders or directions had been received from him. During this time, the factions of the city, the relaxation of discipline in the army, and the threats of invasion from Africa, had placed his affairs in such a state of hazard, as to urge his immediate appearance in Italy

* Hirt. de Bello Alex.

and at Rome; but he thought it of consequence to his authority to leave no enemy behind him in the field *, nor to suffer the remains of disorder in any of the provinces through which he was to pass. Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, to whom Pompey had assigned the kingdom of the Bosphorus, imagining that the civil wars, in which the Romans were engaged, made a favourable opportunity for the recovery of his father's dominions, had passed with an army into Pontus, and from thence invaded the Lesser Armenia and Cappadocia, which had been separately allotted by the Romans to two of their dependant allies, Dejotarus and Ariobarzanes. At the instance of these princes, Domitius Calvinus, who had been commissioned by Cæsar, after the battle of Pharsalia, with three legions to receive the submission of the Asiatic provinces, which had been till then in the interest of Pompey, dispatched to Pharnaces a messenger, requiring him instantly to withdraw his troops from Armenia and Cappadocia; and, in order to give the more weight to this message, he himself at the same time took the field with one Roman legion, joined by two legions which had been formed by Dejotarus in the Roman manner, and two hundred Asiatic horse. He at the same time ordered Publius Sextus and C. Prætorius to bring up a legion which had been lately raised in Pontus, and Q. Patifius to join him with some light troops from Cilicia.

These forces being assembled at Camana in Cappadocia, the messenger, who had been sent to Phar-

* Hirt. de Bello Alex.

naces, returned with an answer, that the king was willing to evacuate Cappadocia; but that, having just claim to Armenia, in right of his father, he would keep possession of that province until the arrival of Cæsar, to whose decision he was willing to submit his pretensions. Domitius, not being satisfied with this answer, put his army in motion towards Armenia. While he advanced, Pharnaces endeavoured to amuse him with negociations, and to put him off his guard, by permitting the country to receive him with all the appearances of peace and security. When he arrived at Nicopolis, the capital of Armenia, the order of Cæsar to march into Egypt was delivered to him; but being unwilling to quit the prey which seemed to be already in his power, risked a battle with the forces of Pharnaces, was defeated, and, with the remains of his army, was obliged to fly by the route of the mountains which separated Armenia from the Roman province.

Elated with this victory, Pharnaces, at the time of Cæsar's departure from Egypt, had returned into Pontus, had taken possession of the principal towns, and with great severity exercised the sovereignty of the kingdom. Meantime, Cæsar being arrived at Antioch, dispatched Trebonius from thence with an account of his own operations, and with instructions to those who were intrusted with his affairs in Italy*, proceeded himself by sea to Tarsus, where he received, as has been mentioned, the submission of Caius Cassius, who waited for his coming; and who, ac-

* Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xi, ep. 23.

cording to the account of Cicero, till then was undetermined, whether he should make his peace with the victor, or attempt to assassinate him. At Tarsus, he held a convention of the principal inhabitants of Cilicia, and from thence marched into Cappadocia, stopped at Comana to make the necessary arrangements in that province, and continued his route to the frontiers of Galatia and Pontus.

Hither Dejotarus, who had espoused the cause of Pompey, had fought under his banners in Pharsalia, and who, by the gift of that unfortunate leader, still retained the sovereignty of Galatia, came to make his submission. He laid down his diadem, and the ensigns of royalty; and, presenting himself in the habit of a suppliant, pleaded, "That, in the late war, "the eastern part of the empire being subject to "Pompey, the princes of that quarter had not been "free to choose their party; that he was himself "not qualified to decide in a question on which the "Roman People was divided; that he thought it "his duty to follow the Roman standard wherever "it was erected, without considering by whom it "was carried." Cæsar, rejecting the plea of ignorance or incapacity, insisted, "That any prince in "alliance with the Romans could not be ignorant "who were Consuls in the year that succeeded the "Consulate of Lentulus and Marcellus, and who "were actually in the administration of the State at "Rome; that they could not be ignorant who was "at the head of the republic, and in possession of "the capital, and of the seat of empire; and who "of consequence was vested with the authority of

" the commonwealth. But that he, as a priva-
" man, and in consideration of this prince's age, h-
" character, and the intercession of his friends, was
" willing to forgive the part which he had taken a-
" gainst himself." He desired him, therefore, to resume the crown and other ensigns of royalty, and to keep possession of his kingdom, reserving the discussion of the title, by which he held any particular territory, to a future day.

Being joined by a legion which Dejotarus had lately formed in the Roman manner, Cæsar's force now consisted of this, together with the remains of the two legions which had escaped with Domitius from Nicopolis, and of the sixth, which had accompanied himself from Egypt, now reduced by the sword, and by the fatigues of service, to no more than a thousand men. With this army he advanced towards Pontus. Upon his approach, Pharnaces sent forward a messenger to present him, in honour of his late victories, with a crown of gold, and made offers of submission, expecting to appease him, or to occupy the time with delays, until Cæsar should be obliged, by the necessity of his affairs, to give his presence elsewhere. " Come not against me," he said, " as an enemy: I never took part with Pom-
" pey, nor declared war against Cæsar. Let me
" not be treated with more severity than Dejotarus,
" who did both." Cæsar replied, That he would listen to Pharnaces when he had acted up to his professions; that he had forgiven Dejotarus, and many others, with pleasure, the injury done to himself; but that he could not so easily overlook the insults

which had been offered to the Roman State; and that he did not pardon wrongs done in the provinces of the Roman Empire, even by those of his own party. "Your not having joined with Pompey," he said, "has saved you from being a partner in his "defeat, but was not the cause of my victory." With this reply to the messages of Pharnaces, Cæsar demanded the instant surrender of Pontus, and full reparation of all the damages sustained by any Roman citizens settled in that kingdom. Pharnaces professed an intention to comply with these demands; but under various pretences delayed the performance of what he promised to do. He had fixed on a hill in the neighbourhood of Ziecla, a place become famous by the victory which his father Mithridates had there obtained over a Roman army under the command of Triarius; and there, in order to secure himself, repaired his father's lines, and seemed to be determined to maintain this post.

Cæsar, having lain for some days within five miles of the enemy, advanced to an eminence separated from the camp of Pharnaces only by a narrow valley sunk between steep banks. He came upon this ground in the night, and began to intrench himself as usual, having a party under arms to cover the workmen. As at break of day the greater part of his army appeared to be at work, this seemed to be a favourable opportunity to attack them; and Pharnaces began to form for this purpose. Cæsar, imagining that he only meant to give an alarm, and to interrupt his workmen, even after he was in motion, did not order the legions to desist from their work,

nor to arm: but seeing him descend into the valley, and attempt to pass it in the face of his advanced guard, he sounded to arms, and was scarcely formed when the enemy had passed both banks of the ravine or gulley to attack him.

The troops of Pharnaces began the action with an ardour that was suited to the boldness with which they had advanced; and Cæsar's contempt of their designs had nearly exposed him to a defeat. But the action, which was doubtful every where else, was decided by the veterans of the sixth legion, before whom the enemy first began to give way, hurried with precipitation down the declivity, and fell into a general rout. Pharnaces fled with a few attendants, and narrowly escaped being taken *. This victory gave Cæsar an opportunity to compare his own glories with those of Sylla, of Lucullus, and of Pompey; and was, on this account, probably regarded by him with singular pleasure. "How cheap is fame," he said, "when obtained by fighting against such an enemy †?" And in the triumphs which he afterwards led in the sequel of these wars, the trophies of this particular victory were distinguished by labels, containing the words, "I came, I saw, I vanquished ‡."

From the peculiar ostentation of the ease with which this victory was obtained, while it was considered by Cæsar as a measure of his own superiority to Sylla and Pompey, we may suspect that vanity,

* Hirtius de Bello Alex. Velleius. Florus. Liv. Epitome, &c.

† Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii, p. 185.

‡ The famous words, *Veni, vidi, vici.*

not less than dominion, was the spring of that emulation from which he had raised such a flame in the empire *. Having, by this defeat, extinguished all the hopes and pretensions of Pharnaces, he restored Domitius Calvinus to his command in that quarter, and to a general inspection of affairs in Asia. This province, which had furnished a principal supply to the public revenue of the State, as well as to the private fortune of Roman adventurers, was now made to pay large contributions in name of arrears of what had been promised to Pompey, or of forfeiture for offences committed against the victorious party.

Cæsar, having issued his orders for the contributions thus to be levied in Asia, set out on his way by Galatia and Bithynia towards Greece; he landed at Tarentum, having been near two years absent from Italy. Many citizens of Rome had waited near twelve months at Brundisium in anxious expectation of his coming, and under great uncertainty of the reception they were to meet with. Cicero, being of this number, set out for Tarentum as soon as he heard of Cæsar's arrival, and met him on the road. When he presented himself, Cæsar alighted from his carriage, received him with marks of respect, and continued to walk and to discourse with him aside for some time. There is no particular account of what passed between them in this conversation. On the part of Cicero, probably, were stated the reasons which he assigns, in a letter to Atticus, for his own

* Sueton. in Vit. Cæsaris, c. 37.

conduct before the battle of Pharsalia, bearing, that he had been averse to the war; that he thought the republic had nothing to gain by the victory of either party; and that he joined Pompey, more influenced by the opinion of others, than decided in his own *. Under these impressions, though courted by Cæsar, who wished to have the credit of his name in support of the measures now to be taken at Rome, he chose to withdraw to a life of retirement, and devoted his time to literary amusements and studies. At this time he probably composed most of his writings on the subject of eloquence, as he did some time afterwards those which are termed his philosophical works †.

U. C. 706. C. Jul. Cæsar, M. Æmilius Lepidus.

Cæsar arrived at Rome in the end of the year seven hundred and six of the Roman æra, in which he had been named a second time Dictator. This year, as has been related, he had passed chiefly in Egypt. Being elected, together with M. Emilius, Consul for the following year, he applied himself, for a little time, in the quality of civil magistrate, to the affairs of state; endeavoured to restore the tranquillity of the city, which had been disturbed in his absence, and to wipe away the reproach which the levities of Antony had brought on his party. He stifled the unreasonable hopes of a general abolition of debts, with which Dolabella had flattered the more profligate part of the community. He told the people, on this occasion, that he himself was a debtor; that he had expended

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi, ep. 11. † Cicer. ad Attic, lib. xv, ep. 13.

his fortune in the public service, and was still obliged to borrow money for the same purpose. With respect to the general policy of the city, and the case of insolvent debtors, he revived the laws which he himself had procured, about two years before, in his way from Spain to Epirus. But while he appeared to be intent on these particulars, his thoughts were chiefly occupied in preparing to meet the war which the remains of the ancient senate and of the republican party were resuming against him in Africa.

This province, in which Varus, supported by the king of Numidia, had been hitherto able to keep his station as an officer of the commonwealth, was now become the sole or the principal refuge of those who made any efforts to preserve or to restore their freedom. Three hundred citizens, many of them senators, and emigrants from Italy, as well as settlers in that province, had assembled at Utica, and considering every other part of the empire as under the rod of a violent usurpation, stated themselves as the only legal remains of the Roman republic; held their meetings under the denominations of Senate and People; authorised the levies that were made in the province, and contributed largely to supply the expence of the war. Many officers of name and of rank, Labienus, Afranius and Petreius, as well as Scipio and Cato, with all the remains they had saved from the wreck at Pharsalia, were now ready to renew the conflict on this favourable ground. The name of Scipio was reckoned ominous of success in Africa; and that of Cato, even if the origin or occasion of the present contest were otherwise unknown, would be

held a sufficient mark by which to distinguish the side of justice, and the cause of the republic.

These representatives of the republic, having a considerable force at sea, and having access to all the ports, not only of Africa, but likewise of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, had furnished themselves in abundance with all the resources of war *. They had mustered ten legions, which, according to the establishment of that time, may have amounted to fifty thousand Roman foot. They had twenty thousand African horse, a great body of archers and slingers, with a hundred and twenty elephants. They expected to be joined by the king of Numidia, who, to the established character of his countrymen for stratagem and valour, joined the glory of his late victory over Curio; and was supposed to muster, at this time, besides numerous bodies of horse, of archers, of slingers, with a great troop of elephants, thirty thousand foot, armed and marshalled, for the most part, in the manner of the Roman legion †.

The army already in Africa, as well as the remains of the sea and land forces of Pompey, who were lately arrived from Macedonia, were willing, as has been mentioned, to have placed Cato at their head. But the established order of the commonwealth, for which all the party contended, requiring that Scipio, who was of consular rank, should have the preference, Cato, who had no more than the rank of Prætor, and who could not be accessary to the infringement of

* Dio. Cass. lib. lxii, c. 5. † App. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. Hirt. de Bell. African.

any established or constitutional form, declined the command. By this circumstance we are deprived of an opportunity to judge how far the military abilities of this eminent personage kept pace with his integrity, judgment, and courage, in civil and political affairs *.

Scipio, who was now the officer of highest rank opposed to Cæsar, and who had the supreme command of all the forces which appeared for the republic, whilst the coasts of Italy were exposed to his attempts, and the condition of Cæsar himself, if his situation at Alexandria had been known, gave sufficient opportunities for enterprise, nevertheless took all his measures for a defensive war.

Such was the state of affairs in Africa, when Cæsar, who with all his military character and authority, frequently experienced the difficulty of commanding mere soldiers of fortune, who had been taught to divest themselves of civil principle, or regard to public duty, was likely to perish in a mutiny of his own army, and to end his career by the swords which he himself had whetted against the republic.

The legions, which after the defeat of Pompey had been ordered into Italy, becoming insolent in the possession of a military power which they saw was to be formed on the ruins of the commonwealth, and feeling their own importance, especially in the long absence of their leader in Egypt, would not be com-

* Guichard does not scruple to say, that, even in his separation from the main army, his military abilities greatly outshone those who were at the head of it. Vid. Mémoir d'Antiquités Militaires.

manded by subordinate officers; nor did they, on the return of Cæsar himself, discontinue the habits of disorder and licence in which they had for some time been indulged. Being stationed in the neighbourhood of Capua, whence it was expected they should embark for Africa, they decamped without orders, and marched towards Rome; paid no regard to the authority of Sallust, who, in the rank of Prætor, with which he had been vested by Cæsar, endeavoured to stop them, killed many officers and persons of rank who ventured to obstruct their march, and threw the city itself into great consternation. On the approach of this formidable body, Cæsar is said to have wavered in his resolution. He had some troops attending his person, and there was a legion which Antony had stationed in the city on occasion of the late commotions. With these he at first proposed to meet and resist the mutiny; but he recollected, that even these troops might be infected with the same spirit of disobedience, and that if he were not able to command by his authority, and were forced to draw the sword in one part of his army against the other, the whole foundations of the power he had erected must fail. While he was agitated by these reflections, he sent an officer with orders to inquire for what purpose the mutinous legions advanced? This officer was told, "That they would explain "themselves to Cæsar." Having this answer, and expecting their arrival at the gates, Cæsar, in order that they might appear to do by his permission, w they were likely to do without it, sent them anotl message, informing them that they had his leave

enter the city with their arms. They accordingly came in a body, and took possession of the field of Mars; where Cæsar, contrary to the advice of his friends, had gone to receive them in person. Being raised on a conspicuous place, they crowded around him; and, from many different quarters at once, complained of the scanty rewards they had received *, enumerated their services, and the hardships they had suffered, and with one voice demanded their instant discharge. Cæsar knowing that they only meant to extort some concessions, which they hoped the consideration of the war, which was still impending in Africa, would oblige him to make; that they were far from wishing to be dismissed, or to resign those arms to which they owed their own consequence, and on which they grounded their present presumption, affected to comply with their request, owned that their demand was highly reasonable; adding, that the service for which they had been hitherto retained was now at an end, and that he was sensible they were worn out, and unfit to contend with new fatigues. In concluding a speech which he made to this purpose, he addressed them as a mere assembly of people, with the appellation of *Quirites*, or fellow-citizens; and observed how proper it was that those, who had served out their legal time, should receive the accustomed dismission. In speaking these words, he was interrupted by a general cry, that they were not quirites or citizens, but soldiers, in condition to dispose of the empire. It is alleged, that the name of

* Dio. Cass. c. 51—55.

Roman citizens *, though the most respectable form of address in the political assemblies at Rome, carried contempt to these military adventurers, and insinuated a state of degradation from that in which they affected to stand. An officer who was prepared for the occasion, or who wished to improve this sentiment in favour of Cæsar, desired to be heard; made an apology for what was past, and offered to pledge himself for the duty and future obedience of the troops. He was answered by Cæsar, That the services of this army were now of little moment to him; that as they desired their dismission, while by their own confession they were yet in condition to serve, he had taken his resolution, and should instantly dismiss them with the usual rewards. "No man," he said, "shall complain that in time of need I employ-"ed him, and now at my ease forget the reward that "is due to him. Such as continue in the service "until the public tranquillity is fully restored shall "have settlements in land; such as have received "promises of money at any time during the war, "shall be paid now, or in a little time hereafter, with "interest." He concluded, however, with saying, "That as he asked no man to remain in the service, "so he should not reject the duty of those who were "willing to abide by their colours; that he was sen-"sible how much he owed this indulgence to their "present requests, and to their merit on former oc-"casions." The whole with one voice desired to be comprehended in this act of indulgence, and

* Quirites, Roman citizens.

headlong into all the extremes of submission, as they had lately gone into every excess of disorder and insolence: Cæsar was thus again in full possession of his power; but he did not venture to punish the authors of the mutiny. It was safer, and perhaps more effectual, to reward such as were conspicuous in any particular merit; he therefore selected a few to be distinguished by immediate effects of his bounty, and put the remainder in motion towards Africa, where they might have an opportunity of earning future rewards and the pardon of past offences, and where they might spend against enemies that fury which, at every interval of leisure to recollect their own pretensions and their importance, they were so likely to turn against their leader *.

The year was now, according to the vulgar computation at Rome, and in consequence of the usual intercalations being neglected, nominally advanced to the middle of December, but was in reality little past the autumnal equinox †, or was in the end of December, when Cæsar, having made the proper arrangements in the city, and, in the manner related, appeased the mutiny which threatened to overturn his power, was again in motion to carry the war into Africa. The season, which was thought unfit for operations at sea, and which had actually forced his antagonists' ships into port, gave him the opportunity he wished for to effect the passage of his army into that province. He knew that the enemy's fleet could not continue to cruize for any time to observe his

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlii, c. 51—55. † Plut. in Vita Cæsaris, p. 154.

motions; and that, with the advantage of a favourable wind, he might easily escape them. He had chosen the same opportunity, and in the same season, two years before, to transport his army into Macedonia against Pompey, who, trusting to the numbers and vigilance of his fleet, suffered himself to be surprised, and to be dispossessed of a country which he occupied with so superior a force.

Cæsar having gained so much on that occasion, by the rapidity of his motions, now made war with many accumulated advantages of reputation and power, which increased his boldness, and facilitated his success. Having ordered troops and shipping from different quarters of Italy to assemble at Lillybæum, from which place he had the shortest passage to Africa, he himself arrived there on what was nominally the seventeenth of December, though in reality but a few days after the autumnal equinox; and although he found no more of his army arrived than one legion, or five thousand men, of the new levies, and six hundred horse, he ordered these, notwithstanding, to embark on board such ships as were then in the harbour; and if the wind had served, would have instantly sailed, even with this small force, trusting that he might be able to surprise some port on the opposite shore, and prepare a safe landing-place for the troops he had destined to follow. But while he continued windbound at Lillybæum, he was joined successively by a number of legions, which he ordered to embark as fast as they arrived; and, that i might be clear of the harbour, and ready to to sea with the first fair wind, sent the transp

with their complement of troops on board, to lie under an island, a little way advanced from the mainland.

Being in this state of readiness with six legions, or about thirty thousand foot, together with two thousand horse; and the wind coming fair on the twenty-eight of December, or, as it is computed, on the twelfth of October, he himself went on board, and leaving orders for the troops that were still in motion towards Lillybæum to follow him without delay, he set sail for the nearest land in Africa. Not knowing of any port to which he might safely repair, he could not, as usual, assign a place of general rendezvous, in case of separation, and only gave orders to the fleet to keep close together; deferring the choice of a landing-place till after he should have observed the coast, and seen in what part of it the enemy were least guarded against a descent. But soon after he got to sea a storm arose, which dispersed the fleet; he himself, with the ships which still kept him company, after being tossed four days in a passage of no more then twenty leagues, got under the land near the promontory of Mercury, and from thence, to avoid the forces of the enemy, which were stationed at Utica and round the bay of Carthage, steered to the southward.

The coast of Africa, from this cape or promontory to the bottom of the great Syrtes, over three degrees of latitude, or about two hundred miles, extends directly to the south. It abounds with considerable towns, which, on account of their commerce, were anciently called the Emporiæ; and by their wealth,

tempting the rapacity both of the Numidians and of the Carthaginians, were long a subject of contention between these powers. Adrumetum lay on one side of a spacious bay, bounded by the head of Clupea on the north, and that of Vada on the south. The southern coast of this bay contained, besides Adrumetum, the following sea-ports: Ruspina, Leptis, and Thapsus; the bay itself extending from the first of these places to the last about thirty-six miles. Scipio had secured Adrumetum and Thapsus, being the extremities of the line, in which the others were included, with considerable forces. In order to render the province unfit for the reception of an enemy, he had laid waste the country, and had collected all the provisions and forage into these and other places of strength for the use of his own army.

Considius, an officer of the republican army, being stationed at Adrumetum, with two legions, and Virgilius, with a proper force at Thapsus, the intermediate ports of Ruspina and Leptis, as well as many of the inland towns, were intrusted to the keeping of their own inhabitants. But these, on account of the general devastations lately committed by order of Scipio, were extremely disaffected to his party, and inclined to favour any enemy against him.

Cato, as has been mentioned, was stationed at Utica, as the last retreat of the Roman Senate, the centre of all their resources, and the seat of their councils.

Scipio had collected the main body of his ar near to the same place, supposed to be the prin

pal object of any attempt that might be made from Italy.

Labienus and Petreius had separate bodies, at proper stations, to guard the inlets of the coast round the bay of Carthage; and were so posted, that they could easily join, and cross over a neck of land to the bay of Adrumetum, upon any alarm of an enemy from that side.

Varus, having the command of the fleet, had kept the sea during summer and the approach of autumn, but had not withdrawn to Utica, and laid up his ships for the stormy season.

Cæsar, however, according to his custom of taking opportunities when his enemies were likely to be off their guard, venturing to sea, even in this season, seems to have had no information to direct him on his approach to the coast, besides the general report that the enemy were strongest and most to be avoided in the bay of Carthage. In this belief he passed the head-lands of Clupea and Neapolis, and stood in to the bay of Adrumetum. Being seen from the shore, he was followed by Cn. Piso from Clupea, with three thousand Numidian horse, and was to be opposed at Adrumetum by Considius, with a force greatly superior to what he could land from the few ships that were now in his company. But so little had he attended to the superior strength of the enemy, or so much was he determined to brave it, that he went on shore near Adrumetum on the nominal first of January, or about the middle of October, with no more than three thousand foot

N. C. 6. Jul. Cæsar Dictat. Stio, M. Emi. Lepidus M. Eq.

and an hundred and fifty horse. This hazardous step his high reputation seemed to require or to justify. The enemy might not be apprised of his present weakness, it being occasioned by the accidental separation of his fleet. They were likely to be awed by his name, and to hesitate in their deliberations against him long enough to give time for the junction of the remainder of his army. In this confidence, he supported the courage of his own people, by proceeding against the enemy with his usual rapidity and decision.

The garrison of Adrumetum, upon this sudden appearance of a force which came to attack them, were thrown into some confusion, and Considius, not perceiving he had to do with an enemy so inferior in point of numbers, and instead of taking measures to crush him before he should receive any reinforcement, thought of nothing but how to secure himself from surprise; shut his gates, manned his walls, and placed all the troops under his command at their posts of alarm. Cæsar, to confirm him in this disposition, sent him a menacing summons to surrender at discretion; and afterwards, at the suggestion of Plancus, who had been in habits of intimacy with Considius, endeavoured to corrupt or to gain him by a more insinuating message; but this officer, being more a man of integrity than he had shewn himself a skilful warrior, ordered the bearer of the message to be put to death, and sent the letter unopened to Scipio.

Cæsar being thus disappointed of any return his message, and suspecting that his attempt to

rupt the commander of the forces at Adrumetum might betray his own weakness, after only one night's stay in this dangerous situation, determined, on the day after he landed, to remove to some place of greater security. With this view he moved to the southward, and though harassed in his rear by the enemy's horse, continued his march without any considerable interruption or loss. As he advanced to Ruspina, a deputation from the inhabitants of that place came forward to meet him, with offers of every accommodation it was in their power to supply, and of an immediate reception into their town. He accordingly encamped one night under their walls; but being inclined to see more of the coast, and not being in condition to divide his little force, he proceeded with the whole to Leptis. Here he was received with equal favour; and having entered the town, took measures to protect the inhabitants from the licentiousness of his own people. The harbour was convenient for the reception of his transports; and a few of them accordingly, having some cohorts of foot and troops of horse on board, it being now the third day after he himself had debarked, appeared in the offing, and made their way to the port.

By this arrival Cæsar was alarmed with an account that numbers of the fleet, after they had parted company, appeared to be steering for Utica; a course by which they must either run into the hands of the enemy, or lose much time before they could correct their mistake, or recover their way to the southward. In a state of anxious suspense, occasioned by these circumstances, he seems to have deliberated, whether

it were not proper for him to reimbark; and in consequence of his doubts, probably, though under pretence of the want of forage, he still kept his cavalry on board, and with great difficulty continued to supply them with fresh water from the land. But as soon as he determined to keep his footing in Africa, he landed his cavalry, and took the necessary measures to procure supplies of provisions by sea. He sent back the empty transports to receive such part of his army as might be arrived at Lillybæum, after his own departure, and ordered ten galleys from the harbour at Leptis to cruize for the missing ships of the embarkation which was still at sea. At the same time he dispatched expresses to Sardinia and other maritime provinces, with orders to hasten the reinforcements of troops or the supplies of provisions which were expected from thence; and having intelligence that the enemy had some magazines in the island of Cercina, near the coast of Africa, he sent thither Crispus Sallustius, the celebrated historian, now acting under him in a military rank, to endeavour to secure those magazines for the use of his army.

Cæsar being determined to keep both the ports of Ruspina and Leptis, which the enemy seemed to have abandoned to him, he was now, by the recent junction of so many cohorts, in condition to garrison Leptis, while himself, with the principal force of his little army, returned to Ruspina, from which to observe the motions of his enemy. This place being unprovided of necessaries for the support of troops, he determined to try what provisions co

be found in the neighbourhood until the arrival of his transports, or until he should be enabled to penetrate farther into the country. For this purpose he advanced with the whole of his little army to forage, followed by all the carriages that could be collected together, and had them loaded with corn, wood, and other necessaries, to form some species of magazine for the troops he intended to place in the town. As soon as he had effected this service, it appeared that he had taken the resolution to go in person in search of the transports, on board of which the greater part of his army was dispersed. And with this view having destined ten cohorts to remain at Ruspina, he himself, with seven others, which made the whole of his strength on the present occasion, went down to the harbour, which was about two miles from the town, and embarked in the night.

The troops which were to be left at Ruspina, being so few, without the leader in whom their confidence was chiefly reposed, surrounded with numerous armies who were likely to assemble against them, were aware of their danger. They had now been three days on shore, and the enemy had full time to be apprised of their situation and of their weakness. The presence of their general had hitherto supported their courage; and they relied on his abilities to repair the effects whether of mistake or temerity; but in his absence they lost all hopes, and expected to become an easy prey to their enemies.

Cæsar, however, fully determined to put to sea, having past the night on board, still continued at anchor; when, at break of day, being about to weigh,

some vessels came in sight, and were known to be a part of the fleet which he so anxiously looked for. These were soon followed by other ships which appeared successively, and brought him the greater part of the six legions with which he had originally sailed from Lillybæum. Being thus prevented in his intended excursion, he returned to Ruspina, in a kind of triumph, and took post between the town and the shore.

In the mean time, it appears that Labienus and Petreius, commanding the cavalry and light troops of Scipio's army, in the angle that is formed by the promontory of Clupea, between the bays of Carthage and Hadrumetum, having intelligence that Cæsar was landed, with the utmost diligence assembled their forces, and marched towards the coast from which they had received the alarm.

Cæsar had taken a defensive station behind the town of Ruspina, the place which he chose for the resort and safe reception of his convoys and reinforcements by sea; but he was far from limiting his plan of operations to the defence of this place. On the fourth or fifth day after his landing, although by his own account he had yet no intelligence of the enemy's motions, he thought proper to continue the alarm he had given, and marched from Ruspina with a body of thirty cohorts, or about fifteen thousand foot, and four hundred horse, to penetrate into the country, to observe its nature, or to extend the sour[illegible] of his own supplies. After he had begun his mar[illegible] for this purpose, and was about three miles from hi[illegible] camp, the parties advanced fell back on the ma[illegible]

body, and informed him that they had been in sight of an enemy. Soon after this report clouds of dust began to rise from the plain, and about noon an army appeared in order of battle. To observe them more clearly, Cæsar, after he had made the signal for the cohorts to form, and to be covered with their helmets, advanced with a small party of horse. He saw bodies of cavalry in every part of the field; and from the imperfect view which could be had of them, as the air was clouded with dust, he supposed their line to consist entirely of horse. He thought himself secure against such an enemy, provided he could sufficiently extend his front, or cover his flanks. For this purpose he divided his small body of cavalry to the right and the left; and that he might not be outlined, diminished the depth to increase the length of his ordinary column. In making this disposition, however, he had mistaken the enemy's force; it did not consist, as his imperfect view led him to believe, entirely of cavalry, but of troops of horse interspersed at intervals with bodies of foot: and he had not seen considerable detachments, which were sent under cover of the hills to turn his flanks, and fall upon his rear.

Under these disadvantages on the part of Cæsar, the action began in front by a scattered charge of the Numidian horse, who advancing in squadrons, at full gallop, from the intervals at which they were placed among the infantry, threw their javelines and darts, and presently retired to their former situation. In this retreat, under cover of the infantry whose in-

tervals they occupied, they instantly rallied, and prepared to repeat the charge.

While Cæsar's infantry was occupied in front with this unexpected mode of attack, his horse were defeated on the wings; and the enemy, in consequence of the disposition they had made, being already on his right and his left, even began to close on his rear, and, by the superiority of their numbers, were every where enabled to continue the impression they made; his men, to shun the arrows and darts of the enemy, giving way, were pressed from the flanks to the centre; so that they were forced into a kind of circle, or formless crowd, without any distinction of front or rear, and were galled with a continual discharge of missiles, which did great execution *.

This renowned commander, who so far had suffered himself to be surprised and over-reached, in a most difficult situation, took the benefit of that confidence which his known ability and presence of mind ever procured him from his troops. Recollecting that the enemy must have weakened their line in every part, by attempting to stretch it over so great a circumference, he prevailed on his legions again to extend their ranks, ordered the cohorts to face alternately to the right and the left, and making a front in both directions, charged the enemy on the opposite sides, and drove them in both ways to a distance from the line of his march. Without attempting, however, to improve his advantage, or

* Cæsaris copiis in orbem compulsis, intra cancellos omnes conjecti pugnare cogebantur.

urge the pursuit, he took the opportunity of the enemy's flight to effect his own retreat, and fell back to the camp behind Ruspina, from which he had moved in the morning.

The speedy march of Labienus and Petreius, from a distance which could not be less than eighty or a hundred miles, accomplished by the fourth or fifth day after the arrival of Cæsar, and their disposition on the day of battle, to avail themselves of their numbers and manner of fighting, was able and spirited. But the event is sufficient to show, that the use of mere missile weapons, in the open plain, against troops who are armed and disciplined for close fight, although it may harass and distress an enemy, cannot against resolute men have any decisive effect.

In about three days after this encounter, Cæsar had intelligence that Scipio himself was advancing with the whole force of his infantry, consisting of eight legions, or about forty thousand men, and four thousand regular horse; an army which he was not in condition to oppose in the field, and which obliged him, contrary to his usual practice, to adopt a plan of defence. Ruspina lay along the coast, and at the distance of two miles from the shore. As his army lay behind the town, covering part of the space between it and the sea with the fortifications of his camp, he threw up an intrenchment from his camp on one side, and from the end of the town on the other, quite to the shore; so that, by means of the town in front, the fortifications of his camp and these lines in flank, the whole space between Ruspina and

the sea was inclosed with his works. The harbour too was thus secured from any attempts of the enemy. And in order to man and defend these fortifications, he landed his engines from the galleys, and brought the mariners to serve them on shore.

The choice of this situation, cooped up in a narrow place, without any secure communication with the country, in case the enemy had seized their advantage, or in case the reinforcements which he himself had expected from the sea had by any accident been long delayed, might have exposed this invader of Africa to the greatest calamities. He himself would not have neglected to hem in an enemy so posted with a line of circumvallation; but the undertaking was too vast for those who were opposed to him, and he was suffered in safety to wait the arrival of his reinforcements, and to collect some immediate supply of provisions from the neighbouring country, as well as to receive convoys which he had ordered from every maritime province.

While Cæsar remained in this position, Scipio arrived at Adrumetum, and having halted there a few days, joined Labienus and Petreius in the station they had chosen, about three miles from the town of Ruspina. Their cavalry immediately overran the country, and interrupted the supplies which Cæsar derived from thence. The space he had inclosed within his intrenchments, being about six square miles, was soon exhausted even of forage or pasture, and his horses were reduced to feed on sea-weed, which was washed or steeped in fresh water, in order to purge it as much as possible of its salt.

To encourage the hopes which Scipio entertained from all these circumstances, the king of Numidia, with a powerful army, was on the march, and likely to join him before Cæsar could receive any considerable addition to his present force; but whatever might have been the consequence of this junction, if it had really taken place, it was delayed for some time by one of those strokes of fortune to which human foresight cannot extend. Publius Sitius, a Roman citizen, who had been an accomplice with Cataline in his designs against the republic, and who, on this account, had fled beyond reach of the Roman power, had assembled a band of warriors or lawless banditti, at the head of which he made himself of importance on the coasts of Africa, and was admitted successively to join the forces of different princes in that quarter. Being now in the service of Bogud, king of Mauritania, and being disposed to court the favour of Cæsar, or hoping to make his peace at Rome by means of a person so likely to be at the head of the Roman State, he persuaded the king of Mauritania to take advantage of Juba's absence, and with such troops as he had then on foot to invade the kingdom of Numidia. Juba being about to join Scipio near Ruspina, when the news of this invasion of his own country overtook him, found himself obliged not only to return on his march, but to call off from his allies great part of the Numidian light troops, who were already in their camp.

Scipio, though thus disappointed of the great accession of force which he expected to receive by the junction of Juba, and though even somewhat redu-

ced in his former numbers, still continued to act on the offensive; and in order to brave his enemy, or, as usual, to derive some species of triumph from the supposed offers of battle, repeatedly drew forth his army on the plain between the two camps. In repeating these operations, he advanced still nearer and nearer to Cæsar's intrenchments, and seemed to threaten his camp with an attack. In return to this insult, or to take off its effects, Cæsar knowing the strength of his own works, affected to hear of the enemy's approach with indifference; and without stirring from his tent, in which he was employed in dictating letters, gave orders for the ordinary guards, which lay without the intrenchments, not to be discomposed, but as soon as the enemy approached them, deliberately to retire behind the parapet; and Scipio, upon this reception, when seemingly most bent on assaulting the lines, being satisfied with the supposed display of his prowess, returned to his camp.

During this suspension of any serious operation, and while Juba was still detained in Numidia by the diversion which Sitius had occasioned in his kingdom, Cæsar had frequent deserters from the African army, and received deputations from different parts of the country, with professions of attachment to himself as the relation of Marius, whose memory was still entire and popular in that province. Among these advances, which were made to him by the natives of the country, he had a message from the inhabitants of Acilla, a place situate about ten miles from the coast, and equally distant from A-

drumetum and from Ruspina, offering to come under his protection, and inviting him to take possession of their town. The people of this place, like those of most other towns in the province, were extremely disaffected to Scipio, on account of the severities which he exercised in the devastation of their country on the approach of Cæsar; and as they dreaded a continuation or repetition of the same measures, they were desirous to put themselves in a posture of defence against him. Cæsar accepted of their offer, and sent a detachment of his army, who turning round the enemy's flank, after a long night's march, entered the town without opposition. Considius having intelligence of what was in agitation at Acilla, sent a detachment at the same time from Adrumetum to secure the place; but coming too late, and finding the enemy already in possession of the town, he brought forward more forces on the following day, and endeavoured, but in vain, to dislodge them.

While Cæsar was thus endeavouring to extend his quarters in Africa, and to enlarge the means of subsisting his army, Crispus Sallustius succeeded in the design upon which he had been sent to the island of Cercina, and was able to furnish a considerable supply of provisions from thence. There arrived at the same time from Allienus, the officer stationed at Lillybæum to forward the embarkations, a large convoy and fleet of transports, having on board two entire legions, the thirteenth and fourteenth, together with eight hundred Gaulish cavalry, a thousand archers and slingers, with a large supply of provi-

sions. As soon as these troops were landed, the transports were sent back to Lillybæum, in order to receive the remainder of the army, which was still expected to arrive at that place. These supplies and reinforcements at once relieved Cæsar's army from the distress they were suffering; and by so great an accession of strength, amounting to twelve thousand men, put him in condition to break from the confinement under which he had for some time remained, and to act on the offensive.

The first object that presented itself in pursuit of this plan, was the possession of some rising grounds in the neighbourhood of Ruspina, which Scipio had neglected to occupy, and from which he could seize his opportunity to annoy the enemy. To gain this point, he decamped after it was dark, on the supposed twenty-sixth of January or tenth of November, and turning by the shore round the town of Ruspina, arrived in the night on the ground which he intended to occupy. This was part of a ridge, which runs parallel to the coast, at a few miles distance from the shore, and which, on the north of Ruspina, turns in the form of an amphitheatre round a plain of about fifteen miles extent. Near the middle of this plain stood the town of Uzita, on the brink of a deep marshy tract, which is formed by the water of some rivulets that fall from the mountains, and having no determinate channel spread upon the plain in that place. Scipio had posted a garrison in the town, and had occupied the ridge on one side of the amphitheatre beyond the marsh, but had neglected the heights, of which Cæsar now took possession.

It seems, that on these heights there remained a number of towers, or a species of forts constructed by the natives in the course of their own wars. In these Cæsar was furnished with a number of separate lodgments, which he joined by lines, in order to continue his communication with the camp he had left, and with the port of Ruspina.

He had, in one night, made a considerable progress in these works, but being observed at the break of day, Scipio, in order to interrupt him, advanced on the plain, and formed in order of battle, about a mile in front of his own encampment. Cæsar, notwithstanding this movement of the enemy, did not at first think it necessary to discontinue the works he had begun; but Scipio seeming to come forward with intention to attack him, while so great a part of his army was at work, he ordered the whole under arms, still keeping the advantage of his ground on the heights. Some parties of cavalry and light troops came near enough to skirmish between the two armies; and Labienus being advanced on the right beyond the main body of Scipio's forces, Cæsar sent a detachment round a village to attack him, and obliged him to retire in disorder, after having narrowly escaped being entirely cut off. This flight of Labienus spread so great an alarm over Scipio's army, that the whole, with precipitation, withdrew to their own camp. Cæsar also returned to his post, and without any further interruption, proceeded in the operations he had planned. As soon as these were completed on the following day, he again formed in order of battle, to return the de-

fiance which the enemy so often had given him while he lay in the lines of Ruspina; and observing that Scipio remained in his camp, he marched on to the town of Uzita, which lay between the two armies. Scipio being alarmed for the safety of this place, at which he had deposited some part of his magazines, advanced to sustain the troops he had posted in the town; and Cæsar, believing that an action was likely to follow, made a halt, with the town of Uzita before his centre, having both his wings extended beyond it to the right and the left. Scipio, not to extend his front beyond the walls of the town, drew up his army in four lines, consisting of many separate bodies interspersed with elephants; but as Cæsar declined to attack the garrison, supported as it was by Scipio's army, Scipio was unwilling to expose any part of his line by advancing beyond the town. And both armies having remained in this posture till sunset, returned at night to their respective camps.

Cæsar still persisting in his design to oblige the enemy to hazard a battle in defence of Uzita, projected double lines of approach from his present camp to the town. As the place was accessible to the enemy, and when their army should be drawn up in order of battle, might be made a part of their line, it was impossible for Cæsar to invest the town, or even to approach the walls, without hazard of being attacked on his flanks from the field, as well as in the centre from the town itself. In order, therefore, to cover the approach which he intended to make to the walls, he carried on from his camp on

the hills two intrenchments on the right and the left, inclosing a space of sufficient breadth to embrace the town. Between these parallel lines his troops advanced to the walls with perfect security, or under cover from any attacks that might be made on their flanks. As soon as this lane was effected to within the necessary distance of the walls, he threw up in front a breastwork opposite to the ramparts of the town, and from thence began to construct the works that were usually employed in the reduction of fortified places.

During the dependence of this siege, both parties received great reinforcements. Scipio was joined by the King of Numidia, who having repelled the enemy who attempted to invade his own kingdom, now came with three bodies of regular infantry, formed in the manner of the Roman legion, eight hundred heavy armed or bridled cavalry, with a great multitude of light or irregular troops. Cæsar's army, on the appearance of this new enemy, were much discouraged; but on seeing that Scipio, even after he was joined by the king of Numidia, still remained on the defensive, they resumed their former confidence, and were themselves soon after reinforced by the arrival of two more legions, the ninth and the tenth, who on their first approach to the coast, mistook for an enemy some galleys which Cæsar had stationed off the harbour of Thapsus, and under this mistake stood off again to sea, where they suffered many days from sickness, want of provisions, and of water.

These legions having been the principal authors of the late mutiny in Italy, are said to have now come without orders, intending to evince their zeal, and to court their general's favour, at a time when their services might be not only acceptable, but necessary to his safety. The principal historian of this war *, however, relates only, that Cæsar having observed Tribunes and Centurions of these legions to have occupied entire transports with their own equipage, to the exclusion of the troops which were then so much wanted for the service, took this opportunity to execute a piece of justice, which he had thought proper to remit, or to defer on a former occasion: That in this mind he dismissed several officers of these legions from the service, with the following terms of reproach: "For you, who have incited the troops of the Roman people to mutiny against the republic, who have plundered the allies, and been useless to the state; who, in place of soldiers, have filled transports with your servants and horses; who, without courage in the field, or modesty in your quarters, have been more formidable to your country than to her enemies, I judge you unworthy of any trust in the service of the republic, and therefore order you forthwith to be gone from the province, and to keep at a distance from all the stations of the Roman army."

The other incidents, which are dated by historians after the commencement of the siege of Uzita, do not serve to make us acquainted with its pro-

* Hirtius.

gress, or with the detail of its operations. The season we are told was stormy, and Cæsar's army, in order to crowd the more easily on board of the transports, had left great part of their equipage behind them in Sicily, and were now without any covering, besides their shields, exposed to heavy rains and hail, accompanied with thunder and fire, which, to their great amazement, instead of the ordinary flashes of lightning, became, in some degree, stationary, or for a sensible time continued to flame on the points of their spears *. While this storm continued, the ground upon which they lay was overflowed with water, or washed with continual torrents from the hills. Cæsar, nevertheless, persisted in the attack of Uzita, and seemed still to flatter himself that the defence of this place would lay the enemy under some disadvantage, which might furnish him with an opportunity to decide the war. The armies were accordingly often drawn out in order of battle, and were present at partial engagements of their cavalry or irregular troops, but without any general action.

In the midst of the great expectations which must have attended the operations of this siege, Cæsar had one of the many occasions, on which he was ever so ready to commit his genius, his reputation, and his life, in acts of seeming temerity, which persons of inferior ability may admire, but never can

* This circumstance, of the flaming points, is cited by a modern officer, to discredit the narration, but is in reality a strong confirmation. It is an appearance now understood among the phenomena of lightning or electricity, but could not then be known any otherwise, than as a fact. Voyez Melange de Remarques sur tout sur Cesar, par Le General de W. a Varsovie.

safely repeat. Varus, with a fleet of fifty galleys, had surprised and burnt the greater part of his shipping at Leptis, and was in chase of Aquila, an officer of Cæsar's marine, who, with an inferior squadron, was flying before him to the southward. Cæsar apprehended that the enemy, in consequence of this advantage, if not speedily checked, must soon become masters of the sea, so as to cut off all his supplies and reinforcements from the coast. He knew that reputation gained or lost on small occasions, often decides the greatest affairs; and that adverse circumstances, which, if suffered to accumulate, may obscure the brightest fortune, can, if seasonably encountered, by daring efforts of resolution and courage, be actually turned to advantage. He instantly therefore went in person to Leptis, and from thence put off in a barge: having overtaken his own squadron which was flying before the enemy, he ordered them to change their course, and to steer directly against their pursuers. Varus was struck with this unaccountable change in the conduct of his enemy, and supposing them to have come in sight of some powerful support, discontinued the chace, put about, and crowding sail, steered for the port he had left. Cæsar, in his turn, gave chace, overtook some of the heaviest sailers that fell astern, and forced the remainder to take refuge in the harbour of Adrumetum. Here he presented himself with an air of defiance; and having effected this apparent change in the state of his affairs at sea, with peremptory orders to his fleet not to resign the advantage which they had gained by this flight of the

enemy, he returned to the attack of Uzita. In such actions the fortunate often succeed, because the attempt appears to be incredible; and men of great ability may no doubt venture into the midst of difficulties, with which persons of inferior capacity are by no means fit to contend.

Cæsar, notwithstanding that by this stroke of address, or of fortune, he preserved his communication with the sea, and received considerable supplies from thence, as well as from the country around him, in which he was favoured by the natives; yet being greatly circumscribed by the superiority of the enemy's light troops, he suffered considerably in his camp from scarcity of provisions; and being in his present operations against Uzita, to fight with a numerous army in detail, behind the walls of a fortified town, without being able to engage them upon equal terms in any decisive action, he took his resolution to discontinue the siege, and remove to a more advantageous station; or proceed to some enterprise in which he was more likely to succeed. He accordingly decamped in the night, set fire to the wood and straw that was amassed upon the ground, left the lanes he had fortified with so much labour, and marching by the shore, placed his baggage between the main column of his army and the sea, and thus covered it from the enemy, who he expected were to follow him by the ridge of hills which overlooked the line of his march.

The retreat of Cæsar was sufficient to confirm the leaders of the republican party in the hopes they had formed, of being able to wear him out by a di-

latory war. They followed him accordingly by the heights, and having observed that he stopped at Agar, a town which he held by the affections of the natives, they took post on three several heights, at the distance of about six miles from his camp. In this position, they were not able to hinder him from making in the contiguous villages and fields a considerable acquisition of provisions and forage, which greatly relieved his army; but, to prevent his further excursions into the country, and to secure its produce to their own use, they had sent two legions, under the command of Caius Mutius Reginus, with orders to take possession of the town of Zeta, which lay about twenty miles from Agar, and on the right at some distance beyond their present camp. Cæsar had intelligence from the natives, that these troops now posted at Zeta, were frequently employed abroad in collecting provisions and forage, and that they might easily be cut off, and the town be surprised. He accordingly formed a design for this purpose; and with a view to the execution of it, removed from the plain of Agar, and fortified a strong camp on a height nearer to the enemy. Here leaving a sufficient guard for his lines, he put the remainder of the army in motion in the night, passed by the enemy's stations, and surprised the town of Zeta, which he entered by break of day, while the greater part of the garrison had left the place in perfect security, and were scattered in foraging parties over the neighbouring country. Having placed a sufficient detachment to secure this new acquisition, he set out upon his return, and having no hopes of be-

ing able to pass the enemy unobserved, made a disposition to force his way through any impediment they might oppose to his march. The night could no longer be of any advantage to him; he set out, therefore, by day, leading the governor of Zeta, with P. Atrius, who belonged to the association of Utica, his prisoners, together with some part of Juba's equipage, and a train of camels, loaded with plunder which he had taken in the place he had recently surprised.

The enemy were by this time apprised of his motions. Scipio was come out of his lines; and, not far from Cæsar's route, had posted himself in order of battle. Labienus and Afranius, with a great power of cavalry and light infantry, had taken possession of some heights under which he was to pass, and were preparing to attack him on his flanks, and on his rear. Cæsar was aware of these difficulties; it was nevertheless necessary to encounter them. He trusted, that the head of his column might force its way; and he placed his whole cavalry to cover the rear of his march. When he came abreast of the enemy, being assailed, as usual, by the African cavalry with peculiar efforts of agility and cunning, he made a halt: and in order, by some great exertion, if possible, to clear his way, and procure to his own people some respite in pursuing the remainder of their march undisturbed, he ordered the legions to lay down the loads which they usually carried, and to charge the enemy. They accordingly put all the Africans to flight; but no sooner resumed their march, than they were again attacked, and repeatedly forced to renew

the same operations. They had already been detained four hours in passing over a hundred paces, or less than half a quarter of a mile, from the place at which they were first attacked. The sun was setting, and the enemy were in hopes of being able to oblige them to halt, for the night, on a field which was destitute of water. Scipio, for this purpose, still kept the position which he had taken in the morning, and from thence observed, and occasionally supported, the operations of the light troops.

Cæsar perceived the danger to which he must be exposed, if he should halt on this ground, and saw the necessity of continuing his march: but observing, that as often as the cavalry in his rear was engaged, whether they repulsed or gave way to the enemy, he was obliged to halt in order to support them, or give time to recover their station, he thought proper to change his disposition, brought forward the horse to the head of his column, and substituted a chosen body of foot in the rear, who, notwithstanding an incessant discharge from the enemy, continued to move, and enabled him, though slowly, to effect his retreat with a regular and uninterrupted pace. In this manner, extricating himself from the great danger to which he had been exposed, he regained his camp, near Agar, with a very inconsiderable loss.

Having thus got possession of Zeta, a post on the flank or rear of his enemy, Cæsar formed successive designs on Vacca, Sarsura, and Tysdra, places similarly situated round the scene of the war. His design on the first of these places was prevented by the Numidians, who, having intelligence of his coming,

entered before him, and reduced the town to ashes. Both armies being in motion for some days, he forced Sarsura; but advancing to Tysdra, with the same intention, he thought proper, upon observing the strength of the place, not to make any attempt against it; and, on the fourth day, having returned to his station near Agar, the enemy likewise resumed their former position.

While Cæsar remained at this post, he received a reinforcement of four thousand men, consisting chiefly of the sick, who had been left behind the army in Italy, and who now in health, rejoined their legions, together with a body of four hundred horse, and a thousand archers and slingers. With this accession of strength, he formed a design on Tegea, which was occupied by a detachment of the enemy, supported by the whole of their army. Being encamped at the distance of a few miles behind the town; and having advanced on the plain, in hopes to force or surprise the place, he was observed by Labienus and Scipio, who came forward, at the same time, about four miles beyond their own station, in order to sustain their detachment. These, consisting of four hundred horse, divided themselves on the right and the left of the town; and the main armies being formed in order of battle, with this post between them, Cæsar gave orders that the party of horse, which ventured to shew themselves without the walls of Tegea, should be attacked. The events which followed this first encounter, brought into action several detached bodies, both of horse and of foot, which were sent from the different sides to sustain the parties enga-

ged, but did not lead to any general or decisive action; and both armies retired at night to their respective lines.

In many of these partial engagements which happened in this campaign, Cæsar's cavalry gave way to that of the Africans. In one of their flights, Cæsar met an officer, who was running away with his party, and affecting to believe him under a mistake, took hold of his bridle, "You are wrong," he said, "for "here is the way to the enemy." Even the legions stood greatly in awe of the Numidian irregulars, by whom they were, on many occasions, surprised with some new feat of agility or cunning; and they were considerably intimidated by the number and formidable appearance of the elephants, which they knew not how to withstand. To fortify the minds of his men, and to prepare them to meet such antagonists, Cæsar had a number of elephants brought to his camp, armed and harnessed like those of the enemy. He exercised his horses in presence of these animals, taught his men in what places to strike where the beast was vulnerable, and how to elude his fury. He likewise made some change in the usual exercise of the legion itself, such as might the better qualify his men to baffle or repel the artful and desultory attacks of the Numidians; and as he frequently employed his regular troops in foraging parties, he inured them by degrees to depart from their usual forms, without losing their courage, and to recover from any casual disorder into which they might be thrown. To show his own confidence in the superiority of his men, he frequently made an offer of battle on equal

ground; and, in the manner that was, in their turns, common to both parties, drew a species of triumph from his enemy's declining to fight.

In these operations the campaign drew on to the middle of February, and had lasted about five months; during this time Cæsar had surmounted very great difficulties, arising from the dispersion of his fleet, the uncertainty of his communication with Italy, and the scarcity of provisions in a country laid waste or possessed by his enemies. He was now become master of many towns on the coast, and of a considerable extent of territory; but from the many objects which required his attention in different parts of the empire, he remained under great disadvantage in supporting a dilatory war; in which it appeared that Scipio and Labienus were resolved to persist. In order, if possible, to break their measures, he formed a design upon Thapsus, their principal garrison and sea-port on the southern boundaries of the province. With this view he decamped in the night from his station near Agar, and directing his march to the southward, arrived before Thapsus on the following day. As he had formerly, in order to secure his convoys against any attempts from this place, blocked up the harbour with his ships, he now seized all the avenues which led to the town, and invested it completely from the land.

Scipio and Juba, greatly interested to preserve a place of so much consequence to themselves, put their armies in motion, and, to counteract that of Cæsar, followed him by the route of the hills. Seeing him invest Thapsus, they took their first posts on

two separate heights, about eight miles from the town. Cæsar, with his usual industry and dispatch, executed lines both of circumvallation and of countervallation. By these lines, which were in the form of a crescent, terminating at both ends on the shore, he embraced the town, and proposed to encamp his army between them. Scipio was sufficiently acquainted with the ground, to know that there was near the harbour a narrow channel, or salt-pit, separated from the sea by a second beach or sand-bank, which it was possible the enemy might not have observed, and by which he might still have an entry to the town, or be able to throw in his succours. He therefore advanced with his whole army; and while he made a feint to interrupt Cæsar in the works he was carrying on, sent a party to occupy the sand-bank, or to throw themselves into the town of Thapsus by that communication. Cæsar, however, had already taken possession of this passage, and shut it up with three several intrenchments or redoubts, so placed as to secure it at once against any sallies from the garrison, as well as attacks from the field.

The combined army, on being thus disappointed of any communication with the town of Thapsus, remained all the day under arms, and gave the enemy an opportunity, which he often affected to desire, of terminating the war by a battle. But Cæsar, either because he had not sufficiently fortified his intrenchments to secure his rear from the town, or because he would not choose that moment to fight, when the enemy was best prepared to receive him, made no advances to engage on that day.

Scipio, remaining on the same ground all night, took his resolution to encamp, and at break of day appeared to be forming the usual intrenchments. Cæsar had then probably completed his own works; and thinking the opportunity fair, or being determined not to suffer the enemy to effect a lodgment in his presence, he made the usual signal to prepare for action; and leaving a proper force to man his own intrenchments against the town, drew out the remainder of his army to the field, ordered part of his fleet to get under sail, to turn a head-land in the rear of the enemy; and as soon as the action began in front, to alarm them with shouts, or a feint to land and to attack their rear. Having made these dispositions, he put his army in motion, and being come near enough to distinguish the posture of the enemy, observed, that their main body was already in order of battle, with the elephants disposed on the wings; and that numerous parties were still at work on the lines, within which they meant to encamp. He halted, and made a disposition suitable to that of the enemy. His centre consisted of five legions, his wings each of four; the tenth and second legions composed the right wing, the eight and ninth composed the left. Five cohorts, together with the cavalry, were selected to support the archers and slingers, that were to begin the attack by galling the enemy's elephants. Cæsar himself went round every division on foot, exhorted the veterans to be mindful of the high reputation which they had to support, and recommended to the new levies to take example from those who were already possessed of so much glory,

and who were, by long experience, instructed in the arts to be practised in a day of battle.

While Cæsar was thus employed, the legions of Scipio appeared to reel; they at one time retired behind their imperfect works, again changed their purpose, and came back to their ground. Many of Cæsar's officers, and many of the veteran soldiers, well acquainted with this sign of distraction and irresolution, called aloud for the signal of battle. But he himself, possibly to whet their ardour, as well as to keep them in breath, again and again halted the whole line.

In this situation of the two armies, Cæsar is said to have been seized with a fit of the epilepsy, to which he was subject; a disease which, although it seems to attack the seats of understanding and of sense, or suspends, for a time, the exercise of every faculty in the most alarming manner, does not appear, if this report may be credited, to effect any lasting diminution of the rational powers, nor in the intervals of fits to be inconsistent with their highest measures, and their ablest exertions. The tale, however, is not consistent with the narration of Hirtius. This historian, although he allows that the troops, in the last part of their motion to engage, acted without any orders; and while Cæsar wished them to advance more deliberately, that they forced a trumpet on the right to sound the usual charge, and that the whole line, without any other signal, overwhelmed by force all the officers who ventured to restrain them, continued to rush on the enemy: yet he observes that Cæsar, instead of being out of condition to act, took his

resolution to excite an ardour which he could not control; and, in order that he might bring his whole army at once with united force into action, commanded all his trumpets to sound, and himself, mounting on horseback, rode up with the foremost ranks. The battle began on the right, where the enemy's elephants being galled with a shower of arrows and stones, reeled back on the troops that were posted to sustain them, trod part of the infantry under foot, and broke over the unfinished intrenchments in their rear.

The left of Scipio's army being thus routed, the main body soon after gave way; and the whole fled to the camp which they had formerly occupied; but, in their flight, being thrown into confusion, and separated from their officers, they arrived at the place to which they fled, without any person of rank to rally or command them. In this state of consternation they threw down their arms, and attempted to take refuge in the camp of their Numidian ally. But this being already in possession of the enemy, they continued their flight to the nearest heights; and having already thrown away their arms, awaited their fate in a state of helpless despair. When they saw the troops that pursued them advance, they made signs of submission, and saluted the victors with a shout; but in vain. They were instantly attacked by the victorious army of Cæsar, who, though affecting clemency on former occasions, now seemed to be actuated with a paroxysm of rage and thirst of blood; contrary to the orders and entreaties of their general, they put the whole of this unarmed

and defenceless multitude to the sword. They are said, on this occasion, to have seized the opportunity of satiating their revenge on some of their own officers who had offended them. One was actually murdered; another being wounded, fled to Cæsar for protection; and many persons of distinction, Senators and Roman Knights, though of Cæsar's party in this contest, observing their danger, thought proper to withdraw to some place of concealment, till the present fury of the troops should abate.

In the beginning of this memorable action, the garrison of Thapsus had sallied, but was repulsed with loss. When the contest was over, Cæsar, to induce the town to surrender, displayed the trophies of victory he had gained; but had no answer. On the following day, he drew up his army under the walls of the town; and having made a speech to the legions, in which he thanked them for their good behaviour; without any reproach for the disorder and cruelty of the preceding day, he declared what were to be the rewards which he intended, at a proper time, for the veterans; and, by some immediate mark of his favour, distinguished a few who had signalized themselves. He appointed Caius Rubellius, with three legions, to continue the siege of Thapsus, and Cn. Domitius, with two others, to reduce Tysdra; and having sent forward M. Messala, with a body of horse on the road to Utica, he himself followed with the remainder of the army *.

* Hirt. de Bello Afric.

At Utica were assembled, from every part of the empire, all who were obnoxious to Cæsar, or who, from a zeal for the republic, had refused to submit to his power. On the third day after the battle of Thapsus, towards night, a person who had escaped from the field coming to Utica, this unhappy convention of citizens was struck with the greatest alarm. Under the effects of their consternation, they met in the streets, ran to the gates, and again returned to their habitations. They crowded together in the public places, and separated by turns, and passed the night in extreme perplexity. Cato represented to them, that the accounts they received might be exaggerated, and endeavoured to compose their fears. As soon as it was day he called them together, and laid before them a state of the place, of the works, military stores, provisions, arms, and numbers of men; and having commended the zeal which they had hitherto shown in defence of the republic, exhorted them now to make the proper use of the means they still had of defending themselves, or at least of making their peace in a body: declared, that if they were inclined to submit to the victor, he should impute their conduct to necessity; but if they were determined to resist, he should reserve his sword for the last stake of the republic, and share with them in the consequences of a resolution, which he should love and admire. He contended, that they were now to consider themselves as assembled, not in Utica, but in Rome; "That the force of the republic was yet very great, "and might still, as on former occasions, rise again

" from its ruins; that the forces of Cæsar must still " be distracted or separated, to make head against " enemies who were appearing in different parts of " the empire; that in Spain his own army had de- " serted from him, and the whole province had de- " clared for the sons of Pompey; that Rome, the " head of the commonwealth, was yet erect, and " would not bend under the yoke of a tyrant; that " his enemies were multiplying while he seemed to " destroy them, that his own example should in- " struct them; or rather, that the courage which " he exerted in the paths of guilt and of infamy, " should animate those who were either about to " die with honour, or to secure for their country " blessings in which they themselves were to share." At this assembly, a resolution was accordingly taken to defend the city of Utica, and numbers of slaves, who were set free by their masters for this purpose, were armed and enrolled. But it soon appeared, that the assembly consisted of persons unable to persist in this resolution, and who were preparing separately to merit the favour of the conqueror by an entire and early submission. They soon made a general profession of this design, expressed their veneration of Cato, but confessed, that they were not qualified to act with him in so arduous a scene; assured him, that if they were permitted to send a message to Cæsar, the first object of it should be to intercede for his safety; and that, if they could not obtain it, they should accept of no quarter for themselves. Cato no longer opposed their intentions; but said, that he himself must not be included in

their treaty; that he knew not of any right Cæsar had to dispose of his person; that what had hitherto happened in the war only served to convict Cæsar of designs which were often imputed to him, and which he always denied. He will now, at least, own, he said, that his opponents were not mistaken in the suspicions they suggested against him.

While matters were in this state, a party of Scipio's horse, which had escaped from the field of battle, appeared at the gates of the town, and were with difficulty, by Cato's entreaties, diverted from a frantic resolution, of putting every Roman citizen, who offered to submit to Cæsar, as well as the inhabitants of the place, to the sword. Being dissuaded from this act of violence, and furnished with some money for their immediate subsistence, they continued their retreat. Most of the Senators, who were present, took shipping, and escaped. Lucius Cæsar undertook to carry to his kinsman a petition from such of the Roman citizens as remained; and said to Cato, at parting, that he would gladly fall at the victor's feet to make *his* peace. To which Cato answered, "If I were disposed to make my peace with "Cæsar, I should repair to him in person; but I "have done him no wrong; I am not an object of "his pardon, and shall not request what it were in-"solence in him to offer me as a favour." He, however, on this occasion, observed to his own son, that it would not become him to leave his father. "At a fit time," he said, "you will put yourself on "the victor's mercy, but do not take part in public "affairs; the times do not afford a station in which.

" it would be proper for you to act." " And why," said the young man, " will you not take the bene-" fit of the victor's clemency for yourself, as well as " for me?" " I was born to freedom," he said, " and " cannot, in my old age, be reconciled to servitude. " For you these times were destined; and it may " become you to submit to your fate." Having passed the day in aiding his friends to procure the means of their escape, he went to the bath, and supped as usual, without any marks of dejection or affectation of ease; and being retired to his chamber, after some time which he employed in reading, he killed himself. His attendants, upon hearing a noise which alarmed them, burst open the door, and would have dressed the wound, but he tore it up with his own hands, and expired in making this effort *. Every one, through the day, had been anxious to know what was the design which Cato covered under the appearance of so much concern for others, and of so little care for himself. On the first report of his death, multitudes crowded to the door of his quarters, and gave the most unfeigned demonstrations of dejection and sorrow. The colony of Utica, though originally hostile to his cause, and still in the interest of Cæsar, ordered a public funeral, and erected his statue in the place of interment.

Cato died in the vigour of life, under fifty: he was naturally warm and affectionate in his temper; and, according to his poetic encomiast †, compre-

* Dio. Cass. Appian. Plutarch. Hirtius de Bello Africano.

† Non sibi sed toto genitum, se credere mundo.

hensive, impartial, and a citizen of the world. But his country, his friend, and those who were placed within his reach, formed that world to him, in which he was to take an effective part. He professed to believe, with the sect whose tenets he embraced, that it might or might not, in particular circumstances, be expedient for a man to preserve or lay down his life; but that, while he kept it, the only good or evil incident to him consisted in the part which he took, as a friend or an enemy to those with whom he was connected. He had long foreseen the dangers to which the republic was exposed, and determined to live only while he could counteract the designs that were formed against it *. The leader of the successful party thought proper to apologize for himself, by decrying the virtues of Cato; but the bulk of mankind, in his own and the subsequent ages, were equally pleased to extol them; and he has given the rare example of a merit, which received its praise even amidst the adulation that was paid to his enemies †; and was thought, by the impartial, equally above the reach of commendation or of censure ‡.

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* Sed vere laudari ille vir non potest, nisi hæc ornata sunt; quod ille ea, quæ nunc sunt, et futura viderit, et ne fierent contenderit, et facta ne videret, vitam reliquerit. Cicer. ad Att. lib. xii, ep. 4.

† See the writings of Virgil and Horace.

‡ Cujus gloriæ neque profuit quisquam laudando, nec vituperando quisquam nocuit, quum utrumque summis prædíti fecerint ingeniis. Frag. Livii ex Hieronym. Prolog. lib. xi, in Oseam.

CHAP. XXIX.

Arrival of Cæsar at Utica.—Wreck of the republican party.—Servility of the Roman people.—Magnificence and administration of Cæsar.—His last campaign in Spain.—Death of the elder of Pompey's sons.—Cæsar's return, triumphs, honours, and policy in the state.—Spirit of the times.—Source of the conspiracy against Cæsar.—Its progress.—Death of Cæsar.

When Cæsar was informed, on his march from Thapsus, that of all the principal men of the opposite party, Cato alone remained at Utica to receive him, he was at a loss to interpret his conduct, and possibly might have found it difficult to determine how he should deal with an antagonist, whom he neither could reconcile to his usurpation, nor treat as a criminal. The character of generosity towards his enemies, which Cæsar had assumed, laid him under some obligation, in point of consistency, to treat the person of Cato with respect; and the opportunity he would have had, in that instance, of exercising his clemency with so much lustre, could not have escaped him. In the busiest scene of his life he had not any party object, nor any party quarrel to maintain; he had repeatedly sacrificed personal animosity to ambition; and when he took the field against the republic, he had few private resentments to gratify: he knew that an affectation of reluctance

in shedding the blood of Roman citizens, the reverse of what remained so much an object of horror in the memory of Sylla, was the likeliest means to palliate the effects of this destructive war, and to reconcile the people to his usurpation. In the bulk of his fellow-citizens he had found either a mere rubbish to be removed from the way of his ambition, or tools with which he might work in removing it; they were either the dupes of his policy, or open to the imputations of sinister designs or unreasonable obstinacy which he cast on his opponents. In Cato, perhaps, alone, he found a measure of estimation, which, with all his abilities and prosperous fortune, he could not pretend to slight, and a penetration, which, without any management for his person, had ever treated his intrigues as a system of villany devised for the ruin of the commonwealth. Cato therefore alone, of all his antagonists, he possibly hated beyond the possibility of reconciliation *.

Cæsar was in reality, according to the representation of his friend Curio, neither sanguinary nor scrupulous of blood, but in the highest degree indifferent to both, and ever ready to do whatever was most likely to promote his own designs. As he had already sufficiently provided for the reputation of clemency, he now made a freer use of his sword, and in proportion as he approached to the end of the war, or saw the means of extirpating those who were most likely to withstand his pretensions, he dipped his hands with less scruple in the blood of

* Et cuncta terrarum subacta præter atrocem animum Catonis.

his enemies. As he pursued Pompey into Egypt, under a decided impression that the death of this rival was material to the establishment of his power in Italy, so it is likely that he now hastened to Utica as a place at which he might crush the remains of a republican spirit in the empire. On hearing of the death of Cato, however, he made use of an expression which served either to discover the resolution he had taken with respect to him, or to preserve the aspect of generosity at no expence. "I must be allowed," he said, "to envy this man the splendour "of his death, as he has refused me the honour of "preserving his life." Having passed through Uzita and Adrumetum, which surrendered to him on his march, and being met by numbers who came to make their submission, he arrived at Utica in the evening, and continued all night without the gates.

Marcus Messala had already taken possession of the town. Cæsar himself entered on the following day; and having ordered the people to attend him, made a speech, in which he thanked the colony of Utica for their faithful attachment to his cause; but spoke of the Roman citizens *, who had been assembled at this place, and contributed to support the war against him, in terms which sufficiently shewed that he was no longer to court the reputation of mercy. Appian says, that as many of them as fell into his hands were by his order put to death. Hirtius relates, that he only confiscated their effects, and that this sentence was afterwards changed into a li-

* Those who were with Cato assumed the character of Roman Senate at Utica.

mited fine, amounting in all to two hundred thousand sestertia, or about a million and a half sterling, to be paid in three years, at six separate payments.

From this general wreck of the republican party in Africa, the leaders continued their flight in different directions. Many who surrendered themselves were spared; but most of those, who, in their attempts to escape, fell into the enemy's hands, either killed themselves, or by Cæsar's orders were put to death *. Afranius and Faustus Sylla, having joined a party of cavalry that fled by Utica from the field of battle, were intercepted by Sitius, and defending themselves, with the loss of many of their party, were taken. In a few days after this event, these prisoners, under pretence of a riot in the camp, were put to death.

Scipio, with Damasippus, Torquatus, and Plætorius Rustianus, endeavoured to escape by sea into Spain. After being tossed some days with contrary winds, they ventured to put into Hippo, on the coast of Numidia, where they met with a squadron of Cæsar's fleet, commanded by Sitius. Their vessel being boarded, they were asked with impatience, Where is the general? Scipio himself made answer, *The general is well;* and in uttering these words stabbed himself, and went headlong into the sea.

Juba, with Petreius, having escaped from the field of battle at Thapsus, lay concealed by day, and continued their flight in the night towards Zama, a place which, at the breaking out of the war, the king of Numidia had fortified, and made the residence of his women and the repository of his treasure and

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii, c. 12. Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii. Florus. Eutropius. Hirtius.

most valuable effects. He knew that if he should be taken captive by a Roman general, the consequence was being led in triumph, and possibly afterwards put to death. He had therefore provided this retreat in case of an unfortunate issue to the war; intending it merely as a place at which he might die in state. With this intention he had raised, near to the royal palace, a pile of wood on which he meant to consume whatever could mark or adorn the victor's triumph; and it was his purpose, while he set these materials, and with them the whole city on fire, to commit himself and his women to the flames.

The inhabitants of Zama had some intimation of this design, and, upon the approach of the king, unwilling to have the exit of a vanquished prince celebrated in their city by such an offering, shut their gates and refused him admittance. They likewise had the humanity to refuse delivering the women into his hands, under an apprehension that he meant they should be a sacrifice to his jealousy, or be involved in his ruin.

Juba finding himself thus disobeyed, even by his own subjects, retired to one of his country seats; and having ordered a splendid entertainment, at the close of it he and Petreius fell together by their own swords. The kingdom of Numidia was converted into a Roman province, and the government of it was committed to Sallust the historian. The son of the king, yet an infant, was reserved to make a part in the procession of the victor's triumph *. The fur-

* Plut. in Cæs.

niture and ornaments of his palaces being sold, produced a considerable sum of money. Great contributions were raised, at the same time, in those parts of Africa which had been already reduced to the condition of a Roman province. The inhabitants of Thapsus were made to pay fifty thousand Roman sestertia *; those of Adrumetum, eighty thousand; those of Leptis and Tysdra paid the quotas exacted from them in corn and oil.

Cæsar having, in this manner, closed a scene in which he had destroyed fifty thousand of his opponents, who might be supposed to be the most obstinate adherents of the republican party, and having joined to the empire a territory, which, by the report afterwards made in the assembly of the people, was fitted to yield an annual tribute of three hundred thousand medimni of grain, and three hundred thousand weight of oil †, he embarked at Utica, on the fifteenth of June, and in three days after his departure from thence, arrived in the island of Sardinia; a part of his dominions, said Cicero, as a taunt to this upstart sovereign, which he had not hitherto seen. Before his departure from Africa, he had made the necessary arrangements respecting the army; and, although he had recently availed himself of the services of the legions who had mutinied in Italy, and seemed to have forgotten their offence, yet he took the benefit of the present prosperous state of his affairs to indulge his resentment; and that they might not communicate with other

* About L. 400,000. † Plut. in Cæs.

factious spirits in the empire, have leisure to overrate their own services, or to set an example to the rest of the army of exorbitant demands, he ordered them to be broke and disbanded in Africa. The remainder of the troops who had given him the victory in that country, he ordered, after receiving the necessary refreshments, to proceed in the voyage to Spain, where he still had, from the sons and adherents of Pompey, some resistance to apprehend.

Leaving the army therefore to pursue this course, Cæsar himself took shipping again in the island of Sardinia on the twenty-ninth of June; and, being some time detained by contrary winds, arrived at Rome on the twenty-sixth of the following month*; having, since the time of his departure from Italy, on the expedition to Africa, in which he had so many difficulties to surmount, spent no more than six months.

The news of Cæsar's victory had been some time received. The principal supports of the republic had fallen at Thapsus and at Pharsalia; and as the sons of Pompey, though favourably received by their late father's adherents in Spain, were not yet supposed to be in condition to resist the victor, the revolution in his favour seemed to be complete, and every part of the Roman empire subjected to his power. Nothing now remained but that he should take possession of that sovereignty to which he aspired, and in which, it soon after appeared, that to him there was a charm, even in the flattery of the obsequious, as well as in the possession of power.

* Hirt. de Bello Afr. c. 86.

Whatever distress the surviving members of the commonwealth may have suffered on the loss of their relations and friends, who had fallen in the late bloody contentions, or whatever mortification they may have felt on the loss of their own political importance, as partners in the empire of the world, no symptoms of aversion, or unwilling submission, appeared on the part of the people; all orders of men hastened to pay their court to the victor, and, by their servile adulations, to anticipate the state of degradation into which they were themselves soon to be reduced.

In the name of the Senate and People, a continual thanksgiving of forty days was decreed for the late victory at Thapsus. The power of Dictator was conferred on Cæsar for ten years, and that of Censor, which gave the supreme disposal of honours and rank in the commonwealth, and which, on account of the abuse to which it was subject, had been some time discontinued, was now, under a new title, that of Inspector of Manners *, restored in his person. At the same time the nomination of some of the officers of state, formerly elected by the people, was committed to him. He was, in the exercise of these powers, to be preceded by seventy-two Lictors, triple the number even of those who used to attend the Dictators, and he was to enjoy, for life, many of the inferior prerogatives, which, under the republic, served to distinguish the first officers of state; such as that of giving the signals for the horses to start, or

* Præfectus Morum.

for the other sports to begin at the games of the Circus; and that of delivering his opinion before any one else in the Senate. It was likewise ordered, that he should have in that assembly a gilded chair of state, placed next to that of the Consul; and, as if it were intended to join ridicule with these extraordinary honours, it was decreed, that as the conqueror of Gaul, in his triumphs he should be drawn by white horses, to put him on a foot of equality with Camillus, to whom this distinction had been given, as the restorer of his country from its destruction by the ancestors of that nation; that the name of Catulus should be erased from the Capitol, and his own be inserted, as the person who had rebuilt that temple and citadel of Rome; that a car, like that of Jupiter, should be placed for him in the same temple, and near to the statue of the god himself; and that his own statue, with the title of a demi-god, should be erected on a globe representing the earth.

It is said that Cæsar refused many of the honours which were decreed to him; but in these, which he no doubt encouraged, or favourably received, he sufficiently betrayed a vanity, which but rarely accompanies such a distinguished superiority of understanding and vigour of mind. Though in respect to the ability with which he rendered men subservient to his purpose; in respect to the choice of means for the attainment of his end; in respect to the plan and execution of his designs, he was far above even those who are eminent in the history of mankind; yet in respect to the end which he pursued, in respect to the passions he had to gratify, he

was one merely of the vulgar, and condescended to be vain of titles and honours which he himself had extorted by force, and which he has shared with persons of the meanest capacity. Insensible to the honour of being deemed the equal in rank to Cato and Catulus, to Hortensius and Cicero, and the equal in reputation to Sylla, to Fabius, and to the Scipios, he preferred being a superior among profligate men, the leader among soldiers of fortune, and to procure by force from his fellow-citizens a deference which his wonderful abilities must of themselves have made unavoidable, and still more if he had possessed the magnanimity to despise it.

Cæsar, soon after the distinctions now mentioned were bestowed upon him, addressed himself to the Roman Senate and People, in a speech which, being supposed to proceed from a master, was full of condescension and lenity, but, from a fellow-citizen, was marked with insult and contumely. A speech delivered on so remarkable an occasion was likely to be in substance preserved; and under the government of his successors, by whom he was ever styled the *divine* Julius*, or numbered with the gods, it was not likely to get abroad but with a view to do him honour. "Let no man," he said, "imagine, "that, under the favour of my exalted situation, I "am now to indulge myself in acts, or even in ex-"pressions of severity; or that I am to follow the "example of Marius, of Cinna, of Sylla, or of most "others, who, having subdued their enemies, dropt,

* Divus Julius.

" in the height of their fortune, that character of " moderation under which they had formerly en- " ticed men to their party. I have appeared all a- " long in my genuine character, and now, in the " height of my power, have no change to make in " my conduct *. The more my fortunes advance, " the more I will endeavour to use them properly. " My sole object, while I endeavoured to rise above " my enemies, was to secure for myself a situation " in which I might exercise virtue with dignity and " safety; and I shall not now imitate the examples " which I myself have so often condemned, nor sully " the splendour of my victories by an illiberal use of " my power.

" As the favours of fortune are won by vigour, so " they are preserved by moderation, and should be " most carefully preserved by those who enjoy the " greatest share of them. I covet sincere affection " and genuine praise; not the adulation that springs " from fear, and is the disguise of hatred. These " are my serious thoughts, confirmed on reflection; " and you shall find me governed by them in all the " actions of my life. I do not mean to be your lord " or your tyrant, but your chief and your leader. " When the State has occasion for my authority, you " shall find in me a Dictator and a Consul; but on " ordinary occasions, no more than a private man †.

" I have spared many who were repeatedly in arms " against me, I have shut my ears to informations " of the hidden designs of others, and have destroy-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii, c. 15, &c. † Ibid.

" ed all letters and papers which could lead to a de-
" tection of my secret enemies. To most of you I
" can have no resentment; and I do not incline to
" raise prosecutions even against those who may
" think they have incurred my displeasure. Live,
" therefore, with me from this time forward in con-
" fidence, as children with their father. I reserve
" to myself the power of punishing the guilty, as far
" as justice requires; but will protect the innocent,
" and reward the deserving.

" Let not these appearances of military force a-
" larm you. The troops which are quartered in the
" city, and which attend my person, are destined to
" defend, not to oppress the citizens; and these
" troops I trust know, upon every occasion, the li-
" mits of their duty.

" Uncommon taxes have lately been levied in the
" provinces and in Italy, but not for my private use.
" I have in reality expended my own fortune, and
" contracted immoderate debts in the public ser-
" vice; and, while I myself have borne so great a
" part of the burden, am likewise made to bear
" the blame of what others have imposed." He concluded with assurances, that the arrears which were due to the legions, and the other debts of the public *, should be paid with the least possible inconvenience to the People.

In this speech was conveyed, not the indignant and menacing spirit of Sylla, who despised the very power of which he was himself possessed; but the

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii, c. 15, &c.

conscious state and reflecting condescension of a prince who admired and wished to recommend his own greatness. The Roman People, in former instances of usurpation, had experienced sanguinary and violent treatment, and they now seemed to bear with indifference the entire suppression of their political rights, when executed by hands that refrained from proscriptions and murders. But as Cæsar seemed to think his present elevation the highest object of human wishes, there were some who, although now silent, thought their own present subjection the lowest state of degradation and misery. "What should I "do in such times?" says Cicero to his correspondent, "books cannot always amuse me. I go into "any company, affect to be noisy, and laugh, to "conceal my sorrow *."

The populace were gratified with shows, processions, and feasts, and with the bounties which they received in money. Cæsar had four separate triumphs in one month. The first for his conquest of Gaul, at which Vercingetorix, the prince of the Arverni, by a custom cruel and odious in all its parts, was led in chains, and afterwards put to death. The second for his victory in Egypt, at which Arsinoë, the sister of the queen, was exhibited in fetters, and by her youth and beauty excited a general compassion, which preserved her life. A third for the defeat of Pharnaces, where the trophies, as has already been mentioned, were marked with the words, *I*

* Cic. ad Familiar. lib. ix, ep. 26. Miraris, tam exhilaratam esse servitutem nostram. Quid ergo faciam?—ibi loquor quod in solum ut dicitur, et gemitum in risus maximos transfero.

came, I saw, I vanquished. The last for the overthrow of the king of Numidia, in which the infant son of that prince was carried in procession. This captive having received a literary education at Rome, became afterwards, according to Plutarch, an historian of eminence *.

Although triumphs were not to be obtained for the defeat of fellow-citizens, and nothing in these processions had a reference to Pompey, yet the effigies of many considerable Senators, who had fallen in the civil war, were carried before the victor's chariot.

In these processions, Cæsar is said to have carried to the treasury, in all sixty thousand talents in money †; two thousand eight hundred and twenty-two chaplets or crowns of gold, weighing twenty thousand four hundred and fourteen pounds ‡. He at the same time distributed to each private man of the army, five thousand denarii or drachmas, about one hundred and sixty-one pounds sterling; to each Centurion double: to the Tribune, quadruple: to the People, an Attic mina of an hundred drachmas, or about three pounds four shillings and sevenpence a man §.

The soldiers who walked in these processions, in chanting their ballads and lampoons, took the usual petulant liberties with their leader, alluded to the disorders of his youth and to the crimes of his age; and shewed that they were not deceived by the professions which he made of a zeal for the liberties of

* Plut. in Cæs. Dio Cass. † About L. 10,000,000.
‡ The Roman pondo consisted of ten ounces, about L. 800,000.
§ Appian. Sueton.

the people. "If you observe the laws," [illegible] "you shall be punished; but if you boldly trans- "gress them all, a crown is your reward." These appearances of freedom in the troops, perhaps flattered the People with some image of the ancient familiarity of ranks which subsisted in times of the republic; but the licence of mere soldiers of fortune brings too often the reverse of freedom to the People; and in whatever degree the inhabitants of Rome were qualified to judge of their own situation, it is likely that the pageants, which now entertained them, were part of the means which Cæsar employed to reconcile them to his usurpation, and to divert their thoughts from the subversion of every privilege they had derived from their ancestors. Farther to secure these effects, he continued to multiply shows and public diversions. He himself, at the close of his triumphs, walked in procession to celebrate the opening of magnificent edifices he had built, and in his return at night from this ceremony, attended by multitudes of the People, was lighted by torches borne on elephants *. At the same time he erected theatres, and exhibited dramatic performances in different parts of the city, and amply indulged the taste of the populace for entertainments of every sort. He introduced not only gladiators to fight in single combat, but parties on foot and on horseback to engage in considerable numbers on opposite sides, and in respect to the actual effusion of blood, to furnish no mean representation of war. Among these, he

* Dio. Cass. Suetonius.

shewed the manner of fighting from elephants, having forty of these animals properly mounted, and the manner likewise of fighting at sea, having vessels on a piece of water which was formed for the purpose. In most of these battles, the parties engaged, being captives or malefactors otherwise condemned to die, but now armed against one another with promise of life to the victor, gave a serious exhibition of the utmost efforts they could make for mutual destruction.

Among the other articles of show and expence which composed the magnificence of these entertainments, are mentioned the blinds or awnings of silk, a material then of the highest price, which were spread over the public theatres to shade the spectators from the sun, and to enable them undisturbed, from under these delicate coverings, to enjoy the sights of bloodshed and horror which were presented before them. Two human sacrifices, we are told, were at the same time offered up in the field of Mars, by priests specially named for this service. Of this shocking exhibition, the historian does not explain the occasion *. The whole was attended by a feast, to which the People were invited, and at which twenty thousand benches or couches were placed for these numerous guests †. So great was the concourse from the country to this entertainment, that multitudes lay in the streets, or lodged in booths erected for the occasion. Many were trampled under foot, and killed in the crowds. Among those

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii, c. 24. † Plut. in Cæsar.

who perished in this manner, two Ro[illegible] are mentioned.

This method of gaining the people by flattering their disposition to dissipation and idleness, was already familiar at Rome. It had been employed under the republic in procuring favour, and in purchasing votes by those who aspired to the offices of state. It was now extended by Cæsar to effect the revolution he had in view, and to reconcile the populace of Rome, who had for some time governed the empire, to the loss of their political consequence, in being deprived of a power which they were indeed for a considerable period unworthy to hold. It is probable, that the arms of Cæsar were not more successful in subduing those who opposed him in the field, than these popular arts were in gaining the consent of his subjects to the dominion he was about to assume.

From this time forward, this successful adventurer took upon himself all the functions of government, and while he suffered the forms of a Senate and popular assemblies to remain, availed himself of their name and authority, without consulting with either, affixing, without their knowledge, and without scruple, the superscription of particular Senators to the decrees or edicts, which he sent abroad into the provinces*. "My name," says Cicero, "is often prefixed to public deeds which are sent abroad, "as having been moved or drawn up by me, and

* It is well known, that the Senatûs Consulta bore the names of the Senators by whom they were proposed.

" which come back from Armenia or Syria as mine, " before I have ever heard of them at Rome. Do " not imagine I am in jest; for I have letters from " persons, whose names I never heard of before, " thanking me for the honour I have done them in " bestowing the title of king *."

Equally absolute in the city as in the provinces, Cæsar placed whomsoever he thought proper on the rolls of the Senate; and, without regard to birth, declared some to be of Patrician rank. He recalled some who had been driven into exile for illegal practices, and reinstated in their ranks many whom the Censors had degraded †. In all the elections, he named half the magistrates, or in a mandate, addressed to the Tribes, took upon himself to direct the People whom they were to choose ‡. In the exercise of so much power, he became reserved and difficult of access, familiar only with persons whom he himself had raised, and who had talents amusing or serviceable, without any pretensions to alarm his

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* Ante audio Senatûs consultum in Armeniam et Syriam esse perlatum, quod in meam sententiam factum esse dicatur, quam omnino mentionem ullam de ea re esse factam. Atque hoc nolim me jocare putes, nam mihi scito jam, a regibus ultimis allatas esse literas, quibus mihi gratias agant, quod se mea sententia reges appellaverim; quos ego non modo reges appellatos, sed omnino natos nesciebam. Cicero ad Familiares, lib. ix, ep. 15.

† At this time, he with much difficulty was persuaded, at the intercession of the Senate, to permit the return of Caius Marcellus, who at Athens, on his way into Italy, was, upon motives which have not been explained, assassinated by one of his own attendants. This Marcellus was Consul, U. C. 703.

The words of Cæsar's mandate were, " Cæsar Dictator tribui, &c. &c. " commendo vobis illum, &c. &c. ut vestro suffragio suam dignitatem teneat." Sueton. in Cæs.

jealousy *. Nevertheless, if the Roma[illegible] overlooked what was offensive in his m[illegible] gal in the powers which he had thus u[illegible] of his acts were in themselves, as might have been expected from so able a personage, worthy of a great prince, and tending to reform abuses, as well as to facilitate the summary proceedings of the despotical power he had assumed.

Among the first acts of this reign, the law of Sylla, by which the children of the proscribed had been excluded from holding any office in the state, was repealed. The judiciary law, which had undergone so many alterations, and which, in its latest form, admitted some of the inferior class of the People † on the roll of the judges or jurymen, was now reformed, so as to limit the exercise of the judicature to the Senators and Knights. A scrutiny was made into the titles of those who had been in the practice to receive corn at the public granaries, and their numbers were greatly reduced ‡. Of the companies which had been multiplied for factious purposes, many were abolished, and the original corporations of the city alone were permitted to remain. Many

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* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. iv, ep. 9. Ib. lib. vi, ep. 14.

† The Tribuni Ærarii.

‡ The leaders of faction under the republic, and no one probably more than Cæsar himself, in order to increase the numbers of their partisans, had augmented this list, and it was undoubtedly become a great abuse. Dion Cassius says, it was at this time reduced by Cæsar to one-half. Suetonius specifies the numbers from three hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and *fifty* thousand. Plutarch and Appian state the reduction, so as to be understood of the numbers of the whole people in comparing the muster taken before the civil war with the one now made.

punishments, for the better restraining of crimes, were increased. To the ordinary punishment of murder, was joined the confiscation of the whole estate of the murderer; to that of some other crimes, the confiscation of one half. The kalendar was reformed upon the principles established by the Egyptian astronomers. The reckoning by lunar months, and the use of irregular intercalations, which had been frequently made for party and political purposes, had so deranged the terms, that the festivals to be observed by reapers did not happen in summer, or those of the vintage in autumn. To restore them therefore to their proper dates in the kalendar, no less than an intercalation of sixty-seven days, or above two months, was required. This intercalation was made in the present year, between the months of November and December, so that the name of December was transferred from the time of the autumnal Equinox, to that, where it still remains, of the winter solstice.

Under the government of Cæsar, from whom little severity of manners was to be expected, sumptuary laws were framed to restrain the expence of the table; and he himself expressed great zeal to correct the abuse which prevailed in this article. Being sensible that Italy was greatly depopulated by the distractions of the commonwealth, and by the devastations of the late civil war, he took measures to restore the numbers of the people, both by detaining the natives of Italy at home, and by inviting foreigners to settle. He gave premiums to those who had families, as if any premium could compen-

sate the want of that domestic security [illegible] which render the establishment of a fa[illegible] cipal charm of human life. This chara[illegible], his project of dominion was likely to mar[illegible] natural substitutes with him were pains and restraints; and of this kind, he ordered, that no citizen above twenty nor under ten, except belonging to the army, should remain out of Italy above three years at a time; and that the sons of Senators, except in the family or retinue of public officers, should not go abroad; that all landholders in Italy should employ no less than one-third freemen on their lands; that all practitioners of liberal arts, particularly foreign physicians settling at Rome, should be admitted on the rolls of the People; and at the same time he extended the privilege of Romans to whole cities and provinces in different parts of the empire *; by these means seeming to increase the number of citizens, or at least the number of those who were to bear this title. Sensible that he himself had become dangerous to the republic, by having his power as a provincial officer improperly prolonged, he took measures to prevent a similar danger to the government, of which he himself had now acquired the possession, limiting the duration of command in the provinces, if with the title of Proprætor, to one year, or with that of Proconsul, to two years; a regulation, in which he shewed how well he understood the nature of the ladder by which he himself had mounted to his present elevation, and how much

* Dio. Cass. Sueton. Appian.

he desired to withhold the use of it from any one else who might be disposed to tread in his steps, or to dispute his own continuance in the height he had gained.

While this successful adventurer, on a supposition that all government had devolved on himself, was providing for the security of his power, and on a supposition that he had no enemy left in the field, or that the remains of the adverse party in the provinces might be extinguished by his officers, was betaking himself to civil affairs and to popular arts, he had reports from Spain which convinced him, that his own presence might still be necessary to repress a party, which began in that country to resume its vigour under the sons of Pompey. He had sent Didius, with the fleet and army, from Sardinia, to secure the possession of Spain; but this service was found to be more difficult than was at first apprehended. He himself had, in appearance, upon the defeat of Afranius and Petreius, reduced this province; but many humours had broke out in it, while he was afterwards so much occupied in other parts of the empire. Even the troops of that country which had joined his standard, mutinied, or, during the uncertain state of his fortunes in Thessaly and Egypt, became refractory to the orders of his officers; and though, upon the death of Cassius Longinus, and the succession of Trebonius, their discipline was in appearance restored, yet consciousness of the heinous offence they had committed against the victor, made them doubt of his forgiveness; and joined with the inclination and respect which they yet en-

tertained for the family of his rival, de[illegible] to take part against him. They had o[illegible] correspondence with Scipio, while he [illegible] head of a powerful army in Africa, an[illegible] him to send a proper officer into Spain, to take the command of such forces as could be raised in the province.

The person sent for this purpose was the eldest of the two sons of Pompey, who, in his way, put into the island of Majorca, and was there detained by sickness, or remained some time in expectation that he might prevail on the natives to espouse his cause. The troops on the continent of Spain, in the mean time, even before the young Pompey arrived to take the command of them, had declared themselves openly against Cæsar, and erased his name from their bucklers. They obliged his lieutenant Trebonius to fly from their quarters, and owned T. Quintus Scapula and Q. Apronius for their generals.

In this posture of affairs young Pompey arrived in Spain, put himself at the head of this army, and either received or forced the submission of the principal towns. He was likewise strengthened by the accession of all the Roman settlers in the province who retained any zeal for the republic, and by the remains of former armies who had been levied by his father, especially such of that army which had served under Afranius on the Segra as were left in Spain; and by many officers of rank, who, having escaped from Thessaly or Africa upon the late calamities of their party, had taken refuge in this country. Among these, Labienus and Varus, with as many as

could be saved from the massacre at Thapsus, were assembling anew under the memorable, though unfortunate standard of Pompey. The two brothers, Cnæus and Sextus, were joined together; and supported by the name of their father, which was still in high veneration, had assembled thirteen legions. Among these were two legions of native Spaniards, who had deserted from Trebonius; one that was raised from the Roman colonists in Spain; and a fourth, which had arrived from Africa with the elder of the two brothers *.

Q. Fabius Maximus and Q. Pedius or Didius †, the officers of Cæsar, being unable to contend for possession of the province, remained on the defensive, and by the reports which they made to their commander, represented the necessity of his own presence for its entire recovery.

The continuance of the dictatorial power in Cæsar's person, had superseded the usual succession in the offices of State. Lepidus still remained in his station of general of horse; and, with a council of six or nine Præfects being left to command at Rome, Cæsar himself set out in the autumn for Spain. He ordered troops from Italy to reinforce those already employed in this service, and, in twenty-seven days after his departure from Rome, arrived at Saguntum ‡.

Upon the news of Cæsar's approach, Cnæus Pompeius had assembled all his force on the Bœtis, now

* Hirtius de Bell. Hisp. † Dio. Cass. ibid. c. 31.

‡ App. de Bell. Civil lib. ii, or, as Strabo writes, at Obulio, lib. iii, p. 160.

the Guadalquivir, posted his brother Sextus [illegible] proper garrison at Corduba, and himself encamped to reduce Ulia, a town which still held out against him in that neighbourhood. Cæsar's first object, upon his arrival in Spain, was to preserve this place from falling into the enemy's hands. For this purpose, he detached eleven cohorts under the command of L. Julius Paciæcus, with orders, if possible, to throw themselves into the town. The night, in which they marched for this purpose, being stormy and dark, they passed the first ports of the enemy unnoticed. But approaching the walls, they were challenged by the sentries there placed by the besiegers; and the officer who led the van of Cæsar's reinforcement, having answered in a low voice, that they were a detachment ordered by Pompey to the foot of the wall in search of some entry, by which, under the cover of the night, they might surprise the garrison, they were suffered to pass; and presenting themselves at one of the gates, upon a signal that had been agreed upon, they were admitted into the town.

While Cæsar thus reinforced the garrison of Ulia, he himself, to make a diversion in their favour, marched up to Corduba, cut off a party that had been sent from thence to observe his motions, and threatened the town with a siege. Sextus, who was in the place, being alarmed, sent pressing representations to his brother, who accordingly abandoned his lines before Ulia, and marched to his relief. Both armies encamped on the Guadalquivir *. The

* The Bœtis.

parties that were sent forward from each to scour the country, or to cover their respective quarters, were engaged in daily skirmishes. But the two brothers being in possession of the principal stations, and in condition to protract the war, continued to act on the defensive. Cæsar, on his part, made some movements in order to disconcert them, and to find, if possible, an opportunity of coming to action; but the country being hilly, and the towns generally built upon heights, every where furnished strong posts for the enemy, and prevented his making any progress. The winter at the same time approaching, exposed his army to considerable hardships, from a season which even there had severities, and from the scarcity of provisions. Under these disadvantages he undertook the siege of Allegua, and on the twentieth of February, after an obstinate resistance, obliged that town to surrender *.

C. J. Cæsar, Dict. 3tio. M. E. Lepidus. M. E. Coss. U. C. 708.

Our accounts of these operations, which are ascribed to Hirtius, and which, with his other performances, are annexed to Cæsar's Commentaries, being less perfect than other parts of the same collection, all we can distinctly learn from them is, that after a variety of different movements, which gave rise to frequent skirmishes, the armies, in the month of March, came to encamp in the plain of Munda, about five miles from each other; that Cæsar was about to leave his station, when, in the morning of his intended departure, he had intelligence, that the

* Hirtius de Bell. Hisp.

enemy had been under arms from the middle of the proceding night, and were meditating some attempt on his camp. This intelligence was followed by the sudden appearance of their army on some elevated grounds near the town of Munda; but as they still shewed no disposition on their part to enter the plain, Cæsar, after some hesitation, advanced to attack them on the heights.

In the army of Pompey, together with the flower of a warlike people, the natives of Spain, were assembled many veterans of the Roman legions, inured to blood; many Roman citizens of rank, now pushed to despair, or warned, by the fate of their party at Thapsus, not to expect safety from the mercy of a victorious enemy, and not to have any hopes but in their swords. Under these impressions, they waited for Cæsar's approach with a proper countenance, and on the first onset repulsed and put to flight the troops by whom they were attacked. In this extremity, Cæsar ran into the ranks of his own men, said, *they were delivering him over to boys;* laid hold of a sword and a shield, and calling out that *this then should be the last day of his life, and of their services,* took a place in the ranks as a mere legionary soldier. In this manner he renewed the action, and being reduced to the necessity of animating his men with the example of his own personal valour, committed his fortune and his life to the decision of a contest, in which he acted as a legionary soldier, and in which his ability as an officer could no longer have any share; but while the event was still in suspense, Bogud, an African, commanding a body

of horse in the service of Cæsar, having made an attempt to pierce into Pompey's camp, drew Labienus from his post in the field to cover it. This error *, committed by a veteran officer in the heat of action, turned the fortune of the day against himself. The troops, who till then valiantly sustained Cæsar's attack, believing that Labienus deserted them, instantly fled in disorder. The slaughter from thenceforward, turned, as usual, entirely against those who fled. Thirty thousand fell upon the field, and among them three thousand Roman citizens of high condition, with Labienus and Attius Varus at their head. Seventeen officers of rank were taken, and thirteen Roman eagles or legionary standards.

Cæsar acknowledged, that having on other occasions fought for victory, he had now been obliged to fight for his life. He had a thousand men killed, and five hundred wounded, before the enemy gave way. Part of the vanquished army retired into the town of Munda, part into the camp, and in their respective posts prepared to defend themselves to the last extremity. Cæsar on the approach of night took possession of all the avenues by which either might escape; and it is said that the troops he employed in this service, instead of traverses of earth or stone to obstruct the highways, raised up mounds from the bodies of the dead.

Early in the morning of the following day, Cæsar, having left the town of Munda in this manner block-

* It is obvious that he ought to have left the camp and all its contents to their fate, until the principal event was decided.

ed up or invested, set out for Corduba, which Sextus, the younger of the two Pompeys, upon the news of the battle, had already abandoned.

Cnæus, on seeing the rout of his own army, fled with a small party of horse on the road to Carteia *. Here he had collected most of his shipping and naval stores; but the news of his defeat having arrived before him, the people were divided in their inclinations. Part had already sent a deputation with an offer of their services to Cæsar; part still adhered to the family of Pompey; and from these opposite dispositions had proceeded to actual violence and bloodshed in the streets. Cnæus himself was wounded in one of their scuffles, and expecting no safety in a place in which so many of the inhabitants had declared against him, took ship, and put to sea with thirty galleys. He was pursued by Didius, who commanded Cæsar's squadron at Gades; and being obliged in a few days to stop for a supply of water, of which he had been ill provided at his sudden departure from Carteia, he was overtaken, most of his ships destroyed, and he himself obliged to seek for safety on shore. Soon after his landing, he dismissed his attendants, or was deserted by them; and encountering a party of the enemy, though weakened by his wounds and loss of blood, he continued with great valour to defend himself, until he was overpowered and slain. His head, according to the barbarous custom of the times, was sent to the conqueror, and exposed at Hispalis.

* Now Gibraltar.

In the preceding operations of the war every circumstance contributed to the fall of the republic, and to the success of Cæsar. In the very outset of the contest, half the nobility, ruined by prodigality and extravagance, had been desirous of anarchy and confusion. Citizens high in civil rank, and with fortunes entire, were generally glad to forego their political importance in exchange for ease and safety, under which to enjoy the pleasure of their villas or country retreats. Even the arms which should have protected the commonwealth, were in the hands of mere soldiers of fortune, who were inclined to favour that side from which they looked for the establishment of military government; they fought to procure great power and estates for themselves, not to preserve laws which gave the security of property and the superiority of wealth to others. Many of the Senators indeed perceived the impending ruin, and were prevailed upon to make some efforts for the preservation of the State, but on most occasions too hastily despaired of the cause. It was not thought honourable or safe for a citizen to survive his freedom. Upon this principle, the friends of the republic, in considerable numbers, while they escaped from their enemies, perished by their own hands.

Soon after the action at Munda, Scapula, one of the officers lately at the head of the republican party in Spain, turned the practice of suicide into a kind of farce. Having retired to Corduba from the field of battle, he ordered a magnificent pile of wood to be raised and covered with carpets; and having given an elegant entertainment, and distributed his

money among his attendants and servants, mounted to the top of this fabric, and while one servant pierced the master with his sword, another set fire to the pile. Thus the victories of Cæsar were completed even by his enemies; and while he made a fresh step to dominion at every encounter, they who opposed him went headlong, and abandoned their country to its ruin.

The province of Spain, under a proper conduct of its force and resources, if it had not been able to stop at once the career of Cæsar's victories, was surely sufficient to have given him more trouble than any other part of the empire. Its natives, brave, and addicted to war, were inferior to the Romans only in policy and discipline. They had been averse to the party of Cæsar, and would not, even in its highest prosperity, prefer it to the cause they had originally espoused. Being mixed with the remains of Roman armies which had been broken and dispersed in the field, they still maintained every place of defence against the conqueror, and, within the walls of cities to which they retired, defended themselves to the last extremity.

Cæsar, having been employed part of the spring and the following summer in subduing this scattered enemy, prepared to leave the province. He assembled the principal inhabitants at Hispalis; and having upbraided them with their animosity to himself and the Roman people, he put them in mind of his early connection with their country, as Quæstor and as Prætor, and of his repeated good offices in the qualities of Senator and Magistrate; having

made a proper establishment for the government of the province, he set out for Italy *, and arrived at Rome in October †. There, although it was contrary to the practice of former ages to admit of triumphs where the vanquished were fellow-citizens, he took a triumph for his late victory at Munda; and the more to amuse the people, who, whatever be the occasion, are captivated with such exhibitions, he appointed separate processions on the same account, to Q. Fabius Maximus, and to Didius, who had acted under him in that service.

These triumphs, over the supposed last defenders of the public liberty, and over the perishing remains of the family of Pompey, so long respected at Rome, instead of the festivity which they were intended to inspire, were attended with many signs of dejection. But none took upon him to censure, or was qualified to stem the torrent of servility by which all orders of men were carried. The same succession of games and entertainments were ordered as in the former year. The Senate and People, indeed, had no longer any concessions to be added to those already made to the conqueror, and it was difficult to refine on the language of adulation, which they had so amply employed in former decrees; but something to distinguish the present situation of affairs, to shew the

* Antony had set out from Rome to meet Cæsar, but to the great surprise and alarm of every body, returned unexpectedly to Rome. Cicero ad Att. xii, 18.

It was known afterwards, that Antony returned under the surprise of an order given by Cæsar, to oblige him to pay for houses, &c. bought at Pompey's sale. Cicer. Phil. ii, 29. Ibid. xxxi, 29.

† Velleius Paterculus.

ardour of some to pay their court, and to disguise the discontent and the sorrow of others, was thought necessary on the present occasion. A thanksgiving was appointed, and ordered to continue for fifty days. The anniversary of the twentieth of April, the day on which the news of the victory at Munda was received at Rome, was ordered to be for ever celebrated with games of the circus *. Even they who felt a secret indignation at the elevation of a single person to act as lord of the commonwealth, concurred, in appearance, with these resolutions in honour of Cæsar †. They flattered themselves, that they were hastening his ruin; that in such draughts the full cup was most likely to nauseate, and provocation, when carried to extreme, might possibly excite revenge in the spirits of free men, if any yet remained.

In the concessions which were made to Cæsar, whether suggested by his friends or by his enemies, there was no attempt to preserve any appearance of the republic, or to veil the present usurpation. The Senate, in presenting their several decrees, waited upon Cæsar in a body, as subjects to acknowledge their sovereign; were received by him on his chair of state, and in all the form of a royal ceremony, stretching forth his hand to each as they approached. While he carried the external show of his elevation to this height, Pontius Acquila, one of the Tribunes, being seated in the exercise of his office, had suffered him, in one of his processions, to pass without rising from his place. This he greatly resented. "Must

* Dio. Cassius. † Plutarch. in Cæs.

"I," he said to those who attended him, "resign the "government to this Tribune?" And for some days, in granting requests or petitions, he still affected to guard his answers ironically, by saying, "Provided "that Pontius Acquila will permit *." The Consulate was offered to him for ten years, but he declined it, as he destined this, with other titles of distinction, for the gratification of those who had served him in the war. He had assumed the title of Consul in his late triumph, but immediately after resigned it to Q. Fabius Maximus.

Such, from henceforward, was to be the manner of conferring honours under the monarchy of Rome. Hitherto, for some time back, families became noble in consequence of having had an ancestor admitted into the Senate, or in consequence of his having borne any of the higher offices of State, such as that of Consul or Prætor. And the descendants, instead of titles, recited the names of a father and grandfather who had been in these offices, and in place of ensigns armorial, erected in their halls the effigies or images of such ancestors. Cæsar, that he might have more frequent opportunities to gratify his retainers, paid no regard to the customary establishments of the Senate; increased its numbers at pleasure, inserting in the rolls such persons as were agreeable to himself, amounting in all to about nine hundred. For the same purpose, he augmented the number of Prætors to fourteen, and that of Questors to forty; and even, without requiring that his friends

* Sueton. in Cæs. c. 78.

should pass through these inferior offices; rewarded them at pleasure with the titular honours of Consular, Prætorian, Patrician, &c. *; and extended his munificence likewise to the provinces, by admitting aliens separately, or in collective bodies, to the privilege or appellation of Roman citizens.

In the midst of examples, which seemed to throw a ridicule on the ancient forms of the republic, as well as to substitute a military government in their stead, Cæsar was pleased to name himself, together with Mark Antony, as Consuls for the following year. This compliment paid to the civil establishment, by condescending to bear the name of legal office, though very illegally assumed, flattered the citizens with hopes that he meant to govern under some form of a republic †. Nothing, however, followed to gratify these hopes; the state which he affected, his dress, his laurel wreath, the very colour and height of his buskins, which was noticed, the seal which he chose to make use of, being the impression of a Venus armed, in ostentation of his supposed celestial extraction; the numerous guards and retinue, exceeding two thousand men, with which he was constantly attended ‡; the satisfaction with which he seemed to receive the forced servility of those whom his sword had subdued, betrayed a mind which, though possessed of real superiority, had not sufficient elevation to disdain the false appearance of greatness.

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* Dio. Cass. lib. xlii, c. 47. † Appian.
‡ Cicer. ad Att. lib. xiii, ep. 52.

On the last day of the year, Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been a few months Consul, died before he had vacated the office; and about noon of the same day, Cæsar, who had assembled the Tribes, ordered them to take the form of the centuries, and to elect Caninius Consul for the remainder of the year, which was only part of a day. Plutarch says, That Cicero exhorted the People to be speedy in paying their court to this new Consul: "for this magistrate, he "said, may be out of office, before we can reach "him." * And Cicero himself, referring to this farcical election, writes in a letter to one of his friends, "We have had a Consulate, during which no one ei-"ther ate or drank, and yet nothing extraordinary "happened; for so great was the vigilance of this "magistrate, that he never slept all the time he was "in office. You may laugh at these things," he says; "but if you were here, you would cry *."

On the following day, Cæsar, with all the powers and ensigns of Dictator, took possession of the Consulate in conjunction with Antony. He intended, after having held this title for a few days in his own person, to resign it in favour of Dolabella, though a young man, still far short of the legal age. The execution of this intention, however, was some time delayed, at

U. C. 709. C. J. Cæsar, Dict. 4to, M. E. Lepidus, M. E. C. Octavius, Mag. Eq. Cn. Domitius Calvinus in sequentem annum designatus non iniit.

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. vii. ep. 30. Ita Caninio Consule scito, neminem prandisse. Nihil tamen eo Consule mali factum est. Fuit enim mirifica vigilantia qui toto suo Consulatu somnum non viderit. Hæc tibi ridicula videntur, non enim ades. Quæ si videris lachrymas non teneres.

the request of Mark Antony, who, being jealous of Dolabella, endeavoured to obstruct his preferment.

Cæsar, now uniting in his own person all the powers of the State, whether of legislation or magistracy, passed the winter in forming projects to embellish the capital, and aggrandise the empire; and among regulations for the better government of the city, besides the sumptuary laws formerly mentioned, and now revived, respecting expence of the table, we read of his prohibiting the use of litters, of purple, and of pearls, except to persons of a certain rank, and to them only at great festivals, and on remarkable occasions. For the better execution of his regulations respecting the table, he appointed inspectors, with orders to seize all illicit articles of provision; and if any thing of this sort were known to escape in the markets, he sent officers to seize them from the very tables on which they were served. And to check the luxury of the times in other articles, he imposed duties on the importation of foreign commodities.

Under the ordinary pretence, that the laws were become too voluminous, he ordered them to be digested into a code, with a view to simplify and to reduce them into a narrower compass; in this measure attempting a reformation which mankind, in certain situations, generally wish for, but which no individual can accomplish without the exercise, and the strongest temptations to extend and to perpetuate, in himself, the possession of absolute power.

In the same spirit of despotical government, with which Cæsar abridged the laws, he acted at once as

legislator and judge. As an instance of his severity in the latter capacity, it is mentioned, that he annulled a marriage, because it had been contracted no more than two days after the woman had parted from a former husband; and, what is more characteristic of his dangerous usurpations, that citizens were degraded, or Senators expelled, at his discretion.

His mind, at the same time, entertained projects of great variety and extent. To drain the Pontine or great marshes, which rendered the air so unhealthy, and so much land unserviceable in the neighbourhood of Rome; to cut across the isthmus of Corinth, to erect moles, and form harbours on the coast of Italy; to make highways across the Apennines; to build a new theatre that should surpass that of Pompey; to erect public libraries, and make a navigable canal from the Anio and the Tiber to the sea at Teracina; to build a magnificent temple to Mars. These projects are justly mentioned as meritorious in the sovereign of a great empire; and it must be confessed, that the love of dominion would be but a wretched passion, if there were not something of this sort to be done after the toils of ambition were over.

The measure which of all others contributed most to the honour of Cæsar, did we suppose him entitled to punish those who opposed him, was the general indemnity which he granted. Some he even employed in the administration of government, and promoted in the State. He placed Caius Cassius and Marcus Brutus, in particular, for this year, on the list of Prætors, and intrusted them with the high-

er jurisdiction of the city. To the widows of many who died in the field against himself he restored their portions, and to the children gave part of their patrimony *. He replaced the statues of Sylla and of Pompey, which the populace, in flattery to himself, had thrown down; "and by this means," says Cicero, "he the more firmly established his own."

It appeared, on many occasions, that Cæsar meant to contrast his own conduct with that of Sylla †; his own clemency with the bloody executions performed by the other. The comparison, no doubt, is obvious, or must occur to every person who reads their story. Sylla had been excited, by extreme provocations, to turn his arms against a party in possession of the capital, and he drew his sword to punish injuries done no less to the republic, and to its most respectable members, than to himself. While he was master of the State, he acted like a person who did not care how odious he rendered despotical power, for he did not mean to retain it. But he mixed, with the resentment of a personal enemy, the high views of a noble citizen, who proposed to reform the State by clearing it of many corrupted and dangerous subjects. When he had accomplished this purpose, he disdained the pageantry of high station, was above receiving the adulation which proceeds from servility, or wishing to enjoy a con-

* Sueton. Dio. lib. xli.i.

† Quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victoriam diutius tenere, præter unum L. Syllam quem imitaturus non sum. Hæc nova sit ratio vincendi, ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus. Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix, ep. 7.

tinual precedence in the management of affairs, which requires no extraordinary compass of mind. Embarked by fortune on a tempestuous sea, when he had conducted the vessel into port, he quitted the helm; and after having been master, was not afraid to place himself among his countrymen as a fellow-citizen; and in this state of equality his greatness of mind secured to him a distinction, which no degree of precedency, and no measure of prerogative, could have bestowed.

To this character, that of Cæsar, in many particulars, may be fairly considered as a contrast. He himself had stirred up the disorders which produced the civil war in which he engaged. He had no injuries either public or private to resent; his affected clemency, in sparing a few captives, in the beginning or in the course of his operations, was belied by the wantonness with which he entered on a war, in which the blood of many thousands of his fellow-citizens was to be unnecessarily shed *. If he had

* It is said that 400,000 Romans perished in this contest.——If the author has been formerly censured for giving to Sylla too much credit for his resignation; in this comparison with Cæsar the meaning cannot be misunderstood. The steps of Sylla, in wading (as the Poet expresses himself *) through slaughter, were horrid: but his resignation shewed, that they were not made to come at a throne, and may have been made in execution of public justice. But Cæsar had no pretence to justice; and for his clemency, there is a degree of idiotism in applying the term to him after his massacre in Gaul, for the subjugation of an innocent people; or rather for the nurture of an army in blood, that he might employ them afterwards in terrifying and enslaving his own country.

* ——————— *nor circumscribed alone*
Their growing virtues, but their crimes confined:
Forbad to wade through slaughter to a throne,
And shut the gates of mercy on mankind.

GRAY's Elegy, in a Country Church-yard

been reluctant in the shedding of blood, his mercy would have appeared, in avoiding so destructive a contest, not in ostentatiously sparing a few of the many whose lives his lust of dominion had wantonly brought into hazard. His clemency should have appeared at the Rubicon, not at Corfinium; in leaving his country to enjoy its liberties, not merely in sparing those whom no man in his senses would destroy, a people who were willing to submit, and whom he desired to govern.

Cæsar used to ridicule the resignation of Sylla as an act of imbecility *; and he himself indeed, even after all occasion of great exertion was over, seemed to enjoy that pre-eminence which the other disdained. The degree of vanity which he is said to have indulged in accepting the frivolous honours which were now conferred upon him by acts of the Senate, is indeed scarcely to be credited. Among these have already been mentioned a decree, that he should have precedency of all magistrates, and the privilege of being always dressed in the triumphal robes; of having a gilded chair of state, and a place of distinction at all the public games; that he should be allowed to deposite a suit of armour in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, an honour appropriated to those who, like Romulus, had killed, with their own hands, a leader of the enemy; that his lictors should have their fasces always bound with laurel; that he himself, in coming from the Latin festivals, should enter the city on

* Syllam nescisse literas qui dictaturam deposuerit. Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. lib. lxxvii.

horseback; that he should have the title of Father of his Country, and be so designed on the coins; that the anniversary of his birth-day should be kept as a festival; that statues should be erected to him in all the towns of Italy, and in the temples of the city; that the statues, without any consideration of his title to these honours, should be adorned with the civic and obsidionary crowns; the first a badge worn only by those who had saved a fellow-citizen in battle, the second by those who had delivered the city itself from a siege *.

The senate and people observing, that these distinctions were agreeable to Cæsar, subjoined, that his robe should be cut in imitation of that of the ancient kings of Rome; that he should have an escort of knights and senators; that it should be permitted to swear by his destiny; that all his decrees without exception, should be ratified; that, at the end of five years, a festival should be held in honour of him, as of a person of divine extraction; that an additional college of priests should be established to perform the rites which were instituted for that occasion; that in all gladiatorian sports, whether at Rome or in the provincial towns, one day should be dedicated to him; that a crown of gold, set with gems, like those of the gods, should be carried before him into the Circus, attended with a thensus or car like that on which the idols of the gods were carried in procession; that he should have the title of Julian Jove, have a temple erected for himself, in conjunc-

* Dio. Cass. lib. lxiv, c. 4.

tion with the Goddess of Clemency; and, to complete the ridicule of these institutions, that Mark Antony should be appointed the priest of this sacred fane *.

From these particulars, which, to characterize the ambition of the person to whom they refer, and the manners of the age, are selected from those mentioned by the original historian †, it was no longer to be doubted, that Cæsar wished to establish a monarchy on the ruins of the republic. He himself is said to have betrayed an arrogance unworthy of a great mind; and to have been so unguarded in his expressions, as to say, That the republic was but a name; that his words should be carefully observed, for that he meant every word should have the force of a law.

To so much affectation of a kingly state, joined to the possession of absolute power, nothing was wanting but the title of King. This Cæsar himself evidently appeared to have the vanity to desire. His retainers and flatterers, on different occasions, endeavoured to surprise the people into a concession of royalty; but notwithstanding the powers of Sovereign, which he exercised without control, and the honours of divinity, which were decreed to him by general consent, his influence was not sufficient to reconcile the Roman people to the name of King. One of his emissaries, willing to suggest the propriety of bestowing this title, or to insinuate Cæsar's purpose of assuming it, had bound the head of one

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliv, c. 6. † Dio. Cass. lib. xliv. c. 6.

of his statues with a royal fillet, Marullus and Cæsetius, two of the Tribunes in office, affecting great zeal for the honour of Cæsar, as well as for the majesty of the Roman State, made inquiry after the author of an insinuation so derogatory to both; and receiving information of the guilty person, in order to check such attempts for the future, sent him to prison. This officious interposition of the Tribunes, though pretending to vindicate Cæsar himself from so odious an imputation, he received with marks of displeasure; and hearing these officers extolled, under the appellation of *Bruti*, as the champions of the public freedom, "Brutes indeed," he said they were; but took no further notice of the matter.

Soon after this incident, some one, or a few in the assembly of the people, saluted him with the title of King. But on hearing, instead of acclamations, a general murmur of dislike, he silenced this unseasonable piece of flattery, saying, That his name was *Cæsar*, and not *King*. Here too the Tribunes again interposed, and raised prosecutions against the authors of such treasonable expressions. But in this instance Cæsar lost his patience, and complained in the senate, that factious men, under the pretence of discharging the public office of magistracy, propagated insinuations injurious to his character, and tending to alarm the people with false apprehensions. Such offences, he said, merit capital punishment; but he should be satisfied with degradation from their office. This sentence accordingly the senate made haste to pronounce; and from thenceforward it was not doubted, that Cæsar, though

indirectly, aspired to the title, as well as the power of a monarch.

This opinion was still further confirmed, when, on the sixteenth of February *, at the *Lupercalia*, (a festival, which being continued down from barbarous ages, served as a monument of primæval rudeness, rather than simplicity), the same piece of flattery, in making tender of a crown, was renewed by Mark Antony, then in the office of Consul, and the chief confident of Cæsar.

It was the custom in this festival of the Lupercalia, for the first officers of State, and the first of the nobles, to present themselves naked in the streets, carrying thongs of undressed hide, with which they ran through the crowd, and struck at those who happened to be placed within their reach. The stroke was thought a remedy, in particular, for barrenness in women; and numbers of this sex accordingly crowded in the way to receive it.

In the ceremony now to be performed, Mark Antony bore his part as Consul; and Cæsar sat on his gilded chair of state, in his triumphal robes, to behold the spectacle. Antony stopped before him, and presented him with a royal crown, saying, "This crown the Roman people confer upon Cæsar "by my hands." A few of the spectators seemed to applaud; but Cæsar, perceiving that the people in general, by their silence, gave signs of displeasure, pushed away the crown with his hand; and upon this action received from the people, by

* Cicer. Philip. ii, c. 34.

universal shout of applause, an unquestionable explanation of their former silence.

To try the effect of a moderation which was so much applauded, Antony threw himself upon the ground at Cæsar's feet, repeated his offer of the crown, and hoped that the people might join him in pressing the acceptance of what was so modestly refused; but in this with no better success than in the former attempt.

That the merit of this refusal, however, might not be forgotten, or that the offer might be held equal to the actual investiture of the crown, an entry was made in the Fasti or public records, by the directions of Antony, bearing, "That the Consul, having, by the order of the Roman people, presented a crown, and offered to confer the majesty of King on Caius Julius Cæsar, perpetual dictator, he had declined to receive it *."

The Roman republic had, for some time, subsisted in a very disorderly state; citizens having dominion over many other nations, scarcely admitted any species of government among themselves. The inhabitants of Rome, assuming the prerogatives of a collective body, of which the members now not only extended over all Italy, but were dispersed throughout the empire, generally assembled in tumults, whose proceedings, at every convulsion, nothing but force could regulate or control; accordingly, the immediate prospect was that of a government of force, either in the hands of a multitude that could not be resisted,

* Cicer. Philip. ii, c. 34.

or in the hands of those by whom such disorders had been suppressed. All who wished to preserve the republic, endeavoured to extend the ordinary prerogatives of the Senate, and to prevent as much as possible, these ill-constituted assemblies of the People from deliberating on matters of State; and it might, no doubt, have been still better for the empire, if the spirit of legal monarchy could at once have been infused into every part of the commonwealth; or if, without further pangs or convulsions, the authority of a Prince, tempered with that of a Senate, had been firmly established. But men do not at once change their habits and opinions, nor yield their own pretensions upon speculative notions of what is suited to the state of their age or country. Cæsar aspired to dominion in order to gratify his personal vanity, not to correct the political errors of the times; and his contemporaries, born to the rights of citizens, still contended for personal independence and equal pretension to power, however impossible it might be for the future to preserve any species of republic among such a people, or at the head of such an empire.

Ever since the expulsion of Tarquin, the name of King had been odious at Rome. The most popular citizens, as soon as they became suspected of aspiring to kingly power, became objects of aversion [illegible] were marked out as a butt to the detestation of [illegible] country. Thus fell Manlius Capitolinus, the Gra[illegible] Apuleius, and others who were loaded with thi[illegible] putation.

The Romans, accustomed to see vanquished kings the sport of popular insolence, led in triumph, put to death, or, if suffered to live, made to languish in obscurity and neglect;—accustomed to see kings, who were their own allies, submitting their cause to the judgment of the Roman People, or even in the streets of Rome, suing for favour, considered monarchy itself as an appurtenance of servility and barbarism; and the project to give a king to the Romans as an attempt to degrade them into barbarians and slaves.

The maxim, which forbids assassination, even of usurpers, in every case whatever, is the result of prudent reflection, and has a tendency to allay the jealousy, and to mitigate the cruelty of persons, who, by violent measures, which laws cannot restrain, may have incurred the resentment of mankind. Even tyrants, it is supposed, are cruel from fear, and become merciful in proportion as they believe themselves safe. It were unwise, therefore, to entertain any maxim which would keep the powerful in a continual state of distrust and alarm, or ever ready to stain the sword which they wield with blood. This prudential morality, however, was entirely unknown in the ancient republics, or could not be observed, without surrendering the freedom for which their citizens were taught to contend. Amongst them the People were obliged to consider, not what was safe, but what was necessary; and could not always defend themselves against usurpations, neither by legal forms, nor by open war. It was thought allowable, therefore, to employ artifice, surprise, and

secret conspiracy, against an usurper; [illegible] so much the case at Rome, that no name [illegible] in greater veneration, than those of citizens [illegible] assassinated persons suspected of views [illegible] to the commonwealth; or who, by any means [illegible] ever, rendered abortive the project of aspiring [illegible] who attempted to arm any party against the legal constitution of their country.

Cæsar, having attempted to join the title of King with the powers of perpetual Dictator, had reason to distrust a People who were actuated by such apprehensions. He was to an uncommon degree the object of private as well as of public resentment, having usurped the government over those whom he had cruelly injured; over the fathers, the brothers, and sons of those who had fallen by his sword. He accordingly, for some time, took the precaution to have a military guard attending his person; but, grown familiar with those he had offended, inured to adulation, and secure in his own personal courage, he dropt this precaution, and began to reign with the confidence of a lawful monarch. Although he had incurred so much resentment, he disdained to stand in awe of it, and ventured to join the confidence of innocence with the highest measures of guilt. This conduct indeed was uncommon, and the effect of a daring courage, though scarcely consistent with the penetration and masterly skill which he had hitherto conducted his affairs. [illegible] serve to confirm, what has already been ob[illegible] that, among the many accomplishments whi[illegible] sar possessed, and together with the abilities w[illegible]

rendered him superior to every direct opposition, he was actuated by a vanity which bordered on weakness. Misled, perhaps, by this passion, he persisted in his emulation to the glory of Sylla, and would shew to the world, that he who had not resigned his power could walk the streets of Rome, unattended, with as much safety as the other, who had had the magnanimity to restore the constitution of his country; joined to this weakness, he had too mean an opinion of those who composed the commonwealth, greatly sunk indeed in their political character, but not fallen into that state of personal weakness, which his security and contempt of their resentment seemed to imply.

Still many citizens of noble extraction were found, who thought that their former condition as members of the republic might be recovered. Some had been stunned with their fall, but not quite overwhelmed; others, who, on specious pretences, had even assisted in obtaining the victories of Cæsar, detested the monarchy to which those victories led. In the first period of the civil war many imagined, that the contest was to end in substituting one party for another, not in the entire subversion of the republican government; and they were inclined, as soon as fortune should declare in favour of either party, though adverse, to be reconciled with those that prevailed *. But when it evidently appeared, that Cæsar, by suppressing the last remains of opposition to himself in every part of the empire, meant to es-

* Cicero ad Familiar.

tablish a monarchy in his own person, a secret indignation filled the breasts of all those who, upon a foot of family consequence, or personal ability, had any pretensions to political importance. To such persons the dominion of an equal appeared insufferable. Many of them, in conferring the extravagant honours which had been decreed to Cæsar, affected servility as the mask of a sullen displeasure, which, conscious of a tendency to betray itself, took the disguise of an opposite extreme.

The question respecting the expedience of monarchical government, did not enter into the deliberations of any one. If it had been urged, that a King was necessary; it would have been asked, Who gave the right to Cæsar? If the People in general were corrupt; did the bankrupts, and outlaws, and soldiers of fortune, who formed the court of Cæsar, deserve a better name? If the great, the able, and experienced citizens, who were qualified to support the republic, were now no more, by whose sword had they perished? or if the republic, by the disorders which prevailed in it, was ripe for destruction, who had been through life the most distinguished promoter of those disorders? If the corrupt arts, the treasons, the murders, encouraged or even executed by Cæsar, had made a change of government necessary, the first act of that government, for the instruction of mankind, c to have been to punish the author of so many ders and crimes, not to reward him with a cro

Many of Cæsar's officers, and the nearest person, were as much in this mind as any othe

zens; and on this supposition, so familiar was the thought of proceeding to the last extremities against him, that, when Antony came to meet Cæsar on his return from Spain, Trebonius ventured to sound his inclinations respecting a design on Cæsar's life, as a person under whom the republic was no longer safe *. Although Antony did not adopt the measure, he did not betray Trebonius, nor did he appear to be surprised at the proposal. It was afterwards suggested, that Antony should be invited to a share in the conspiracy which soon after broke out; and the proposal was dropt only on account of the refusal which he had already given to Trebonius; so readily was it believed, that every noble Roman would rather share in the government of his country, as an independent citizen, than as a retainer to the most successful usurper.

It is well known, that a conspiracy accordingly was, at this time, forming against the life of Cæsar, although the first steps and the consultations of the parties are no where minutely recorded. The principal authors of it were Caius Cassius and Marcus Brutus, then Prætors in the city; Decimus Brutus and Trebonius, who had both served in high ranks under Cæsar himself, and of whom the first was destined by him to the command in Cisalpine Gaul, and to the Consulate in the following year.

Of these Caius Cassius was early noted for a high and impetuous spirit. It is observed, that, being a boy when Sylla was at the height of his power, he

* Cicer. Philip. ii, c. 14.

struck the son of the *Dictator* for having [illegible] his father was the master of the Roman People. The tutor of young Sylla having [illegible] complaint to Pompey, the boys were called, and questioned on the subject of their quarrel, "Do but repeat your words again," said Cassius;" "and in this presence I will strike you." He had distinguished himself in Syria by collecting the remains of the unfortunate army of Crassus, with which he repelled the attempt of the Parthians to invade that province. He followed Pompey in the civil war, and commanded a squadron of the fleet on the coast of Sicily at the time of the battle of Pharsalia. From thence he sailed for the coast of Asia, and waited for the victor, when he was expected to arrive from Alexandria, professing his intention to drop all further opposition against him, but with a secret design, according to Cicero, to have put Cæsar to death, if he had not debarked on a different side of the Cydnus from that on which Cassius had taken his station to receive him *.

Marcus Brutus was the nephew of Cato by his sister Servilia; and so much a favourite of Cæsar, who was said to have had an intrigue with his mother, that he was by some supposed to be his son. The father of Brutus, in the civil wars of Sylla, had been on the side of Marius, and having fallen into Pompey's hands, was by him put to death. [illegible] son retained so much resentment on this acc[illegible] that he never accosted or saluted Pompey till

* Cicer. Philip. ii, c. 11.

the civil war broke out; when, thinking it necessary to sacrifice all private considerations to the public cause, he joined him in Macedonia, and was received with great marks of distinction. This young man, either on account of his uncle Cato, or on account of the expectations generally entertained of himself, was by all parties held in high consideration. Being taken prisoner at the battle of Pharsalia, he was not only spared by the victor, but sent into the province of Cisalpine Gaul with the title of Governor; where, during the war in Africa against Scipio and the king of Numidia, he remained, perhaps, rather under safe custody than high in the confidence of Cæsar. He was in this year, together with Caius Cassius, who had married his sister, promoted to the dignity of Prætor; and though of less standing than Cassius, had the precedence, by a supposed partiality of the person who now disposed of all preferments and honours in the commonwealth. This circumstance was supposed, at the time that Brutus and Cassius were actually framing their conspiracy, to have occasioned a breach between them, and possibly helped to blind those who ought to have kept a watchful eye on their motions.

Cassius is reputed to have been the prime mover in the design against Cæsar's life; and to have been the author of anonymous calls to vindicate the freedom of Rome, which were posted up, or dropt in public places; and which, from the prevailing spirit of discontent, found a ready acceptance. Labels were hung upon the statues of the ancient Brutus, and billets were dropt, in the night, upon the

judgment-seat of the Prætor of this [illegible] him to imitate his ancestors, by re[illegible] lic; "You sleep, you are not Brutus:" [illegible] statues of his supposed ancestor, the [illegible], was written, "Would you were alive! These expressions of a secret disaffection, and prognostics of some violent design, either escaped the attention of Cæsar, or were despised by him; but were easily understood by persons who looked for a deliverance from the indignities to which they felt themselves exposed. While Cassius and Marcus Brutus entered into a formal concert on this subject, numbers pined under the want of that consideration to which they thought themselves born; many were provoked by particular instances of vanity or arrogance in the present Dictator*; and upon the least hint of a design against him, were ready to join. "I am sorry "you should be ill at so critical a time," said Brutus to Legarius. "I am not ill," said the other, "if you have any intentions worthy of yourself†."

Great numbers daily acceded to the plot; of whom

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* Cæsar had, about this time, a visit from the queen of Egypt, who lived with him at his gardens on the Tiber (Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xiv). Many who overlooked his usurpation, and the violence he did to the constitution of his country, were scandalized at the intimacy in which he lived with a strange woman. Being accustomed to the distinctions of a court, and considering Cæsar as the monarch, she treated the citizens, who were still admitted to him [illegible] of equality, as dependents and subjects. He himself, with all his state, lite. As an apology for having made Cicero wait too long in his a ber, he accosted him, with saying, "How can I hope to be tolerated, v "Marcus Tullius Cicero is made to wait? If any one could forgive it, I "but the world must detest me." Cleopatra, it is probable, made no logy when she gave cause to complain of her arrogance.

† Sueton. in Cæsare.

the following, besides Brutus and Cassius, are the principal names upon record: Cæcilius and Bucolianus, two brothers, Rubrius Rex, Q. Legarius, M. Spurius, Servilius Galba, Sextius Naso, Pontius Aquila. These had ever been on the side of the Senate, or in the last conflict adherents of Pompey. The following had acted in the war under Cæsar himself: Decimus Brutus, C. Casca, Trebonius, Tullius Cimber, Minucius, and Basilus *; they are said, in all, to have amounted to sixty †. Cicero was known to detest the usurpation of Cæsar; to mourn over the fall of the commonwealth, over the humiliation of the Senate, and the diminution of his own political importance; but he was not consulted in this design. The authors of it relied on his support, in case they should be successful; but they knew too well his ingenuity in suggesting scruples and difficulties, to bring him into their previous deliberations on so arduous an enterprise.

The conspirators, in forming their project, generally sounded the minds of persons before they made any formal or direct proposal. Thus, Brutus being in company with Statilius, Favonius, and Labio, proposed, among other problematical questions, some doubts concerning the expediency of assassinating tyrants. Favonius observed, that such actions led to civil war, and that this was worse than mere usurpation. Statilius said, that no wise man would engage in so hazardous an enterprise to restore the government of knaves and fools, then calling them-

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. † Sueton. in Cæsare.

selves the republic of Rome. Labio contended warmly with both; and Brutus changing the subject, thought no more of Statilius or Favonius, but in private communicated the design to Labio, by whom it was immediately embraced.

As so many were concerned, and as they remained some time undetermined in the choice of a time and place for the execution of their purpose, it is singular that the conspiracy should have come to such a height undiscovered. But Cæsar did not encourage informers; his great courage preserved him from the jealousies by which others in less dangerous situations are guided. He trusted to his popularity, to his munificence, to the professions of submission which were made to him, and to the interest which he supposed many to have in the preservation of his life. He had not only dismissed the guards, which at his return to Rome had attended him, and was commonly preceded only by his Lictors and the usual retinue of his civil rank; but had suffered the veterans to disperse on the lands which had been assigned to them, and unfurnished Italy of troops, having transported the greater part of the army into Macedonia, reserving only a small body under Lepidus in the suburbs of Rome. His own mind, though pleased with the appearances, as well as the reality of greatness, it is probable, was well nigh satiated with the pageantry of state. His thoughts vacant and languid in the possession of a st which he had struggled through so much and his active spirit still urged him to extens

jects of conquest *. He accordingly planned a series of wars, which were not likely to end but with his life. He was to begin with revenging the death of Crassus, and reducing the Parthians. He was next to pass by Hyrcania and the coasts of the Caspian Sea into Scythia; from thence, by the shores of the Euxine Sea into Sarmatia, Dacia, or by the Danube into Germany; and from thence, by his own late acquisitions in Gaul, to return into Italy †; for this purpose, he had already sent forward into Macedonia seventeen legions and ten thousand horse ‡.

As this sovereign of the empire, whatever may have been the extent of his projects, was likely to be employed some time in the execution of them, he thought proper to anticipate the election of magistrates at Rome, and to arrange, before his departure, the whole succession to office for some years. Dion Cassius says, that his arrangement was made for three years; Appian, for five years. It is certain that he fixed the succession to office for at least two subsequent years. Hirtius and Pansa were destined to the Consulate in the first; Decimus Brutus and Plancus, in the second §. He continued to increase the number of magistrates, that he might have the more opportunities to gratify his retainers and friends. The Quæstors, as has been mentioned, he augmented to forty, the Ædiles to six, the Prætors now to sixteen. Among the latter he named

* Dio. Cass. Appian. Plutarch. † Plutarch. in Cæsare.
‡ Appian. de Bel. Civil. lib. ii. § Cicero ad Attic. lib. xiv, ep. 6.

Ventidius, a native of Picenum, who had been taken and led in triumph, while the people of that district, with the other Italians, in support of their claim to be enrolled as citizens, were at war with Rome. Ventidius had subsisted by letting mules and carriages. In the pursuit of this business he had followed the army of Cæsar into Gaul; and becoming known to the general, was gradually trusted and advanced by him. His career of preferment continued up to the dignity of Consul, and he himself, as has been formerly observed, came at last to lead, in the capacity of a victorious general, a procession of the same kind with that in which he had made his first entry at Rome as a captive.

This arrangement, in which Cæsar, by anticipating the nomination of magistrates, precluded the citizens from the usual exercise of their rights of election, made the subversion of the republic more felt than any of the former acts of his power, and gave the leaders of the conspiracy a great advantage against him. The prospect of his approaching departure from Rome, which was fixed for the month of March, urged the speedy execution of their purpose. The report of a response or prediction, which some of the flatterers of Cæsar had procured from the College of Augurs, bearing, that the Parthians were not to be subdued but by a king *, appeared to be the pre-
lude of a fresh motion to vest him, in his intended
expedition to the east, with the title, and v
ensigns of royalty, to be borne, if not in the

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliv, c. 15.

least in the provinces *, in order to qualify him, in terms of the supposed prophecy, to become the conqueror of Parthia.

A meeting of the Senate being already summoned, for the Ides, or fifteenth of March, the proposal to bestow on Cæsar the title of King, as a qualification for his intended enterprise, was expected to be the principal business of the assembly. This circumstance determined the conspirators in the choice of a place for the execution of their design. They had formerly deliberated, whether to pitch upon the Campus Martius, and to strike their blow in the presence of the Roman People assembled, or in the entry to the theatre, or in a street through which Cæsar often passed in the way to his own house †. But this meeting of the Senate seemed now to present the most convenient place, and the most favourable opportunity. The presence of the Senate, it was supposed, would render the action of the conspirators sufficiently awful and solemn; the common cause would be instantly acknowledged by all the members of that body; and the execution, the moment it was done, would be justified under their authority. Although some might be disposed to resist, they were not likely to be armed; and the affair might be ended by the death of Cæsar alone, or without any effusion of blood beyond that which was originally intended.

It was at first proposed that Antony, being likely to carry on the same military usurpations which Cæsar had begun, should be taken off at the same time;

* Zonaras, lib. x, c. 14. † Sueton. in Cæsare.

but this was overruled. It was supposed that Antony, and every other Senator or citizen, would readily embrace the state of independence and personal consideration which was to be offered to them; or if they should not embrace it, they would not be of sufficient numbers or credit to distress the republic, or to overset the balance of parties in which the freedom of the whole consisted. It was supposed that the moment Cæsar fell, there would not be any one left to covet or to support an usurpation which had been so fatal to him. "If we do any thing more "than is necessary to set the Romans at liberty," said Marcus Brutus, "we shall be thought to act "from private resentment, and to intend restoring "the party of Pompey, not the republic."

The intended assembly of the Senate was to be held in one of the compartments of Pompey's theatre, fitted up for this purpose. It was determined by the conspirators, that they should repair to this meeting, as usual, either separately, or together in the retinue of the Consuls and Prætors; and that being armed with concealed weapons, they should proceed to the execution of their purpose as soon as Cæsar had taken his seat. To guard against any disturbance or tumult that might arise to frustrate their intentions, Decimus Brutus, who was master of a troop of gladiators, undertook to have this troop, under pretence of exhibiting some combats on that day to the People, posted in the theatre, and ready at his command for any service *.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliv, c. 15.

During the interval of suspense which preceded the meeting of the Senate, although in public Marcus Brutus seemed to perform all the duties of his station with an unaltered countenance; at home he was less guarded, and frequently appeared to have something uncommon on his mind. His wife Porcia suspected that some arduous design respecting the State was in agitation; and when she questioned him, was confirmed in this apprehension, by his eluding her inquiries. Thinking herself, by her extraction and by her alliance, entitled to confidence, she bore this appearance of distrust with impatience; and, under the idea that the secret which was withheld from her, must be such as, upon any suspicion, might occasion the torture to be employed to force a confession; and supposing that she herself was distrusted more on account of the weakness than of the indiscretion of her sex, she determined to make a trial of her own strength, before she desired to have the secret communicated to her. For this purpose she gave herself a wound in the thigh, and while it festered, and produced acute pain and fever, she endeavoured to preserve her usual countenance, without any sign of suffering or distress. Being satisfied with this trial of her own strength, she told her husband the particulars, and with some degree of triumph added, "*Now you may trust me; I am the "wife of Brutus and the daughter of Cato; keep me no "longer in doubt or suspence upon any subject in which "I too must be so deeply concerned.*" The circumstance of her wound, the pretensions which she otherwise had to confidence, drew the secret from her

husband, and undoubtedly from thenceforward, by the passions which were likely to agitate the mind of a tender and affectionate woman, exposed the design to additional hazard of a discovery and of a failure.

But the morning of the Ides of March, the day on which this conspiracy was to be executed, arrived, and there was yet no suspicion. The conspirators had been already together at the house of one of the Prætors. Cassius was to present his son that morning to the people, with the ceremony usual in assuming the habit of manhood; and he was, upon this account, to be attended by his friends into the place of assembly. He was afterwards, together with Brutus, in their quality of magistrates, employed, as usual, in giving judgment on the causes that were brought before them. As they sat in the Prætor's chair, they received intimation that Cæsar having been indisposed over-night, was not to be abroad; and that he had commissioned Antony, in his name, to adjourn the senate to another day. Upon this report, they suspected a discovery; and while they were deliberating what should be done, Popilius Lænas, a senator whom they had not intrusted with their design, whispered them as he passed, "I "pray that God may prosper what you have in "view. Above all things dispatch." Their suspicions of a discovery being thus still farther confirmed, the intention soon after appeared to be public. An acquaintance told Casca, "You have concealed "this business from me, but Brutus has told me of "it." They were struck with surprise; but Brutus

presently recollected that he had mentioned to this person no more than Casca's intention of standing for Ædile, and that the words which he spoke probably referred only to that business; they accordingly determined to wait the issue of these alarms *.

In the mean time Cæsar, at the persuasion of Decimus Brutus, though once determined to remain at home, had changed his mind, and was already in the street, being carried to the senate in his litter. Soon after he had left his own house, a slave came thither in haste, desired protection, and said he had a secret of the greatest moment to impart. He had probably overheard the conspirators, or had observed that they were armed; but not being aware how pressing the time was, suffered himself to be detained till Cæsar's return. Others, probably, had observed circumstances which led to a discovery of the plot, and Cæsar had a billet to this effect given to him as he passed in the street: he was entreated by the person who gave it instantly to read it; and he endeavoured to do so, but was prevented by the multitudes who crowded around him with numberless applications; and he still carried this paper in his hand when he entered the senate.

Brutus and most of the conspirators had taken their places a little while before the arrival of Cæsar, and continued to be alarmed by many circumstances which tended to shake their resolution. Porcia, in the same moments, being in great agitation, exposed herself to public notice. She listened with anxie-

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

ty to every noise in the streets; she dispatched, without any pretence of business, continual messages towards the place where the senate was assembled; she asked every person who came from that quarter if they observed what her husband was doing. Her spirit at last sunk under the effect of such violent emotions; she fainted away, and was carried for dead into her own apartment. A message came to Brutus in the senate with this account. He was much affected, but kept his place *. Popilius Lænas, who a little before seemed, from the expression he had dropped, to have got notice of their design, appeared to be in earnest conversation with Cæsar as he alighted from his carriage. This left the conspirators no longer in doubt that they were discovered; and they made signs to each other, that it would be better to die by their own hands than to fall into the power of their enemy. But they saw of a sudden the countenance of Lænas change into a smile, and perceived that his conversation with Cæsar could not relate to such a business as theirs.

Cæsar's chair of state had been placed near to the pedestal of Pompey's statue. Numbers of the conspirators had seated themselves around it. Trebonius, under pretence of business, had taken Antony aside at the entrance of the theatre. Cimber, who, with others of the conspirators, met Cæsar in the portico, presented him with a petition in favour of his brother, who had been excepted from the late indemnity; and in urging the prayer of this peti-

* Plut. in. Bruto.

tion, attended the dictator to his place. Having there received a denial from Cæsar, uttered with some expressions of impatience at being so much importuned, he took hold of his robe, as if still farther to press the entreaty. *Nay*, said Cæsar, *this is violence*. While he spoke these words, Cimber flung back the gown from his own shoulders; and this being the signal agreed upon, called out to strike. Casca aimed the first blow. Cæsar started from his place, and in the first moment of surprise, pushed Cimber with one arm, and laid hold of Casca with the other. But he soon perceived that resistance was vain; and while the swords of the conspirators clashed, in their way to his body, he wrapped himself up in his gown, and fell without any further convulsion or struggle. It was observed, in the superstition of the times, that in falling, the blood which sprung from his wounds sprinkled the pedestal of Pompey's statue. And thus having employed the greatest abilities to subdue his fellow-citizens, with whom it would have been a much greater honour to have been able to live on terms of equality, he fell, in the height of his security, a sacrifice to their just indignation; a striking example of what the arrogant have to fear in trifling with the feelings of men whom they ought to respect, and at the same time a lesson of jealousy and of cruelty to tyrants, or a warning which they are but too willing to take in the exercise of their power, not to spare those whom they may have insulted by their vile usurpations.

When the body lay breathless on the ground, Cassius called out, there lies the most worthless of men *. Brutus called upon the senate to judge of the transaction which had passed before them, and having addressed himself to Cicero by name †, was proceeding to state the motives of those who were concerned in it, when the members who had for a moment stood in silent amazement, rose of a sudden, and began to separate in great consternation. All those who had come to the senate in the retinue of Cæsar, his lictors, the ordinary officers of State, citizens and foreigners, with many servants and dependents of every sort, had been instantly seized with a panic; and, as if the swords of the conspirators were drawn against themselves, had already rushed into the streets, and carried terror and confusion wherever they went. The senators themselves now followed. No man had presence of mind to give any account of what had happened, but repeated the cry that was usual on great alarms, for all persons to withdraw, and to shut up their habitations and shops. This cry was communicated from one to another in the streets. The people, imagining that a general massacre was somewhere begun, shut up and barred all their doors as in the dead of night, and every one prepared to defend his own habitation.

Antony, upon the first alarm, had changed his dress, and retired to a place of safety. He believed that the conspirators must have intended to take his life together with that of Cæsar; and he fled in the

* Cic. ad Famil. lib. xii, ep. 1. Nequissimum occisum esse.

† Philippica ii, c. 12.

apprehension of being instantly pursued. Lepidus repaired to the suburbs, where the legion he commanded was quartered; and uncertain whether Cæsar's death was an act of the Senate, or of a private party, waited for an explanation, or an order from the surviving Consul, to determine in what manner he himself should proceed *. In these circumstances a general pause, or an interval of suspense and silence, took place in every part of the city.

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* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

CHAP. XXX.

General consternation on the death of Cæsar.—Tumultuary assembly of the people.—Declarations of Cinna and Dolabella.—Appearance of Brutus and Cassius in the forum.—Their return to the capitol.—Meeting and debate in the senate.—Act of oblivion.—Speech of Brutus to the people.—Funeral of Cæsar.—Insurrection of the people.—Policy of Antony.—Appearance of Octavius.—His dissension with Antony.—Both have recourse to arms.—Aspect of things.—Antony proceeds to expel Decimus Brutus from the Cisalpine Gaul.

In the general consternation, occasioned by the death of Cæsar, the authors of this important event appeared to be no less at a loss what to do next, than the other members of the Senate, on whom it was brought by surprise. The difficulty or danger of executing the first part of their design had appeared so great, that they looked no further, or they possibly imagined that with Cæsar's life every impediment to the ordinary course of affairs would be removed; and that the Senate and People, restored to their authority and privileges, would naturally recur to their usual forms. But finding themselves deserted in the Senate, and not knowing to what dangers they might still be exposed, they wrapped up the left arm in their gowns; a preparation which the Romans, in the habit of using a shield, generally

made when alarmed with any prospect of violence. And thus in a body, with their swords yet stained with blood, went forth to the streets proclaiming security and liberty, and inviting every one to concur with them in restoring the commonwealth. They were joined by many who, though not accessory to the conspiracy, were pleased to embark with them in the present state of their fortunes. Of these are particularly mentioned the following names: Lentulus Spinther, Favonius, Acquinas, Dolabella, Murcus, Peticus, and Cinna. But observing that the People in general were not forward in espousing their cause; and knowing that, besides the legion which Lepidus commanded in the suburbs, there were in the city numbers of veterans, who having received grants of land from Cæsar, either had not yet gone to take possession of them, or having been at their settlements, had returned to pay court to their patron before his departure from Rome; and suspecting that Antony, now the sole Consul and supreme officer of State, was likely to exert the powers of a magistrate against them; and being on every side beset with dangers of which they knew not the extent, they determined to take refuge in the Capitol, and with the gladiators of Decimus Brutus, who had already taken possession of that fortress, to wait the issue of this general scene of suspense.

Multitudes of the People, observing that the persons who had occasioned this general alarm were themselves on the defensive, and no way inclined to extend the effusion of blood, ventured forth into

the streets, and many crowded together in the Forum or ordinary place of resort *. The first person that took any public part upon this occasion was Cinna, the son of him who had been a leader of the Marian party, brother-in-law to Cæsar by a former wife, and now, by his nomination, advanced to the dignity of Prætor. This relation of the deceased, to the surprise of every one, tore the Prætor's gown from his own shoulders; declared that in this act he then abdicated his office, as having been unwarrantably obtained, not by free election, but by the nomination of an usurper; and he proceeded to make a harangue to the People, in which he treated Cæsar as a tyrant, extolled the conspirators as the restorers of liberty to their country, and proposed that they should be invited to assist in the assembly of the People, and have the proper safeguards to their persons, which the present occasion made necessary.

Dolabella, who had been nominated by Cæsar to succeed in the office of Consul, which he himself was about to vacate, thinking that the intended succession was now open to him, reversed the first part of Cinna's conduct, by assuming the robes and ensigns of Consul, to which he had no other title than his being named by the late usurper; but joined with the abdicated Prætor in applauding the authors of that usurper's death, expressed his wish that he

* Appian says, that the friends of the conspirators, by distributing money, endeavoured to form a party among the populace. The necessity of this expedient is sufficient, if real, to shew how desperate the attempt was of restoring democratical government to the inhabitants of Rome, composed of the refuse of Italy and of the provinces, collected to enjoy the rewards of idleness and faction.

himself had been a partner in the glory of their action, joined with Cinna, in proposing that these restorers of liberty should be instantly met in a regular assembly of the People, and that the anniversary of the present day should be observed for ever, as a festival sacred to the restoration of the commonwealth.

The partisans of Cæsar, yet unacquainted with the extent of their own danger, had absented themselves, and the audience consisted chiefly of persons to whom these proposals were agreeable. The motions that were now made by the late Prætor Cinna, and the pretended Consul Dolabella, accordingly prevailed, and the leaders of the conspiracy were invited to descend from the Capitol. But of this invitation only Marcus Brutus and Cassius took the benefit. Having joined the multitude, they severally addressed themselves to those who were present with an air of dignity and consciousness of merit, as being the procurers of that liberty which the People were now to enjoy, and by which they were thus already enabled to act for themselves. They contrasted the late usurpation of Cæsar * with the free constitution of the republic; observed, that with respect to themselves, unsupported as they were with any military force, they could not, in supplanting the usurper, have entertained any wish to succeed in the possession of his power; that they could have no object besides the restoration of the laws and the freedom of their country. And they ex-

* Appian. de Bello Civili, lib. ii. Dio. Cass. lib. xliv, c. 21.

horted the audience, in terms rather popular, than really applicable to the present state of affairs, to make the same use of their deliverance from an usurped and violent domination which their ancestors, at the expulsion of Tarquin, had made of a corresponding event. They specified the merit which many persons had in this enterprise, particularly that of Decimus Brutus, who had furnished the company of gladiators, which, in entering on this business, made the principal part of their strength; and observed, that, notwithstanding the splendid fortune to which this citizen might have aspired under Cæsar's influence, he had preferred the freedom of his country and the restoration of the commonwealth. They turned the attention of the audience on the case of Sextus Pompeius, the only surviving son of the great Pompey, now unjustly deemed an outlaw and a rebel *. "In the person of this young "man," they said, "you have the last of a noble "family, who, in the late ruinous contest, have sa-"crificed themselves for the republic; even he is "still beset by the emissaries of the late usurper, "who, pretending public authority, are armed for "his destruction, with swords yet red with the "blood of his father and of his brother." They moved the People, that so unjust a war should be instantly suspended, and that this young man should be restored to the rights of his ancestors; that the

* This young man having absconded for some time after the defeat and death of his brother at Munda, had again appeared in Spain at the head of a considerable force, and defeated Asinius Pollio, who had been employed by Cæsar against him.

Tribunes Cæsetius and Marullus, being unjustly degraded by Cæsar, in violation of that sacred law, which he himself, upon much less palpable grounds, had made his pretence for a civil war, should now be restored to their dignities.

In these fond anticipations of freedom, the authors of this attempt to restore the popular forms, enjoyed for once the fruits of their labour, and spoke to a numerous assembly of the Roman People, seemingly unrestrained and unawed by force. The city, however, had not yet recovered from the consternation occasioned by the recent event. The present assembly was not sufficiently attended by persons on whom the conspirators could rely for their safety. It was thought most prudent, therefore, that Brutus and Cassius should return to their friends in the Capitol, and that from this place they should treat of an accommodation with Antony, and with the other leaders of the opposite party.

On the following day, Antony, seeing that the restorers of the commonwealth remained in the Capitol, and abstained from violence against any of the supposed friends and adherents of Cæsar, ventured abroad from his lurking-place, and resumed the dress and ensigns of Consul. In this capacity he received a message from the conspirators, desiring a conference with himself and with Lepidus. Antony, though in times of relaxation and security, extravagant, dissipated, and in appearance incapable of serious affairs *; yet in arduous situations he general-

* If I am not mistaken, says Cicero, upon this occasion, he minds eating and drinking even more than mischief. (Cicero ad Attic. lib. xiv, ep. 3, quem quidem ego æpularum magis arbitror rationem habere, quam quidquam mali cogitare). How much he was mistaken will soon appear.

ally belied these appearances, was strenuous, cautious, and able. He did not yet perceive how far the party of Cæsar was or was not extinguished with its leader. The only military force in Italy was at the disposal of Lepidus, of whom he was jealous. In his anwser, therefore, he assumed an appearance of moderation and of regard for the commonwealth, and proposed to refer every question to the Senate, which he had already called to deliberate on the present arduous state of affairs.

In expectation of this meeting of the Senate, all parties were busy in consultations, and in soliciting support to their interest. The friends of the conspirators were in motion all night visiting the Senators, and preparing measures for the following day. The veterans of Cæsar, both officers and legionary soldiers, apprehending that the grants of land lately made to themselves might be recalled, went to and fro in the streets, and made application wherever they had access, with representations and even with threats. They at the same time provided themselves with arms, and prepared to overawe the Senate by their numbers.

In the course of the same night, Lepidus had marched into the city with the legion he commanded, and took possession of the Forum. To the people who assembled around him, he lamented the death of Cæsar, and inveighed against the authors of this unexpected event. By thus disclosing his mind, he encouraged the partisans and retainers of the late Dictator to come abroad, and rendered the streets and passages exceedingly dangerous for those who

were supposed to be of the opposite party. Cinna, who, to evince his zeal for the reviving republic, had resigned the office of Prætor, which Cæsar had conferred upon him, was attacked on his way to the Senate, and narrowly escaped with his life.

While others had scarcely got over the first effects of surprise and terror, the supposed dissipated Antony bethought himself of a circumstance, which, more than any other, for some time directed the course of public affairs. By his credit with Calpurnia, the widow of Cæsar, he got possession of all his memorials and of all his writings, and had secured an immense sum of money, which had been deposited by him in the temple of Ops *.

On the following day, being the eighteenth of March, the Senate, as soon as it was light, assembled in the temple of the Earth. The veterans beset the doors †. Dolabella presented himself, ushered in by the Lictors, and took possession of one of the Consul's chairs. Antony being seated in the other, moved the Assembly to take into consideration the present state of the commonwealth. He himself professed great zeal for the republic, and a disposition to peace ‡. The greater part of those who spoke after Antony justified or extolled the act of the conspirators, and moved that they should have public thanks and rewards for their services. This

* Cicero says, septies millies H. S. about six millions Sterling, Philip. ii, c. 37. 4000 Talents, Plut. in Anton.

† Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xiv, ep. 14. Nonne omni ratione veterani qui, armati aderant, cum presidii nos nihil haberemus, defendendi fuerunt?

‡ Ibid. Philip. i, c. 1.

they supported by a charge of usurpation and tyranny against Cæsar. Upon this point, however, Antony thought proper to interpose; reminded the Senators how nearly many of them were concerned in this question. "They who are to vote in it," he said, "will please to observe, that if Cæsar shall be "found to have acted with legal powers, his acts "will remain in force; if otherwise, all the proceed-"ings that took place during his administration "must be erased from your records; and his body, "as that of a traitor and a tyrant, made fast on a "hook, must be dragged through the streets, and "cast into the Tiber. This sentence would affect "the remotest parts of the empire, or would extend, "in its application, farther perhaps than we should "be able to enforce it by our arms. Part indeed is "in our power. Many of us hold offices, or are "destined by Cæsar's nomination to offices, either "at home or abroad. Let us begin with divesting "ourselves of what we now hold; and with renoun-"cing our expectations for the future. After we "have given this proof of our disinterestedness, our "allies abroad will listen to us, when we talk of re-"calling the favours granted to them by the late "Dictator."

By this artful turn, which was given by Antony to the subject now under deliberation, many, who in the late arrangements made by Cæsar, held places in the Senate or magistracy, or who were by his appointment destined to succeed into high situations at home or abroad, were greatly disconcerted. Some of those who were actually in office, as retainers of

the late usurpation, made haste to resign their powers, and laid down the ensigns of magistracy on the steps where they sat; but Dolabella, who, in consequence of a destination made, though not fulfilled by Cæsar, had recently assumed the consular robes, and who, being under the legal age, had no hopes of being re-elected by the free voice of the People, notwithstanding his declaration in favour of the authors of Cæsar's death, pleaded for the necessity of sustaining all the acts and decrees of the usurper.

While the Senators were thus engaged in debate on the terms of their first resolution, relating to the act of the conspirators and the death of Cæsar, the People who had assembled in great multitudes in the market-place, became impatient to know what was passing, and pressed on the steps of the temple where the Senate was met, with some attempts to force or break open the doors *. On this occasion, Antony and Lepidus thought proper to go forth, under pretence of appeasing the tumult; but with a real intention to observe what, in this critical state of affairs, was the prevailing disposition of the People, and with a full resolution to be governed in their own measures, by what seemed to be the will of the multitude. Finding the humour of the majority, and the disposition of the troops, such as they desired, menacing and sanguinary against the conspirators, they endeavoured to inflame their passions, employing signs and gestures of indignation, rather than words which could not be heard. Among other expressions or gestures of this nature, Antony

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

laid open his bosom, to shew the armour with which he had thought necessary, in the Senate, and amidst so many concealed enemies, to guard his own life. By this, and other signs which he made, he insinuated that Cæsar had fallen in consequence of his excessive confidence, and of the clemency with which he had spared those who became his assassins.

From this scene, which passed in the streets, Antony returned to the Senate; where the debate * being still continued, Dolabella alleged the confusion which must arise from a general suspension of magistracy, or the disorders attending general elections at so critical a time, and insisted, that all the magistrates now in office should remain. Cicero pleaded for a general amnesty and oblivion for the past; enumerated the evils which had been brought on the republic, by the contentions and by the vindictive spirit of party; proposed that none should be questioned for Cæsar's death, nor any one be called to account for any violence committed under his authority; that the arrangements made by Cæsar himself should continue; that every one destined to office, should in his turn succeed according to that destination; and that all the provisions made for the army should be fully secured to them †.

After some opposite opinions on the question had been delivered, Antony concluded the debate with a tone of more authority than he had hitherto assumed. "While you deliberated," he said, "on "the conduct which you were to hold with respect "to the conspirators, I chose to be silent; but when

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii. † Dio. Cass. lib. xliv, c. 34.

" you changed the question, and proposed to con-
" demn the dead, I ventured only to make one ob-
" jection, which being removeable by yourselves,
" ought to have been the least of all your difficulties.
" And yet I find it is sufficient to stop your pro-
" ceedings! What are we to think of the remain-
" ing objections? The whole fabric of the empire
" rests at this moment on establishments made by
" Cæsar: at home on the arrangements he has made
" in the succession to office; abroad on the grants
" of possessions or immunities made by him to prin-
" ces, cities, corporations, and provinces, and on
" the several conditions he has, in return, stipulated
" with them on behalf of the Roman People. Ima-
" gine then, upon the subversion of what he has
" established, what scenes of confusion must follow.
" It is true, confusion at a distance may not affect
" you; but the scene in Italy will be sufficient to
" occupy your utmost attention. Will the veterans,
" do you think, who have not yet laid down their
" arms, or not discontinued the use of them, of whom
" many thousands are now in this city, will they al-
" low themselves to be stripped of the grants which
" were made to them in reward of long, dangerous,
" and faithful services? You have heard their voice
" last night in the streets. You have heard their
" menaces against the authors of our present dis-
" tresses. Will they behold with patience the body
" of their favourite leader dragged with ignominy
" in the streets? Will they bear with an indignity,
" which, though done to his memory, must involve
" a forfeiture of all that they themselves have re-

"ceived, or a disappointment of all they expect in "reward of their services? Will the Roman Peo- "ple in general submit to have the principal author "of their present greatness stigmatized by your de- "crees as a criminal, and to have his assassins re- "warded with honours?—The proposal to me, in "all its parts, appears wild and impracticable. Let "the conspirators, if you will, escape with impunity, "provided they are sensible of the favour that is "shewn to them; but talk not of rewards to them; "nor, under pretence of censuring the conduct of "your late Dictator, wildly open a scene of confu- "sion, by subverting all your present establishments. "My opinion is, that the acts of Cæsar, without ex- "ception, should be ratified, and that all affairs "should be suffered to move on in the channels in "which he has left them. On these preliminary con- "ditions I will submit to an accommodation, and "agree that we think no more of the past."

In delivering this speech, Antony having perceived so powerful a support in the legion which now had possession of the Forum, in the veterans, and in the promiscuous multitudes of people who were assembled round the doors of the Senate, expressed himself with assurance and great vehemence. A decree was accordingly passed, by which all prosecutions, on account of Cæsar's death, were prohibited; all his acts, for the sake of peace, were confirmed; all his plans ordered to be carried into execution; and all the grants of land, which had been made by him to the veterans, specially ratified *

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

This decree being to be carried to the Comitium or popular assembly for their assent on the following day, and the accommodation of parties being so far advanced, the conspirators intimated an inclination to address themselves to the People; and were instantly attended by great numbers, who to hear them assembled on the ascent of the Capitol *. Brutus spoke from the steps. He explained the motives upon which his friends and himself had thought proper to betake them to their present retreat; and, in speaking on this subject, complained of the outrage which had been offered to Cinna, who, though not concerned in the death of Cæsar, was attacked, for having been supposed to approve of what they had done. He enumerated the distresses which had afflicted the commonwealth, from the time at which Cæsar commenced hostilities to the present hour; "a period, during which the best blood of the re-"public," he said, "was continually shedding, in "Spain, in Macedonia, and in Africa, to gratify the "ambition or vanity of a single man. These things, "however," continued he, "we consented to over-"look, and in suffering Cæsar to hold the higher "offices of State, became bound, by our oath of "fidelity, not to call any of his past actions in ques-"tion. If we had likewise sworn to submit our-"selves to perpetual servitude, our enemies might "have some colour for the accusation of perjury, "which we are told is now laid to our charge; but "the proposal of any such engagement we should

* Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xv, ep. 1.

" have rejected with indignation, and we trust that " every Roman citizen would have done so also. " Sylla, after having gratified his revenge against " many who were no doubt his own enemies, at the " same time that they were enemies of the public, " at last restored the commonwealth; but Cæsar, " without any pretence, besides the gratification of " his own ambition, continued, in the city and in " the provinces, to usurp all the powers of the em- " pire. The treasury he treated as his property, and " the magistrates of Rome as his creatures, to be " placed or displaced at his pleasure. One of the " last acts of his life, in preparing for his departure " from Rome, was to fix the succession of magis- " trates for a number of years; in order that in his " absence you might not, by choosing your own offi- " cers, recover the habit of exercising that freedom, " and of enjoying those rights, of which he meant " to deprive you for ever."

From this account of Cæsar's usurpation, Brutus proceeded to speak of the grants which had been made to the veterans. " He acknowledged the long " and faithful services which those men had per- " formed against the enemies of the commonwealth " in Gaul, in Germany, and in Britain; approved of " the provision which had been made for them, and " assured them of his concurrence in carrying this " provision into its full effect. At the same time, " he lamented the sufferings of those who had been " stripped of their ancient possessions, to make way " for those new grants; proposed that they should " have a compensation from the Treasury, and thus

" hoped that the justice of the commonwealth would " be employed in equally protecting the rights of " every citizen."

This speech was received with applause; and on the following day the act of oblivion being confirmed by the People, and the children of Antony having been sent * as hostages to the Capitol, the conspirators came down from thence, and were received in the Forum with loud acclamations. After parties had saluted each other with mutual congratulations and expressions of friendship, Cassius retired to sup with Antony, and Brutus with Lepidus. The republic seemed to revive. The nobles in general expressed their satisfaction in the present state of affairs, and extolled the authors of Cæsar's death as the restorers of freedom to their country. Many, however, who had shared in the late usurpation, having tasted of military power, and being unable to acquiesce in the condition of mere citizens, however dignified, or to accommodate themselves to the restraints and formalities of legal government, were likely to prove but ill members of the reviving republic. Antony, in particular, considered himself as the successor of Cæsar, and could not for a moment cease to devise the means of retaining the sovereignty, and of holding or granting at pleasure the dignities and emoluments of the State.

The senate had weakly, under the shew of moderation, resolved to confirm the late dictator's will, and to ratify all his acts, both public and private; they

* Cicer. Philip. i, c. 1.

had decreed that the remains of the deceased should be honoured with a public funeral, which was to be conducted in the manner which his friends should think proper.

Antony was prepared to take advantage of these circumstances, towards preserving the party of Cæsar both in the army and in the city, not doubting that while this party prevailed, he himself should remain at its head. For this purpose, he published Cæsar's will, in which he knew that there were many clauses likely to gratify the people, and to inflame their minds against his assassins. Among these, were a legacy of money to be distributed to the inferior citizens, at the rate of twenty-five Attic drachmas, about two pounds ten shillings a man *; or, according to Octavius, quoted by Dion Cassius, 300 H. S. about the same sum; together with an assignment of his gardens on the river, as public walks for the service and pleasure of the people. Many legacies were likewise bequeathed to private persons. The principal inheritance, together with the name of Cæsar, was devised to Octavius, grandson to his sister Julia. The remainder, in case of the failure of this young man, was destined to Decimus Brutus, who, in the mean time, together with Mark Antony, was made guardian of the young Cæsar, and executor of the will.

Upon the publication of this deed, the partisans of Antony took occasion to extol the munificence and generosity of the deceased towards the Roman

* Appian. de Bello Civili, lib. 2.

people, to blacken the conduct of the conspirators, representing that of Decimus Brutus, in particular, as equal to parricide; and Antony, in this manner, having secured the public attention and favour, proceeded to celebrate the funeral with all the honours that were due to a public benefactor, and to a common parent of the people.

Cæsar's body, in the general consternation, had been left for some hours on the spot where it fell. It was at last borne on a litter, by a few slaves, to his own house. In this confusion, one of the arms, all over bloody, was left hanging over the side of the litter; and this circumstance, though at the time in appearance unnoticed, yet remained with a deep impression on the minds of those who beheld it. On examining the body, there were found twenty-three wounds, sufficiently ghastly, although no more than one or two were mortal. Antony determined to exhibit this spectacle to the people, accompanied with that of the robes, which were pierced and torn in the struggle with which Cæsar fell, and all over stained with his blood. He likewise ordered a solemn dirge to be performed, with interludes of music, agreeable to the practice at Roman funerals, and suited to that particular occasion. He himself prepared to speak the oration; and a day being fixed for the solemnity, a pile was raised in the Campus Martius, near to the tomb of Julia, the daughter of the deceased, and the wife of Pompey. Although it was intended that the body should be consumed on this pile in the Campus Martius, the funeral oration was to be spoken from the Rostra in the

Forum, and a couch was placed there, adorned with ivory and gold, on which was laid the corpse, with an effigy of the deceased, covered with purple, and over it a trophy, on which was to be hung the robes in which he was killed. The whole of this pageant was covered up, and adorned with a gilded canopy of state. In bearing it to the Forum, the pall was carried by magistrates then in office, or by persons who had passed through the highest stations of the commonwealth. But in the procession, the streets were so crowded, that no order could be kept, and multitudes, who ought to have passed in regular procession, hurried by the shortest ways to the place at which the obsequies were to be performed *.

Antony began the funeral oration, with an apology for intruding on the patience of many, who possibly took no particular concern in the catastrophe of Cæsar's life. "Had Cæsar been a private man," he said, "I should have proceeded to his funeral in "silence; but one who has died in the first station "of the republic, is entitled to public notice. And "my own station as Consul, were I qualified for the "task, would have imposed on me a special duty on "this occasion; but in this instance, the eulogium "of the dead must proceed from a higher authority "than mine. The senate and the people of Rome "have spoken, and they have left to me only the "task of repeating what they have said." After these words, he read over the decrees of the senate and people, enumerating the titles, dignities, honours, and powers, which had been conferred on

* Sueton. in Cæsar.

Cæsar. He spoke of the lustre of his family, the graces and accomplishments of his person, and of his singular abilities; gave a general account of the wars in which he had been engaged; his splendid successes, and the accession of glory and of empire he had procured to the Roman State: and when he had gained so far on the attention of his audience, he addressed himself to the popular part in particular. "When you were oppressed," he said, alluding to the overbearing influence of Pompey, "by "a faction which engrossed all the powers and dig- "nities of the commonwealth, Cæsar generously in- "terposed in your behalf. When this faction had "withdrawn themselves from the allegiance that "was due to the sovereignty of the Roman peo- "ple; and when they had actually armed first the "provinces of Spain, afterwards Macedonia, Greece, "Asia, Africa, and all the eastern parts of the em- "pire against you, he braved the storms of winter "and the superior force of such an enemy; he dis- "persed the cloud which had gathered over your "heads; he carried the glory of your arms into "Asia, Africa, Egypt, and yet a third time into "Spain. His enemies every where experienced his "valour in battle, and his clemency in victory. He "pardoned many who were repeatedly in arms a- "gainst himself; and when he dreaded the effects "of an excessive lenity towards those who appear- "ed to be incorrigible, he sought for pretences to "forgive his enemies, under the shew of gratifying "his friends, whom he encouraged to solicit him for "pardon.

"On the subject of his administration in the "State, I need not make any observation to you. "You were witnesses of his conduct. Descended "of your ancient kings, he had more glory in re- "fusing a crown that was offered to him, than they "had in wearing it with all its honours.—You loved "him—You set him at the head of your priesthood— "at the head of your army—at the head of the repub- "lic:—you declared his person sacred as that of your "Tribunes—you declared him the father of his coun- "try—you shewed him to the world, adorned with "the ensigns of sovereign power—your Dictator— "your Guardian, and the terror of your enemies. "But he is now no more.—This sacred person is now "breathless before you. The father of his country "is dead: not, alas! of disease—not of the decline "of years—not by the hands of foreign enemies— "not far from his own country—but here within "your walls, and in the Roman Senate, in the vi- "gour of health, in the midst of all his designs for "your prosperity and glory. He who often repel- "led the swords of his enemies, has fallen by the "hands of treacherous friends, or by the hands "of those whom his clemency had spared.—But "what availed his clemency? what availed the laws "with which he so anxiously guarded the lives of "his fellow-citizens? His own he could not guard "from traitors. His mangled body, and his grey "hairs clotted with blood, are now exposed in that "Forum which he so often adorned with his tri- "umphs; and near to that place of public debate,

" from which he so often captivated the people of " Rome with his eloquence *.

At this passage, it is said that Antony began to change the tone of lamentation into that of rage; that he raised his voice to indignation and threats, but that he was checked by a general murmur of the Senators; and that he thought proper again to soften his expressions. " The gods," he said, " are " masters of the fortunes of men. It is our part to " forget the past, to look forward to the future, to " cultivate peace among ourselves, and to accom- " pany this hero with songs of praise to the man- " sions of the blest." Having spoke these words, he tucked up his robe, and disengaged his arms as for some vehement action; and standing over the bier in which the effigy was laid, uncovered it; but, as appalled at the sight, or struck into silence, he held up the torn and bloody garment to view, sunk again into a sorrowful tone, and prayed that it were possible for him to redeem that precious life with his own. Being interrupted with a general cry of lamentation from the People, he made a pause to hear the interlude. At a passage of the hymn, in which Cæsar was personated in the following words, " *For this I spared, that they might murder me;*" a general cry of indignation burst from the multitude; and, at the same time, the effigy of the dead, with all its wounds and stains of blood, being raised to view, the People could no longer be restrained. Part ran to avenge his blood on the persons of the

* Dio, Cass. lib. xliv, c. 49.

conspirators, and part tore up the benches and tribunals of the magistrates, dismantled the Senate-house, brought into heaps the spoils of the supposed enemies of Cæsar, and forgetting the preparations which had been made for a funeral pile in the field of Mars, brought the most precious combustible materials they could find to light a fire in the Forum itself, and there to consume the body of the dead.

From this beginning, the People continued during the whole night to bring fresh materials. The officers who had attended the procession, stripped off the robes in which they were dressed, and cast them in the flames. Women crowded to the pile, and threw upon it, as a sacrifice to the manes of the dead, the ornaments of their own persons, the gorgets and the prætextas of their children. The People, in general, appeared to be seized with a degree of phrenzy, of which, neither the measure of their attachment to Cæsar in his lifetime, nor the manner in which they had received the first accounts of his death, had given any adequate expectations: they ran through the streets denouncing vengeance on his enemies, and proceeded to violence against every person who was represented as such. Helvius Cinna being mistaken for Cornelius of the same name, who, on the preceding day, had declared his approbation of the conspiracy, was put to death by the populace, his body torn in pieces, and his head carried in procession on the point of a spear *.

* Sueton. in Cæs. Plut. ibid. Appian. Dio. Cass. &c.

The perpetrators of this murder being led by the retainers and dependents of Cæsar's family, snatched lighted brands from the funeral pile, and attacked the houses of Brutus, Cassius, and the other conspirators. They even attempted to demolish Pompey's theatre, in which Cæsar had been killed, and lighting many fires at once in different parts of the city, threatened the whole with immediate conflagration and ruin.

In these riots, though partly projected by Antony, the public disorder was carried to a greater height than he had foreseen or wished. His intention was to incite a popular cry against the authors of Cæsar's death, and to check the Senate in any opposition they were likely to give in the execution of his own designs. But when the crimes which were committed began to reflect dishonour on the party of Cæsar, and when all persons of property were alarmed, and the city itself was threatened with destruction, he found himself obliged to interpose the authority of magistrate, and put an end to tumults of so dangerous a nature. For this purpose, in concert with Dolabella, he issued an edict, prohibiting the populace to assemble in arms on any pretence whatever, and posted guards in different parts of the town to secure the observance of it.

The Consuls having by these means restored the peace of the city, and dispersed all the crowds which had assembled, except that which still remained at the place of Cæsar's funeral, where the populace continued for some time to feed the pile, Antony made a journey to the country, and remained in

Campania great part of April and May. During this time, he was assiduous in his visits to the quarters and new settlements of the veterans, on whom he was for the future to rely for support in the pretensions which, it is probable, he had already conceived, and which were much too high for the safety of the commonwealth. In his absence, one Ematius, who had formerly assumed the name of Marius, and under this popular designation had been busy in disturbing the public peace, and who, upon this account, had by the late Dictator himself been driven from the city, now again appeared, affected to lead in the riotous honours which were paid to the memory of Cæsar, and, attended by the populace, erected an altar or monument on the spot where the corpse had been burnt, and drew multitudes thither as to a place of devotion. On this occasion, Dolabella, who had offended many of the more respectable citizens, by assuming, without any regular authority, the dignity of Consul, now recovered their favour by a vigorous exercise of his power against this impostor, gave orders that Ematius should be put to death, many of his accomplices thrown from the Tarpeian rock, and the monument or altar they had erected should be rased to the ground *.

By these executions, the peace of the city seemed to be re-established, and even the commonwealth itself in some measure restored. Both the Consuls affected the character of ordinary magistrates, shew-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliv, c. 50. and 51. App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

ed a proper deference to the Senate, and in all things endeavoured to give satisfaction to the friends of the republic. Antony, in particular, upon his return to the city, consulted the principal Senators apart upon every motion which he proposed to make, and referred the determination of every question to the free discussion of their body at large. He affected to have no secrets; and though empowered by the late act of the Senate to carry into execution the different articles of Cæsar's will, and to complete all his intended arrangements, he did not, under these titles, propose any measure but what was generally known and approved *.

In pursuance of this system of moderation, it was proposed by Antony himself, that Sextus, the remaining son of Pompey, who, under the authority of the late Dictator, had been declared an outlaw, should be restored to his country, and have a compensation in money for the losses which had been sustained by his family. To provide for the future safety of the commonwealth, as well as for that of private persons, it was proposed from the same quarter, that a law should be enacted to abolish for ever the name and power of Dictator. At the same time, this popular magistrate declared his concurrence in all the honorary votes which had passed in favour of Brutus and Cassius, and in every act which had a tendency to mitigate the animosity of Cæsar's party, to pacify the veterans, and to incline them, without any further disturbance, to settle on the

* Cicero, Philip. i, c. 21.

lands which had been assigned as the reward of t[illegible] services.

The Senate, in order to terminate as soon as [illegible]sible every occasion of public uneasiness or ala[illegible], although they greatly disapproved of rewarding in the troops as a public service, what was in fact the overthrow of the republic itself, and had reason to dread the precedent, yet hastened to the performance of all Cæsar's engagements, in order to deprive the veterans of any pretence for multiplying their demands, or remaining any longer in arms.

These circumstances had a very favourable aspect, and the storm which threatened the city and the commonwealth appeared to be laid. Many had foretold, that the permission of a public funeral to Cæsar would have dangerous consequences; and during the late tumults and riots thought themselves sufficiently justified in these predictions. But their apprehensions now appeared to have been groundless, and the authors of the late moderate counsels, in which the Senate was induced to temporise, and to make concessions in such matters as were of less moment, in order to appease the animosity of parties, and to obtain their consent in matters of more consequence, were now highly applauded.

All the conspirators, in the height of the late disorders which arose on account of Cæsar's funeral, had withdrawn from the city, and, under different honourable pretences which were expressly furnished to them by the Senate, continued to absent themselves from Rome. Many of them had been formerly named to the government of provinces, and now

proceeded to take possession of their lots. Decimus Brutus, on this occasion, repaired to the Cisalpine Gaul, Trebonius to Asia, and Tullius Cimber to Bithynia.

Marcus Brutus had been appointed to the government of Macedonia, and Cassius to that of Syria; but those chiefs of the conspiracy being actually in office as Prætors, could not, agreeably to the forms of the republic, take possession of provinces until the expiration of their year, nor could they regularly absent themselves from the city, without some decree from the Senate to dispense with their attendance as officers of State. Under the present favourable aspect of public affairs, and after the Consuls had given such evident proofs of their respect for the commonwealth, it was supposed that the authors of the late revolution might now return in safety to the capital; and Cicero himself, on this occasion, was so confident of the perfect restoration of peace to the republic, that in writing to Atticus, he assures him, that "Brutus may now walk the "streets of Rome with a crown of gold on his "head." In this, however, with all his penetration, he had overrated the professions, and mistaken the designs of Antony, now in the supreme direction of affairs. This profligate adventurer, the more dangerous that he was supposed, by his debaucheries, disqualified for any deep or arduous design, had assumed the disguise of moderation and deference to the Senate, merely to conceal his intentions, until he should have formed a party on which he could rely. He had so far imposed on the public, by

seeming to be alarmed with danger to his own person from the riots which he affected to suppress after the funeral of Cæsar, that the Senate permitted him to arm his friends; and suffered him, under their own authority, to assemble a powerful body of men, amounting to some thousands, chiefly composed of officers who had served under the late Dictator, and who now submitted to act as the guards of Antony's person *. Being thus strengthened, when the return of Brutus and Cassius was mentioned to him, it appeared that these were not the associates with whom he meant to co-operate in the State. "They "cannot be safe," he said, "in the midst of so "many of Cæsar's retainers and friends †."

Antony was greatly awed by the abilities of Brutus and Cassius, by the respect which was paid them by the public, by their credit with the Senate, and by their determined resolution to maintain its authority. In order, therefore, to fortify himself against them, he maintained a continual correspondence with the veterans of the late Cæsar's army, courted their attachment, and stated himself as their protector and leader. In this quality, he made his visit to their settlements in Campania, where, it has been observed, he passed the greater part of the months of April and May. At his return, he endeavoured to strengthen himself still more, by entering into a concert with Lepidus, who, in the station of second in command to Cæsar, or general of the horse

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. i.

† Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 1,

to the Dictator, remained at the head of all the military forces in Italy. He became engaged to obtain for Lepidus the dignity of Chief Pontiff; and, in order to cement the union of their families, proposed a marriage of his own daughter with the son of this officer. He had been averse to the promotion of Dolabella, and, at the death of Cæsar, would have opposed his assuming the dignity of Consul, if he had not been prevented at first, by the uncertainty of his own situation, and afterwards, by the countenance which this intruder into public office began to receive from the Senate itself. In these circumstances, to dispute the accession of Dolabella would be to throw him entirely into the hands of the republican party; he thought proper, therefore, to disguise his inclinations, and took measures to gain him, or at least to set him at variance with the authors of the late conspiracy. For this purpose, he made him an offer of his services to procure an appointment to command in any of the more advantageous provincial situations.

Notwithstanding that Cassius was already appointed to the government of Syria, Antony, according to agreement, undertook to support the pretensions of Dolabella, and to aid him in supplanting Cassius at the meeting of the Senate, which was to be held on the first of June. Having, in this manner, set his rivals at variance among themselves, and, with great industry and application, strengthened himself by his coalition with Lepidus and Dolabella, the one at the head of the army, the other his own colleague in the principal office of the State; and ha-

ving secured the attachment and support of the veteran soldiers recently settled in Italy; he no longer kept any terms with the senatorian party, or with the friends of the republic. Having formerly obtained a resolution of the Senate to confirm all the acts, and to maintain the arrangements which had been devised by Cæsar, and being master of the papers and memorials in which these were contained, he brought extracts and quotations from them in support of his several proposals, without producing the originals; and in this form commenced, in the name of the dead, a reign more arbitrary than that of the living Cæsar had been. As he had never communicated to any one the papers or memorials from which these authorities were drawn, he expunged or he inserted whatever he thought proper, or even, without taking this trouble, framed his quotations on every subject, to the purpose which he meant to serve. He made Cæsar's memorials to teem with intended laws and acts of the Senate, and of the People; with grants and forfeitures of lands; with the pardon of crimes and recalls from banishment; with orders for levying contributions from princes, states, and private persons; with compositions to be exacted from towns and corporations, for the ransom of their possessions, liberties, and franchises; and even with distinct resolutions and decisions relating to matters which took their rise after Cæsar's death *. His wife Fulvia, the widow of Clodius, likewise availed herself of this valuable

* Cicer. Philip. ii, c. 38.

mine, and sold offices and commissions, together with entire provinces and kingdoms *, to those who were willing to pay her the price, which she set upon her good offices, in having such grants inserted among the memorials of Cæsar.

Among the acts of Antony during this Consulate, is mentioned a change which he made in the judiciary law, by which he obtained, that a certain number of Centurions, or military men, should be entered on the rolls of the judges, instead of the revenue officers †, whom Cæsar had excluded. Relying on this and other artifices, which procured him the support of the army, he rose every day in his presumption; and while he incited Dolabella to persist in supplanting Cassius in the province of Syria, he himself proposed to supplant Marcus Brutus in his nomination to the government of Macedonia. By this appointment, he meant to place himself at the head of the army, which Cæsar, to be in readiness for his Asiatic or Parthian expedition, had transported into Macedonia; and it appeared afterwards to be his design, as soon as he had obtained the command of this army, to procure an appointment to supersede Decimus Brutus in the province of Cisalpine Gaul, and under pretence of expelling him from thence, to retransport this army again into Italy.

In order to obtain acts for so much of these purposes as he was then about to execute, he summoned all the members of the Senate ‡ to assemble on

* Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. xiv, ep. 12. † Tribuni Ærarii.
‡ Cicero ad Attic. lib. xv, ep. 6.

the first of June. He had brought into the city, to overawe this assembly, great numbers of his veterans, on whom he himself, besides confirming the settlements which had been assigned to them by Cæsar, had bestowed considerable favours. At this meeting of the Senate, few of the members, who were inclined to oppose the Consul, thought that they themselves could with safety attend. Even Hirtius and Pansa, though named for the Consulate of the following year, and protected by the dignity which belonged to that destination, thought proper to absent themselves *.

At a call of the Senate, so ill attended, Antony obtained for himself, without opposition, the government of Macedonia, with the command of the well-appointed army which had been destined for Asia, but which, from the period of Cæsar's death, had remained inactive in that province. He at the same time obtained for Dolabella the province of Syria to the exclusion of Cassius; and by these several arrangements, stated himself and his colleague as in open enmity with the leaders of the republican party, whom they had lately affected to court, but whom they now proceeded to strip of the preferments and honours which had been assigned to them by the commonwealth.

Under pretence of making compensations to Cassius and Brutus for the loss of the provinces of Macedonia and Syria, of which they were now deprived, Antony procured them appointments which

* Cicer. ad Attic. Philip. i, c. 2.

they considered as an additional insult; that of Brutus, to inspect the supplies of corn from Asia; and that of Cassius, to superintend the supplies of the same kind which were brought from Sicily.

While the Senate complied with Antony in his demands on these several subjects, they endeavoured to restrain his abuse of the supposed will and memorials of Cæsar. For this purpose they appointed a committee of their own number to inspect the contents of those papers, and to attest the reality of such notes and instructions as were to be carried into execution under the authority of the Senate. Antony, however, paid no regard to this appointment, nor even suffered the committee to meet in discharge of the duty for which they were named.

About this time *, and alarmed by these violences, Cicero, who had hitherto maintained some degree of neutrality or moderation between the parties, withdrew from the city. He had, before the death of Cæsar, under pretence of superintending the education of his son at Athens, intended to settle in Greece, and had obtained Cæsar's consent, and the leave of the Senate for this purpose. On Cæsar's death, having hopes that the republic was about to revive, he took his resolution to remain at Rome; but being now satisfied that these hopes were vain, or, in his own figurative expression, observing, *that, although the tree had been cut down on the Ides of March, its roots were yet entire, and made vigorous shoots*, he resumed his former design of absenting

* The middle of June.

himself; and instead of applying again to the Senate for leave, accepted from Dolabella, the newly appointed governor of Syria, a commission of lieutenancy in that province, which he was to employ as a pretence for crossing the Ionian sea. In execution of this design, he arrived on the twenty-sixth of June at Antium, where he found Brutus, with his wife Porcia, and his mother Servilia, with other persons of distinction. He gave it as his opinion, that Brutus and Cassius, for the sake of peace, should accept of the commissions assigned to them as inspectors of the supplies of corn from Sicily and Asia, and should repair to their several provinces for that purpose. While the company were yet deliberating on this subject, they were joined by Cassius, who, upon Cicero's repeating what he had said, answered, with a stern countenance, That he would not go into Sicily, nor accept as a favour what was intended as an affront. He complained, that opportunities had been lost of rendering effectual the first and principal step which had been taken to deliver the commonwealth, and was inclined to blame Decimus Brutus for some part of this neglect. Cicero censured the conduct of the whole party, for not having secured the completion of a business that was so successfully begun. "You ought," he said, "immediately upon the death of Cæsar, to have assumed "the government, to have called the Senate by your "own authority, and to have taken advantage of the "spirit that was generally raised among the People "for the recovery of their legal constitution."

In the result of this conference, Brutus and Cas-

lius, as well as Cicero, took their resolution to depart from Italy; and the two former, with so much resentment of the indignity which they had suffered in their appointment to inspect the importation of corn, that they engaged Servilia * to employ her influence in having this appointment expunged from the public acts or records of the Senate. Before their departure, they wrote a joint letter to Antony, conveyed in expressions that were guarded and polite; but demanding an explanation of the terms on which they stood with him, and of the purposes for which he had assembled the veterans of Cæsar in such numbers at Rome. Some time after this letter was sent, they drew up a joint edict or manifesto, setting forth the cause of their absence from the capital, and protesting against the violence which was daily offered to the constitution of their country.

In answer to this letter, and to the paper with which it was followed, Antony issued a manifesto full of invective and contumely, and which he transmitted, under a formal address, to the Prætors Brutus and Cassius, accompanied with a letter in the same style. The originals of these several papers are lost; but in reply to the last, we find addressed to Antony, and signed by Brutus and Cassius, the following original preserved among the letters of Cicero.

"Brutus and Cassius, Prætors, to Antony, Consul, &c.

* The mother of Brutus.

" We have received your letter, with [illegible]
" manifesto, is full of reproach and of [illegible]
" very improper from you to us. We have done
" you no injury; and if we were inclined to hostili-
" ties, your letter should not restrain us. But you
" know our resolutions, and you presume to threaten
" us, to the end that our pacific conduct may be
" imputed to fear. We wish you all the preferments
" and honours which are consistent with the freedom
" of the commonwealth. We have no desire to quar-
" rel with you; but we value our liberties more than
" we value your friendship. Consider well what
" you undertake, and what you can support. Do
" not be encouraged so much by the length of Cæ-
" sar's life, as warned by the short duration of the
" power he usurped. We pray to God, that your
" designs may be innocent, or, if they be not inno-
" cent, that they may be as little hurtful to yourself
" as the safety of the commonwealth can permit *."

These altercations, as might be expected, led to an open breach. The Prætors wrote to Decimus Brutus, Trebonius, and Cimber, to put their several provinces in a state of defence, and to make what further provision they could of men and money, as for a war that could not be avoided. Cicero, in continuing his voyage to Greece, had arrived on the sixth of August at Leucopetræ, beyond Rhegium, and had set out from thence; but being put back, was met by some citizens at Rhegium, just arrived from Rome, who brought him copies of the edicts

* Cicer. ad Famil. lib. ii, ep. 3. Dated 4th of August.

or manifestos issued by Cassius and Brutus, with a report, that a full meeting of the Senate was expected on the first of September; that Brutus and Cassius had sent circular letters requesting the attendance of all their friends; that Antony was likely to drop his designs; that the cause of the republic, bearing so favourable an aspect, his own departure was censured, and his presence was earnestly wished for.

Upon these representations, Cicero took his resolution to return to Rome, and arrived again at Pompeii, on the nineteenth of August *. Here, among the accounts of what had passed in the Senate on the first of that month, he was informed that Piso, the father of Calpurnia, and father-in-law of the late Cæsar, had, notwithstanding this connection and his interest in the remains of the late usurpation, vigorously opposed the measures of Antony; and, on that occasion, had acquired great distinction as a man of ability, and as an upright citizen; but that not being properly supported in the Senate, he had declined any further struggle, and had absented himself on the following day.

Cicero, though not greatly encouraged by these reports, continued his journey to Rome; and having arrived on the last of August, found that the expectations which he had been made to entertain of Antony's intentions were void of foundation; and that the outrages this adventurer was likely to commit were such, as to make it extremely unsafe for any

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. xvi, ep. 7.

distinguished friend of the republic to come in his power. For this reason, Cicero, on the first of September, sent an excuse to the Senate, pleading the ill state of his health, which obliged him to remain shut up in his own house. Antony considered his absence from the meeting as an affront to himself, or as giving too much countenance to the suspicions which were entertained of his violent intentions. Under this impression he burst into rage, and sent an officer to require the attendance of Cicero, threatening, if he persisted in his supposed contumacy, to pull down his house about his ears; the ordinary method of forcing those to submission, who shut themselves up, or took refuge in their dwellings from any sentence of the law. He was dissuaded, however, from attempting to execute his threat; and being himself absent from the Senate on the following day, Cicero ventured to take his seat, and, in the absence of the Consul, delivered that oration which is entitled the first Philippic. In this speech he accounted for his late retirement from the capital, and for his present return, in terms strongly reflecting on the conduct and administration of the present Consul.

Antony, in his turn, greatly exasperated by the accounts he received of Cicero's speech, prepared to reply at a subsequent meeting of the Senate; and delivered himself accordingly with great acrimony against his antagonist. These mutual attacks thus made in the absence of parties, produced from Cicero that famous oration which is entitled the second Philippic; a model of eloquence in the

style of ancient invective, but which, though put in the form of an immediate reply to imputations supposed to be made in his own presence, never was at all delivered, and is to be considered as little more than a rhetorical pleading in a fictitious case. The offence, however, which was given by the publication of this invective, made a principal part in the quarrel, which the parties never ceased to pursue, till it ended with Cicero's life.

While the Consul Antony in this manner threw off the mask of a legal magistrate, and acted in some measure as a person who succeeded to the military usurpation erected by Cæsar, a new actor appeared on the stage of public affairs, from whose youth, nothing important, it was thought, could, for some time, be expected. This was Caius Octavius, the grand-nephew of Julius Cæsar, by his niece Attia, and the son of Octavius, who, in the course of State-preferments, had arrived at the dignity of Prætor; and in this rank, having governed the province of Macedonia, died suddenly on his return from thence. His widow, the mother of this young man, married Philippus, a citizen of moderate parts, but upright intentions. In the house of Philippus the young Octavius was brought up, and passed his early years, while his grand-uncle was engaged in the most active parts of his life, and while he was insinuating himself by intrigues, or forcing his way at the head of armies, to the sovereignty of the Roman empire. Elevated by his connection with this relation to a high situation, and to higher views, he had followed him in the late campaign against the sons of Pom-

pey in Spain, and was already marked out, though a minor, to succeed Lepidus, under the dictator, as general of the horse.

Upon the return of Cæsar into Italy, and after the army destined for the war in Asia had been transported into Macedonia, the young Octavius was sent to Apollonia, as a place at which he might continue his studies, and his military exercises, and be in the way to join the army, and to attend his uncle in the projected expedition to the East.

After this young man had been about six months at Apollonia, a messenger arrived in the beginning of the night with accounts of Cæsar's death, bearing, that he had fallen in the Senate; but without determining whether he fell by the hands of a few, or in the execution of a general resolution of the whole body. The young man was greatly dejected and perplexed in his thoughts. The military men then about him advised him to repair to the quarters of the army in Macedonia, and to put himself at their head. But his stepfather Philippus, and his mother Attia, in their letters, had cautioned him against this or any other ambitious design: they advised him to return into Italy in the most private manner, and warned him to avoid giving any umbrage to the partisans of the republic, who had now got the ascendant at Rome, and would not allow any person whatever to tread in the dangerous steps of his late uncle.

Octavius accordingly embarked for Italy; and as he knew not what might be the disposition of the troops who were then stationed at Brundisium, he

chose to land at Lupia, a place at some little distance, and on the same coast. Here he received farther accounts from Rome, with particulars of the conspiracy; the proceedings of the Senate; accommodation of the parties; the tumults that arose at Cæsar's funeral; the will, and his own share in it: but his friends still persisted in recommending a private station, and advised him even to drop his pretensions to the name and inheritance of Cæsar. But this youth, though only turned of eighteen, took upon him to decide for himself in this matter. He sent an officer to sound the disposition of the garrison at Brundisium; and finding that they were inclined to revenge the death of their late favourite leader, and that they resented the other proceedings of the republican party, he proceeded in person to Brundisium in the most public manner, and was met at the gates by the troops, who received him with all the honours thought due to the son and representative of Cæsar.

From this time forward, Octavius assumed the name and designation of his late uncle. He was soon after attended by persons of all ranks from the neighbourhood of Brundisium, and set forward to Rome with a retinue, to which, as he passed on the way, he received continual accession of numbers. The veterans, in general, who had grants of land, flocked to him; complained of the remissness of Antony in suffering the assassins of his own friend and benefactor to go unpunished, and declared their resolution to be revenged, as soon as any person appeared to lead them. Octavius thanked them for

their grateful respect to his father's memory, but exhorted them to moderation and submission. He wished to know the state of parties more perfectly before he should declare himself; and on his journey to Rome, young as he was, employed all the caution and wariness of age for the security of his own person, lest any disguised enemy should have insinuated themselves amongst a multitude of professed friends, who were yet generally unknown to him. At Terracina, about fifty miles from Rome, he received a report, that the Consuls had superseded Brutus and Cassius in the provinces of Macedonia and Syria, and by the same account had assigned them inferior stations, at Cyrene and Crete; that many exiles were recalled, particularly Sextus Pompeius; and that, under pretence of executing the intentions of Cæsar, many new members were admitted into the Senate *.

Octavius, upon his arrival at Rome, found his step-father and his mother under great apprehensions of danger to his person from the power of the Senate, and from the general disposition which appeared in the late act of indemnity that was passed in favour of those who had borne an active part in Cæsar's death. And these apprehensions were strongly confirmed by the neglect of Antony, who took no notice of his arrival, and did not pay that attention which from him might be thought due to the name of Cæsar; but notwithstanding these unpromising appearances, this young person neither desponded nor ex-

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

posed himself by any hasty act of presumption. He said, "That, being so young a man, and in a private "station, he could not expect that the first advances "should be made to him from the Roman Consul; "that he would soon convince the Senate of his "dutiful intentions towards them; that all the world "must applaud in him the endeavours he should "make to bring the authors of his father's death to "justice; that the act of indemnity, in favour of the "assassins, had passed when there was no one to "oppose it; but that a charge of murder, when di-"rectly brought *, could not be slighted by the Se-"nate, by the Roman People, nor even by Antony "himself; that to decline the inheritance which was "left to him, would be disrespectful to the memory "of Cæsar, and injurious to the Roman People, in "whose behalf he was made executor of his father's "will. Cæsar," he said, "has distinguished me, "and honoured me; and I had rather die, than ap-"pear unworthy of such a father." His friends were silenced by the appearance of so much discretion and resolution. They broke off the conference with an advice, which already appeared to be unnecessary, That he should do nothing rashly, nor embrace violent measures, where prudence might equally gain his purpose.

Next morning this young man, attended by a numerous company of his friends, repaired to the Forum, and presented himself before the Prætor C. Antonius, in order to declare in form his acceptance

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

of the inheritance of his late uncle, and in order to be solemnly invested with the name of Cæsar. Thence he went to Pompey's gardens, where the Consul then resided; and after being made to wait, for some time, in a manner that sufficiently discovered, on the part of Antony, a dislike to his visit, he was at last admitted to a conference.

The young Octavius, having been educated as the nearest relation to Cæsar, and destined to inherit his fortunes, had conceived the extent of his own importance from the height of Cæsar's power; he considered the sovereignty of the empire, in some measure, as his birthright, and his own interest as the central point to which all public transactions should tend. In this conference with Antony, he is said to have betrayed more of this character than suited his present condition, or than could be reconciled with the discretion with which he had acted on other occasions. He entered with the Consul on a review of his conduct as an officer of State, from the death of Cæsar to the present moment; thanked him for the regard he had in some things shown to his father's memory, and with equal confidence censured and arraigned him in others. "You did well," he said, "in resisting the motion which was made in the Se-"nate to thank the murderers of my father and your "own benefactor and friend; and you did well in "depriving Brutus and Cassius of the important pro-"vinces of Macedonia and Syria; but why precl "my just resentments by an act of indemnity in t "favour? Why assign any provinces at all to "persons? Why suffer Decimus Brutus, in par

"lar, with so great a force, to keep possession of "Gaul? This is not only to spare, but to arm them "against me." He concluded by demanding restitution of the money which Antony had seized in the temple of Ops*; to the end that he might, without delay, pay off to the Roman People the legacies bequeathed to them by Cæsar.

Octavius, in this first specimen of his boldness and address, although he ventured to insult the Roman Consul, paid court to the army and to the People; and perhaps wished for the reputation of having quarrelled with Antony on the subject of his remissness in avenging the death of Cæsar, and from his own impatience to pay off the contents of his will. Antony, being surprised and piqued at the arrogance of his speech and of his pretensions, endeavoured to check his ambition, by putting him in mind, that although he was named the heir of Cæsar's estate, he must not pretend to inherit his dignities; that the Roman constitution acknowledged no hereditary powers; that he ought to remember in whose presence he stood; that the Roman Consul must be equally indifferent to his approbation, or to his censure. "To me," he said, "it was owing that your "relation was not declared an usurper and a tyrant; "consequently, to me it is owing that you have any "other inheritance by him besides the disgrace of "being related to a traitor, whose body had been "dragged through the streets, and cast into the Ti-"ber. As to any money which may have been

* Plut. in Antonio. Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

" lodged in the treasury: of that," he said, " Cæsar
" had already diverted too much to his own private
" uses; that when his receipts came to be examined,
" and when the sums not accounted for came to be
" claimed, much public money might be found
" among his effects; that Cæsar himself, if living,
" could not refuse to make up his accounts; and
" that a proposal was actually in forwardness to have
" them stated and examined."

From these altercations, Octavius and Antony parted on very ill terms, and were publicly known to have quarrelled. Octavius, from an affected zeal to put the People in possession of the legacy bequeathed to them by his father, brought his own effects to sale. Antony, on his part, affected to promote the inquiry into the applications of public money, and gave out, that the heirs of the late Dictator would have great sums to refund, and little reversion. These heirs, in return, pleaded the late decree of the Senate and People, ratifying all Cæsar's acts, and consequently precluding all inquiries into this, or any other part of his administration; but as Antony could fabricate acts of Cæsar, when wanting, to his purpose, so he could set aside or evade the most formal authority when it stood in his way.

In the mean time, the friends of the republic rejoiced at a breach which seemed to weaken their enemies, and gave them hopes, that a competition for the succession to Cæsar's power would divide the army, and thus shake the foundation on which that power itself was supported. In this contest, Antony, by his age, his character of magistrate, and

by his great personal influence in the commonwealth, having so much the abvantage, they thought it safest to promote the interest of his antagonist, who was in a private station, a minor, under the direction of relations inclined to moderation, and strongly possessed with deference to the Senate. Antony, by his arrogance, and the public contempt with which he treated the heir of Cæsar, gave offence to the very party from which he himself hoped for his principal support. Having already obtained all the ends which he proposed to himself in courting the Senate, he pulled off the mask, and set them at defiance. Octavius, on the contrary, while he endeavoured to supplant his antagonist in the favour of the People, affected great deference to the Senate, and regard to the commonwealth. He even changed his language in public respecting the conspirators, and to their friends affected a desire to be reconciled with them. Being at the country-house of Philippus at Tusculum, near to that of Cicero, he took this opportunity to pay his court to a person of so much consideration in the republican party; accosted him with the title of Father, and mentioning his friends of the late conspiracy with respect, affected to put himself entirely under his protection *. Cicero being either the dupe of these artifices, or willing to encourage Octavius against Antony, seemed to listen to his professions; notwithstanding that Philippus, who was interested to save the republic, at the same

* Cic. ad Attic. lib. xiv, ep. 11. Modo venit Octavius in proximam villam Philippi, mihi totus deditus.

time informed him that he did not believe this artful boy was sincere *.

While the young Cæsar thus strove to ingratiate himself with the party of the Senate, his chief reliance was on the People. He opened an office for the payment of the late Dictator's legacy to every one who claimed a share of it; and as these liberalities were ascribed to the deceased, and could not be made a charge of corruption against himself, he did not scruple to extend them beyond the letter of the will. He endeavoured at the same time to make it be believed, that by the oppressions of Antony he was straitened for means to perform his duty in this respect to the People; enjoined his agents to hasten the sale of his own effects at any price, and continually brought new articles to the market in order to raise money with this pious intention †. Being introduced to the People by one of the Tribunes, he delivered a harangue, in which he apprised them of his purpose to exhibit shows and theatrical entertainments in honour of his late father's memory ‡. And meant at these entertainments to have seated himself in his late uncle's chair of state; but in this particular had the mortification of being forbid by the Tribunes §.

Although the Senators in general promoted the claims of Octavius, and considered him as a zealous confederate against Antony, who was the principal object of their fears, the conspirators saw in him

* Cic. ad Attic. lib. xii, ep. 15.
† Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.
‡ Ibid. lib. xv, ep. 1.
§ Ibid. ep. 2.

representative of their late enemy, and the leader of Cæsar's army. They endeavoured to put their friends on their guard against him, and by all means in their power to counteract his popular arts. For this purpose the public entertainments, which were this year to have been given by Brutus in the quality of Prætor, were provided and exhibited in his absence with great splendour. These exhibitions, from animosity to the young Cæsar, rather than from a regard to Brutus, were brought on by C. Antonius, the brother of the present Consul, who being Prætor, presided in the place of his absent colleague, and who was desirous on this occasion to divide with Octavius the popular favour even in behalf of Brutus, with whom he was not any more than his brother on good terms *.

As in such festivals, the object of the giver was to ingratiate himself, so the applause with which the entertainment was received, was considered as an indication of his success, in any project he had in view with the People. On the present occasion, the Tereus of Accius being brought on the stage, and every sentiment of liberty applicable to the times being greatly applauded, this was considered as an intimation of popular favour to the deliverers of their country, and to Brutus in particular, the giver of the feast. His friends, of course, thought this a favourable opportunity to make trial of their strength; and as the Roman People, still supposed to be the sovereigns of the world, were accustomed,

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

like other despotical masters, to decide on the greatest affairs as matters of occasional pastime, and in the midst of their pleasures, the aristocratical party raised a cry, that the restorers of public liberty should be recalled to their country *. But this cry was not returned by the audience, and the performance itself was stopped by the clamours of the opposite party, until the proposal now made in favour of the conspirators should be withdrawn.

Brutus and Cassius, finding their party among the People so little able to support them, saw no security but in the possession of territory, which, in case of an open attack from their enemies, might supply them with money and arms for their defence. They determined, therefore, notwithstanding the late arrangements, by which they were superseded, to repair to the provinces to which they had been originally destined; Cassius to Syria, and Brutus to Macedonia and Greece. They were encouraged in the execution of this purpose by the divisions and quarrels which arose in the opposite party. Observing that the adherents of the late Cæsar were ranged on different sides; some with Octavius, and others with Antony; that the army itself, though extremely averse to disputes, which tended to disturb them in the possession of the advantage they had gained, were likely to hesitate or to divide in the choice of their leader; these restorers of the commonwealth left Italy with some hopes, that a set-

* Cicero ad Att. lib. xvi. ep. 2.

blance of public freedom might return in the dissention of its enemies.

Meantime, the officers whom Antony had assembled as a guard to his own person, ventured to expostulate with him on a breach which was so likely to weaken their party, and they exhorted him to act in concert with Octavius, at least until they had obtained a just revenge against the assassins of Cæsar. On this occasion Antony entered into the reasons of his past conduct, and accounted for the concessions which he had made to the Senate, as necessary to obtain the conditions on which the present flourishing state of the party depended. He reminded his friends, that it was by his means that Cæsar's grants had been ratified; that it was by his means that, notwithstanding the late act of indemnity, the conspirators had been expelled from the city, and stripped of their provinces. But whatever mask he had hitherto been obliged to assume, for the future, he assured them, that being possessed of a proper force, he would appear undisguised, and give sufficient proof of his regard to Cæsar's memory, and to the interest of his surviving friends. In compliance with the entreaties which were now made to him at this conference, he soon after had an interview with Octavius; at which they were, in appearance, reconciled to each other: but their pretensions were far from being sufficiently adjusted to render any agreement between them of long continuance. Octavius aspired to a degree of consequence which Antony by no means thought necessary to admit in so young a person. His undoubted

title to the inheritance of Cæsar, and the attachment of Cæsar's personal friends, made Antony consider his advancement as altogether incompatible with the success of his own designs. Effects of their jealousies and animosities accordingly in the sequel appeared, such as rendered an open breach again unavoidable.

A vacancy having happened in the college of Tribunes *, Octavius, though far short of the legal age, was presented by his friends as a candidate for this station. Antony, to cross them, without specifying any particular case, published an edict in general terms, threatening with prosecution any person who should make a proposition to the People contrary to law; and by these means prevented their farther proceeding in this design.

Soon after this act of authority, on the part of Antony, to check the ambition of the young Cæsar, men armed as for an assassination were discovered in the Consul's house. They were not brought to any public examination; but it was given out that they had been suborned by Octavius. Whether this plot was fabricated, in order to load an enemy with the odium of it, and to justify the measures which were meditated against a person supposed to have aimed at the Consul's life, or whether it was by Antony himself actually believed to be real, is uncertain. It occasioned a considerable ferment in the city, and the parties reasoned upon it as they were severally inclined. The friends of Antony

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

persisted in accusing Octavius, and others recriminated, urging as a proof of Antony's design on the life of Cæsar, his having recourse in this manner to a forgery, which was evidently intended to exasperate the army and the People against his antagonist, and to justify the violence which he himself, with the first opportunity, meant to employ *. Cicero, however, says, that people of judgment believed the plot on the part of Octavius to have been real, and that they approved of it †.

In the late interval of military usurpation, the Senators in general, though willing to resume the government, were actually unable to bear the load which it was likely to lay on their shoulders. They rejoiced at the breach between Octavius and Antony; but if these adventurers should continue to quarrel about the spoils of the commonwealth, the greater part of those who had any interest in defending it were no more than a prey to the conqueror. Clouds hung over their councils on every side. The officers who had served under Cæsar in the late civil war, were posted at the head of armies in the most advantageous situations. Asinius Pollio was governor in the farther province of Spain, Lepidus in the nearer; Plancus commanded in Gaul, and Antony in Macedonia. The veterans remained in the neighbourhood of Rome with swords in their hands, anxious for the settlements which had been lately assigned to themselves by Cæsar. These they did not believe to be secure without the destruction

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. † Cic. ad Famil. lib. xii, ep. 23.

of every law and of every form which could be cited to favour the claims of the former proprietors.

Antony made rapid advances to the military usurpation he had in view. Having availed himself so far of his first appointment, as to get possession of the numerous and respectable army which Cæsar, on their way to the Parthian war, had transported into Macedonia, he proceeded to execute the exchange he had projected of this province for the Cisalpine Gaul; and, under pretence of expelling Decimus Brutus from thence, had ordered the army of Cæsar to be transported back into Italy. Soon after the detection of the supposed plot of Octavius, he himself departed from Rome, and set out for Brundisium. The troops which he had ordered from Macedonia were already arrived at that place; and as he had intelligence that Octavius had his emissaries employed to seduce them, he hastened to prevent the effect of this design, and to secure his own authority. He professed to employ this army merely in gaining possession of the province which had lately been decreed to him by the People. But, in the desire of occupying, with an army, that very station from which the late Cæsar had so successfully invaded the republic; and which, according to the expression of Cato on the nomination of Cæsar to that province, was in reality the citadel or commanding station which gave possession of Rome; he sufficiently evinced the designs which he had formed against the republic, and no less alarmed the supposed heir of Cæsar's fortunes, who expected to be the

first victim of his power, than it threatened the republic itself with a new and dangerous usurpation.

Under these impressions, while Antony took the road to Brundisium, Octavius repaired to Campania, and, by large donations * in money, engaged the veterans who were settled at Calatia, Casilinum, and Capua, to declare for himself. With this powerful support, he published his intention to withstand the Consul, and took measures to procure the authority of the Senate against their common enemy. He professed great zeal for liberty, and affected to put himself entirely under the direction of Cicero, now the most respectable of all the remaining members of the Senate. He entreated this experienced counsellor to favour him with an interview at Capua. "Once more," he said, in his letter upon this occasion, "save the republic." At their conference it was deliberated whether Octavius should throw himself into Capua with three hundred veterans who had joined him, and there intercept Antony on his return to Rome; or should cross the Apennines, to give the legions, who were marching from Brundisium by the opposite coast, an opportunity to execute the project of defection, which he believed they were meditating in his favour. In this question he affected to be determined entirely by Cicero, who advised him, in preference to either of the schemes he had mentioned, to move with all the force he could assemble directly to Rome †.

* Five hundred Denarii, i. e. about L. 16.

† Cicero ad Attic. lib. xvi, ep. 8.

In compliance with this advice, Octavius having assembled ten thousand men, without waiting to array, or even to have them completely armed, advanced with the utmost dispatch to prevent Antony, who about the same time had set out from Brundisium, and directed his march without intermission towards Rome *.

The city was thrown into a great alarm by this unexpected approach of two hostile armies. Some expressed their fears of Antony, others of Octavius, and some of both. It was uncertain whether these partisans advanced in concert to oppress the republic, or in competition to contend for its spoils. Many appearances favoured the latter supposition; and the late reconciliation gave some credit to the former.

Octavius, having the advantage of a shorter march, arrived before his antagonist; and being within two miles of the gates, was there received by Canutius, one of the Tribunes, whom he soon after sent back into the city, with assurances, that he had assembled his party not to second, but to oppose the designs of Antony; and that his purpose was to employ all the force he could raise for the defence of the commonwealth. The Tribune Canutius, in reporting what passed with Octavius, exhorted all who wished to preserve the republic to lend their assistance in execution of this design.

Upon these assurances, delivered by a Tribune of the People, the gates were thrown open to Octa-

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

vius, and he entered the city, though not in a military form, yet followed by a numerous band of attendants, who were armed, though with weapons concealed. With this company he took possession of the temple of Castor and Pollux, and prepared to explain himself to a numerous concourse of people, who were hastening into the area or court before the temple. Being introduced by the Tribune into this assembly, as a person who had matters of great moment to communicate respecting the state of public affairs and the designs of Antony, he began his speech by commemorating the merits of his late adoptive father, with the ingratitude and injustice of Antony; declared, that although he had assembled his friends merely in his own defence, he was ready to employ them in the service of his country, and submitted himself entirely to such directions as he should receive from the powers established by law in the commonwealth; observed, that they could not possibly doubt of his inclination to be employed, at least against his own personal enemies.

It was probably in this speech, that Octavius, being to make a solemn asseveration, pointed to the statue of Julius Cæsar, with these words, "So may "I arrive at my father's honours*!" He had two opposite and irreconcileable parties to please on this occasion, and had not learned, that the only safe course in such cases is silence. He offended the partisans of the republic by the veneration he expressed for Cæsar, and by his wish to tread in his

* Cicero ad Atticum, lib. xvi. ep. 15.

steps; and in this, perhaps, committed the only public indiscretion with which he is chargeable in any part of his conduct. But what was in reality a more dangerous effect of this error, he offended the military part of his audience by the regard he affected to entertain for the civil government of the State, and by his open declaration of war against Antony. By this declaration, military men found themselves not invited to enter, as they expected, on the secure possession of the rewards and honours which had been promised to them; but called upon to fight for empire against their late fellow-soldiers, commanded by an officer now at the head of the commonwealth, from whom they had high expectations as a friend, and much to fear as an enemy.

Soldiers of fortune being thus disappointed of the spoils which they expected to seize, and of the rewards which were due for services past, some of them absolutely renounced the party of Octavius; others, under pretence of providing arms and necessaries for the field, or pleading various excuses, applied for leave to return to their own habitations. The greater part of the veterans actually withdrew: but Octavius, young as he was, did not sink under this untoward aspect of his force. He had ordered levies in Etruria, and in the district of Ravenna. These levies, upon the reputation of the ascendant he had gained in the city, succeeded apace, and [illegible] duced military adventurers from every quarter to pouse his cause.

Many who had served under Julius Cæsar, bei accustomed to the life of a soldier, though destit

for landholders in Italy, were not yet rooted in the condition of citizens, or in that of husbandmen. They had yet fresh in their memories the licence and the spoils of war. These allurements they saw offered anew under the auspices of a leader who bore the name of Cæsar, and whose munificence was recently brought to the proof. Many, therefore, even of those who had lately fallen off from Octavius, being unwilling that others should engross the harvest in which they themselves had been invited to partake, again repaired to his standard; and, as fast as they arrived, were sent into different quarters, to be armed, arrayed, and furnished with all necessaries for immediate service *.

Octavius from thenceforward conducted himself between the parties with great address: To the veterans he talked of avenging Cæsar's death: to the friends of the republic he set forth the dangerous designs of Antony, professing to sacrifice all private resentment to his zeal for the commonwealth †. On occasion of the Tribunitian elections, he even promoted the interest of Casca, though noted for having struck the first blow at Cæsar ‡, and affected in all things to be governed by the Senate.

Under this aspect of things, what hopes could be entertained for the republic? Could Statesmen intrust the age or the intention of this crafty boy, nursed, as they observed, in the midst of usurpa-

* Dio. Cassius, lib. xlv, c. 12. Appian de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

† Cicero ad Attic. lib. xv, ep. 12.

‡ Ibid. lib. xvi, ep. 15.

tion; and who, by arming himself without any legal authority, had given but too palpable evidence of an assuming and audacious spirit? The Senators stood in awe of Antony, and were afraid to provoke him. If they should do so, Octavius did not yet appear to be in condition to cope with the Roman Consul; and if his force were sufficient, his designs were likely to be equally dangerous to the commonwealth with those of his rival. The latter, with a numerous army, had all the authority of government in his hands.—The dispositions of Pansa and Hirtius, the Consuls named by Cæsar for the ensuing year, were yet unknown.—Although many things, therefore, were transacted in name of the Senate, this order of men scarcely ventured to resume their ordinary functions, and still trembled under the rod which Cæsar had lifted against them, even while it hung in suspence between the different divisions of his remaining party *. Piso, the father-in-law of Cæsar, had ventured to oppose Antony. Cicero and Publius Servilius afterwards followed this example. "But all that we have gained," said Cicero, "is no more than this, that the "Roman people may perceive, that whoever contends for liberty is not safe at Rome." These Senators, therefore, together with L. Cotta, L. Cæsar, and L. Sulpicius, had, in despair, upon seeing Antony put himself at the head of an army, absented themselves from the public assemblies.

* Cicero ad Attic. lib. xiv. ep. 5. et 6. Ibid. ad Dolabellam, post 17.

It was evident from every circumstance, that the fate of the empire was to be determined by the sword. The legions feeling their own consequence, were in haste to assume the character of masters, and treated with equal contempt, in their turns, the different persons who proposed to command them. Of the five legions which had been quartered in Macedonia, four were already landed at Brundisium when Antony arrived at that place. They turned out on his coming, but did not receive him with the usual acclamations and shouts. As having suspended their judgment, until they should know what gratuities they were to receive in reward of their services, they closed in profound silence round the platform from which he was to speak. When he mentioned four hundred sestertii, or between three and four pounds a man *; this being far short of the rewards that were expected for giving a new master to the commonwealth, he was answered with signs of derision. In return to this insolence, the Consul, trusting to the authority with which he was vested, assumed a tone which tended rather to exasperate than to overawe his audience. He reproached these legions with ingratitude for the favour he had recently done them, in changing their destination from Parthia to the Cisalpine Gaul; and with treachery, in having suffered to remain among them the emissaries, whom he said it was known a presumptuous boy had employed to debauch them from their duty. "These," he continued, "shall not escape me; in

* Dio. Cass. lib. 45, c. 15; or according to Appian, 100 = 16s.

"the mean time prepare yourselves for a march into "the province which is allotted for your station."

Antony, while he was speaking, [illegible] the mortification to see entire cohorts, with their officers, withdraw from his presence, uttering words of contempt and of scorn. Seeing the desertion likely to become general *, and being greatly provoked, he dismissed the audience, sentenced three hundred officers and private men to immediate death, and stood by while they perished under the hands of his Lictors, who were the executioners. Fulvia, who had attended him in his journey to Brundisium, is said to have been present likewise at this scene, and to have satiated her revenge of the insults offered to her husband, with so near a view of the executions, as to have her clothes stained with blood †.

The offence that was taken at these cruelties gave ample encouragements to the agents of Octavius, who, notwithstanding the threats of Antony, still continued to negociate in the quarters of his army. Papers were dropt and handed about, containing a contrast of Antony's parsimony with the liberality of Octavius. A search was made for the authors of these libels; but the bad success with which it was attended, served only to show the general disaffection of the troops. The accounts, at the same time, which were brought of the progress which Octavius made in the settlements of the veterans, and of his reception at Rome, gave Antony a just sense of his own danger, and made him change his tone. In a seco[illegible]

* Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xvi, ep. 8. † Ibid. Philip. iii, c. 2, et 4.

address to the army, he made an apology for his recent severities. They knew, he said, his character, that it was neither sordid nor severe; that the sums he had mentioned were no more than a present to signalize their meeting, and an earnest of his future munificence. He did not, however, at this time, make any addition to his former bounty, lest it should seem to be extorted.

The soldiers, in appearance satisfied with these declarations, accepted with respect the sum which had been offered to them; submitted to the changes which had been made among their officers, and marched off in divisions by the coast of the Adriatic towards Ariminum. Antony himself, with an escort of cavalry and infantry, composed of men the bravest and most attached to his person, whom he had selected from the army, set out for Rome. At his arrival the horse were quartered in the suburbs; he himself, attended by a body of foot, entered the city, had a regular guard mounted in the court of his own house, ordered centinels to be posted, gave the parole, and made every disposition to prevent surprise, as in a military station. Being still vested with the office of Consul, he summoned the Senate to meet on the twenty-fourth of September; and, in the proclamation or summons, declared, that if any Senator absented himself on that day, he should be deemed an accessary to the plot against the Consul's life, which had been lately discovered, and an accomplice in the other wicked designs known to be in agitation against the republic.

Notwithstanding this pompous threat, Antony himself did not attend at the time appointed; but, by another proclamation, again summoned the Senate to meet on the twenty-eight of the same month. He intended, on this day, to obtain a decree against Octavius; whom, in all his manifestos, he qualified with the name of Spartacus; as having, without any legal authority, presumed to levy war, and to act in open defiance of the State*; but, as he entered the porch of the Senate-house, a messenger arrived with accounts that the Legio Martia had deserted with its colours to Octavius. Before he had recovered this shock, another messenger came with a like account of the fourth legion. He entered the assembly, but very much disconcerted, and unprepared to act in circumstances so different from those with which he laid his account. He avoided the mention of Octavius; and pretending to have called the Senate for form's sake, without any particular business, made a short speech, and adjourned. From this meeting, hearing that one of the revolted legions had taken post at Alba, he instantly repaired to that place, in hopes of reclaiming them; but was received with a discharge of arrows or stones from the battlements, and obliged to retire. Fearing that the remainder of the army would follow this example, he ordered them an additional gratuity of five hundred sestertii, or about four pounds a man. And to give them an immediate prospect of action, which is often the most effectual means

* Cicer. Philip. iii, c. 8.

stifling dangerous humours in an army, he declared his intention to make war on Decimus Brutus, in order to dislodge him from the province of Gaul. In pursuance of this intention, he ordered his equipage for the field, and set up his standard at Tibur *, to which place he expected that all his friends and adherents would repair.

Antony, being joined by the last of the troops from Macedonia, had still three legions belonging to that army; and these, together with the veterans settled in the neighbourhood of Tibur, who came with their ensigns and colours to offer their services, amounted in all to four legions, besides the ordinary attendance of irregular troops, and the crowds of people that flocked to his standard. With this formidable aspect, having for a few days overawed the city, and drawn around him the greatest part of the Senate, and of the Equestrian order, with many even of those who had so lately declared for his rival, and who, in the contest of such parties, ever yield to the present impression, and are the property of him who can best work on their fears; he set out on his march to Ariminum, the last station of Italy on the frontier towards Gaul.

Octavius at the same time had assembled his forces at Alba, consisting of the two legions which had lately come over to him from Antony, one legion of new levies, together with two of the veterans lately re-embodied, which, not being full, were completed with the choice of his new-raised men. He

* Tivoli.

made a report to the Senate of the number and description of the troops he had thus assembled, and received their thanks and congratulations. It is nevertheless probable, that his services were received by this body with great distrust of their own situation, and of his designs.

Had the Senate been free to determine on whose swords they were to rely for defence, those of Cassius and Brutus, originally drawn in their cause, must have appeared the preferable choice. Uncertain, however, of the effect of any direct or public resolution in favour of those who were the authors of Cæsar's death, they left the correspondence to be maintained with them to private persons; and Senators accordingly wrote in their separate capacity, to recommend perseverance and the utmost exertion of their zeal. "Such is the state of the republic," says Cicero to Cassius; "even in the calmest times, "scarcely able to support itself. What must it be "in the present storm? All our hopes are in you. "But if you have withdrawn yourselves merely for "your own safety, we cannot have hopes, not even "in you. If you intend any thing worthy of your "own character, I wish I may live to see the effect. "The republic, at any rate, must revive under your "efforts*." He adjured Decimus Brutus, by the example of Octavius, who, although in a private station, raised armies for the State; he adjured him by the example of the faithful legions who deserted from Antony, to stand by the commonwealth; an

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xii, ep. 2.

in the present crisis to exert himself to the utmost, without waiting for orders from the Senate *.

Cicero had already proclaimed his animosity to Antony, and, besides his zeal for the republic, had a particular interest in abetting any party that could be formed against him. Hearing that this enemy was gone from the city, and that all the forces in its neighbourhood had declared for Octavius, or, as he flattered himself, for the Senate, he ventured, on the ninth of December, to return to Rome †, earnestly bent on the measures that were to be taken in this arduous state of affairs.

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 7. † Ibid. ep. 5.

CHAP. XXXI.

Situation and address of Octavius.—Meeting of the Senate.—Progress of Antony.—His march into Gaul.—Message of Octavius to Decimus Brutus.—New Consuls Hirtius and Pansa.—Meeting of the Senate.—Deputation to Antony.—His answer.—Declared an enemy.—Advance of Hirtius and Octavius to raise the siege of Mutina.—Brutus and Cassius confirmed in the command of all the Eastern Provinces.—Progress of the war in Gaul.—Siege of Mutina raised.—Junction of Antony and Lepidus.—Consulate of Octavius.

WHEN Antony left Rome to take possession of the Cisalpine Gaul, Octavius was in arms at the gates of the city, and, though a mere youth under age, was furnished with every art which age itself could bestow, to qualify him for the part he was to act. He had gained upon the army by donations and promises; upon the Senate in general, by public professions of duty and of zeal for the republic; and on particular members, by attentions and flattery. The legions, which had lately come over to him from Antony, having exhibited a mock fight, he ordered them, on that occasion, a special gratuity of five hundred sestertii, or four pounds a man; saying That as this was but the representation of a battle, the reward was proportional; but if he should ever have occasion to employ them in real fights, the

should have as many thousands *. In this situation, it became necessary for the Senate, either to authorise and to avail themselves of this ultroneous support; or, by refusing it, to drive the veterans, and all the military faction which still revered the name of Cæsar, into measures immediately fatal to the republic.

Upon the march of Antony towards Gaul, Octavius had already sent a message to Decimus Brutus † with assurances of his aid in retaining that province, and of his co-operation every where else in supporting the authority of the Senate. Hitherto men stood in awe of Antony, as being vested with the authority of Consul, and threatening to treat his opponents as rebels to the State. Even Hirtius and Pansa, destined to succeed in the Consulate of the approaching year, it was supposed, would scarcely venture to take possession of the office without his consent, or the usual form of his abdication; but the prospect of a vigorous support from Octavius, relieved many from their fears of his antagonist, and determined them on the part they were to act.

The Senate being assembled by one of the Tribunes on the nineteenth of December, for the purpose of taking measures to enable the Consuls elect in safety to enter on the possession of their office; a manifesto was produced from Decimus Brutus, of which no copy remains, but probably stating his right to the province of Gaul, and representing the injustice of Antony in attempting to dislodge him

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii. † Dio. Cass. lib. xliv, c. 18.

by force. Octavius was at the same time introduced by the Tribune, and pronounced a panegyric on Brutus *. Cicero, in a speech which is still extant, extolled the conduct of the young Cæsar in arming the veterans, as a generous effort to defend the republic, made at the expence of his private fortune, and at the hazard of his life. He applauded the two legions who had lately deserted from Antony; and warmly urged the Senate to support Decimus Brutus in his province. He moved, that thanks should be given to these officers, and to the troops who adhered to them; and that the Consuls, on the first of January, should move the Senate further to consider of the rewards that were due to the army, for the faithful services which they had rendered to the commonwealth. These public propositions he blended with a continual and vehement invective against Antony †. And having obtained decrees of the Senate to the several effects he had proposed, these he carried also to the Comitia or assembly of the People for their approbation, and there likewise supported them with a repetition of the same topics, urged with all the usual force of his eloquence ‡.

In the mean time, Antony, being arrived on the frontier of Gaul, dispatched an officer to Decimus Brutus, with a copy of his own commission from the Roman People, and with an order to evacuate the province. To this message he had for answer, that Decimus Brutus held his command by authority

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* Cicero ad Famil. lib. xi, ep. 6. Ibidem, Philip. iii, c. 5

† Cicer. Philip. ii. ‡ Ibid. Philip. iv.

the Roman Senate, who alone, by the laws, were entitled to dispose of the provinces; and that he would not surrender what the laws of his country had enjoined him to defend. Antony, after having to no purpose exchanged repeated messages on this subject, continued his march into the province, and forced Brutus, with two legions and some new levies, which were under his command, to throw himself into Mutina *, where he had formed some magazines from the stores and provisions he was able to collect in the neighbourhood, and where he proposed to wait for the succours which he was made to expect from Rome. In the mean time Antony advanced to Bononia † and Claterna, took possession of these places, and proceeding to invest Mutina, prepared to besiege it in form.

Such was the posture of affairs in the end of December, about ten months after the death of Cæsar ‡. On the first of January, the Consuls Pansa and Hirtius, being to enter on the exercise of their office, proceeded to the Senate from the temple, where they had performed the usual sacrifices; and agreeably to the order of the nineteenth of December, moved this assembly to take under consideration the present state of the republic §. Pansa having proposed the matter as it stood for deliberation, called upon his father-in-law, Q. Fusius Calenus, to deliver his opinion. This Se-

U. C. 710. C. Vibius Pansa, C. Hirtius, both killed. Octavius succeeded Pansa. Upon his resignation, C. Carinus succeeded Octavius. Q. Pedius succeeded Hirtius. Ventidius succeeded Pedius, who died in office.

* Modena. † Bologna. ‡ Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.
§ Ibid. lib. iii.

nator being disposed to favour Antony, advised, that they should not, rashly, take any violent resolution against a person who was but now retired from office; that they should first send him a deputation, with instructions from the Senate to lay down his arms, and return to his duty. This motion was vehemently opposed by Cicero, who, in a speech still extant *, insisted that Antony was already in effect declared an enemy, and ought to be reduced by force, not gained by negociation and treaty. He recounted the violences committed by him in his late Consulate, particularly the acts which he promulgated under the pretence of Cæsar's will and memorials. "From the foundation of Rome to "this present hour," he said, "Antony alone has "had the impudence to present himself in this as- "sembly, escorted by a military force. The kings "never attempted it. The boldest adventurers, "and they who were most forward to revive the "kingly power, never ventured so far. I remem- "ber Cinna; I have seen Sylla; and, last of all, "Cæsar. These were the persons, who, since the "expulsion of Tarquin, made the greatest advances "to kingly power. I do not say that they were "unattended in the Senate, or that their attendants "were always unarmed; but they were followed "only by a few, and with weapons concealed. "This daring assassin has made his parade in the "streets with a military force, moving in cohorts "under arms, in all the form of a regular march.

* Cicer. Philip. v.

"He posted a body of archers with their quivers "full, and had chests of spare arrows for immediate "and continued action, on the very steps by which "Senators were to ascend to their meeting in the "temple of Concord. You have ordered public "thanks to the troops who have drawn their swords "against him: you have extolled the generous "magnanimity of a noble youth, who, without wait-"ing for your commission, brought a hasty power "to cover the city from his violence; and are you "now deliberating, whether you are to soothe his "fury with negociation, or to meet it with force *? "If you send deputies to his camp, no matter with "what message, you will appear to surrender your-"selves to him; you will appear to distrust your "own cause; you will damp the ardour of your "own troops; and you will every where through-"out the empire shake the faith of the provinces."

Such was the purport of Cicero's speech respecting the conduct of Antony, the merits of Decimus Brutus, of Lepidus, of Octavius, of the legions, and of the veterans; and of L. Egnatuleius the Tribune, who led the Legio Martia in the late choice which they made of their party. In the close of his speech, he moved, That suitable honours should be decreed to each; that the Senate should ratify all the proceedings of Brutus in defending the province of Gaul; that Lepidus should have a statue erected to him; that Octavius should have the rank of Proprætor, be confirmed in his present command, and be

* Cicer. Philip. v.

entitled to sue for the offices of State before the legal age; that three years of the age appointed by law should be dispensed with in behalf of Egnatuleius; that the veterans who had taken arms under Octavius, and the legions who had deserted from Antony to join the standard of the commonwealth, should have the gratuities that were promised to them by Octavius; and at the end of the present war should have grants of land, and a perpetual exemption to themselves and their children from every military service. In his encomium on Brutus, he insinuated the praise that was due to the disinterested part he took in the conspiracy against Cæsar; but, not to offend the partisans of the dead now attached to Octavius, he declined entering fully on that subject. He pledged himself for the future behaviour of Octavius. "This admirable young man," he said, "having once tasted of true glory, having "found himself held forth by the Senate, by the "People, and by all orders of men, as a citizen dear "to his country, and as the guardian of the com- "monwealth, never can place any other species of "distinction or honour in competition with this. "If Julius Cæsar had found himself, at so early a "period of life, in such an illustrious point of view, "he never would have climbed into power by mis- "leading the populace, nor have betaken himself "to measures incompatible with the safety of his "country. The mind of this young man is perfect- "ly known to me. Love of the republic, respect to "the Senate, deference to good men, the desire of "real glory, are his ruling passions. I will there-

"fore venture to pledge my honour in the most "positive assurances to you, to the Roman People, "and to the commonwealth. I promise, I under- "take, I engage, that C. Cæsar will persevere in the "conduct which he now holds towards the republic, "and that he will always be what you wish, or what "you ought to desire, on every occasion that he "should continue to be."

Octavius, we may suppose, had in some measure blinded Cicero with his flattery; yet in this panegyric there was probably more of what the orator wished his pupil to adopt, than of what he believed to be his original intention; but this designing young man was not to be caught in such snares. He knew too well how to retort these artifices, even at an age when others scarcely knew that such arts are practised; and the experienced Cicero, with all the penetration and wit for which he is celebrated, was the dupe of a youth, who possessed the deepest of all artifices, that of suffering himself in appearance to be deceived, while in reality he practised on the cunning of others for his own purpose *.

L. Piso, with a considerable party in the Senate, inclined to moderate the resolutions that were proposed against Antony. He contended, that no Roman citizen could be condemned unheard; that for the present, no more could be done than appoint a day of trial for the accused, and cite him to answer for himself. The time of the first meeting being already spent in this debate, the Senate adjourned;

* Cicer. Philip. v.

and the subject being resumed on the following day it is said * that Fusius Calenus, with a torrent of abuse and reproach, retorted on Cicero the invective which, on the preceding day, he had pronounced against Antony. He reminded him of the obscurity of his birth, and accused him of a presumption, which was supported only by a talent for declamation, often employed by him against the most honourable citizens, never in bringing real criminals of State to account. "What have you done," he said, "accosting Cicero, either at home or abroad, to "merit the high degree of consideration to which "you lay claim? In what war have we ever pre-"vailed under your auspices? What accession of "territory have you ever gained to the empire of "Rome? Even in respect to your boasted talent "for speaking, you do but impose upon the world "the labours of retirement for the prompt effusions "of eloquence; and you publish harangues, which "you had neither the invention to conceive, nor "the courage to deliver in the face of any public "assembly, or in the midst of any real affairs." In this strain of abuse, he accused Cicero of having forced Cataline into rebellion, and of having put to death, without any trial, Cornelius Lentulus, and other Roman citizens of rank; of having lighted the fire of dissension among the leaders of the present unhappy divisions which tore the republic, and of having blown up the flames which still continued to consume the State; of having meanly abandoned the cause of Pompey upon his defeat in Pharsalia, and

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

of having instigated assassins to take away the life of Cæsar, even after he himself had implored his mercy, and accepted of his protection. He reproached him with a fresh instance of ingratitude, in this attempt to turn the arms of the republic against a late Consul, to whose clemency he himself was indebted for his life. Having mixed this invective with the defence, and even with the praises of Antony, he concluded with calling upon the Senate to consider how absurd it would be to declare war upon a magistrate, who acted by commission from the Roman People, at the head of an army of which they had given him the command, and in the very province which they had committed to his government; and this merely in support of a young man, who presumed, without any public authority, to levy war against a Roman officer of the highest rank, and in favour of a rebel, who had presumed forcibly to retain a province, which the Roman People had ordered him to surrender. "Such men," he said, "were indeed "the enemies of the republic; but he did not move "for any formal declaration against them. The "times," he observed, "will not suffer us to do all "that ought to be done." He moved only that messengers should be instantly dispatched to all the parties at war in this unfortunate contest; that all of them should be required to lay down their arms, and to submit to the decisions of the Senate; that if any one of them should disobey, it would then be full time to declare him a public enemy, and to give to the Consuls the usual and regular charge of consulting the safety of the commonwealth, and of doing

whatever was necessary to reduce disorderly subjects to their duty *.

Such are the abuses of an admired art, as vile and odious in its falsehoods, as in the genuine effusions of truth it is noble and respectable; and this speech, compared with some of the former, which were delivered relating to the same persons and things, may serve to exhibit the variety of colours with which any subject or character may be covered in debate, and by which the mind may be misled, and public assemblies perplexed in their councils. The majority of the Senate were aware, however, of Antony's designs, and knew the danger of suffering him to obtain a military establishment, or the possession of a formidable army within the Alps; and they would probably have come to a resolution abundantly severe, if one of the Tribunes had not interposed, and, for the present, forbid their proceeding any further on the subject.

The Senate was again adjourned to the following day, and, in the mean time, the relations and family of Antony, his mother, his wife, his children, and intimate friends, went into mourning, passed the night in visiting the principal citizens, or in accosting the People, as they passed in the streets, to implore their protection. When the Senate was about to assemble, this company of suppliants took their station on the steps of the temple, in which they were to meet, and embraced the knees of the members as they passed.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlv, c. 18. lib. xlvi, c. 28.

This solemn council, when met, on coming to the question, took, as is common on such occasions, a middle course between the extremes which had been urged in debate. They so far treated Antony as a friend, as to order a deputation of their own members to attend him in his camp; but the message which they sent by this deputation sounded more like a declaration of war, than an overture of reconciliation, or a prelude to peace *. They commanded him † not to disturb in his government Decimus Brutus, whom they qualified with the appellation of Consul-elect; not to lay siege to Mutina; not to lay waste the province; not to make any levies of forces, or presume to continue in arms against the authority of the Senate.

L. Piso, Philippus, and Servius Sulpicius, being deputed to carry these orders, had further in charge to signify to Decimus Brutus, and to the troops under his command, the entire approbation of the Senate, and the high esteem and honour ‡ in which they were held on account of their conduct. The Senate at the same time entered, on their own records, the honorary decrees which had been passed in favour of Decimus Brutus, Octavius, Egnatuleius, and the army, in the terms which had been proposed by Cicero; and resolved, that the gratuities already paid by Octavius to the veterans, and to the

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xii, ep. 24.

† Decimus Brutus was already destined to succeed in the Consulate of the following year.

‡ Cicer. Philip. vi.

legions who had lately come over from Antony, should be refunded from the Treasury; that lands should be assigned, and, after the present war, a perpetual exemption be given to them from all military service.

When the deputies were gone with the message which they had received from the Senate, the party of Antony at Rome endeavoured to alarm the People, and to load his enemies with all the consequences that were likely to follow from the late resolutions. They extolled the happy effects of moderation and peace; insinuated that Antony, being a person of a daring and impetuous spirit, ought not to have been rashly incensed; that his party was strong, and, in case of a rupture, would be joined by numbers of desperate men, for whom no attempt was too arduous, and against whom the friends of the republic could not be too much on their guard *.

While the People were amused with such discourses at Rome, Servius Sulpicius, one of the three deputies, and the very person on whom the Senate chiefly relied for the effect of their commission, died on the journey. The other two were kindly received by Antony, and admitted, without any jealousy or distrust, to visit the approaches he had made, and the works he had erected, against the town of Mutina.

While the siege was continued without interruption, the commissioners being received with affected submission to the orders of the Senate, were told,

* Cicer. Philip. vii.

that Antony would evacuate the province, disband his army, and return to a private station; that he would forget the past, and agree to a sincere reconciliation, provided that the legions then under his command, with his cavalry and his guards, were properly rewarded, accommodated with grants of land, and put upon the same footing in all other respects with the troops of Octavius; provided that the arrangement of the provinces, which he had made in conjunction with Dolabella, should be confirmed; that the acts founded on the will and memoirs of his late colleague should be ratified; that no account should be required of the money which had been lodged in the temple of Ops; that the Septemviri, or commissioners of the treasury, should not suffer for what they had done in delivering the treasure from thence; that a general indemnity should pass in favour of all his adherents; that his act relating to the courts of judicature should not be repealed: Upon these conditions he should agree to evacuate the Gallia Togata *, while he retained the Comata †, with six legions, to be completed with draughts from the troops now under Decimus Brutus; that he should be allowed to retain this force as long as Marcus Brutus and Caius Cassius should remain under arms; and that, at any rate, he should retain his division of the province for five years.

In this plan of accommodation, Antony paid his court to the army, and, even in the concessions he made, endeavoured to frustrate the principal articles,

* Within the Alps. † Beyond the Alps.

by means of the conditions which he took care to subjoin; and, in order more effectually to defeat the purpose of his antagonists, he sent to Rome, in the company of the deputies of the Senate, his own Quæstor, of the name of Cotyla, with instructions to solicit his interest, and to intrigue with the Senators and principal citizens *. Complaining of the ascendant his enemies had gained in the city, "With "what countenance," he said, "can they arraign "the administration of Cæsar, while they submit to "that of Cicero? If they allege that Cæsar was an "usurper, what is this Cicero, who pretends to dictate to the Roman Senate, and to suspend the orders of the Roman People? Let him know that "I claim the province of Gaul, in consequence of "an appointment from the highest authority in the "State, and he may be assured that I shall treat "Decimus Brutus as a rebel, if he persist in withholding it from me. The life of this traitor shall "atone for that noble blood which was shed in presence of the Roman Senate, and shall expiate "the guilt in which Cicero is fast involving the Senate itself †."

Antony, in this commission to his Quæstor, and in his public declarations, joined with the insolence of the matter, affected expressions of submission to the Senate; and made a variety of proposals, either to gain time, or to insinuate himself into favour with the army, whose interest he pretended to have greatly at heart. The deputies who had been employed

* Cicer. Philip. viii. † Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

on this unsuccessful mission, incurred much public censure. It was unworthy of L. Piso and of L. Philippus, it was said, to hold any intercourse with a rebel, who refused the most immediate compliance with the orders that were sent to him *. Under this sense of the matter, at a meeting of the Senate, it was moved, that war should be declared against Antony, and that every Senator should assume the military habit. This motion was agreed to, even by Lucius Cæsar, uncle to Antony; a decree was framed upon it, and passed without opposition, by which the army under his command were required by a certain day to lay down their arms †.

Upon this resolution, obtained by those who strove for the preservation of the commonwealth, great rejoicings were made over all Italy, and it did not then appear from whence any real danger could arise to the authority of laws, which were so properly supported. The Consuls, it was observed, acted with great vigour; the Senate, the middling class, and the citizens in general, expressed great zeal ‡. The people crowded to have their names enrolled in the levies which were ordered ‖. The reputation which Cicero gained in bringing public affairs into this situation, set him at the head of the commonwealth; but while it placed the whole administration of the State in his hands, it made him an object of great animosity to the opposite party, and of some envy to many persons of principal consider-

* Cicer. ad Famil. lib. xii, ep. 4.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 29, 30. Cicer. Philip. viii.

‡ Cicer. ad Famil. lib. xii, ep. 4. ‖ Ibid. lib. xi, ep. 8.

ation in his own. It was under the impression of these circumstances, he complained, that Senators of the first rank were lukewarm, were timid, or ill affected to the cause of the republic *.

The conduct of the war was committed to the Consuls, and, jointly with them, to Octavius, in the rank of Proprætor. Orders were likewise dispatched to Lepidus and to Plancus, to co-operate with these officers. The first was yet in the province of Narbonne, on his march into Spain; the other was posted on the Rhone †. The treasury being so much exhausted by the late embezzlements, that there was not money sufficient for the immediate service, it was agreed that all citizens should pay the five-and-twentieth part of all their effects; that the Senators should pay, over and above, a certain rate for all the houses or tenements they either possessed or let to tenants; and that in aid of these supplies, requisitions of money and of arms should be made through all the towns of Italy.

In the mean time, Octavius, without waiting for the authority with which the Senate had lately invested him, had followed Antony across the Apennines, and took post with his army at the Forum Cornelii ‡, on the road from Ariminum ‖ to Mutina §. The messages which passed between the Senate and Antony, as well as the delays which the Consuls, under the pretence of winter, made in advancing with their forces, gave him some degree of

* Cicer. ad Famil. lib. xi, ep. 8. † Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 39.
‡ Imola. ‖ Rimini. § Now Modena.

uneasiness. Pansa was employed at Rome in conducting the new levies. Hirtius, though destined to take the field, and to join Octavius, was still detained by indisposition *. In the mean time, Antony continued the siege of Mutina without intermission.

Octavius, after having sent many pressing messages to hasten the march of the Consul, was at last joined by him at the Forum Cornelii, and they advanced together; forced the posts which Antony had established at Claterna and Bononia, and encamped at the latter of these places †. Here they were still separated by the Rhenus and Lavinius from the army of Antony, which covered the siege of Mutina, and were precluded from any communication with the town. The country being flat, they endeavoured to give notice of their presence by lights elevated on poles from the highest trees; and lest these signals should not be observed, they employed dexterous swimmers to pass through the enemy's stations by the channels of the rivers, and proceed to the town with intelligence of approaching relief, engraven on plates of metal.

Upon this information, Brutus was confirmed in his resolution of defending the place to the last extremity, and prevailed on the garrison, under the prospect of effectual succours, to persevere in the toils and dangers of their present service ‡.

The Senate, notwithstanding they trusted that the preservation of the republic would be taken up

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 35, 36. † Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xii, ep. 5.
‡ Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 35, 36.

as the common cause of all those who could partake in its honours, and believed that the present Consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, though appointed by Cæsar, were sincerely embarked in its cause; and notwithstanding the confidence they placed in Octavius as opposed to Antony, they still relied chiefly on those who had taken an active part against the late usurpation of Cæsar, and looked to Brutus and Cassius for a principal support against the remains of that military faction. On this account, they had annulled the proceedings of Antony relating to the distribution of the eastern provinces, reinstated Marcus Brutus in the government of Macedonia, and Cassius in that of Syria; and, by these appointments, placed the whole resources of the commonwealth on the east, from the Hadriatic to the utmost boundary of the empire, under their authority *.

Marcus Brutus and Cassius had left Italy in the preceding autumn. Brutus had passed through Lucania. Thither Porcia accompanied him, with the melancholy prospect of parting, perhaps for ever. While she endeavoured to conceal her grief, she was betrayed into tears by the sight of a picture, which represented the parting of Hector and Andromaché. One of the company, without observing Porcia's distress, repeated from Homer the lines from which the hint of this picture was taken. *My father, my mother, and my brother, are, Hector, all in thee* †. "But I cannot reply," said Brutus,

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. iii.

† Ἕκτορ ἀταρ σὺ μοι ἐσσὶ πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ,
Ἠδὲ κασίγνητος. —— Iliad. lib. vi, v. 429.

"in the words of Hector, *Go to thy maids, and mind "thy loom;* for although Porcia is deficient in "strength of body, in her mind she is formed to "great affairs*."

Brutus, having embarked at Elea, sailed into Greece, where he was received with every mark of respect. Here he seemed to devote himself entirely to study; but had his agents employed to provide what was necessary to meet the storm, which he had reason to expect. He sent Herostratus into Macedonia, to sound the disposition of the troops in that province, and drew about himself all the young Romans who were then at Athens, attending the different schools which still supported the reputation of that place.

While Brutus remained in Greece, he received a sum of money, amounting to sixteen thousand talents, recently collected from the revenues of Asia†; and besides the new levies he had ordered, was joined by different bodies of troops already in the province or its neighbourhood. Of these, some had served under an officer named Apuleius; others under Vatinius in Illyricum. Some had been stationed under Caius Antonius at Apollonia‡. And a considerable part of Dolabella's forces, who were marching under Cinna into Asia, followed the same example‖. As Brutus was considered in Macedonia and Thessaly as reviving the party of Pompey,

* For these particulars, Plutarch quotes young Bibulus, the son of Porcia by a former husband, who was present. Plutarch in Bruto.

† Cic. Philip. xiii. ‡ Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii, c. 27.

‖ Plutarch, in Bruto.

many who had served under that leader, and were yet dispersed in those parts, flocked to his standard; so that he soon appeared at the head of a considerable army, amounting to four legions complete, with a detached body of five hundred horse. A great convoy, with spare arms, which Cæsar had provided for the Parthian war, and which, by the order of Antony, were then to be again returned into Italy, were intercepted by him at Demetrias. Upon the order of the Senate to put him in possession of Macedonia, the greater part of the province, then under the command of Hortensius, acknowledged his authority. At his departure from Athens, many of the young Roman nobility, with the ardour of ingenuous youth, made a part of his retinue, and among these, the son of Marcus Tullius Cicero, who, though with a genius for letters inferior to that of his father, became nevertheless distinguished as a soldier in the course of the war *. And to him we may join also Horatius Flaccus, though less a soldier, and of meaner extraction, no less ennobled, though only by his wit.

Cassius, at the same time, had gone with the utmost dispatch into Syria, to prevent Dolabella, who was sent by the opposite party to take possession of that province. He had received some supplies of men and of money from Trebonius, then commanding at Smyrna, and prevailed with part of the cavalry of Dolabella, on their march through the province of Asia, to abandon their leader. With these forces, he advanced into Cilicia, reduced the city of

* Plutarch in Brute.

Tarsus, and continued his march, with a respectable appearance, into his intended province.

At the arrival of Cassius, the forces of Syria were divided, and the opposite parties had actually committed hostilities against each other. The troops which had been stationed there by Julius Cæsar, had, even before his death, mutinied, and had put Sextus Julius, a young man who commanded them, to death. Having thus set one party at defiance, they declared for the other, took orders from Cæcilius Bassus, one of Pompey's officers, who, having escaped from Pharsalia, then lay at Tyre, and in this change of their leader, embraced the cause of the republic. They defeated Statius Murcus, whom Cæsar had ordered, with three legions, to reduce them, and made it necessary to bring against them a reinforcement of three legions more from Bithynia, under Marcus Crispus. This officer had accordingly arrived with this reinforcement to the party of Cæsar, and was actually engaged in the siege of Apamea, to which Bassus had retired, when Cassius arrived in Syria.

There were now in this province, engaged on opposite sides, no less than eight legions. Upon the arrival of Cassius, the two legions under Bassus submitted to his command; and soon after the other six, moved by the authority of his commission from the Senate, or gained by his personal character and address, followed this example. Four more legions, who, intending to join Dolabella, were marching from Egypt through Palestine *, were intercepted,

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii, c. 26, 27, 28.

and forced to receive his orders as governor of Syria. His army, by these different accessions, amounted to twelve legions.

Upon the first suspicion that Brutus and Cassius intended to possess themselves of such important provinces, Dolabella, to whom, by the influence of Antony, the command in Syria had been assigned, set out from Rome, and with all possible diligence, joined some troops that were placed to receive him on the side of Macedonia, passed the Hellespont, and continued his route to the East. In passing through the province of Asia, he had an interview at Smyrna with Trebonius, professed a friendship for him, affected great respect for his associates in the conspiracy against Cæsar, and a zeal for the restoration of the commonwealth. After this conference with the governor of the province, he put his army in motion with the most pacific appearances on the route to Ephesus; and having by these means put Trebonius off his guard, he returned in the night, surprised the city of Smyrna, seized on the person of the governor, and, with many insults, put him to the torture *, continuing him under it for some days, in order to extort a discovery of the treasure which he supposed to be hid in some part of the province; but on the third day, Dolabella having satiated his mind with these cruelties, gave orders that Trebonius should be strangled, his head severed from the body, and exposed on the point of a spear, while the limbs were dragged through the streets.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii, c. 29.

This murder, being committed on the person of a Roman officer, within the very province in which he was appointed to command, raised a general indignation. Dolabella was declared a public enemy by the Senate. The conduct of the war against him was committed to Caius Cassius, who being now at the head of the armies in Syria, was, together with Marcus Brutus, authorised by formal decrees to retain all the forces they had assembled, and all the resources of which they were possessed, and to employ them according to their own judgment, where the service of the republic seemed most to require their exertions *.

Thus the flames of war, which were already lighted in Italy, began to extend, and were soon communicated to every part of the empire. The opposite armies before Mutina continued during the winter to observe each other, and in their attempts to give or to withhold relief from the besieged in that town, had frequent skirmishes or partial engagements. The chief direction of affairs at Rome, in the mean time, had devolved upon Cicero, who incited the Senate and the People, with all the powers of his eloquence, against Antony. The soldiers in general, with their officers, were notwithstanding inclined to favour this declared enemy of the commonwealth. Ventidius, in particular, who professed to range himself under Octavius, was in reality warmly attached to his rival; and in order to serve him, actually formed a design to surprise Cicero, and the other heads

* Cicer. Philip. xi.

of the republican party at Rome. For this purpose he assembled a body of veterans in the neighbourhood, and advanced towards the city; but his design being suspected, and the persons against whom it was directed having taken the alarm, and withdrawn to places of safety, he turned away to the Picenum, and there waited the issue of the campaign *.

The Senate, meanwhile, as in full possession of the republic, devised laws, to prevent for the future a return of the abuses which led to the present disorders, alluding to the progress of Cæsar and Pompey. They resolved, that no extraordinary commission of any kind should be given to any single person, or any provincial appointment prolonged beyond a single year †. But while they were thus employed, separate addresses were presented to them from Lepidus and from Plancus, warmly recommending an accommodation with Antony †. Cicero made his observations on this conduct, in a letter to Plancus of the thirteenth of the kalends of April, or twentieth of March; but he delivers himself to Lepidus on the same subject with more warmth, alluding to some recent honours which had been received by this officer, and for which he neglected to make the proper acknowledgments. "I am glad," he said, "that you wish to reconcile your fellow-citi-
"zens. If you could procure them peace without
"slavery, you would perform a meritorious service
"to your country, and acquire much honour to your-

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* Cicer. Philip. xii. Ibid. ad Familiar. lib. x, ep. 16.
† Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi. c, 39. † Cicer. Philip. xii.

"self; but if, under the title of peace, we are again "to become the slaves of a profligate villain, be as- "sured that every man in his senses will prefer death. "In my opinion, therefore, it will be wise in you to "desist from a proposal, which neither the Senate, "the People, nor any good man can approve *."

Notwithstanding these sentiments, publicly declared by a person then supposed to be at the head of the republic, numbers in the city and in the Senate had espoused the cause of Antony. Piso, at whose house the wife and children of this supposed public enemy were entertained, openly corresponded with him. The Consul Pansa proposed a fresh deputation to be sent to him with overtures of peace, and his party in the Senate insidiously offered to devolve the honour of this deputation upon Cicero himself, who rejected the offer, with proper animadversion on the danger to which his life must be exposed in the camp of his personal enemy, and discussed with his usual eloquence the weakness of the council itself, as well as the great impropriety of suffering himself to be employed in it.

While this measure was in agitation, Hirtius and Octavius appear to have joined in a message to Antony, informing him of what had been proposed in the Senate, and desiring a cessation of arms, with liberty to convey some supply to the garrison of Mutina, until the event of the Senate's deliberations should be known. Antony replied in terms calculated to insinuate himself into the favour of the late

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. x, ep. 6.—27.

Cæsar's party, and to gain the affection of the a[illegible] but full of reproach and contumely against t[illegible] who pretended to espouse the cause of the comm[illegible] wealth, and against the authors of the present councils at Rome. In this he alluded to a late decree of the Senate, which was expressed in terms of indignation against the murderers of Trebonius, and to a commission or warrant, which empowered Marcus Brutus and Caius Cassius to execute public justice against Dolabella on this account. In reference to these measures, "I know not (said Antony, in his "answer to Hirtius and Octavius) whether I should "receive more satisfaction from the death of that "villain Trebonius, than I feel indignation at the "unjust sentence passed against Dolabella. That "the Roman Senate should value the life of that "vile Trebonius, more than they did that of Cæsar "himself, the father of his country, is surely pro-"voking enough; but what must I feel, when I see "you Hirtius, whom Cæsar has raised and adorned "so much, that I am persuaded you scarcely know "yourself? and when I see you, young man, who "have no pretence to consideration besides the "name of Cæsar, which you have boldly assumed, "contributing all in your power to blast the me-"mory of Cæsar? and when I see you both endea-"vouring to oppress his friends, committing your-"selves, with all the powers of the commonwealth, "into the hands of Marcus Brutus and of Caius Cas-"sius, who were his murderers; and when I see you "joined against me to rescue from justice this as-"sassin, Decimus Brutus, who had so aggravated a

"part in the same crime?——But the camp and "the head quarters of Pompey it seems are to be "restored, and to bear anew the name and the au- "thority of a Roman Senate, where the exile Ci- "cero is to be set up at the head of this reviving "faction.

"You are employed in avenging the death of "Trebonius; I am employed in avenging the death "of Cæsar; and we, who were once the friends of "Cæsar, like a troop of gladiators belonging to the "same master, are now to part, and from opposite "sides to fight and to cut one another's throats "under the auspices of Cicero, who is become "director of the shew! But for me, I have taken "my resolution, and will neither suffer the veterans "to be stript of their just rewards, nor the wrongs, "which are intended to myself and to my friends, "to be carried into execution. If in this I am sup- "ported, and succeed, life will be sweet; if I fail, "the thought of what you are to suffer, from the "very party you are now endeavouring to raise up "against me, will even then be some consolation. "If the faction of Pompey be so insolent in its ruin, "I choose that you, rather than I, should expe- "rience the effect of its recovery, and of its return "to power."

Antony, in all his discourses, affected to be in good understanding with Lepidus and with Plancus, who, he insinuated, were in concert with himself, and embarked in the same cause *. But whatever

* Cicer. Philip. xiii.

secret correspondence these officers may have [illegible] together, they and Pollio likewise professed highest duty to the Senate, and affection to the monwealth. Plancus having, for some time after the commencement of the war, declined any open declaration, now informed the Senate in a public address, That he had hitherto been taking measures to render the declaration he should make of real moment to the republic; that he had remained silent so long, not from any hesitation in the choice of his party, but from a desire more effectually to serve that party which he had long since embraced; that before he declared himself, he had secured the co-operation of his own officers, the affections of his army, and of the whole province in which he was stationed; that he was now at the head of five complete legions well affected to the commonwealth, and, in consequence of his liberalities, attached to himself; that the whole province was unanimous in the same cause; that the People, with a zeal which a concern for their own freedom or safety could not surpass, had taken arms in support of the Roman republic; that he was ready to obey the orders of the Senate, either to retain his command, or resign it to any person they should appoint to receive it from him; that he would either remain in his post, or advance upon the enemy; and by the last of these measures, if it should be thought expedient, he would cheerfully draw upon himself the whole weight of the war: for that provided he could, by any means, re-establish the commonwealth, or defer its ruin, the manner of doing it was indifferent to

to him. Others, he said, had declared themselves for the Senate; while that body, being greatly alarmed, was lavish of its commendations and of its rewards; but that if he had missed the time in which his declarations were likely to have been most highly valued, he had chosen the occasion on which his efforts promised the greatest benefit to the public, a consideration which should be to him a sufficient reward for the highest service he could perform *.

Pollio, at the same time, wrote to Cicero, expressing a violent detestation of Antony's faction, and of the designs of their leader. To be connected with such a person in any cause, he said, would be grievous; that even his having acted under Cæsar himself, being contrary to his disposition, he said, and to his principles, was, notwithstanding the circumstances which obliged him to it, now become serious matter of regret. The experience of his condition under that usurper had made him more sensible of the value of freedom, and of the misery of dependence and servitude. "If any one for the "future," he continued, "shall pretend to usurp "such powers, he shall find in me an open and a "declared enemy. There is no danger to which I "will not expose myself in the cause of freedom †."

While the party of the Senate appeared to gain such accessions of strength by the declaration of so many military officers in the different provinces, Decimus Brutus was reduced to great straits at Mutina; and waited, under many circumstances of dis-

* Cicer. ad Famil. lib. x, ep. 8. † Ibid. ep. 31.

tress, for the opening of a compaign, in which expected that his own fate, and that of the republ might soon be determined. On the approach of proper season, the Consul Pansa, with the levies he had made, amounting to four legions, marched towards Gaul, and being arrived at Bononia on the fourteenth of April, was next day to have joined his colleague, who had taken post with Octavius, to observe, and to impede the progress of the siege. To facilitate their junction, Hirtius had detached the legion which was called the Martia, with two Prætorian bands, to occupy the passes, and to strengthen the van of Pansa's army, in case they should be disturbed on their march. Antony, at the same time, having intelligence of their route, marched in the night with two chosen legions, the second and third, two Prætorian cohorts, being veteran and experienced troops, with a numerous body of irregulars and horse. He took post at a village, which was called the Forum Gallorum, and posting the horse and irregulars in open view in the field, at some distance from the village, he placed the legions and irregular infantry in ambuscade under the cover of the houses.

When Pansa's army, led by the detachment which Hirtius had sent to receive them, came in sight of Antony's horse and irregulars, they could not be restrained until the posture and strength of the enemy were examined. They broke from their ranks, and, without waiting till the village should be visited, they rushed through a defile in a wood or morass to intercept the enemy, who, appearing to consist of

horse and light infantry alone, could, as they apprehended, have no hopes of safety but by endeavouring to escape, which it was necessary by an immediate attack to prevent. As the foremost of Pansa's army were passing in the most disorderly manner from this defile, in pursuit of their supposed prey, Antony, with the legions, placed himself in their way, and forced them to halt, and even to fall back with great slaughter. Pansa himself was dangerously wounded, and his army obliged to take refuge in the camp from which they had marched in the morning. Here, too, Antony attempted to force them, but was repulsed; and fearing that his own retreat might be cut off, took his resolution to retire, and endeavoured, without loss of time, to rejoin the main body of his army which lay before Mutina.

Antony was soon justified in his apprehensions of the danger to which the further pursuit of his victory over Pansa might have exposed him; for Hirtius, having intelligence of the movement he had made in the night, though too late to prevent its effects, had, with twenty cohorts of veterans, left his own camp, arrived at the Forum Gallorum, and was in possession of the very ground on which Pansa had been defeated, when Antony, returning from the pursuit of his victory, fell, in his turn, into the same snare which he himself, a few hours before, had so successfully laid for his enemy; he was accordingly surprised and defeated with great slaughter, and with the loss of the eagles or standards of both the legions, and of sixty ensigns of the cohorts. After this disaster he himself, having fled with the cavalry,

arrived about ten at night in his camp before Mutina*, and from thence sent detachments abroad to collect the remains of his scattered party, or to facilitate their retreat†.

Pansa having been carried to Bononia on account of the wounds he had received, Hirtius took the command of his division of the army, and effected its junction with his own, and with that of Octavius.

In this state of affairs, Antony being considerably weakened by his loss in the late action, and the enemy being greatly reinforced by their junction, he determined to keep within his lines, to continue the blockade of Mutina, and to await the effect of the distress into which he had already reduced the besieged. The straits to which Decimus Brutus, with the garrison, was exposed, at the same time hastened the endeavours of Hirtius and Octavius to force the enemy to battle. For this purpose, or in order to relieve the town, they made a feint to throw in succours on a side which the besiegers had deemed inaccessible, and which, on this account, they had but slightly guarded. Antony, alarmed by this attempt to render abortive all the labours he had sustained in the preceding blockade, drew forth his army to oppose them, and by this movement exposed himself to the hazard of a general engagement. While he was making his disposition to receive the enemy in the field, his lines were attacked by a sally from the town, and it became necessary to divide his forces. He himself, with that part of his army

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. x, ep. 30. † Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

which remained with him to make head against Hirtius and Octavius, was defeated, fled to his camp, and, being pursued thither, continued to give way, until the action ended by the death of the Consul Hirtius, who, after he had forced the intrenchments of the enemy, was killed, and fell near to the Prætorium or head-quarters of their general.

Upon this event, Octavius, on whom the command devolved, not having those qualities of a soldier which were necessary to replace the Consul, suffered the victorious army, thus checked by the loss of their leader, to be driven back from the ground they had gained, and left the enemy again in possession of his own works and encampment. In the operations of the preceding day, however, Antony, feeling all the effects of a defeat, and not being in condition to continue the siege, resolved to decamp in the night; and executed this resolution unobserved and unmolested, either from the town of Mutina or the camp. Here the personal courage of Octavius began first to be suspected, or appeared more fit for the council than for the field. It must, however, for the present, be left undetermined, whether much of what is imputed to cowardice in the sequel of this history, was not rather a part of his general character for address and good management, with which he shunned the risk of his own cause and that of his party, in the unnecessary exposure of his own person. He had other motives, on the present occasion, to restrain his efforts; and Decimus Brutus, though in the morning he had observed that the lines of the besiegers seemed to be evacuated, yet,

as he had no intelligence from the camp, remained all that day in suspense. Even after he had received information of what had passed, of the various events of the action, and of the Consul's death, he was discouraged in finding, that he was from thenceforward to depend on Octavius for support and co-operation in the war; and being greatly alarmed by the neglect which this young man had shown in not joining him the moment the communication between them was open; while he was not in condition to act alone, having neither cavalry nor baggage horses, and the troops being greatly reduced by the hardships they had suffered, he was obliged to remain inactive, so that the enemy were permitted to effect their retreat undisturbed *.

On the second day after the battle, Decimus Brutus, being sent for by Pansa, the surviving Consul, to Bononia, to concert the future operations of the war, learned, on his way, that this Consul also was dead of his wounds.

By these delays Antony had got two days' march a-head, and, without halting, reached the fens of Sabatta on the coast of Liguria. Here, the country being of difficult access, he thought himself secure, and made a halt, to deliberate on the part he had to act. At the same time Ventidius, who, upon the news of the defeat of his friend at Mutina, had passed the Apennines by hasty marches, followed and joined him at this place †.

In the first accounts of Antony's defeat which

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 13. † Ibid.

were carried to Rome, it was reported, that his army had been entirely routed; that he himself had escaped from the field of battle with only a few broken remains of his infantry unarmed; and that to recruit his numbers, wherever he passed, he had broken open the work-houses, and set loose and inlisted the slaves *.

Upon these representations most of the Senators were greatly elated; and, amidst the acclamations of the People, ordered a feast of thanksgiving, which was to last for sixty days, and renewed the proclamation in which Antony, with all who had served under his command, were declared to have forfeited all the rights of citizens, and to be enemies of their country †.

The commonwealth being deprived of its legal head by the death of both the Consuls, Decimus Brutus, as next in succession, according to the arrangement which had been made for the ensuing year, became the principal object of consideration with the Senate; and being supposed most deeply interested in the preservation of the republic, was the person on whom they chiefly relied for the support of their cause. The Senators, accordingly, seemed to drop at once the high regard which they had hitherto paid to Octavius, and overlooking his pretensions and his influence over the army, vested in Decimus Brutus the command of all their forces, whether in Italy or in Gaul.

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 10.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 39.

Thus ended the connection of the young [illegible] with the friends of the republic, an alliance which had, on both sides, probably been equally insincere. The young man, pretending to have his eyes opened by this conduct of the Senate, and supposing that the party of Antony was less hostile to himself than that which had now gained the ascendant in the commonwealth, he slighted the instructions which were sent to him to take his orders from Brutus, retained the command not only of the troops which had hitherto followed his own standard, but the command likewise of a legion which had been raised for the republic by Pansa *. He refused to co-operate with Decimus Brutus in pursuing their recent advantage against Antony, and had influence enough with different bodies of the army, particularly with the fourth legion and the Martia, to hinder their obeying the orders they had received from Rome †.

In this manner, as the respect which was paid to Octavius by the Senate vanished with the occasion which they had for his services; so all the professions he made of concern for the republic, and of zeal for its restoration, disappeared, with the interest which led him to make those professions. And Decimus Brutus, the person now acknowledged by the Senate as Consul Elect, and head of the republic, for whose relief Octavius affected to have assembled his forces, was left by him to finish the remains of the war against Antony, at the head of such troops

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, e. 20. † Ibid. ep. 10.

as had any degree of attachment to himself, or to the cause of the republic.

Decimus Brutus, when the war broke out, had a military chest of forty thousand sestertia, about three hundred and twenty thousand pounds; but the whole was now expended, and his own credit likewise exhausted. He was, from this time forward, ill supported at Rome, all motions made in his favour being opposed by the party of Octavius, as well as by that of Antony. The troops which adhered to him amounted to seven legions; these he subsisted by such means as he himself could command. He advanced to Dortona on the fourth of May *; and from thence continuing his march till within thirty miles of the enemy, he received intelligence, that Antony, in a speech to his army, had declared his intention to pass the Alps, and to cast himself entirely on the friendship of Lepidus, in whose disposition towards himself he professed to have great confidence; that this proposal being disagreeable to the army, they had declared their resolution to remain in Italy, and exclaimed, That here they would conquer or perish; that Antony had been disconcerted by this declaration, and had continued a whole day undetermined as to his future operations; but in order to conform himself to the inclination of the army, and, if possible, to keep his footing in Italy, he was about to surprise Pollentia, a fortified place on the Tenarus, and had detached Trebellius with a body of cavalry for this purpose.

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 10. 19.

Decimus Brutus, upon this intelligence, sent forward three cohorts to prevent the design on Parma; and these having effected their march in time to secure the place, the enemy, by this disappointment, notwithstanding their late resolution to remain in Italy, were under a necessity of passing the Alps *. They undertook this difficult march so ill provided with every necessary, that, according to Plutarch, they had no subsistence but what was found on the route as they passed, consisting chiefly of wild herbs, fruits, and animals not commonly used for human food; but Antony himself discovered a patience and a force of mind, which no man, judging by his usual way of life, could have expected from him; and, by his own example, supported the spirits of his men through the greatest distresses †.

Lepidus, in consequence of the Senate's instructions, or of his own desire to be at hand to take such measures as the state of the war in Italy might require, had discontinued the march of his army into Spain, and returning through the province of Narbonne, had passed the Rhone at its confluence with the Soane; and now, hearing of Antony's march, descended on the left of this river, and took a situation to intercept him, not far from the coast at the Forum Vocontium, on a small river called the Argenteum, which empties itself into the sea at Forum Julii ‡.

In the mean time, Antony had passed the Alps, and on the fifteenth of May arrived with the first

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 13. † Plut. in Antonio. ‡ Frejus.

division of his army at Forum Julii, four-and-twenty miles from the station of Lepidus. Ventidius having followed about two days' march in the rear of Antony, and having again joined him at this place, their forces consisted * of the second legion entire, with a considerable number of men, but without arms; the broken remains of many legions, together with a body of cavalry, of which, this part of the army having suffered least in the late action, Antony had still a considerable force. But in this position many deserted from him, and his numbers were daily diminishing: Silanus and Culeo, two officers of rank, were among the deserters.

Such was the posture of affairs, on the twenty-first of May, when Lepidus gave to Cicero the strongest assurances † of zeal for the commonwealth. Plancus, at the same time, had taken post on the Isere ‡, had thrown a bridge over that river, and waited for the arrival of Decimus Brutus, whom he expected to join him by the most ordinary passage of the Alps §: but while he lay in this position he received a message from Lepidus, informing him of Antony's approach, and expressing great distrust of many in his own army, whom he suspected of a disposition to join the enemy. Upon these representations, Plancus marched on the twentieth of May, as appears from his dispatches to Rome of this date; expected to join Lepidus in eight days, and hoped, by

* Cicero ad Familiar. lib. x, ep. 17. † Ibid. ‡ Isara.

§ Probably by Mount Cenis, or the channels of the Dorea Baltea and the Isere.

his presence, to secure the fidelity of the army, which began to be questioned. He wrote, with great confidence, of the zeal and affection of his own troops; and was pleased to say, that he himself, unsupported by any other force, should be able to overwhelm, as he expresses himself, the broken forces of Antony, though joined by the followers of that muleteer Ventidius *.

In the mean time, the armies of Antony and Lepidus being posted in sight of each other, frequent messages passed between the leaders; and as no hostilities were committed, the soldiers conversed freely together, though without any apparent effect †. Lepidus still professed to govern himself by the orders of the Senate, and to employ his army in support of the commonwealth. But while he preserved these appearances, he sent an order to countermand the junction of Plancus; and having convened his own army, as usual, around the platform ‡, from which it was the custom to harangue the troops, he addressed them in a speech, in which he repeated his professions of duty to the republic, and urged a vigorous exertion in the war. It had not yet appeared to what point these professions were tending, when he was answered with exclamations, which he probably expected, from some leading persons among the soldiers, in which they declared the wishes of the army for peace. Two Roman Consuls, they

* Cicer. ad Famil. lib. x, ep. 13.

† Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

‡ The Suggestum, most commonly raised of turf.

said, had been already killed in this unnatural quarrel. The best blood of the republic had been spilt, and the most respectable citizens declared enemies of their country; that it was time to sheathe the sword: "for our parts," they said, "we are determined that our arms from henceforward shall "not be employed on either side *." From this audience the army of Lepidus proceeded to invite Antony into their camp, and presenting him to their general as a friend, terminated the war between them by a coalition, in appearance forced upon Lepidus, but probably previously concerted with himself.

Antony being now joined with Lepidus in the command of an army, which had come to oppose himself, and by his popularity, or superior ability, having got the ascendant of his colleague; found himself again in possession of a great force, composed of the remains of his own late defeat, three legions that had joined him under Ventidius, and seven of which the army of Lepidus consisted †.

Plancus, being still upon his march, persisted in his intention to join Lepidus, notwithstanding he had received an order or instruction from himself to the contrary; but having, at last, received positive information of his defection, and considering the danger to which he himself must be exposed with inferior numbers against two armies united, he returned to his post on the Isere, and sent pressing

* Cicer. ad Famil. lib. x, ep. 21.
† Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

instances to hasten the march of Decimus Brutus, and of other succours from Italy *.

Lepidus, even after the reception of Antony into his camp, addressed the Senate in a solemn declaration, still asserting his affection to the commonwealth, and representing the late change of his measures as the effect of necessity imposed upon him by the troops, who, in a mutinous manner, refused to make war on their fellow-citizens. While he made these professions, he recommended to the Senate the example of the army, exhorted them to drop all private animosities, to make the public good the rule of their conduct, and in respect to the recent defection of the legions he commanded, not to treat as a crime, the humane and merciful disposition which fellow-citizens had exercised towards each other †.

At the same time dispatches arrived from Plancus and Decimus Brutus, both treating the pretended mutiny of the army in Gaul as a mere artifice of their general to conceal his own dispositions ‡. The city was greatly alarmed, and such of the populace as still affected a zeal for the authority of the Senate, demolished the statues which had been lately erected to Lepidus. The Senators, incensed not only at his treachery, but at the false professions with which he presumed to address them on the subject, proceeded to declare him a public enemy, and resolved, that all his adherents, who did not return to their duty before the first of September, should be invol-

* Cicer. ad Famil. lib. x, ep. 11. † Ibid. ep. 35. ‡ Ibid.

ved in the same sentence. Private instructions were sent, at the same time, to Marcus Brutus, and to Caius Cassius, urging them to hasten the march of their forces for the defence of Italy and the capital of the empire *.

During these transactions, Octavius remained inactive on the Po. The demise of the two Consuls opened a new scene to his ambition. This event came so opportunely for his purpose, and his own character for intrigue was so much established, that he was suspected of having had an active part in procuring the death of those officers. It was said, that he employed an assassin to dispatch Hirtius in the heat of battle; and that Pansa's wound, not being otherwise mortal, he suborned the person who dressed it, to render it so by an injection of poison. A surgeon, named Glyco, was actually taken into custody on this account; the suspicion remained against Octavius till the last moment of his life, and even made a part in the grievous reproaches with which his memory continued to be loaded after his death †. It was rejected, however, at the time, even by Marcus Brutus, who warmly interceded with Cicero in behalf of Glyco, as a person who was himself a great sufferer by Pansa's death, and who bore such a reputation for probity as ought to have secured him against this imputation ‡. The testimony of Marcus Brutus, when given in favour of Octavius, must, no doubt, be admitted as of the

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. † Tacit. Annal. lib. i, c. 10.
‡ Cicer. ad Brutum, ep. 6, edit. Olivet. tom. 9.

greatest authority, and may be allowed, in a great measure, to remove the whole suspicion.

Octavius himself gave out, that Pansa, when dying of his wounds, desired to see him in private, gave him a view of the state of parties, and advised him no longer to remain the tool of those who meant only to demolish the party of Cæsar, in order that they themselves might rise on its ruins. But from the detail of what passed in the interval between the battle of Mutina and the death of Pansa, of which Decimus Brutus sent an account to Cicero, it does not appear that Octavius could have seen Pansa. And it is probable, that this pretended advice of the dying Consul was fabricated afterwards, to justify the part which Octavius took against the Senate *. The supposed admonition of Pansa, at any rate, was probably not necessary to dissuade Octavius from continuing to support the republic any longer than his own interest required. This was the great rule of his conduct, and if, until that hour, he continued to believe, that the Senate intended to raise him on the ruin of Antony's party, in order that he might become their own master, and sovereign of the empire, he fancied surely what was not probable, and what they never professed to be their intention. The restoration of the republican government, and of the Senate's authority, implied, that individuals were to be satisfied with receiving the honours of the republic in their turn; and in this prospect, Octavius himself affected to

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 13.

acquiesce, so long as it suited with the state of his fortunes, to act the part of a mere citizen or constituent member of a free state.

The Senate undoubtedly sustained a great loss in the death of the Consuls. Though trained up under Cæsar, and not possessed of any remarkable share of political virtue, they were men probably of moderate ambition, tenacious of the dignities to which they themselves and every free citizen might aspire, but not covetous of more. They were likely, therefore, to take an ordinary part in the civil establishment of their country, and by the dignity of their characters, to overawe the more desperate adventurers, whose views and successes were inconsistent with the safety of the commonwealth.

If the Consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, had lived, even with such abilities as they possessed, they might have kept Lepidus within the bounds of his duty; they might have prevented Antony from recovering the defeat which he had lately received at Mutina, and might have obliged Octavius, if not to drop his ambitious designs, at least to defer the execution of them to a more distant period. But, immediately after the death of these magistrates, it became evident, that this young man was dissatisfied with his situation and with the party he had apparently joined; and accordingly, not only kept at a distance from Decimus Brutus, but seemed determined not to take any part in the farther operations of the war. The prisoners that were in his hands he treated as friends, and by suffering them, without any exchange or ransom, to join their own army, gave hopes that he was

ready to treat on reasonable terms of a reconciliation with their leader. He, at the same time, took measures with the Senate that seemed to prognosticate a rupture, and, in particular, made application for a triumph, in which neither his age, his rank, nor his share in the late action, or victory obtained over Antony, in any degree supported his claim; and having failed in this attempt, he declared his intention to sue for the office of Consul.

Octavius, in aspiring to a station for which he was so far from being legally qualified by his age, affected to insist that Cicero * should be associated with him in the office †, and should take the whole administration on himself. For his own part, he said, that, in this association, he aspired only to the title of Magistrate; whilst the world must know, the whole authority of government, and all the glory to be reaped in the public administration, would redound to his colleague; that, in this request, and in that he had made for a triumph, he had no object but to gain a situation in which he might lay down his arms with honour, as having such a public acknowledgment of the services ‡ he had endeavoured to render to the commonwealth.

Cicero, according to the testimony of Dion Cassius, fell into the snare which was thus laid for him by this artful boy, that he accordingly supported his pretensions to the Consulate, and was willing to

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 42. † Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.
‡ Cicer. ad Brutum, ep. 10.

become the ostensible colleague and the tutor of this reviving Cæsar.

Octavius afterwards boasted of the artifice he had employed in this piece of flattery to Cicero, as the only means he had left, at that time, to secure the formal continuance of his military command *. But the Senators, and the partisans of the conspirators in particular, were greatly exasperated. The proposition appeared so strange, that no Tribune, no person in any office, not even any private citizen, could be found to move it †. The animosity of Cicero to Antony had already, they thought, carried him too far in flattering the presumption of this aspiring young man. If he should prevail on the present occasion, all that the Senate had hitherto done to restore the constitution would be fruitless. A person who presumed to claim the office of Consul at an age so improper, and so far short of that which the law prescribed, was likely, when possessed of this power, to set no bounds to his usurpations. In order, therefore, to elude his project, they deferred the elections, and, in the mean time, appointed ten commissioners, under pretence of inquiring into the abuses committed in Antony's administration, and of distributing to the army the gratuities, and of executing the settlements devised for their late services, but probably with a real intention to vest these commissioners with the chief direction of affairs, until it could be determined who should succeed in the office of Consul, and who should be intrusted with the

* Plut. in Cicer. † Cicer. ad Brutum, ep. 19.

safety of the republic. The partisans of the commonwealth were now, in appearance, superior to their enemies, but, from their recourse to such indirect measures, seemed insecure in possession of the superiority they had gained *.

The Senate, in order to exclude Octavius from this commission, without giving him any particular reason to complain of their partiality, at the same time left out Decimus Brutus; and by this equal exclusion of persons at the head of armies from the management of affairs, in which the armies were so much concerned, they enabled Octavius to fill the minds of the soldiers with distrust of the civil power, and to state the interests of the civil and military factions as in opposition to each other †. He no longer, therefore, disguised his aversion to the Senate; complained, that they treated himself with disrespect, called him a boy who must be amused ‡, decked out with honours, and afterwards destroyed ‖. "I am "excluded," he said, "from the present commission, "not from any peculiar distrust in me, but from the "same motive from which Decimus Brutus is also "excluded, a general distrust of every person who is "likely to espouse the interests of military men; "and, from these exclusions, it is evident what is "intended with respect to the army, and with re"spect to the expectations entertained by the vete"rans, of a just reward for their services §."

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. † Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. xi, ep. 20.

‡ Ibid. ep. 21.

‖ Laudandum adolescentem, ornandum, tollendum.—This last word is ambiguous. This saying was imputed to Cicero, but is peremptorily denied by him.

§ Sueton. in Octavio, c. 12.

Upon the junction of Antony with Lepidus, the Senate felt the necessity of paying a little more attention than they had lately done to the interests of Octavius. Instead of appointing him to act under Decimus Brutus, as they at first intended, they now joined him in the command of the army; and, in this new situation, required him to co-operate in defending Italy against the united forces of Antony and Lepidus.

Octavius instantly communicated to the army these orders of the Senate, with insinuations of the hardships which they were now to undergo on being sent on a fresh service, before they had received the rewards which were promised and due to them for the former; and he proposed, that they should send deputies to the Senate with proper representations on this subject.

A number of Centurions were accordingly selected, to carry what was rather a mandate than a request of the army to Rome. As they delivered their message in name of the legions, without any mention of Octavius, this was thought a favourable opportunity to negociate directly with the troops, without consulting their leader; and the Senate accordingly sent a commission for this purpose, with hopes that they might be able to detach the army from their general, or that at least they might be able to engage, in their own cause, those legions, in particular, who had deserted from Antony, with such earnest professions of zeal for the commonwealth.

Octavius, to counteract this design before the commissioners employed in the execution of it ar-

rived in his camp, drew forth his army, and in a speech complained of this and of the former injuries he had received from the Senate: "Their intention," he said, "is to cut off separately all those "who were attached to the public service under "Cæsar. When they have accomplished this purpose, the army too must fall at their feet *. They "will recall the grants of land which have been "made to you, and will deprive you of the just reward of all your faithful services. They charge "me with ambition; but what evidence is there of "my ambition? Have I not declined the dignity of "Prætor, when you offered to procure it for me?— "My motive is not ambition, but the love of my "country; and for this I am willing to run any hazard to which I myself may be exposed; but cannot endure, upon any account, that you should "be stript of what you have so dearly bought by "your labours in the public cause. It is now become evident, that, in order to prevent the most "dangerous powers from coming into the hands of "your enemies, and in order to ensure the rewards "to which you are so justly entitled, it is necessary "that your friends should be raised to the head of "the commonwealth. In the quality of Consul, I "shall be able to do justice to your merits; to punish the murderers of my father, to be revenged "of our common enemies, and at last to bring these "unhappy domestic dissensions to an end †."

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. iii. † Ibid.

This harangue was returned with acclamations of joy, and a second deputation, to be escorted by four hundred men, was instantly appointed from the army, demanding the Consulate for their general. The officers employed in this service were repeatedly admitted to audiences in the Senate *. In answer to the objections which were drawn from the defects of their general's age and title, they urged former precedents; that of Scipio, of Dolabella, and the special acts relating to Octavius himself, in whose favour ten years of the legal age had been already dispensed with. One of the officers in this singular deputation, while the Senate proposed a delay in order to deliberate on the matter, is said to have shown the hilt of his dagger; and some one of the party who escorted the deputies, in resuming his arms at the door of the Senate-house, was heard to say, in girding the belt of his sword, *If you will not confer the Consulate on Octavius, this shall.* To these menacing insinuations, Cicero, who had jests imputed to him, on occasions that were equally serious to himself and to the republic, is said to have replied, *Nay, if you pray in that language, you will surely be heard.*

While the Senate delayed giving any direct answer to this military demand, they again sent a deputation of their own members with money to be distributed to the legions, hoping, by this means, to divert them from the project which they had formed in favour of their general. But Octavius, being se-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 42.

cretly apprised that a sum of money was sent to corrupt his army, and observing that the soldiers were impatient at having no immediate return to their own message, chose not to wait the trial of this dangerous experiment, separated the legions into two columns, marched directly to Rome; and on his way being met by the deputies of the Senate, he commanded them, at their peril, not to approach the army, or to interrupt its march.

Upon the news of his approach, the city was thrown into great consternation. The Senate, believing they had erred in offering too little money to the troops, ordered the former bounty to be doubled *. They yielded the matter in dispute, resolving that Octavius should be admitted to the Consulate; or, according to Dion Cassius, that he should have the title and ensigns of Consul, but without the actual power; that he should have a place in the Senate among those who had been Consuls; that he should be Prætor at the first elections, and Consul at the following †. And thus having done enough to shew their fears, but not to disarm, or to lull the ambition of this presumptuous young man, they sent new deputies, with every symptom of trepidation and alarm, to intimate these resolutions.

Soon after this deputation from the Senate was dispatched, two legions, lately transported from Africa, and ordered for the defence of the city, having arrived at the gates, the Senators, with their party

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. † Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 41.

among the People, resumed their courage: they were even disposed to recall their late concessions, and began to exclaim, that it were better to perish in defending their liberties, than, without any struggle, to fall a prey to their enemies. In this humour persons of every condition assumed the military dress, and ran to their arms.

There were now at Rome three legions, with a thousand horse; one legion having been left there by Pansa when he marched towards Gaul. These troops were posted on the side from which the enemy was expected, on the Janiculum, and covering the bridge which led from thence to the city. Galleys were ordered to be in readiness at Ostia, to convey the public treasure beyond the sea, in case it should become necessary to take this measure to save it: and it was determined to seize the mother and sister of Octavius *, who were then supposed to be at Rome, and to detain them as hostages. But this intention was frustrated by the timely escape of these women, who, apprehending some danger, had already withdrawn from the city. Their flight being known, such an early precaution taken by themselves, or their friends, in this matter, was considered as the evidence of a long premeditated design, of which they were apprised, on the part of their relation.

Under this impression, and that of the superior force with which it was known Octavius was prepared to assail them, the senators again lost hopes of

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

being able to withstand him; but they flattered themselves, that the subsequent resolution they had taken to resist, would not be known in time to prevent their first conciliatory message to the army from being delivered. Their concessions were accordingly published among the troops; but appearing to be forced, were received with contempt, and served only to encourage the presumption of the soldiers, and to hasten their march. As the army drew near to the gates, all the approaches were deserted by those who had been placed to defend them, and the advanced guard of Octavius passed almost through the whole breadth of the city, to the Mons Quirinalis, without being met by any person in the quality either of friend or of enemy. But, after a little pause, numbers of his own party among the People having gone forth to receive him, the streets were instantly crowded with persons of all ranks, who hastened to pay their court *.

This unwelcome guest having halted his army during the night in the first streets which they entered, on the following day, with a proper escort, and amidst the shouts and acclamations of the multitude, took possession of the Forum. The troops which had been assembled to oppose him, at the same time left their stations, and made an offer of their services. Cornutus, one of the officers who commanded those troops, with a hopeless fidelity to the trust which was reposed in him, having in vain endeavoured to prevent their defection, killed him-

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

self. Cicero is said to have desired a conference with his young friend, and intended colleague in the future Consulate; but, when he seemed to presume on his former connection, was coldly answered, That he had been too slow in his present advances.

In the following night a rumour was spread, that the Martia and the fourth legion, which made a part in the army of Octavius, but supposed to be particularly attached to the Senate, on account of the late honorary decrees which had passed in their favour, had declared against the violent measures of their leader; that they offered to protect the Senate and People in their legal assemblies, and in any resolutions they should form on the present state of the republic. Numbers of Senators believed this report, and were about to resume their meetings. Crassus, one of the Prætors, set out for the Picenum, where he had considerable influence, in order to assemble what forces he could raise to secure the success of this design; but before morning this report was known to be groundless, and all orders of men returned to their former dejection and submission.

At break of day, Octavius removed the army from the streets of Rome into the Campus Martius. He did not suffer any acts of cruelty to be committed, or make any inquiry after those who had been forward in opposing his claims. He affected the clemency of his late uncle; but, like him too, without any scruple, laid his hands on the public treasure, made a distribution to the army of the sums which had been at first decreed to them; and engaged for

himself, soon after, to add from his own estate what had been successively promised. Having ordered that the election of Consuls should immediately proceed, he withdrew with the army, affecting to leave the People to a free choice. And being himself elected, together with Q. Pedius, whom, without any mention of Cicero, he had recommended for this purpose, he returned in solemn procession, to offer the sacrifices usual on such occasions, and entered on his office on the twenty-first of September, the day before he completed his twentieth year *.

On this occasion the young Cæsar, in the capacity of Consul, made a speech to the troops, acknowledging their services; but avoided imputing to their interposition the honours which he had recently obtained in the city. For these honours he returned his thanks to the Senate, and to the assemblies of the People. These he accosted as the sovereigns of the empire; and was answered by an affected belief of his sincerity.

In the same spirit of servility with which so many honours had been decreed to Julius Cæsar, it was enacted, that Octavius should for ever take rank of every Consul, and the command of every general, even at the head of his own army; that he should have an unlimited commission to levy troops, and to employ them where the necessities of the State might require †; that his adoption into the family of Cæsar should now be ratified in the most solemn manner

* Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii, c. 65. † Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 39.

by the assembly of the Curiæ; a form which the laws of the republic required in every such case, and in which he had been formerly prevented by the intrigues of Antony; that the act declaring Dolabella an enemy of his country should be repealed, and an inquest set on foot for the trial of those who had been concerned in the death of Julius Cæsar.

Before the tribunal established for this purpose, numbers were cited, and upon their non-appearance condemned. Among these were Marcus Brutus and Caius Cassius. In giving sentence against them, the judges affected to shew their ballots; and a citizen, of the name of Silicius Coronas, being of the number, likewise held up his ballot into view; but, in the midst of this tide of servility and adulation, had the courage to acquit the accused. His conduct for the present passed without any notice, but he was reserved, with silent resentment, as an object of vengeance to be afterwards inflicted *.

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

CHAP. XXXII.

Proceedings of the new consul.—State of the eastern provinces.—Interview of Octavius, Antony, and Lepidus, with their coalition.—The proscription or massacre.—Death of Cicero.—Sequel of the massacre.—Succession of consuls.—Severe exaction of taxes.—State of Sextus Pompeius.—Movements of Antony and Octavius respectively.—Both bend their course to the east.—Posture and operations of Brutus and Cassius.—Their arrival and progress in Europe.—Campaign at Philippi.—First action, and death of Cassius.—Second action, and death of Brutus.

THE republic, of which Octavius was now, in appearance, the legal magistrate, had declared open war against Antony and Lepidus; and in consequence of this declaration, the forces of Decimus Brutus and of Plancus, as has been mentioned, had advanced to the Rhône and the Isere, but had been obliged again to retreat, in order to avoid coming to action with a superior enemy. It was considered, therefore, as the first object of the Consul, to reinforce that army of the republic, and to carry the decrees of the Senate into execution against those who presumed to dispute their authority. He accordingly marched from the city as upon this design; but it soon after appeared, that he had been some time in correspondence with those supposed enemies of their country; that he intended to join them against the

Senate, and, with their forces united, to resist the storm which was gathering against them in the East, under the governors of Macedonia and Syria.

While the siege of Mutina was still in dependence, Marcus Brutus had drawn his forces towards the coast of Epirus, with intention to pass into Italy; but having received a report that Dolabella, then in the province of Asia, had transported a body of men from thence to the Chersonesus *, and that he seemed to intend the invasion of Macedonia, he was obliged to return for the defence of his own province; and from thenceforward, by the state of the war in Syria, was hindered, during some time, from taking any part in the affairs of the West.

Dolabella, in consequence of his appointment to supersede Cassius, and after the murder of Trebonius, had assembled a powerful squadron of ships on the coast, to accompany the march of an army with which he proposed to expel his antagonist from the province of Syria †. His operations, however, began in that quarter with his receiving a great check to his hopes in the defeat of his squadron; his galleys having been dispersed, and all his transports taken by Lentulus, who had served under Trebonius, and who now commanded the fleets of Brutus and Cassius in those seas ‡. Notwithstanding this defeat of his forces at sea, Dolabella advanced by land into Cilicia; and while his antagonist lay in Palestine, to intercept the legions which were co-

* Cicer. ad Brutum, ep. ii.

† Cicer. ad Famil. lib. xii, ep. 12. ‡ Ibid. ep. 15.

ming to join him from Egypt, he made considerable levies, took possession of Tarsus, reduced the party which Cassius had left at Ægæ, and proceeded to Antioch; but finding the gates of this town were shut against him, he continued his march to Laodicæa, where he was admitted; being determined to make a stand at this place, he again assembled the remains of his shipping, in order to bring his supply of stores and provisions by sea *. Having encamped and intrenched his army close to the walls of Laodicæa, he threw down part of the ramparts, to open a communication between his camp and the town †.

Cassius having intelligence of the progress made by his rival in the province, and of his dispositions to secure Laodicæa, prepared to dislodge him from thence. For this purpose he advanced to Pallos, at the distance of twenty miles from the enemy's station, and took measures, by cutting off his supplies both by sea and by land, to reduce him by famine. In execution of this design, he endeavoured to procure shipping from every part of the coast, extending from Rhodes to Alexandria; but found that most of the maritime States of Asia were already drained by his enemy, or were unwilling to declare themselves for either party. The port of Sidon was the first from which Cassius obtained any supply of vessels; but the officer who commanded them having ventured with too small a force to appear be-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii, c. 30.

† Cicer, ad Famil. lib. xii, ep. 13.

fore Laodicæa, was unable to cope with the navy which Dolabella had collected from the remains of his late defeat; and, though he defended himself with great obstinacy, and with great slaughter of the enemy, after many ships were sunk on both sides, suffered a capture of five galleys with all their crews. Notwithstanding this check, Cassius was soon after joined by squadrons from Tyre, Aradus, and even from Cyprus. The governor of this island, contrary to the orders of Cleopatra, his sovereign, who had assembled her fleet to support Dolabella, ventured to change their destination, and to take part with his enemies *.

With this accession of force, Cassius being again in condition to block up the harbour of Laodicæa, presented himself for this purpose, and two engagements followed; in the first of which the advantage was doubtful; in the second, the victory declared for Cassius, and rendered him master of the coast. Holding his enemy therefore blocked up by sea, he continued to press upon the town from the land, and, by the fifth of June, had reduced the besieged to great distress; but while he seemed to rely entirely on the effects of this circumstance †, he had a secret correspondence with the garrison, and on a day concerted with the officer on duty, was admitted into the place.

Dolabella, finding that the town was already delivered up, chose to fall by the sword of one of his

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

† Cicer. ad Famil. lib. xii, ep. 13,

own men, of whom he requested the favour to save him, by this last act of attachment, from falling into the hands of his enemies. The troops who had served under him acknowledged the authority of his rival, and took the oath of fidelity usual in ranging themselves under a new general. Cassius seized what money he found in the public treasury, or in the temples at Laodicæa, laid the citizens under a heavy contribution, and put some of those who had been most forward in serving his enemy to death *.

Such was known, some time before the battle of Mutina, to be the event of affairs in Asia; and the fortunes of Marcus Brutus and Cassius, they being supposed to have twenty legions under their command, with all the resources of the Eastern Empire, were still in a thriving condition, when Octavius, soon after his nomination to the office of Consul, under pretence of urging the war against Antony and Lepidus, had taken his departure from Rome, leaving his colleague Pedius in the administration of the city. To him he had given instructions to obtain, as of his own accord, the revocation of the acts by which Antony and Lepidus had been declared public enemies. He incited the army, at the same time, to demand a reconciliation of parties, and administered an oath to them, in which they swore not to draw their swords against any of the troops who had ever served under Julius Cæsar. As the Consul Pedius made no mention of his colleague in making his motion in favour of Antony and Lepidus,

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

the Senate, not knowing how far it might be agreeable to Octavius, referred the whole matter to himself; and, upon his having signified his approbation, proceeded to revoke their former decree of attainder *. By these means Octavius, without appearing himself as the author of this change, transferred the imputation of treason from Antony and Lepidus to Brutus and Cassius, with their adherents in the late conspiracy against the life of Cæsar.

As soon as the state of parties was thus transformed, Octavius congratulated the Senate on the wisdom of their measures, and from thenceforward treated with Antony and Lepidus as friends, corresponded with them on the subject of the commonwealth, and invited them, without loss of time, to return into Italy.

Under pretence of duty to the will of the Senate in this new arrangement, Plancus separated his army from that of Decimus Brutus, and espoused the cause which the republic itself, under the authority of the Consuls, was pleased to adopt. Pollio likewise followed this example.

In consequence of these separations, Decimus Brutus was left singly to withstand the force of so many personal enemies who were united against him, and now supported with the authority of the State itself. He still had ten legions, of which the four with which he had defended the city of Mutina during the preceding winter, were not yet recovered from the sufferings of that service. With the other

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 44.

six, being raw and undisciplined troops, he did not think himself in condition to dispute the field with so many veteran armies; and he determined therefore to withdraw by Illyricum into Macedonia, and to join himself with the forces which were raised for the republic in that province. But in the execution of this design he found, that in civil wars armies are not easily retained on the losing side, and had occasion to observe, that soldiers by profession are seldom hearty in behalf of civil institutions against a professed intention to govern by force. On pretence of the hardships of the proposed march, he was deserted, first by the new levies, and afterwards by the main body, with all the irregulars, who, except a few Gaulish horse, departed with their colours displayed to join the enemy. Of those who remained, he, under the deepest impressions of despair, allowed as many as were so disposed to provide for themselves; and with only three hundred horsemen who adhered to him, set out for the Rhine, intending to make his intended retreat through Germany. But, in proportion as difficulties multiplied on his way, the little troop which attended him gradually diminished; and being reduced to ten, he imagined that, with so few in his company, he might even pass through Italy itself undiscovered. He accordingly disguised himself, and returned to Aquileia: but being there seized, though unknown, as a suspicious person, and being conducted to an officer of the district who knew him, he was by the orders of Antony put to death *.

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

Thus, while all the military powers of the East were assembled under Marcus Brutus and Cassius, with a professed design to restore the republic, those of the West were equally united for a contrary purpose. Antony and Lepidus having passed the Alps, descended the Po, and advanced towards Mutina. Octavius being already in that neighbourhood with his army, they met, with five legions of each side, on the opposite banks of the Levinus, not far from the scene of their late hostile operations against each other. The leaders agreed to hold a conference in a small island formed by the separation and reunion of two branches of the river. To the end that they might have equal access to this island, bridges were laid on the divisions of the Levinus by which the island was formed. The armies drew up on the opposite banks; and as the recent animosities of Antony and Octavius still left some remains of distrust between them, Lepidus first entered alone into the place that was intended for their conference; and having seen that no snares were laid by either party, he made the signal agreed on, and was joined by the other two without any attendants.

Octavius now met with Antony in a character more respectable than that in which he had formerly appeared, and, with the dignity of the Roman Consul in office, had the place of honour assigned to him. They continued their conference during this and the two following days *; and at the expiration of this time made known to their armies, that

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iv.

they had agreed on the following articles: That Octavius, in order to divest himself of every legal advantage over his associates, should resign the Consulate; that the three military leaders, then upon an equal footing, should hold or share among them, during five years, the supreme administration of affairs in the empire; that they should name all the officers of State, magistrates, and governors of provinces; that Octavius should have the exclusive command in Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily, Lepidus in Spain, and Antony in Gaul; that Lepidus should be substituted for Decimus Brutus in the succession to the Consulate for the following year, and should have the administration at Rome, while Octavius and Antony pursued the war against Brutus and Cassius in the East; that the troops, at the end of the war, should have settlements assigned to them in the richest districts and best situations of Italy. Among the last were specified the neighbourhoods of Capua, Rhegium, Venusia, Beneventum, Nuceria, Ariminum, and Vibona.

To strengthen this agreement, the daughter of Fulvia, the wife of Antony, by Clodius her former husband, was betrothed to Octavius. He was said to have already made a different choice, and consequently to have had no intention to fulfil this part of the treaty *; but the passions, as well as the professions, of this young man, were already sufficiently subservient to his interest †.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi, c. 51, 55, 56. † Ibid.

While the willing co-operation of armies was secured by the publication of the several articles which concerned themselves, the circumstances which chiefly distinguished this famous coalition, was the secret resolution, then taken, to extinguish at once all future opposition to the Cæsarian party, by massacring all their private and public opponents. They drew up a list, of which the numbers are variously reported, comprehending all those who had given them private or public offence, and in which they mutually sacrificed their respective friends to each other's resentment. Antony sacrificed his uncle Lucius Cæsar to the resentment of Octavius; who, in his return, sacrificed to that of Antony, not only Cicero, but Thoranius also, his own guardian, and formerly his father's colleague in the office of Prætor *. Lepidus gave up his own brother L. Paulus; and all of them agreed to join with these private enemies every person supposed to be attached to the republican government, amounting in all to three hundred Senators and two thousand of the Equestrian order, besides many persons of inferior note, whose names they deferred entering in the list until their arrival at Rome. They meant, as soon as they should be in possession of the capital, to publish the whole list for the direction of those who were to be employed in the execution of the massacre. But as there were a few whose escape they were particularly anxious to prevent, they agreed that the execution should begin, without any warning, by the murder of twelve

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iv.

or seventeen of their most considerable enemies, and among these was included Marcus Tullius Cicero *, whose recent speeches had so grievously offended Antony, and whose name was no longer of any use to Octavius. They ratified the whole by mutual oaths; and having published all the articles, except that which related to the massacre, the plan of reconciliation between the leaders was received by the armies with shouts of applause, and was supposed to be the beginning of a period in which military men were to rest from their labours, and to enjoy undisturbed the most ample reward of their services.

This atrocious confederacy, known by the name of the Second Triumvirate, having thus planned the division or joint administration of an empire, which, of two of them at least, each hoped in the end to engross for himself, they proceeded to Rome, with an aspect which, to those who composed the civil establishment of the commonwealth, was more terrible than that of any band which had ever been formed for its ruin.

In former times, individuals rose to the head of parties or factions, and brought armies to their standard, by the natural ascendant of superior abilities; and, if they prevailed, either disdained the advantages of usurped dominion, or knew how to employ their powers in exertions or pursuits not unworthy of human reason. But in this instance, persons obscure, or only known by their profligacy, were followed by armies, of whom almost every individual

* Sueton. in Octav. c. 27.

in his place adopted the project of enslaving his country. The spirit of adventure pervaded the meanest rank of the legions, and every soldier grasped at the fruits that were to be reaped in subduing the commonwealth. If no person had offered to put himself at their head, they themselves would have raised up a leader whom they might follow in seizing the spoils of their country.

Lepidus, noted for his want of capacity, being in the station of Prætor when Cæsar took possession of Rome, and being the only Roman officer of State who was willing to prostitute the dignity of his rank, by abetting the violence which was now done to the constitution, was intrusted with power, and the command of an army, merely because he brought the name and authority of a magistrate to the side of that usurpation. The use of his name had been likewise convenient to Antony, in the late junction or coalition of their armies; and was now necessary or convenient to both the other parties in forming their union, as he held a kind of balance between them, and was to witness transactions in which neither was willing to rely on the unattested faith of the other.

Antony, possessed of parts which were known chiefly by the profligate use which he made of them, seeking to repair by rapine a patrimony which he had wasted in debauch; and though, greatly beyond expectation, strenuous when pressed by necessity, yet ever relapsing, in every moment of ease or relaxation, into the vilest debauchery or dissipation.

Octavius, yet a boy, known chiefly by acts of perfidy and cunning above his years; equally indifferent

to friendship or enmity, apparently defective in personal courage, but followed by the remains of Cæsar's army, as having a common cause with themselves in securing the advantages which they severally claimed by inheritance from him. This adventurer was now about the twentieth year of his age, had been already two years at the head of a faction, veering in his professions and in his conduct with every turn of fortune; at one time, reconciled with the authors of Cæsar's death, and courting the Senate, by affecting the zeal of a citizen for the preservation of the commonwealth: at another time, courting the remnant of his late uncle's adherents, by affecting concern for their interests, and a solicitude for the security of the grants they had obtained from Cæsar: at variance with Antony on the score of personal insults and incompatible pretensions, even charged with designs on his life; but now, in appearance, reconciled to him, from considerations of interest or present conveniency. He had already, in the transactions of so short a life, given indications of all the vilest qualities incident to human nature, perfidy, cowardice, and cruelty; but with an ability or cunning which, if suffered to continue its operations, was likely to prevail in the contest for superiority with his present or any future rivals in the empire.

Such was the received description of persons who had now parcelled among themselves the government of the world, and whose infamy was exaggerated by the fears of those who were likely to suffer by the exercise of their power. Under the domi-

nion of such a junto, if any one were left to regret the loss of public liberty, or to feel the state of degradation into which citizens were fallen; if any one could look forward through the terrors of impending murder, to the prospect of future evils; to them surely a scene of expectation was opening, the most gloomy that ever had presented itself to mankind: persons, apparently incapable of any noble or generous purpose, coveting power as a licence to crimes, supported by bands of unprincipled villains, were now ready to seize and to distribute, in lots among themselves, all the dignities of the State, and all the patrimony of its members.

In human affairs, however, the prospect, whether good or bad in extreme, is seldom verified in the completion; and human nature, when seemingly driving to the wildest excess, after a series of events and struggles, settles at last in some sort of mediocrity, beyond which it is sometimes pushed by occasional starts and sallies, but in which it cannot have a permanent duration. The first entry of this Triumvirate on the scene of their government, indeed, was such as could not be supported throughout in the sequel of any tyranny or usurpation whatever.

The Triumvirs being on their way to Rome, their orders for the immediate execution of seventeen of the principal Senators had been received before their arrival, and several were accordingly surprised and murdered in their houses, or in the streets. The first alarm appearing the more terrible, that the occasion of such murders was unknown, struck all orders of men with a general amazement and terror.

The streets were presently deserted, and hushed in silence, except where armed parties skulked in search of their prey, or by the cries which they raised, gave mutual intimation of the discoveries they made. Persons who found themselves pursued, attempted to set the city on fire, in order to facilitate their own escape. Pedius, the Consul, continued all night in the streets, endeavouring to prevent the calamity of a general conflagration. In order to quiet the minds of those who were not aimed at in this execution, he published the names of the seventeen, with assurances that the executions were not to proceed any further *. It has been supposed, that the design was no farther communicated to this magistrate, and that if he had survived, he would have opposed the extremes to which it was carried; but, on the following night, he died of the fatigue he had incurred on this occasion, and the public assurances he had given were attended with no effect.

The Triumvirs marched in divisions towards the city, and made their entries separately on three successive days. As they arrived, they severally occupied their quarters with guards and attendants, and filled every public place with armed men, and with military standards and ensigns. In order to ratify the powers they had devised for themselves, they put the articles of their agreement into the hands of the Tribune Publius Titius, with instructions, that they should be enacted in the public assembly of the Roman People, and put in the form of a legal commis-

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iv.

sion, or warrant, for the government they had usurped. By the act which passed on this occasion, the supreme power or sovereignty of the republic, during five years, without any reserve or limitation, was conferred on Octavius, Antony, and Lepidus; and a solemn thanksgiving being ordered for the events already passed, which led to this termination, the citizens in general, under the deepest impressions of terror and sorrow, were obliged to assume appearances of satisfaction and joy.

As the first act of this government, two lists or proscriptions were delivered to the proper officers of the army, and posted in different parts of the city; one a list of Senators, the other a list of persons of inferior rank, on whom the troops were directed to perform immediate execution. In consequence of these orders, all the streets, temples, and private houses, instantly became scenes of blood *. At the same time, there appeared on the part of the Triumvirs a manifesto, in which, having stated the ingratitude of many whom the late Cæsar had spared, of many whom he had promoted to high office, and whom he had even destined to share in the inheritance of his fortunes, and who, nevertheless, conspired against his life, they alleged the necessity they were under of preventing the designs of their enemies, and of extirpating a dangerous faction, whom no benefits could bind, and whom no considerations, sacred or profane, could restrain. "Under the influence of this faction," they said, "the perpe-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvi. Appian. lib. iv.

" trators of a horrid murder, instead of being called " to an account, are intrusted with the command " of provinces, and furnished with resources of men " and of money, to support them against the efforts " of public justice, and against the indignation of " the Roman People. Some of these murderers," they continued, " we have already chastised; others, " being at the head of powerful armies, threaten to " frustrate the effects of our just indignation. Ha- " ving such a conflict to maintain in the provinces, " it would be absurd to leave an enemy in posses- " sion of the city, and ready to take advantage of " any unfavourable accident that may befall us in " defence of the commonwealth. For this reason, " we have determined to cut off every person who " is likely to abet the designs of such traitors at " Rome, and to make this desperate faction feel the " effects of that war which they were so ready to " declare against us and our friends.

" We mean no harm to the innocent, and shall " molest no citizen, in order to seize his property. " We shall not insist on destroying even all those " whom we know to be our enemies; but the most " guilty, it is the interest of the Roman People, as " well as ours, to have removed, that the republic " may no longer be torn and agitated by the quar- " rels of parties who cannot be reconciled.

" Some atonement likewise is due to the army " insulted by the late decrees, in which they were " declared enemies to the commonwealth.

" We might," they concluded, " have surprised " and taken all our enemies without any warning,

" or explanation of our conduct; but we prefer this " open declaration of our purpose, that the innocent " may not, by mistake, be involved with the guilty, " nor beyond what is necessary even be alarmed." They concluded this fatal proclamation, with a prohibition to conceal, rescue, or protect any person whose name was proscribed; and they declared, that whoever acted in opposition to this order, should be considered as one of the number, and involved in the same ruin. They declared, that whoever produced the head of a person proscribed, if a free man, he should receive twenty-five thousand Attic drachms or denarii, and if a slave, should have his liberty, with ten thousand of the same money; and that every slave killing his master, in execution of this proscription, should have his freedom, and be put on the rolls of the People, in the place which was occupied by the person he had slain.

At the time that this proclamation and the preceding lists were published, armed parties had already seized on the gates of the city, and were prepared to intercept all who attempted to escape. Others began to ransack the houses, and took their way to the villas and gardens in the suburbs, whither it was likely that any of the proscribed had retired. By the disposition they made, the execution began in many places at once, and those who knew or suspected their own destination, like the inhabitants of a city taken by a storm, felt as surrounded by enemies from whom they were to receive no quarter. To many, it was observed by historians, that their own nearest relations were objects of terror, no less

than the mercenary hands that were armed against them. The husband and the father did not think himself secure in his concealment, when he supposed it to be known to his wife or to his children. The slaves and freedmen of a family were become its most terrible enemies. The debtor had an interest in circumventing his creditor; and neighbours in the country mutually dreaded each other as informers and spies. Besides the price that was put upon the head of every person proscribed, the money which the master of a family was supposed to have in his house, was considered as an additional reward to the treachery of his domestics. The first citizens of Rome were prostrate at the feet of their own slaves, imploring protection and mercy, or perished in the wells or common sewers, where they sought for concealment.

Persons having any private grudge or secret malice, took this opportunity to accomplish their ends. Even they who were inclined to protect or conceal the proscribed, were terrified with the prospect of being involved in their ruin. Many, who themselves, contrary to expectation, were not in the fatal list, enjoyed their own safety, in perfect indifference to the distress of their neighbours; or, that they might distinguish themselves by their zeal for the prevailing cause, joined the executioners, assisted in the slaughter, or plundered the houses of the slain.

There were killed, in the beginning of this massacre, Salvius, one of the Tribunes of the People, together with Minucius and Annalis, both in the office of Prætors. Silicius Coronas, a person already

mentioned, who being one of the Judges at the citation of Marcus Brutus and Caius Cassius for the murder of Julius Cæsar, had ventured, in the presence of Octavius, to hold up into view the ballot by which he acquitted them, and who, although at that time in appearance overlooked, now perished among the proscribed.

Many tragic particulars, in these narrations, seem to be copied from former examples of what happened under Marius, Cinna, and Sylla, of persons betrayed by their own servants, their confidents, and nearest relations, and with a treachery and cruelty, which seemed to increase with the corruptions of the age; but yet not without instances of heroic fidelity and generous courage, of which human nature itself still appears to be susceptible, even in the most degenerate times.

The slave of one of the proscribed, seeing soldiers come towards the place where his master lay concealed, took the disguise of his master's clothes, and presented himself to be killed in his stead. Another slave agreed to personate his master, and being carried in his litter, was killed, while the master himself, acting as one of the bearers of the litter, escaped. Another having been formerly branded by his master for some offence, was easily suspected of a desire to seize this opportunity of being revenged; but he preferred the opposite part. While his master fled, he put himself in the way to stop his pursuers, produced a head, which he had severed from a dead body in the streets, and passing it for that of

his master, delayed the pursuers, and procured him sufficient time to escape.

The son of Hosidius Geta saved his father by giving out that he was already killed, and by actually performing a funeral in his name. The son of Quintus Cicero, though, in the former part of his life, often on bad terms with his father and with his uncle, and often undutiful to both, ended his days in an act of magnanimity and filial affection; persevering in the concealment of his father, notwithstanding that the torture was applied to force a discovery, until the father, who was within hearing of his cries, burst from his concealment, and, together with the son, was slain *.

Quintus Cicero, who perished in this manner, having been in the country, or having escaped from the city on the first alarm of these murders, was for a little time in concealment with his brother Marcus. The brothers are mentioned as being at Tusculum together, and as setting out from thence for Astura, another of Cicero's villas on the coast, intending to embark for Greece; but as Quintus was entirely unprovided for the voyage, and his brother unable to supply him, they parted on the road in agonies of grief. In a few days after this parting, Quintus having put himself under the protection of his own son, received, though in vain, that striking proof of his filial affection and fidelity, which has just been mentioned.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii. Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iv.

Marcus Cicero having got safe to Astura, embarked, and with a fair wind arrived at Circeii. When the vessel was again about to set sail, his mind wavered; he flattered himself that matters might yet take a more favourable turn; he landed, and travelled about twelve miles on his way to Rome *: but his resolution again failed him, and he once more returned towards the sea. Being arrived on the coast, he still hesitated, remained on shore, and passed the night in agonies of sorrow, which were interrupted only by momentary starts of indignation and rage. Under these emotions, he sometimes solaced himself with a prospect of returning to Rome in disguise, of killing himself in the presence of Octavius, and of staining the person of that young traitor with the blood of a man, whom he had so ungratefully and so vilely betrayed. Even this appeared to his frantic imagination as some degree of revenge; but the fear of being discovered before he could execute his purpose, the prospect of the tortures and indignities he was likely to suffer, deterred him from his design; and, being unable to take any resolution whatever, he committed himself to his attendants, was carried on board of a vessel, and steered for Formiæ †. Having another villa near to this place, he was again landed, and being fatigued with the motion of the sea, went to rest; but his servants, according to the superstition of the times, being disturbed with prodigies and unfavourable presages, or rather being sensible of their master's

* Plut. in Cicerone. † Ibid.

danger, after a little repose, awaked him from his sleep, forced him into his litter, and hastened again to embark. Soon after they were gone, Popilius Lænas, a Tribune of the legions, and Herennius, a Centurion, with a party who had been for some days in search of this prey, arrived at the villa. Popilius had received particular obligations from Cicero, having been defended by him when tried upon a criminal accusation; but these were times, in which bad men could make a merit of ingratitude to their former benefactors, when it served to ingratiate them with those in power. This officer, with his party, finding the gates of the court and the passages of the villa shut, burst them open; but missing the person they sought for, and suspecting that he must have taken his flight again to the sea, they pursued through an avenue that led to the shore, and came in sight of Cicero's litter, before he had left the walks of his own garden.

On the appearance of a military party, Cicero perceived the end of his labours, ordered the bearers of his litter to halt; and having been hitherto, while there were any hopes of escape, distressed chiefly by the perplexity and indecision of his own mind, he became, as soon as his fate appeared to be certain, determined and calm. In this situation, he was observed to stroke his chin with his left hand, a gesture for which he was remarked in his moments of thoughtfulness, and when least disturbed. Upon the approach of the party, he put forth his head from the litter, and fixed his eyes upon the Tribune with great composure. The countenance of a man

so well known to every Roman, now worn out with fatigue and dejection, and disfigured by neglect of the usual attention to his person, made a moving spectacle even to those who came to assist in his murder. They turned away, while the assassin performed his office, and severed the head from his body.

Thus perished Marcus Tullius Cicero, in the sixty-fourth year of his age. Although his character may be sufficiently known from the part which he bore in several transactions, of which the accounts are scattered in different parts of this history, yet it is difficult to close the scene of his life, without some recollection of the circumstances which were peculiar to so distinguished a personage. He appears to have been the last of the Romans, who rose to the highest offices of State by the force of his personal character, and by the fair arts of a republican candidate for public honours. None of his ancestors having enjoyed any considerable preferments, he was upon this account considered as obscure, and with reluctance admitted by the nobility to a participation of rank with themselves. It was however impossible to prevent his advancement, so long as preferments were distributed according to the civil and political forms of the republic, which gave so large a scope to the industry, abilities and genius of such men. Under those forms, all the talents of a citizen were allowed to have some effect, and all the variety of useful qualifications were supposed to be united in forming a title to consideration with the public; the qualifications of a warrior were united

with those of a citizen, and even the talents of a lawyer and barrister, with those of a Senator and Counsellor of State. The law required* that the same person should be a warrior and statesman; and it was at least expedient or customary, that he should be also a barrister, in order to secure the public favour, and to support his claim to preferments and honours.

Cicero was by no means the first person at Rome, who with peculiar attention cultivated the talents of a pleader, and applied himself with ardour to literary studies. He is nevertheless universally acknowledged, by his proficiency in these studies, to have greatly excelled all those who had gone before him, so much, as to have attained the highest rank in the commonwealth, without having quitted the gown, and to have made his first campaign in the capacity of Roman Proconsul, and above ten years after he had already exercised the supreme executive power in the State.

To the novelty of this circumstance, as well as to the novelty of his family-name in the list of officers of State, was owing some part of that obloquy which his enemies tried to employ against him; and it may be admitted, that for a Roman he was too much a mere man of the robe, and that he possibly may have been less a statesman and warrior, for having been so much a man of letters, and so accomplished a pleader.

* Ten or fifteen years' military service was required, as a qualification for the higher officers of State. Vid. Polyb. ubi supra.

Cicero, whether we suppose him to have been governed by original vanity, or by a habit of considering the world merely as a theatre for the display of his talents, and for the acquisition of fame, more than as a scene of real affairs, in which objects of serious consequence to mankind were to be treated, was certainly too fond of applause, courted it as a principal object even in the fairest transactions of his life, and was, by this means, too much dependent on the opinion of other men, to possess himself sufficiently amidst the difficulties which occur in the very arduous situation which fell to his lot. Though disposed, in the midst of a very corrupt age, to merit commendation by honest means, and by the support of good government, he could not endure reproach or censure, even from those whose disapprobation was a presumption of innocence and of merit; insomuch that, even where he thought his own conduct the most meritorious, he felt the unpopularity of his actions, with a degree of mortification which greatly distracted his mind, and shook his resolution. Being, towards the end of his life, by the almost total extirpation of the more respectable citizens and members of the Senate who had laboured with himself for the preservation of the commonwealth, left in a situation which required the abilities of a great warrior, as well as those of the ablest statesman, and in which, even such abilities could not have stemmed the torrent which burst forth to overwhelm the republic, it is not surprising that he failed in the attempt. The catastrophe, indeed, it must be owned, in looking back to the different

stages of its approach, may in some degree be imputed to himself. In his desire to temporise and please opposite parties, he sometimes forwarded the most dangerous designs of Pompey, sometimes of Cæsar, or of both together. Upon the death of the latter, in order to conciliate his party, he moved that his acts should be confirmed, and his projects carried into execution, and thereby threw absolute power into the hands of Antony; and even when this storm might have blown over, or wore out by his own violence, he raised it afresh, and from a more dangerous quarter, by the countenance and support he procured to a new Cæsar. It is evident, that in temporising with such parties, nothing is to be gained, and in opposing them, the fall at least may be honourable.

Antony, at the same time that he gave orders for the death of Cicero, gave directions that not only his head, but his right hand likewise, with which he had written so many severe invectives against himself, should be cut off *, and brought to him as an evidence of the execution.

In the course of these murders, the heads of the slain were usually presented to the Triumvirs, and by their orders set up in conspicuous places, while the bodies were cast into the river, or suffered to be exposed in the streets. Antony, having more numerous resentments to gratify than either of his colleagues, had the heads of his enemies brought to him frequently, even as he lay on the couch at his

* Plut. in Cicerone.

meals. That of Cicero was received by him with the joy of victory; he gazed upon it with singular pleasure, and ordered it, together with the hand, to be exposed on the rostrum from which this admirable orator had so often declaimed, and where these mangled parts of his body were now exposed to the view of a multitude, that used to crowd to his audience *. Fulvia, too, had her enemies on this occasion, and received the bloody tokens of their execution with a savage avidity and pleasure, which, to those who judge of propriety from modern customs, or who form their opinions of the sex from the manners of modern times, will scarcely appear to be credible. When the head of Cicero, in particular, was brought to her toilet, with a peculiar and spiteful allusion to the eloquence, by which she herself, as well as her present and former husband, had been galled, she is said to have forced open the jaw, and to have pricked and tore the tongue with the point of a bodkin, which she took from her hair.

In this horrid scene of revenge and cruelty, rapacity too had its share; many persons were proscribed, merely that their estates might be brought into the coffers of the Triumvirs; and many persons were threatened with proscription, to induce them to ransom their lives with money †. The list received frequent additions, and underwent many alterations, some names being scratched out, and others inserted; a circumstance, by which persons of any consi-

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iv.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii.

derable property, as well as those who were obnoxious to any of the persons in power, were kept in the most anxious state of suspense and uncertainty. Many who were spared by the public usurpers of government, fell a sacrifice to the resentment of their private enemies, or to the avarice of those who wished to possess themselves of their property *; and the names of some persons who had thus, without any previous authority, been put to death, were afterwards inserted in the list of the proscribed, in order to justify the murder.

The troops were sensible of their own importance on this occasion, and set no bounds to their pretensions. They solicited grants of the houses of persons reputed to be of the opposite party; or, being the only buyers at the frequent sales which were made of forfeited estates, obtained the possession of them by a kind of fictitious purchase. Not satisfied with the price which was paid them for the blood of the proscribed, or with the extravagant gratuities which they frequently received, they were, under various pretences, hastening to seize every subject that tempted their avarice. They intruded themselves as relations into families with which they had no connection, and laid claim to inheritance which no one ventured to dispute; they plundered at discretion the houses of the rich, or murdered indiscriminately those who offended them, or who stood in their way to the possession they coveted; they at the same time encouraged, by their example, fugi-

* Dion. Cass. lib. xlvii. c. 12. Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iv.

tive slaves, and disorderly persons of every denomination, who, forming themselves into bands in the disguise of soldiers, engaged in the same practices, and perpetrated similar crimes.

The Triumvirs, whose principal object it was to secure the government, though nowise interested in these extreme disorders, which far exceeded what they originally projected, not daring to restrain the military violence, lest it should recoil on themselves, left for some time the lives, as well as the properties of the People, entirely at the mercy of the troops; and citizens, who were reputed to have any effects in reserve, were fain to adopt some soldier as a son and heir, in order to obtain his protection.

Such are the particulars which are recorded of this horrid transaction, which, however monstrous in those who gave rise to it, far exceeded the bounds of what they proposed to have done. When the evil had in some measure spent its force, its authors were willing to divert the attention of the public, or to efface the melancholy impressions which remained. For this purpose, Lepidus and Plancus being about to enter on the office of Consul for the following year, on some slight pretence of a victory gained by the army in Gaul, entered the city in procession; but the Triumvirs, suspecting that the People were more inclinable to dejection than triumph, enjoined them, by a formal proclamation, to give on that day all the demonstrations of joy which generally made part in the reception that was given to victorious generals.

Appian. ut supra.

The soldiers indeed were not wanting, as usual, in the petulant sarcasms and familiar abuse, in which they availed themselves of their present consequence: they sung, in their procession, scurrilous ballads, alluding to examples of parricide as well as murder committed by their chiefs in the late proscription; by Lepidus and Plancus, that of their own brothers; by Antony and Octavius, that of their nearest relations and friends *. But at the disposal of such censors as these, every citizen who was likely to frown on their crimes, every person whose countenance gave signs of dejection or sorrow, every possessor of land, and every father of a family, had reason to tremble for their own persons, their possessions, and the safety of their children.

Such was the aspect of affairs in Italy; but there were still some rays of hope, which shone from a distance. Not only Brutus and Cassius, in their provinces of Macedonia and Syria; but Cornificius in Africa, and Sextus Pompeius in Sicily, still held up the standard of the republic, and offered places of refuge to its friends. Sextus Pompeius stationed ships on the coast to receive them, and published rewards for the rescue or protection of his father's adherents, and of the other unfortunate remains of the commonwealth †. Paulus, the brother of Lepidus, though abandoned to destruction, was suffered to escape by the soldiers of the army, from partiality to himself or to their general. Lucius Cæsar was

* De Germanis non de Gallis triumphant Consules.

† Appian. ut supra. Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii. c. 12.

protected by his sister, the mother of Antony. Messala escaped to Brutus. Many others, whose names only are known, took refuge with one or other of the parties, who were still in condition to aim at the restoration of freedom, or to contend for the sovereignty of the empire.

U. C. 711. L. M. Plancus, M. Æ. Lepidus.

Lepidus and Plancus being entered on the office of Consul, had in charge from the Triumvirs, as the first object of their subordinate magistracy, the raising of money to supply the further exigencies of the war. Great sums had been expected to arise from the sale of the estates of the proscribed; but the purchase of such estates was justly reckoned invidious among a certain class of the People, who declined being partakers in the spoils of innocent and respectable citizens; and it was dangerous for an ordinary citizen to appear to be rich, or in condition to make any purchase; insomuch, that they who had murdered the owners were almost the only buyers of their estates when brought to market; and the money which arose from that quarter, fell greatly short of the expectations which had been entertained from the sales.

It was computed, that two hundred millions Roman money, were yet wanting to supply the expence of the war *. In order to make up this deficiency, the male sex chiefly having hitherto suffered by the public exactions, a contribution was levied from such women related to the opposite party as were supposed to be rich. At the same time persons

* Appian. ut supra.

of every rank, whose estates exceeded one hundred thousand * Roman money, were commanded to give an account of their effects, in order to be assessed in a tax equal to a fiftieth of their stock, and one year's income of their ordinary revenue †.

To enforce these exactions, hitherto unusual in Italy, much violence was necessary. The rents of houses in the city, and the produce of lands in the country, were sequestrated, leaving only one-half for the subsistence of the owners. In this manner, great sums of money were levied from the peaceable part of the commonwealth; but as the Triumvirs had already incurred a very heavy debt in their military operations, and in bounties to secure the troops in their interest, and had in prospect an arduous and expensive war against Brutus and Cassius, armed with the forces, and supported by the treasures of the East, the first sums which came in were far from being sufficient for their purpose. Additional exactions were accordingly made, under the denomination of fines or forfeitures, from those who were alleged to have given in a false state of their effects.

In the manner of the late sanguinary proscriptions, the Consuls published lists of all who had incurred this penalty, and ordered their effects accordingly to be seized. The inhabitants of the towns were obliged to find subsistence for the troops that were quartered on them, and the country was pillaged, under pretence of a search that was made for

* About eight thousand pounds. † Appian. ut supra.

the property of rebels. While the soldiers subsisted by these irregular means, their pay accumulating in the hands of their leaders, together with the advantages which they expected at the end of the war, operated as a pledge of their attachment and perseverance in the cause *.

Although few men were now left in Italy, who could forget their own personal dangers, so far as to think of the commonwealth, or who could be suspected of any design to restore the ancient government, yet this was made the ordinary ground of suspicion against those whom the Triumvirs wished to oppress; and the desire to remove it, led all orders of men to affect a veneration for the memory of Cæsar, and to vie in their protestations of zeal to avenge his death. The anniversary of this event was made a day of mourning. A shrine was erected on the place of his funeral, and was declared to be a public sanctuary and a place of refuge even to criminals. The divine or monarchical honours which were thus paid to the memory of the dead, preserved in the minds of the People that disposition to endure a master which was thought favourable to the living usurpers, and which the division of power between them might have otherwise diminished †.

Agreeably to the model of Julius Cæsar's arrangements, preparatory to his intended expedition into Asia, the Triumvirs, before the departure of Octavius and Antony on the service to which they were

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii, c. 14, 15.

† Ibid. lib. xliv, c. 18, 19.

destined, fixed the succession to all the offices of State for some years. They had under their command an army of forty legions, which they now separated into two divisions *. The one, under the direction of Antony, was assembled on the eastern coast, to be in readiness to cover Italy on that side, or to pass into Macedonia, and to carry the war against Brutus and Cassius into that province. The other was destined to remain in Italy, in order to secure the head of the empire, and to withstand the attacks which might be attempted by sea from Sicily or Africa, which were still in the possession of the opposite party.

Sextus Pompeius, the last of the family of the great Pompey, in consequence of the resolutions passed in his favour soon after Cæsar's death, had set out from Spain as admiral of the Roman navy, and fixing his station in Sicily, had a numerous fleet, and mustered considerable land forces †. With these in the war which immediately followed, he wished to co-operate with the combined armies of the two Consuls, Hirtius and Pansa; but was prevented by a doubt which arose, whether the veterans of Cæsar, who composed great part of that army, would act in concert with a son of Pompey ‡? Upon the coalition of Octavius with Lepidus and Antony, he again became an exile, but continued in possession of Sicily, a province which, by the present division of the empire, was comprehended in the lot of Octavius.

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* Appian. ut supra. † Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 17.
‡ Cicer. Philip. xiii.

Cornificius, by commission from the Roman Senate, still held the province of Africa, and refused to surrender it to Sextus, an officer who had been sent by Octavius, in consequence of the late distribution, to take possession of it in his name. The dispute being likely to end in a war, the opposite parties applied to the neighbouring princes for aid; but the lieutenant of Octavius having his commission from the ostensible authority then established at Rome, or being known to represent the triumphant party, was acknowledged by most of the African powers in alliance with the Romans. Being joined by their forces, he came to an action with his antagonist near Utica, and obtained a victory, in which Cornificius was killed. Lælius and Roscius, two officers of rank in the vanquished army, perished by their own hands *. As many as could find shipping, escaped to Sextus Pompeius, then master in the neighbouring ports of Sicily.

Soon after this event, Octavius, being desirous to dislodge the remains of the republican party from an island of so much importance to Rome, sent Salvidienus with a fleet, towards the straits of Messina, while he himself marched by land to Rhegium. A sea-fight soon after ensued, from which the fleets retired with equal loss. That of Octavius put into some port of the neighbourhood, which, by the historian, is called Balanus, to refit; and he himself, being arrived at Rhegium, was meditating a descent upon the opposite shore, when he received pressing

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. iv, p. 622, &c. Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 21.

instances from Antony to join him at Brundisium, that they might endeavour to repel the storm which was gathering from the East, and which seemed to threaten their establishments in Italy with the greatest hazard *.

Marcus Brutus, after fortune seemed to have declared for the republican party at Mutina, thinking himself at liberty to attend to the affairs of the East, and to support Cassius in his struggle for the possession of Syria, had passed with his army into Asia, in order to cut off all supplies from Dolabella, and to avail himself of the resources, for the pay and subsistence of the army, which were still to be found in that opulent province. While he was employed in the execution of this design, the important events already mentioned took place in that quarter. Cassius had prevailed in Syria, got entire possession of the province, was acknowledged as general by all the armies which had been assembled by either party beyond the boundaries of Cilicia; and he was meditating an expedition into Eygpt, to punish Cleopatra for the part she had taken against himself in his contest with Dolabella, and to raise a contribution in her country for the farther support of the war.

In the mean time, the victory obtained at Mutina, on which Brutus relied for the safety of Rome, though even by an army which till then was reputed on the side of the commonwealth, made a great change to its prejudice, giving an opportunity to its enemies to declare themselves, and to unite their

* Appian. ut supra.

forces: insomuch that, by the coalition of Octavius and Lepidus with Antony, all the remaining armies of the West were joined, not only to subdue the capital, but to carry the war into Macedonia and Asia, the last retreat of the republican interest: and the opposite divisions of East and West in the empire were now at issue for the sovereignty of the whole.

Brutus being informed of these circumstances, and of the late proscriptions, sent a message to Cassius, with pressing instances to divert him from his design against Egypt, and to turn his forces to the rescue of the commonwealth from the hands of tyrants, and to avenge the innocent blood which had been so profusely shed in Italy, and in the streets and mansions of Rome.

Upon these representations, Cassius having left a legion to secure the possession of Syria, marched to the westward, and in his way raised large contributions for the support of the war. Among the other measures which he took for this purpose, he surprised Ariobarzanes in his palace, and obliged him to deliver up the money then in his treasury. He pillaged the city of Tarsus; and, upon account of the support which the inhabitants of that place had given to Dolabella, again subjected them for the future to a heavy contribution *.

About the middle of winter, Brutus and Cassius, with their armies, joined at Smyrna. These restorers of the republic had parted some months before at Pireus, one bound for Syria, the other for Macedonia; but more like exiles than Roman officers of

* Appian. ut supra.

State, without any men, shipping, or money, and under great uncertainty of their success, in obtaining possession of the provinces on which they had their several pretensions. Their affairs now bore a different aspect; they had a numerous fleet, and a mighty land force, large sums of money already amassed, with the resources of a territory the most wealthy of any part in the Roman empire *. Brutus proposed that they should, without delay, transport their forces into Europe, and prevent the Triumvirs from getting any footing in Macedonia or Greece: but Cassius contended, that they had yet enemies or allies of doubtful fidelity in Asia, and that it would be imprudent to leave any such behind them, or to forego the treasure which they might yet command in that country, and which would enable them to reward and to encourage their armies.

Brutus, influenced by these considerations, accordingly marched into Lycia, while Cassius proceeded to execute a project he had formed for the reduction of Rhodes. His fleet being on their way to turn the Capes of Asia, in order to support him in this design, the Rhodians, trusting to their superior skill and reputation as mariners, assembled all the ships they could muster, and, near to the harbour of Lindus, ventured to engage those of Cassius; but with all their seamanship, being inferior in number and weight of ships, they were defeated with considerable loss. Cassius beheld the engagement from a high land on the continent, and as soon

* Plut. in Bruto.

as the ships could be again refitted *, ordered the fleet to Loryma, a fortified harbour in the continent, over against the island of Rhodes; from thence he embarked his army. He himself, with eighty galleys, escorted the transports in their passage, landed on the island, and invested the capital both by sea and by land.

The Rhodians, having trusted entirely to the defence of their shipping, were unprovided of all things necessary to withstand a siege. Cassius, by surprise, or by the treachery of a party within the walls, soon became master of the place, laid it under a severe contribution; and having left an officer of the name of Varus to command in the island, returned to the continent, with a great accession of reputation and wealth.

Brutus at the same time had forced the passes of the mountains leading into Lycia, and advancing to Xanthus, summoned the town to surrender. This place had of old acquired renown by the obstinate resistance of its inhabitants, or by the desperation they had shewn, when forced by Harpalus, the general of Cyrus, and by Alexander in his way to the conquest of Persia †. Upon the advance of Brutus, they razed their suburbs, and removed every building which might cover the approaches of an enemy. The walls were surrounded by a ditch fifty feet deep; and this being the first impediment which Brutus had to encounter, he began the attack with a continual labour to fill it up, and to effect a passage for his en-

* Appian. ut supra. † Ibid. lib. iv.

gines to the foot of the rampart. Having accomplished this object, he proceeded to cover his workmen with galleries, and to erect the engines usually employed in making a breach. He was opposed by the besieged in repeated sallies, in the last of which, his works were set on fire, and reduced to ashes.

In the mean time two thousand of the besiegers, pursuing the party who had made this sally, entered the city promiscuously with them, and not being properly supported, suffered the gates to be shut, and themselves to be cut off from relief. Being instantly surrounded by the inhabitants, numbers of them were killed, and the remainder forced into a temple, where they endeavoured to defend themselves.

This circumstance produced the most vigorous efforts on the part of the Romans, to force the walls, that they might rescue their friends, or make a diversion in their favour. They applied scaling-ladders to the battlements, and forcing-engines to the gates; and having at last made their way into the town, that they might at once terrify the inhabitants, and give notice of approaching relief to their own party, they raised a mighty shout as they entered the streets, and continued to urge their fury, in every direction, with fire and sword. The inhabitants, unable to resist this storm, retired to their houses, and there, with a resolution to maintain their ancient fame, determined to perish by their own hands, rather than submit to the enemy. In execution of this purpose, the father of a family, beginning with the

slaughter of his wife and his children, proceeded to kill himself.

While the people of Xanthus were employed in such acts of desperation, Brutus hearing the cries of anguish and of murder, supposed that his troops had refused to give quarter, and were killing the wretched inhabitants of the place, without distinction of sex or age. In order to put the speediest stop to so horrid a scene, his first thought was to bring off the troops, by sounding a general retreat; but being informed that the people were perishing, not by the cruelty of his army, but by their own desperation, he ordered to be proclaimed a general freedom and protection to all the inhabitants; but so long as any considerable number of the citizens remained, the officers who approached them, even with an offer of quarter, were answered with threats, or, by showers of darts and of arrows, were obliged to keep at a distance. The temples and public buildings were, with great difficulty, saved from fire; but besides a few women and slaves, none of the inhabitants could be rescued from the general destruction.

Brutus, greatly afflicted with this piteous catastrophe, marched with reluctance towards Patara, where the inhabitants were supposed to be infected with the same desperate spirit; and, to prevent the necessity of such fatal extremities, sent a message to prevail on the people to surrender, and to accept of his protection. At this place, however, the example of Xanthus appeared much too horrid to be followed, and the inhabitants submitted to pay the contributions which were exacted from them.

Lentulus, at the same time, who commanded the fleet which had been employed in transporting the army of Cassius into the island of Rhodes, forced his way into the harbour of Andriaca, the port of Myra, by breaking the chain which was stretched across the entrance; and this place being reduced, the inhabitants of Lycia sent offers of submission, and of their service in the war, agreed to pay a certain tribute, and to join the fleet with their galleys. Lentulus being accordingly reinforced with a great accession of ships, set sail for Abydus, the shortest passage into Europe, where he was ordered to wait the arrival of the land-forces.

At the same time, upon a report that the Queen of Egypt, with a numerous fleet, was at sea, to effect a junction with Octavius and Antony, Murcus, commanding another squadron belonging to Brutus and Cassius, had been stationed at the Cape of Tenarus to intercept her; but being informed that the Egyptian fleet was dispersed, or had suffered much in a storm, he weighed from Tenarus, and steered for Brundisium, where he took possession of an island at the mouth of the harbour, and in that station expected to prevent the transportation of any troops from Italy to Macedonia or Greece. He had however arrived too late for this purpose. Great part of Antony's army had already effected its passage, and he himself, with the remainder, waited for a favourable wind, to run or to pass unnoticed in the night.

In this state of the war, Brutus and Cassius, having accomplished the services in which they had been

severally engaged, again assembled their forces on the right of the Meander. It is said, that they began their conference on bad terms, the effect of a jealousy which had been industriously raised between them; but there did not appear in the sequel, any consequences from which to infer disagreement; and their joint forces, without delay, began to move towards Europe, in order to check the advances which they were informed the enemy had already made towards Greece. Having passed the Hellespont, they marched, by the isthmus of Cardia, to the coast of the bay of Melanus; here they made a halt for some days, to muster and to review their forces. The army of Cassius consisted of nine legions, that of Brutus of eight, amounting to about eighty thousand men, formed in the manner of the Roman infantry. Brutus had four thousand Gaulish and Lusitanian horse; two thousand cavalry, made up Thracians, Illyrians, Parthians, and Thessalians. Cassius had two thousand Gauls and Spaniards, and four thousand Parthian archers, in the manner of their country, mounted on horseback. They were followed likewise by some princes of Galatia, at the head of their respective forces. The whole, by this account, amounted to near one hundred thousand men. Many of the legions had been formed under Cæsar, and could not be retained in their present service, without frequent liberalities, and without a prospect, at the end of the war, of settlements, not inferior to those which were enjoyed or expected by the troops of the opposite side. The wealth of A-, however, having put their leaders in condition

to perform what was at present expected from them, all former engagements were now fulfilled, as the best earnest that could be given of future gratuities.

At the close of this muster, Cassius and Brutus, with all the officers of senatorian rank, of whom numbers were then present, being assembled on a platform, raised as usual to some height from the ground, were surrounded by the army, who crowded as usual in expectation of a speech from their leaders; and it was supposed, that what they were to deliver, so far as it could be heard or communicated, might have the effect of a manifesto, or proclamation, respecting the cause in which they were engaged, and their own intentions. Cassius spoke for himself, for his colleague, and the body of Senators who attended them; addressing this motely assemblage of native Romans and aliens, of citizens and soldiers of fortune, collected from different parties, as if it were an assembly of the Roman People deliberating on their public rights. He mentioned the mutual confidence that was natural between officers and men engaged, as they were, in a common cause; enumerated their resources, with the other advantages they possessed, and took notice of the punctual discharge of all former engagements, as the best security which could be given of a fixed intention to make a suitable provision for every soldier who should contribute to bring the war to a favourable issue. "The "unjust reproaches of our enemies," he said, "we "could easily disprove, if we were not, by our num- "bers, and by the swords which we hold in our "hands, in condition to despise them. While Cæsar

" led the armies of the republic against the enemies
" of Rome, we took part in the same service with
" him, we obeyed him, we were happy to serve un-
" der his command. But when he declared war on
" the commonwealth itself, we became his enemies;
" and when he became an usurper and a tyrant, we
" resented, as an injury, even the favours which he
" presumed to bestow upon ourselves. Had he been
" to fall a sacrifice to private resentment, we should
" not have been the proper actors in the execution
" of the sentence against him. He was willing to
" have gained us with preferments and honours;
" but we were not willing to accept, as the gift of
" a master, what we were entitled to claim as free
" citizens. We conceived, that, in presuming to
" confer the honours of the Roman republic, he en-
" croached on the prerogatives of the Roman People,
" and insulted the authority of the Roman Senate.

" Cæsar cancelled the laws, and overturned the
" constitution of his country; he usurped all the
" powers of the commonwealth, set up a monarchy,
" and himself affected to be a King. This our an-
" cestors, at the expulsion of Tarquin, bound them-
" selves and their posterity, by the most solemn
" oaths, and by the most direful imprecations, never
" to endure. The same obligation has been entail-
" ed upon us as a debt by our fathers; and we, ha-
" ving faithfully paid and discharged it, have per-
" formed the oath, and averted the consequences of
" failure from ourselves, and from our posterity.

" In the station of soldiers, we might have com-
" mitted ourselves, without reflection, to the com-

" mand of an officer, whose abilities and whose va-
" lour we admired; but, in the character of Roman
" citizens, we have a far different part to sustain.
" I must suppose, that I now speak to the Roman
" People, and to citizens of a free republic; to men
" who have never learned to depend upon others for
" gratifications and favours, who are not accustom-
" ed to own a superior, but who are themselves the
" masters, the dispensers of fortune and of honour,
" and the givers of all those dignities and powers
" by which Cæsar himself was exalted, and of which
" he assumed the entire disposal. Recollect from
" whom the Scipios, the Pompeys, even Cæsar him-
" self, derived his honours: from your ancestors,
" whom you now represent, and from yourselves, to
" whom, according to the laws of the republic, we,
" who are now your leaders in the field, address
" ourselves as your fellow-citizens in the common-
" wealth, and as persons depending on your plea-
" sure hereafter for the just reward and retribution
" of our services: Happy in being able to restore
" to you what Cæsar had the presumption to appro-
" priate to himself, the power and the dignity of
" your fathers, with the supreme disposal of all the
" offices of trust that were established for your
" safety, and for the preservation of your freedom;
" happy in being able to restore to the Tribunes of
" the Roman People the power of protecting you,
" and of procuring to every individual that justice
" which, under the late usurpation of Cæsar, was
" withheld, even from the sacred persons of those

"very magistrates on whom their fellow-citizens re-
"lied for safety.

"A lawless usurper is the common enemy of all
"good men; but the task of removing him can be
"the business only of a few. As for those who
"were concerned in the death of Cæsar, the Senate
"and the People of Rome, as soon as it was proper
"for them to pronounce their judgment, have, by
"the rewards and honours which they have bestow-
"ed upon them, declared their full approbation.
"But that Senate, and those honourable citizens,
"are now become a prey to assassins and murder-
"ers; they bleed in the streets, in the temples, in
"the most secret retreats, and in the arms of their
"families; or they are dispersed and fly wherever
"they hope to escape the fury of their enemies.
"Many are now present before you, happy in your
"protection, happy in witnessing the zeal which
"you entertain for the commonwealth, for the rights
"of your fellow-citizens, and for your own. These
"respectable citizens, we trust, will soon, by your
"means, be restored to a condition, in which they
"can enjoy, together with you, all the honours of a
"free people, concur with you in bestowing, and
"partake with you in receiving, the rewards which
"are due to such eminent services as you are now
"engaged to perform *."

Such is the substance of what we receive as the speech of Cassius on this memorable occasion; and

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. Lib. iv.

although we may not consider these compositions as the genuine record of what was spoken, yet as they contain the ideas and reasonings of times so much nearer than ours to the date of the transactions to which they refer, it is undoubtedly fit, and often instructive, to retain the argument on which they are founded. At the close of this speech, it is said that Cassius resumed the comparison of the forces and resources of the opposite parties, stated to his own army their equality by land, and their superiority by sea; remarked the facility with which they were to be supplied with all necessaries; and concluded with a promise, to pay an additional gratuity of fifteen hundred sesterces to every individual man *.

After this solemnity, the army resumed its march, and continued to advance, in separate columns or small divisions, by the route of Ænos and Doriscus, whilst Cimber, with a squadron of galleys, having a legion and a considerable detachment of archers on board, sailed towards the coast of Macedonia, with orders to pitch upon a proper station within the mountains of Pangeus, a ridge which stretching from Thrace southward, terminated in the bay of Strymon, opposite to the island of Thasus †. The leaders of the main army, upon their arrival on the river Nessus, found that the usual passage of the mountains at Symbolus was already seized by Saxa and Norbanus, officers serving under Antony, who, with the first division of his army from Italy, had traver-

* About L. 12. † See Plate IV.

sed Macedonia, and were now actually in possession of this pass, at which they proposed to resist or retard the further progress of their enemies westward in Europe.

Here the eastern armies were accordingly stopped, and were likely to end their career in Thrace, while their antagonists continued in possession of Macedonia, and preserved the most convenient retreat for their shipping in the bay of Strymon. They were relieved, however, from this apprehension by Rusco-polis, a Thracian prince, who attended them, and who pointed out a different route from that which the enemy had obstructed. Under this guide they marched three days among the mountains, and having crossed the summit, descended in the track of a river towards Philippi, a town which was situate on the eastern boundary of the plains of Amphipolis. This march would have led the army of Brutus and Cassius into the rear of the station occupied for Antony by Saxa and Norbanus, and would have cut off their retreat, if by timely intelligence they had not been warned to consult their own safety. These officers, on hearing of the enemy's approach, withdrew from their post, fell back no less than forty or fifty miles * to Amphipolis; and having put this place in the best posture they could for defence, determined to await the arrival of Octavius and Antony, who were hastening to fix the scene of the war at a distance from Rome.

* 350 stadia.

Brutus and Cassius took post at *Philippi*, on the declivity of the mountains, near to the pass which Saxa and Norbanus had lately abandoned. They encamped about two miles * from the town, on two separate eminences, about a mile † asunder. On their right was Philippi, covered by the mountains; on the left an impassable marsh, which reached about nine miles from their camp to the sea ‡. In their front, the country from Philippi, westward to Amphipolis, extending about forty or fifty miles, was flat and subject to floods and inundations of the rivers. The fleet was in harbour at Neapolis, near where the marsh, which covered the left of Cassius's camp, terminated in the sea; and Cimber had fixed on that place as the port for which all their convoys should steer, and by which they expected to be plentifully supplied with necessaries from Asia, and the coasts of the Ægean sea. They formed, at the same time, a magazine in the island of Thasus, out of the reach of the enemy, at which to lodge in safety the surplus of their provisions and stores.

Antony and Octavius had been employed, during the winter, in transporting their forces into Macedonia; and having effected their passage, notwithstanding the vigilance of the enemy's fleet, their army advanced by rapid marches to the river Strymon, in order to preserve Amphipolis, and to have as much as they could of the fertile plains of Macedonia in their rear. Octavius had been taken ill, and remained behind at Dyrrachium. Antony, upon his

* Eighteen stadia. † Eight stadia. ‡ Seventy sta

arrival at Amphipolis, having found the town in a posture of defence, fixed upon it as a place of arms for the security of his heavy baggage and stores. From thence he advanced upon the plain, through a march of some days, and pitched in full view of Philippi, and within a mile of the enemy's stations.

It was the object of the Triumvirs to bring the war to a speedy issue, as they foresaw the difficulty of being long able, without any supply of provisions from the sea, to maintain so numerous an army by the sole resources of the neighbouring country. Brutus and Cassius, on the contrary, perceived their own advantage, and were determined to protract the war. They fortified their camps with great care, and joined them to each other, to the town of Philippi on the one side, and to the morass on the other, with such works as formed a continued chain to cover their communication, over an extent of twelve miles from the town of Philippi, in front of their own camps, and behind the morass to the port of Neapolis.

Antony's camp being on the plain, and in a low situation, was overlooked by the enemy, and subject to be overflowed by the torrents which fell from the hills. He made every possible effort to bring his antagonists to action, and by his forwardness in pressing them to a battle, raised the courage of his own troops, and assumed, as is common with those who act offensively, the appearance of superiority, whether of force or of valour. While he yet continued in this posture, Octavius, though not entirely recovered from his illness, joined him from Dyrrachium. They took two separate stations opposite

to those of the enemy; Octavius opposite to Brutus, and Antony to Cassius. The number of legions on both sides were equal; but those of Antony and Octavius were not complete. In cavalry they were unequal; that of Brutus and Cassius amounting to twenty thousand, while that of Octavius and Antony was no more than thirteen thousand.

Antony and Octavius, in order to force their antagonists to a battle, or to cut off their communication with the sea, formed a design to pierce the morass, and to seize upon the heights beyond it on the left of Cassius's camp. In the work which they carried on for this purpose, they were covered by the cane or reeds, which grew to a great height in the marsh; and in ten days, without being observed, by means of timbers, hurdles, and earth, which they sunk as they advanced, accomplished a passage, and sent in the night a party of their army to occupy the opposite heights, to make lodgments, and to intercept the communication of their antagonists with the port of Neapolis, from which they received their daily supplies.

As soon as Brutus and Cassius perceived this advantage gained by the enemy, they took measures to recover it, and to open their own access again to the sea. For this purpose they, in their turn, traversed the morass in a line which crossed the passage which the enemy had made, and pierced their highway with a deep and impassable ditch. Having, in this manner, cut off the enemy's parties that had passed the morass from any succours or supp[illegible] from their main body, they were about to fo[illegible]

them, when Octavius and Antony endeavoured to recover their passage; and, to divert the attention of the enemy from what they were doing in the marsh, drew forth their whole armies in order of battle on the plain.

While Octavius was still confined by sickness, his lieutenant or next in command took his place in this movement, and advanced toward the intrenchment of Brutus. The light troops began to skirmish on the ascent of the hill. And, notwithstanding it was the resolution of both leaders in the republican army not to hazard a battle, except in defence of their own intrenchments, the legions of Brutus observing, from their parapet, what passed between the advanced parties in front, were so animated or incensed, as not to be restrained. They accordingly quitted their lines, attacked the wing on which Octavius was supposed to command, drove them back to their ground, and continuing the pursuit, even forced them in their camp. Octavius himself, having been carried from his bed to a litter, narrowly escaped falling into the enemy's hands.

On the other wing Antony likewise had advanced towards the camp of Cassius; but as he was observed, at the same time, beginning to work in the morass, this movement of his army was considered as no more than a feint to favour the other design. Cassius, to divert him from his operation in the marsh, drew forth his army likewise; and having greatly the advantage of the ground, did not suppose that the enemy, in such circumstances, would venture upon a general action. In this how-

ever he was disappointed. Antony seeing Cassius expose his front, discontinued his work in the morass, mounted the height in his presence, forced him to retire, even took and pillaged his camp, and thus showed, in his turn, the consequence of a vigorous attack upon troops, who, trusting to the effect of position, leave the whole advantage of impetuosity to their enemy.

These separate actions, or the preparations which were made for them, had filled up the greater part of the day. It was already dusk, and the field, for the most part, was covered with clouds of dust; so that no one could see to a distance. Those who commanded on the right in both armies, having put those who were opposed to them to *flight*, thought that the event was decisive *in* their own favour. But Brutus on the one side, and Antony on the other, being informed of what had passed on the other wings of their respective armies, neither of them attempted to preserve the advantage he had gained. Disqualified by fatigue or surprise from renewing the contest, they severally passed each other on the plain, and hastened back to their former stations.

Cassius, after the rout of his division, with a few who adhered to him, had halted on an eminence, and sent Titinius to the right, with orders to learn the particulars of the day on that side. This officer, while yet in sight, was met by a party of horse emerging from the clouds of dust that covered the field. This party had been sent by Brutus to learn the situation of his friends on the left; but Cassius,

supposing them to be enemies, and believing that Titinius, whom he saw surrounded by them, was taken, instantly, with the precipitant despair which, on other occasions, had proved so fatal to the cause of the republic, presented his breast to a slave, to whom he had allotted, in case of any urgent extremity, the office of putting an end to his life. Titinius, upon his return, imputing this fatal calamity to his own neglect in not trying sooner to undeceive his general by proper signals, killed himself, and fell upon the body of his friend *. Brutus soon after arrived at the same place, and seeing the dead body of Cassius, shed tears of vexation and sorrow over the effects of an action so rash and precipitant, and which deprived the republic and himself, in this extremity, of so necessary and so able a support. *This*, he said, *is the last of the Romans.*

The surviving leader of the republican party, in order to prevent the impression which the sight of a funeral so interesting was likely to make on the army, ordered the body of Cassius to be carried to the island of Thasus, and there privately interred. He himself spent the night in re-assembling the troops who had been dispersed, formed both armies into one body, and drew the whole into one camp. He still kept his ground at Philippi, and endeavoured to support the courage of the troops, and to replace the activity and military skill of his unfortunate colleague. In his addresses to the army, he set forth the advantages they had gained as more than

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii, c. 34. Appian. lib. iv.

sufficient to compensate their losses. He represented the precarious condition of the enemy, who, having already exhausted the province of Macedonia in their rear, were obliged to bring their provisions from Thessaly, which was at a greater distance, and not likely to supply them so long. "The sea-ports," he observed, "being every where blocked up, and "their convoys intercepted by a fleet of above two "hundred and sixty sail, the prospect of what they "must speedily suffer will make them impatient for "action. They will provoke," he said, "they will "attempt to insult you; but this appearance of "courage is a mere effect of despair. Only wait "the result of these circumstances, and perseve-"rance will insure your success." He supported these exhortations by giving the army full satisfaction in all their claims or pretensions, and with an additional gratuity to every man of a thousand sesterces *.

The leaders of the other side, at the same time, were equally employed in what was necessary to palliate the sufferings, or to raise the hopes of their own army. Though not equally in condition to make present donations, they amply supplied this defect with expectations and promises. They declared their intention of giving an additional gratuity of five thousand sesterces to each private man †, five times as much to the Centurion, and the double of this sum to the Tribune. "Judge ye," said Antony, in his address to the army, "who has suffe-

* About L. 8. † About L. 40.

"most by the mutual pillage of yesterday? You, "who have left all your effects behind you in Italy, "or the enemy, who came to their ground loaded "with the spoils of Asia? Their own general, by "killing himself, has proclaimed your victory. And "we declare you victorious, by bestowing upon you "the rewards of valour to which you are entitled. "If the enemy are pleased to dispute your claim to "these rewards, let them meet us again in the field. "They shall have an opportunity to-morrow, and "for some days to come: if they shrink from the "contest, and remain behind their intrenchments, "I shall leave you to determine who is victorious, "or who has been vanquished in the trial of force "we have had."

Antony and Octavius accordingly drew forth their army for many days successively, and notwithstanding their affectation of triumph, were greatly embarrassed with the resolution which appeared to be taken by the enemy, not to hazard a battle. They began to suffer greatly for want of provisions, and felt the approach of winter, which, in a marshy situation, threatened them with growing inconveniencies. Brutus, to hasten the effects of the season, had turned the course of a river from the hills, and laid under water part of the plain on which they encamped *. At the same time a recent calamity, which befell them at sea, increased these distresses, and diminished their hopes of relief.

On the same day on which the late battle was

* Zonoras, c. 19, p. 385.

fought at Philippi, Domitius Calvinus had sailed from Brundisium, having on board of transports two legions, of which the Martia was one, with two thousand men of the Prætorian bands*, and a body of horse, convoyed by some galleys, or ships of force. Being met at sea by the fleet of Brutus, consisting of one hundred and thirty sail, under Murcus and Ænobarbus, a few of the headmost and best sailing ships escaped; but the remainder being surrounded, had no resource but in the valour of the troops, who endeavoured to defend themselves with their swords, grappling and lashing their transports to the ships of the enemy; but in this attempt, being galled with missiles from the armed galleys, particularly with burning darts, by which some of the transports were set on fire, the others, to avoid the flames, were obliged to keep at a distance; and the greater part of them suffering extremely, without being able to annoy the enemy, were sunk or destroyed. Calvinus himself, having been five days at sea, with difficulty escaped to Brundisium.

These tidings had their effect in both armies. In that of Brutus they inspired an unseasonable ardour, and a disposition to commit the cause of the party to the hazard of a battle; in that of Antony and Octavius, they still further impressed the necessity of a speedy decision. These leaders, to amuse their own troops, and to provoke the enemy, had seized, in the night, a post on the declivity below the ground

* It is probable, that the troops quartered at Rome, to awe the city, already began to be so distinguished.

which was lately occupied by Cassius. They were suffered to make a lodgment upon it by Brutus, who had not any apprehension that he could be annoyed from a situation which was so much lower than his own. On the following day, however, it appeared, that their intention in seizing this post was to cover a movement, which they proposed to make to their right on the edge of the morass: this they accordingly executed, and pitched again in two separate encampments. In their new position they were observed to sound the morass, and either intended a feint, or had a real design, by effecting a communication with the opposite side, again to cut off every intercourse of Brutus with his ships. But finding that all the heights on the opposite side were now secured against them by intrenchments, they dropped that intention, and endeavoured, by frequent alarms, and by exposing their own parties on the plain, to engage their antagonist in a general action.

Brutus, in the meantime, having secured his own communication with Neapolis, by a proper disposition of posts from his present encampment to the sea; and trusting that his enemies must, upon the approach of winter, be obliged to evacuate Macedonia, or to separate their army for the convenience of finding subsistence; persisted in his resolution to protract the war. In this conjuncture, he wrote to his friend Pomponius Atticus in the following terms: "My object is secure; for either I shall, by my "victory, rescue the Romans from the servitude in- "to which they are fallen, or perish in the attempt, "and in my death escape from slavery. So far have

"I done my part, and wait for the issue in which "public freedom or death is to follow. As for An- "tony, who has chosen to become the retainer of "Octavius, rather than a sharer with us in the equal "rights of a citizen, he has a different alternative; "either now to perish with this young man, or, "being the dupe of his artifices, to become here- "after the subject of his usurpation *."

The troops of Brutus, however, could not be reconciled to this dilatory plan; they began to complain that a victorious army, as they styled themselves, should be cooped up behind intrenchments, and should be insulted like women; even the officers, pretending to reason on the state of the war, censured their commander for losing the opportunity, which so great an ardour in the army gave him, of deciding the contest at a blow. They alleged, that even if the attempt should prove unsuccessful, he might still return to the execution of his defensive and dilatory operations.

Brutus was aware that the army, now under his command, having been trained up as mere soldiers of fortune, had no principle of attachment to either side; that it was necessary to consult their inclinations, as well as to flatter their hopes. He remembered that Cassius had been obliged, in many things, to abate the usual rigour of his discipline; and being himself of a mild and indulgent nature, he yielded to those who were under his command; or not being able to stem the torrent which daily increased, he

* Plutarch. in Bruto.

suffered the impatience of his own men to hurry him into a risk of all his fortunes. In about twenty days after the former action *, overcome by mere importunities, he drew forth his army on the declivity before his encampment; the enemy, at the same time, according to their usual practice, were forming upon the plain; and both sides foresaw the approach of a general engagement.

Historians introduce their accounts of the last action at Philippi, with a detail of forms and solemnities, which, on other occasions, they have either omitted to mention, or which were not equally practised. As soon as the parole or word for the day was given over the different divisions of the respective armies, a single trumpet sounded the signal of battle; and was followed by a numerous band, which played an air, while the legions were dressing their ranks, and while the men were trying and handling their arms.

Brutus, being on horseback, passed along the lines of his own army, and exhorted his men not to quit the advantage of the ground on which they stood, by advancing too far to meet the enemy. "You have "promised me a victory," he said; "you have "forced me to snatch it now, rather than to wait "for a more secure possession of it hereafter. It is "your business to fulfil your own expectations and "mine."

On the other side, Antony and Octavius were happy in having their fortunes, in some measure desperate, brought to the chance of a battle. They put

* Plutarch. in Bruto.

their army in mind, that this was what all of them wished: "You are poor and distressed," they said, "but in the enemy's camp you will find an end "to your sufferings, and the beginning of riches "and plenty. From us, who are your leaders, you "may expect the rewards which are due to valour, "and every effect of a disposition in us which is "sufficiently liberal, but which victory alone will "give us the power to indulge in the manner that "we wish."

In these preparations the day being far spent, and noon about three hours already past, the trumpets on both sides having sounded a general charge, made a sudden pause, and sounded again, while both armies being in motion, struck upon their bucklers, advanced with a mighty shout, and, under a shower of missile weapons of every sort, closed with their swords. They continued long to struggle on the same spot, with all the fury that kindles in the use of short weapons. The places of those that fell in the first rank were continually supplied from the ranks behind them; and the place of action began to be chocked up with heaps of the slain. No stratagem is said to have been practised, or any accident to have happened, to determine the fate of the day on either side; but, after a severe contest, the army of Brutus began to give way, at first slowly, and almost insensibly; but being urged with growing violence, they were thrown into some confusion, and, beginning to run, gave up the day without hopes of recovery. In the disorder that followed, numbers, who fled to the camp, finding the entrances obstruct-

ed by the crowds that pressed for admission, despaired of safety there, and passed on to the heights in its rear. Octavius pushed on to the enemy's camp, in order to secure, or to keep in awe those who had taken refuge within it. Antony pursued those who were dispersed on the heights, and at the approach of night, made the necessary dispositions to hinder those who were within the intrenchment, or those who were in the field, from rallying or assembling again; and employed parties of horse all night to scour all the avenues in search of prisoners.

Brutus himself being cut off from the camp, and closely followed; Lucilius, one of his company, to give him time to escape, affecting to personate his general, and falling behind, was taken. This captive, supposed to be Brutus himself, being conducted to Antony, to whom he was known, met with a reception not unworthy of his generous artifice. "You intended," said Antony to those who brought the prisoner, with a politeness which seemed to refute some of the imputations on his character, "You "intended to bring me an enemy, but you have "brought me a friend *."

Brutus, in the mean time, having in the dark passed a brook that ran between steep and rocky banks covered with wood, made a halt with a few friends, on the opposite side, as in a place of safety. Being yet uncertain of the extent of his loss, he sent an officer to observe the field, and with orders, if any

* Plutarch. in Bruto.

considerable body of the army were yet together, to light a blaze as a signal or token of its safety. This officer accordingly made his way to the camp, and finding it still in the possession of his friends, lighted the blaze; but lest it should not be observed, he himself attempted to return to his general, fell into the enemy's hands, and was slain.

As, from the signal now made, it appeared to Brutus and the small company who attended him, that the camp was still in possession of their own people, they thought of making their way thither; but recollecting that the greater part of the army were dispersed, they doubted whether the lines could be defended until they could reach them, or even if they should be maintained so long, whether they could furnish any safe retreat. While they reasoned in this manner, one of their number, who had gone to the brook for water, returned with an alarm that the enemy were upon the opposite bank; and saying, with some agitation, "We must fly.—"Yes," replied Brutus, "but with our hands, not with our "feet." He was then said to have repeated, from some poet, a tragic exclamation in the character of Hercules: *O Virtue! I thought thee a substance, but find thee no more than an empty name, or the slave of Fortune.* It is impossible that Brutus could think that the value of virtue depended on the event of a battle; but the vulgar, in their traditions, willingly lend their own thoughts to eminent men in distress. The thoughts of Brutus are expressed in his letter to Atticus already quoted: *I have done my part, and wait for the issue, in which death or freedom is to be*

low. If he had ever thought that a mere honourable intention was to insure him success, it is surprising he was not sooner undeceived. Being now to end his life, and taking his leave of the company then present, one by one, he said aloud, That he was happy in never having been betrayed by any one he had trusted as a friend. Some of them, to whom he afterwards whispered apart, were observed to burst into tears; and it appeared that he requested their assistance in killing himself; for he soon afterwards executed this purpose, in company with one Strato and some others, whom he had taken aside.

This catastrophe, as usual, set the imaginations of men to work; and many prodigies and presages were believed to have preceded it. A spectre, it was said, had presented itself in the night to Brutus, when he was about to pass the Hellespont, told him it was his evil genius, and was to meet him again at Philippi; that here it accordingly again appeared on the eve of the late action.

Brutus was then about thirty-seven or forty years of age *. Next to Cato, he, of all the Romans, was supposed to have acted from the purest motives of public virtue. Cassius had too much elevation of mind to endure a master; but Brutus was likewise too just to have usurped on the rights of his fellow-citizens, even if they had been in his power. His character, however, in some respects, is questionable; and we may not, through the disguise of man-

* Liv. Epitome, lib. cxliv. Vel. Paterculus, c. 72.

ners so different from our own, be able to ascertain the truth. Cicero, who is at once the principal author of his fame and of the exceptions which are taken against it, charges him with an uncommon degree of arrogance, and complains of the tone which, while yet a young man, he took even with himself*. He likewise relates some particulars of a loan which one Scaptius had transacted for Brutus in the island of Cyprus, and of which the payment was exacted under the proconsulate of Cicero, with circumstances of uncommon avarice and cruelty; and that in this he even presumed to demand that the Roman Proconsul should support him with all his authority. The loan was usurious, and, in exacting the payment of it, the Senate of Salamis, in the island of Cyprus, had been surrounded by a party of cavalry, and shut up from the use of food. Cicero writes of this proceeding to Atticus, with every expression of blame and indignation; and yet Brutus, then a young man, continued to be held in the highest veneration and esteem by persons who were acquainted with these particulars. "If you should have no "other advantage," says Atticus, in writing to Cicero, "from your present government, but the op- "portunity of gaining the friendship of Brutus, this "alone will be enough." And Cicero himself frequently mentions Brutus, after this transaction, with peculiar expressions of admiration and love†. So

* Ad Attic. lib. v, ep. 21, et lib. vi, ep. 1. Ad me autem etiam, cum rogat aliquid, contumaciter, arroganter, ακειναντητως, solet scribere.

† Vid. lib. de Claris Oratoribus, cap. 3, &c. &c. This book is expressly dated after the return of Cicero from Cilicia.

that we must either suppose Brutus to have been innocent of this extortion and cruelty committed by his agent in Cyprus, or that such proceedings, though contrary to law, were so much authorised by the practice of the times, as to stain the manners of the age much more than the characters of individuals. Of these conjectures, perhaps, both are in part to be admitted: the law of the republic forbidding the interest of money under the denomination of usury, inflamed, rather than prevented the evil. Under this prohibition, the necessitous borrower was made to pay for the risk and obloquy which the lender incurred by transgressing the law, as well as for the use of his money. It was impossible to prevent by laws what is necessary in the common course of human affairs: persons having occasion for money must borrow, and persons having money will lend, in order to reap the benefit of it. It appears to have been customary with towns in the provinces, with corporations, and with dependent princes, to borrow money at exorbitant interest from the rich at Rome; and probably to employ that money in making presents to gain the powerful *. Pompey had great sums owing to him in Asia, and likewise received great presents from thence. These we must admit to have been great abuses; but individuals are not always accountable for the abuses of their age, even where they have not corrected them in their own practice.

Brutus and Cassius, the last unsuccessful leaders of the republican party, even after it became a crime

* Cicer. ad Attic. lib. v, ep. 21.

to mention their names with respect, were revered in secret by every person who had any memory or conception of the ancient republic, and will, in every age, be held in estimation by those who conceive that merit is to be valued independent of fortune. Even Antony, it is said, when the death of Brutus was reported to him, expressed the highest respect for his memory, covered his remains with the imperial robe which he himself had wore in the field, and ordered his obsequies to be performed with the highest marks of distinction and honour *; in this instance probably acting from policy, or, under all the vices of dissipation and profligacy with which he was charged, knowing how to seize the occasion of gaining public esteem, by splendid pretensions to generosity and candour.

Octavius, who far excelled his colleague in the ordinary arts of discretion and policy, is represented as greatly inferior to him in his behaviour on the present occasion. It is said that he ordered the head of Brutus to be carried into Italy, and exposed on Cæsar's tomb; and, among other proofs of insolence and cruelty which he gave in the present prosperous tide of his fortunes, that having among his prisoners a father and a son of the name of Florus, he ordered that one of them should be put to death, and that they should cast lots, or fight, to determine which should be spared. Under this cruel sentence the father entreated that he himself might die. Octavius attended to see the execution; and, after

* Plut. in Antonio et Bruto.

death of the father, likewise witnessed that of the son, who killed himself *.

That part of the vanquished army which fled to the heights, being about fourteen thousand men, hearing of the death of the last of their leaders, surrendered themselves, and were equally divided between Octavius and Antony. Those who remained in the camp, or at any of the out-posts of the army, likewise laid down their arms. Of the persons of rank who partook in the wreck of their party at Philippi, some escaped by sea, and joined Sextus Pompeius in Sicily, now the sole refuge of those who adhered to the commonwealth. Others killed themselves, or in the late action had refused quarter, and fought till they were slain. Among the first were Livius Drusus, the father of Livia, afterwards the wife of Octavius. Among the second were two young men of distinguished names; Cato, the son of him who died at Utica, and Lucius Cassius, nephew of the late general. Labeo, with great deliberation, prepared a grave for himself in his tent, wrote to his family at Rome, gave directions about his affairs, and then submitted himself to a person whom he had retained to put an end to his life.

It appears to have been a point of honour among the Romans of this age, to perish by their own hands, rather than by that of an enemy, otherwise they could have easily, when fortune appeared to

* Sueton. in Octav. c. 14. Dio. Cass. dates this particular after the battle of Actium.

have declared against them, forced their antagonists to bestow that death which they afterwards obtained with great reluctance from their friends: and perhaps, in forcing matters to this extremity, they might have turned, on occasion, the fortune of battle. Cæsar seems to have owed victory, at times, to efforts of this sort, and his party in general prevailed by their perseverance under checks and difficulties, as much as by the advantage they took of the favours of fortune *.

* See the history of the Campaigns on the Segra at Dyrrachium, and in Africa.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Immediate consequences of the event at Philippi.—New partition of the empire made by Octavius and Antony.—Their separation.—Progress of Octavius at Rome.—His friends Mæcenas and Agrippa.—Alarm and distress in Italy on the dispossession of the inhabitants to make way for the troops.—Jealousy of Fulvia and Lucius Antonius.—Blockade and reduction of Perusia.—Progress of Antony in Asia.—His stay at Alexandria.—Return to Italy.—Accommodation with Sextus Pompeius.—Return of Octavius and Antony to Rome.—Their policy.

Among the immediate consequences of the late event at Philippi, is mentioned the death of Porcia, the wife of Brutus, and the daughter of Cato. Being suspected of an intention to kill herself, watched by her servants, and anxiously precluded from the ordinary means of effecting that purpose, she is said to have swallowed burning coals, and expired. This was alleged to have happened on hearing of her husband's death; but Plutarch cites a letter of Brutus, extant in his own time, from which it appeared that this catastrophé preceded the death of Brutus, and was imputed to negligence of the servants, who attended her in the delirium of a fever *.

* Plut. in Bruto.

By the battles which had been fought in different parts of the empire, by the late massacre in Italy, and by the event of the war at Philippi, the last pillars of the commonwealth seemed to be removed, or but a few of its citizens were left who had any zeal, or were qualified to take any active part for its preservation. Octavius and Antony, upon the seeming removal of every obstruction from their way, without paying any regard to the pretensions of Lepidus, made a new partition of the empire. Octavius, to his former lot, had an addition of Spain and Numidia; Antony, that of the farther Gaul and the province of Africa *. It was agreed betwixt them, that Antony should prosecute the remains of the war in the East, and raise the necessary contributions to enable them to fulfil their engagements to the army: that Octavius should return into Italy, conduct the war against Sextus Pompeius, repress the designs of Lepidus, in case he should be dissatisfied with the present arrangement, and in proper time proceed to settle the veterans on the lands which had been allotted to them. These articles were committed to writing, and the ratifications exchanged. Antony having received from Octavius a reinforcement of two legions, departed for Asia, and Octavius set out on his return to Rome.

When accounts of the victory at Philippi were received in the city, a thanksgiving was ordered; and, instead of being limited to fifty or to sixty da as in the late decrees which had passed in hon

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 2.

even of Julius Cæsar, this festival was now to be continued for an entire year. In proportion to the approaches which the republican party made to its final extinction, the few who remained to partake in its ruin, affected a joy which kept pace with their sorrow, and disguised their fears in profuse expressions of pretended attachment and zeal for the honour of those who now had them at their mercy.

Under such an affectation of gladness, covering extreme anxiety or terror, the pacific inhabitants of Italy looked for the arrival of an army which was to be gratified with their richest possessions. They remembered what had passed at former military entries into Rome, and they anticipated the sufferings which were to be expected from a young man who had, during some time, and from mere craft and policy, assumed an air of moderation, and employed every artifice to forward his purpose; but in proportion as he became secure of his end, threw off his original mask, and concurred in *usurpations the most bloody* of any that had been known in the history of mankind. Octavius being detained by sickness on his way to the city, these gloomy apprehensions, which preceded his coming, gained force from delay. It was supposed that he deferred his arrival only while he adjusted his plan, or took measures to render its effects more certain. Every one exaggerated the evil, but no one thought of a remedy. Such was the present state of a helpless Senate and People, the remains of a commonwealth, insatiate of riches or power, and distinguished by pride, even after they lost their vigour, and were unable to dis-

charge the functions which the preservation of such a state required.

The new Cæsar gave notice to the Senate, that he was detained on his way by sickness, accepted the decree of a continued thanksgiving for the late victory obtained at Philippi, but desired to have it understood, that this honour was conferred on account of the exemplary justice which he had done on the assassins of his father. The cunning, so often noticed, with which he sometimes dropt this pretence, or with which he occasionally resumed it, as the object of all his pursuits, forms a striking part in his character. He at one time co-operated with the conspirators, declared it to be his intention, in conjunction with them, to restore the republic, and accordingly joined in the resolutions which were taken at Rome in favour of Decimus, as well as of Marcus Brutus and Cassius; he promoted the election of Casca into the office of Tribune; he raised an army to resist the usurpations of Antony, and took into his councils the most vehement partisans of the Senate. "*Even Servius Galba, holding the* "*very dagger with which he murdered Cæsar,*" said Antony to him in his letter during the siege of Mutina, "*is now employed in your camp* *." As he often, however, on former occasions, courted the army, by affecting a pious intention to avenge his father's death, so he now recurred to the same pretence, as the most likely to counterbalance the vour that was paid to the memory of Brutus a

* Cicer. Philip. Antony to Octavius and Hirtius.

Cassius, and the general regret which attended the catastrophé or last ineffectual scene that was acted in behalf of the commonwealth.

U. C. 712. L. Antonius, P. Servilius, Vatica Isauricus.

About this time, Octavius was known to have in his councils two officers of distinguished merit, Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa and Caius Cilnius Mæcenas; both well qualified in their respective parts, to support him in the pretensions he had formed on the empire. The first, by his courage and military abilities, was qualified to supply or to conceal the defects of his patron as a soldier; the second, by his industry, his temper, his choice of friends, and his fitness to soften the manners of the times, by diverting the minds of men from objects of public distress to the elegant and amusing occupations of literature, well qualified to smooth the difficulties which might remain in the way of an usurped administration. Although it had not yet appeared in what degree this successful adventurer was to commit his affairs to such able hands, his discernment in choosing them might be considered as the presage of a reign not depending on accidents, but founded on a real ascendant of understanding and judgment.

Upon the arrival of the young Cæsar at Rome, he gave assurances to the Senate of his intention to avoid all unnecessary acts of severity *. But the first object of his administration being to settle the veterans on the possessions which they had been made to expect at the end of the war, he was very soon led in-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii. c. 3.

to a scene of much trouble, and involved in great difficulties.

At the formation of the Triumvirate, the army had been flattered with the hopes of being settled on the most fertile lands, or in the wealthiest cities of Italy. In order to fulfil these expectations, it was necessary to dispossess the ancient inhabitants; and as this was now to be done without any pretence of forfeiture, or delinquency of any sort, the unhappy sufferers pleaded, that the lands intended for the army should be taken by lot, or in equal proportions throughout every part of the empire. But the soldiers were untractable, and not to be satisfied but by immediate possession of the lots which had been specially assigned as the reward of their services. A general order was accordingly issued for the present occupiers of those lands to remove. The victims of this severity repaired to Rome in entire families; persons of every sex, age, and condition, crowded the streets, took shelter in the temples and other places of public resort, and filled the city with complaints and lamentations *. "The ancient inhabitants of Italy, citizens of Rome," they said, "were stripped of their possessions, and turned out "to perish with their children, to make way for ad-

* Publius Virgilius Maro is said to have been of this injured train. Having had a small property in land near Mantua, he was stripped of it to make way for an officer of the legions; a wrong to which he so tenderly alludes in his Eclogue, (Nos patriæ fines et dulcia linquimus arva, Nos patriam fugimus But being recommended to Mæcenas by Asinius Pollio, who commanded that part of Italy, he obtained, from the respect that was due to his fine genius a protection which humanity and justice owed equally to every other person that was involved in this calamity.—Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v.

"venturers who had subverted the laws of their "country, and who were to perpetuate the military "usurpation they had established. The same vio- "lent hands which had stripped the Roman People "of their sovereignty, were now to be let loose on "their property. The innocent, who had taken no "part in the late troubles, were to be sacrificed, "merely because their possessions suited the con- "veniency of those who had already brought so ma- "ny evils on the commonwealth. They had been "promised protection from this party; but were "now to suffer, from their pretended protectors and "friends, greater evils than any conquered province "had ever endured from the worst of its enemies."

To these complaints both the army and its leaders were equally insensible, and proceeded, in particular instances, to acts of violence, which the object in view might not have required. Armed parties employed in the execution of this measure, by their indecision in distributing the lots; individuals, by quitting those which were at first assigned, in order to exchange them for others; and numbers being let loose without any specific grant or assignment to make free with such lands as suited their conveniency, kept the mind of the people in a state of suspense and apprehension, from which no one was exempt. In these disorders, the leader himself was obliged to connive at what he could not restrain, and give way to a violence to which he owed the possession of his power *.

* Appian. lib. v.

The army, now considering the lands of Italy as their property, looked upon every person inclined to protect the ancient inhabitants as their enemy, resented every delay that was made in gratifying their desires, and were equally insolent to their own officers as they were to the People. A party being assembled in the Campus Martius to receive their dismission and their assignments of land; and having some time waited for Octavius, from whom they expected satisfaction in these particulars, became impatient and clamorous, laid violent hands on Nonius, a Centurion, who endeavoured to pacify them, and even threw him into the river, where he perished. They afterwards dragged the dead body on shore, and placed it in the way by which it was expected their general should pass, to serve as a warning, that he himself should not slight their displeasure. Octavius being informed, before he came abroad, of this menacing insult, which had been offered to his authority, saw the necessity of not appearing to be moved. He passed the dead body without seeming to observe it, made the intended distribution of land to the troops; and affecting to consider the murder of Nonius as the effect of a private quarrel, in which he was not to take any part, left this dangerous meeting with a mild exhortation, that they should *not weaken their own cause by quarrelling among themselves.*

The cohorts which Octavius retained for the ordinary guard of his own person, treated him, on occasion, with equal disrespect. As an instance of this sort, it is mentioned, that one of their body

ving, at the public theatre, seated himself on the Equestrian bench, and the audience being scandalized at this act of presumption, the soldier was removed by order of his general; but his companions being made to believe that he was carried away to be put to death, placed themselves in the way of Octavius, as he passed from the theatre, and, with clamours and threats of instant revenge, demanded their fellow-soldier to be restored. He being produced accordingly, they called upon him to declare what usage he had met with; and when they were told by himself that no violence had been offered to him, they alleged that he was hired to conceal the truth, and to betray the honour of the army, and were scarcely to be appeased by his repeated asseverations to the contrary.

In these dangerous times, enormities which were committed by disorderly persons of any denomination being imputed to the soldiers, were suffered to pass with impunity. Robbery and murders became frequent, and the city of Rome itself, as well as the provincial towns, was infested by vagabonds, who, either from necessity, or from the licence of the times, subsisted by rapine. No property was safe, and the condition of persons of all parties equally insecure. At Rome the rent of houses fell to a fourth, and whole streets appeared to be deserted *.

In this distracted scene, nevertheless, there were persons who envied Octavius the hateful pre-eminence which he seemed to enjoy. Among these

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 9.

Manius, the person intrusted with the affairs of Mark Antony, Lucius, the brother of Antony, now in the office of Consul, and Fulvia his wife, aspiring to a share of the government, became impatient of an administration from which they thought themselves unfairly excluded. Not only L. Antonius, in the capacity of Consul, but the others also, in right of the absent Triumvir, thought themselves entitled to more consideration than they now enjoyed.

The power of distributing the lands and other rewards to the army, it was observed, gave Octavius a signal advantage over his colleague, and fixed the expectations of all men upon him alone. By these means he filled Italy with his own retainers and friends; and Fulvia, in particular, complained that her husband should be thus deprived of the fruits of a victory, which had been obtained chiefly by his conduct and valour. She appealed to the legions, presented herself at their quarters, and, with her children in her arms, implored, what she was pleased to call, a matter of right in behalf of their parent and her own husband.

In this manner, persons representing the absent Triumvir endeavoured to divide the party, and to add to the scene of political confusion already subsisting, a breach and opposition of interest among those who commanded the army. The country, at the same time, suffered from the interruption that was given by the fleets of Domitius Ahenobarbus and Sextus Pompeius, from the opposite ports of Illyricum and Sicily, to the importation of corn and other necessaries; and this circumstance, join

the precarious state of property, and the other causes which discouraged industry, completed the distresses of Italy.

The People, although they were willing to submit to any government, were not likely to be long able to endure their present oppressions. The friends of Antony endeavoured to load Octavius with the blame of these evils, and thought this a favourable opportunity to wrest the government out of his hands. To gain the soldiers, they found fault with the provision he had made for them as too scanty; and they joined in the complaints that were made by the sufferers, who were dispossessed of their property to make way for the soldiers. To other parties, they affected a design to restore the republic; and Lucius Antonius, in the character of Roman Consul, called upon the remaining friends of the commonwealth to appear in support of their legal magistrate. He professed his intention to make war even on his own brother, as well as on Octavius, if he should persist in support of the present usurpations, or should attempt to obstruct the restoration of freedom. But, notwithstanding his professions of respect for the laws, affecting to believe that his own person was in danger, he put a numerous body of attendants under arms, and presented himself in the streets at the head of a military force; a measure that was ever considered at Rome as the intimation of a design to set the laws at defiance, and to usurp the government.

Octavius, greatly provoked by these attacks which were made upon him by the representatives of An-

tony, repudiated the daughter of Fulvia, whom, at the formation of the Triumvirate, he had betrothed merely to serve a political purpose, and whom he now returned to her family, with express declarations of his never having had any correspondence with her as his wife. Fulvia, affecting to consider this insult as a prelude to greater injuries, appealed to Lepidus in behalf of his absent colleague, and withdrew to Prænesté, whither great numbers of all ranks and conditions, both civil and military, willing to distract the authors of their present distresses, flocked to her standard. Here she put herself at the head of an army, held regular councils, and, with a dagger by her side, gave the parole, and frequently harangued the troops.

In this immediate prospect of a rupture, preparations for war, and representations to Antony, the absent Triumvir, were equally made on both sides. It was yet uncertain how the army itself might divide between the parties. Octavius was likely, by his presence, to command the superior number; but great part of the forces now in Italy had been levied in the name of Antony, and still, according to the custom of those armies, bore his name on their shields. The two legions which were to have been transferred to Octavius, to replace those which he had given to his colleague in Macedonia, were still retained by Lucius Antonius for his brother. The provinces of Gaul, with considerable armies, ready to march into Italy, were under the governme Ventidius, of Plancus, and of Asinius Pollio, were the peculiar adherents of Antony, and no

likely to abandon his cause. Antony himself, by the superiority of his military character, had, in the course of his joint operations with Octavius, greatly surpassed him, and had acquired a high degree of reputation with the troops. It was therefore necessary for his rival to proceed with great caution, and not rashly to draw upon himself, in this quarrel, the weight of his colleague's authority, nor to disgust the army, by appearing to be the aggressor in a war between their leaders.

Such contests were certainly in general disagreeable to the legions, who, having subdued the republic, hoped now, at their ease, to share in its spoils. It was necessary, therefore, for Octavius, if a war should ensue, to make it appear to be the work of his enemies. For this purpose he formed at Rome a council of the principal officers; proposed that they should make inquiry into the grounds of the present dissension, and oblige those who were in fault to submit their pretensions to equitable judgment.

Fulvia and her partisans called this military convention by a ludicrous name, which we may translate *the Ammunition Senate* *, and refused to submit their cause to so new a tribunal.

The army in general was alarmed at the prospect of seeing the civil war again break forth. Two legions that had served first under Cæsar, and afterwards under Antony, being now quartered at Ancona, sent a deputation to Rome, with entreaties that the parties would avoid a rupture. The depu-

* Senatus Caligatus.

ties who came on this business were referred by Octavius to L. Antonius, who, he said, was the aggressor; and in consequence of this reference, attended by a great concourse of people, they proceeded to Prænesté, where the heads of the opposite party were assembled, and beseeched them to spare the republic, already too much afflicted with civil dissensions. They were told for answer, "That "Octavius was the aggressor; that while his col- "league was raising money for the benefit of the "army, he was artfully changing the inhabitants of "Italy, and occupying all the important stations of "the empire with his own retainers and creatures; "that the money, which, under pretence of support- "ing the war against Sextus Pompeius, had been "taken from the treasury, was by Octavius diverted "from its use, and employed in corrupting the "troops of his friend; that the estates of the pro- "scribed, under the pretence of sales, at which, be- "sides the creatures of Octavius, there was no man "to purchase, had been actually employed by him "for the same purpose; that, if he really meant to "avoid a rupture, he ought to do nothing without "consulting the friends of his colleague, who were "equally entitled with himself to share in the fruits "of their common victory obtained at Philippi. "But I know," said Lucius Antonius, "the false- "hood of Octavius; while he amuses you with the "hopes of a negociation and treaty, and with pro- "fessions of having nothing at heart besides "interest, he is arming himself with the utmos "gence, and has reinforced the garrison of B "sium, with an evident purpose to obstruct t

" turn of his own colleague, and your principal " friend, into Italy."

Octavius being in possession of the capital, in order that he might appear to have, not only the authority of government, but the countenance likewise of all the more respectable citizens of Rome on his side, called an assembly of Senators, at which he invited the Equestrian order also to attend. He represented to this assembly the calamities which were now impending over Italy from the jealousy and restless ambition of a few persons, who called themselves the friends of Mark Antony, and he exhorted the audience, with one accord, to join him in averting these evils. He accordingly obtained a deputation to be sent to Prænesté, where the heads of the opposite party were assembled, to remonstrate against their procedure. This measure, however, did not produce any effect, besides that which the crafty author proposed by it, that of transferring, as much as possible, to his enemies, the blame of such evils as were expected to follow.

While Octavius thus endeavoured to muster the citizens of Rome of his side, the expedient of a military congress, proposed by some officers of the army, was likely to be of more weight in the business. This order of men, perceiving themselves about to be involved in a quarrel, were extremely averse to risk all the advantages they had already obtained, without any prospect of gain. And the expedient they suggested was readily embraced by their chiefs. Gabii, being half way from Prænesté to Rome, was fixed upon as the place at which they should meet;

but on the day on which they were to open their conference, parties of horse having been, from some remains of distrust, without any concert, sent forward on both sides, to escort their deputies, and mutually to observe each other, and having met unexpectedly on the highway, and from misunderstanding coming to blows, numbers were killed or wounded, and the intended convention was dropped.

Each of the parties, in consequence of this accident, published a manifesto, and began to assemble in a hostile manner. Lucius Antonius had ordered new levies, and with these, joined to the troops already on foot under the authority of his brother, and who were now stationed in the nearer province of Gaul, under Calenus, he proposed to assemble an army of no less than eleven legions.

Octavius ordered six legions under Salvidienus, from Spain; and having already four in Italy, with a considerable body of troops, which, under the designation of Prætorian bands, made the ordinary guard of his person, he took the field to prevent the designs of his enemies.

The nobles or citizens of rank were divided; but the greater part, who had yet any hopes of having the civil government restored, thought themselves safer in the party of an actual Roman Consul, even such as Lucius Antonius was, than in that of Cæsar, who now held no regular office in the State. Numbers accordingly repaired to the camp of the criminal magistrate.

Sextus Pompeius, on the eve of a conte

likely to divide his enemies, might have been of considerable consequence, or might have obtained for himself advantageous terms from either party. His forces had been greatly augmented by an accession almost equal to two legions, the remains of the wreck at Philippi, which had escaped with Murcus. He might have got a footing in Italy, and by the favourable disposition of many who felt the oppression of the present government, or dreaded the future effects of its tyranny, might have held a species of balance between the contending parties. He, nevertheless, either under the notion of leaving his enemies to waste their strength against each other, or not having a sufficient genius for such arduous enterprises, suffered the opportunity to escape, and contented himself with endeavouring to secure the possession of Sicily and Sardinia, which he vainly hoped to retain as a patrimony independent of Rome.

Ænobarbus, the other remaining leader or representative of the republican party, who was still hovering on the opposite coast of Italy with the remains of a fleet, which he had commanded under Brutus and Cassius, made frequent descents, and plundered the recent settlements of the veterans. He even forced his way into the harbour of Brundisium, there took some galleys belonging to Octavius, and laid waste the adjacent country; but, while he was acting in a manner equally hostile to both parties, the divided forces of the Triumvirs, indifferent to every external enemy, began to assemble against each other in the field. Lepidus declared for

Octavius, and these two having left the city together, Lucius Antonius presented himself at the gates, and was admitted. This Consul having assembled the People, declared that his intention was to restore the republic. His brother, he said, for the future desired no illegal powers, and was ready to join in calling Octavius and Lepidus to account for the tyranny they had lately exercised against the ancient and unoffending proprietors of land in Italy.

In the mean time, the issue of this contest appeared, in a great measure, to depend on the movements that were making on the side of Spain and of Gaul. Salvidienus being on his march to join Octavius, was closely pursued by Asinius and Ventidius, who had declared for Antony. Agrippa, on the part of Cæsar, passed the Po in order to join Salvidienus; and having succeeded in this design, they obliged Asinius and Ventidius to remain on the defensive, expecting the arrival of the Consul, who was on his march to support them.

When Antonius came to a pass of the Apennines, on the Flaminian way, he found the gorges of these mountains already occupied by Agrippa and Salvidienus: not attempting to force them, he fell back to Perusia, and sent orders to Ventidius to join him by some other route; but Octavius having got possession of Sentinum and Nursia, two posts on the opposite sides of the mountains, effectually prevented the junction of his enemies, assembled all his own forces in the neighbourhood of Perusia, and in ed Antonius in that place. Here he effecte of circumvallation, extending about fifty sta

six miles, and placed his army between two parallels, equally strong, against any attempts that were likely to be made from the garrison, or from the field.

Lucius Antonius being thus shut up in Perusia during the autumn, or part of winter, and all the efforts of Fulvia, Asinius, Ventidius, and Plancus, to succour him being ineffectual, he was reduced, from want of provisions, to the greatest extremities, and offered to capitulate.

Octavius, in accepting this offer, took measures, with his usual address, to divide his enemies, or to sow the seeds of future jealousy among them. He affected to distinguish the regular troops, which had been formed to serve under his colleague Mark Antony, from the adventurers, or rather supposed disorderly persons, who had taken a part in this insurrection. The first, from pretended respect to his colleague in the Triumvirate, he allowed to withdraw with honour; the others he required to surrender at discretion. In complying with this requisition, L. Antonius himself set the example, went forth in person to receive the victor's commands, and being courteously treated, alleged his duty as a civil magistrate, or his desire to restore the republic, as an apology for his conduct, and implored mercy for those who had embarked with him in the same design. Octavius replied, "That as his enemies had "surrendered themselves at discretion, he should "make no remarks on the truth of their plea, nor "talk of conditions, where he was not to be bound

"by a treaty; that he must now consider not only "what his enemies had merited, but what was due "to himself." Having found among his prisoners some of the veterans who had served under the late Cæsar, he was disposed to have ordered them all to immediate execution; but observing that this measure was extremely offensive to his own army, he confined his severities to the Roman citizens, who, he pretended, had on this occasion acted with equal animosity to the army, and to himself. To avenge the supposed injury now done to the army, all persons not of the military profession, found under arms, were put to death. Of these, Cannutius, C. Flavius, Clodius Bythinicus, and others, are mentioned by Appian *. This Cannutius is said by Dion Cassius to have been the Tribune, who, presenting Octavius to his first audience from the People, contributed so much to the rise of his fortunes.

The greater part of these executions were performed in the presence of Octavius himself, and in the manner of sacrifices offered in form upon an altar, erected to the manes, or to the shade, hereafter to be called the deity of Julius Cæsar †. In this form of devotion, however detestable, these murders were supposed, in that age, to carry an aspect of duty, which sanctified the cruelty with which they were ordered, or with which this pretender to filial piety witnessed the scene. Four hundred of the Senatorian and Equestrian order are said, by Dion Ca[illegible] and Suetonius, to have stained this altar with

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v. † Divus Julius.

blood *. The magistrates and council of Perusia, being separately ordered to execution, implored for mercy, but had one general answer, *You must die* †. The town itself, whether by the desperation of its inhabitants, or by the outrage of those who were now become masters of it, was set on fire, and burnt to the ground. The country around being deserted, or laid waste with fire and sword, and cleared of its former inhabitants, became a prey to such followers of the army as chose to occupy it ‡.

At the date of this odious transaction, Octavius was no more than twenty-three years of age; and though, in former examples of cruelty, his youth may have been overruled or misled by the party rage of his colleagues, yet, in this instance, he himself betrayed a merciless nature, in the effects of which he had no other person to share, or to divide the blame §; and the world began to dread more from the separate power which he was about to establish, than they did from the joint usurpation, in which he bore a part, with men, of whom the one was contemned for want of capacity, and the other detested for his profligate manners.

U. C. 713. L. Dom. Calvinus, Asinius Pollio.

Before the breaking out of this war in Italy, Domitius Calvinus and Asinius Pollio had been destined Consuls; and the year following that in which these transactions took place, is accordingly dated or inscribed with their names. They were prevented,

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii. c. 14.
† Sueton. in Octav. c. 15.
‡ Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii. c. 14. et 15.
§ Livii Epitome, lib. cxxvi.

however, by this breach between the adherents of Antony and of Cæsar, from taking any formal possession of their office.

Pollio holding his commission from Mark Antony, although he had no opportunity to act, was understood to join with the brother in the late division of their parties. While the war continued, being stationed in his province, which was the district of Venetia, he carried on a correspondence with Ænobarbus, and representing Lucius Antonius, with his title of Roman Consul, as legal head of the republic, endeavoured to engage that officer on his side; but, in the event of the war, this correspondence was discontinued, and the military adherents of Antony being dispersed or cut off, his relations and retainers fled in different directions.

Fulvia, escorted by three thousand horse, took the road to Brundisium, and from thence, with Plancus and some other attendants, under the convoy of five galleys, passed into Greece *. Julia, the aged mother of Antony, took refuge with Sextus Pompeius in Sicily. Thither likewise fled Tiberius Claudius Nero, with his wife Livia Drusilla, and her infant son, persons often to be mentioned in the sequel of this history, as principal sharers in that very power which now seemed to be raised by Octavius on the ruin of their own fortunes. Others had recourse to the protection of Ænobarbus on the coast of Apulia.

While the relations of Antony in Italy were engaged in this unfortunate contest, he himself

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v.

passed from Greece, through Asia, into Egypt, where believing all his difficulties were at an end, he indulged his natural disposition to pleasure and dissipation. At Ephesus he had assembled the principal inhabitants of the Asiatic province, and representing the occasion which obliged his colleagues and himself to make a demand for money, proposed a contribution. "They were about to disband the "army," he said, "consisting of no less than twen- "ty-eight legions, to whom were due great arrears "of pay, together with deserved rewards and gra- "tuities for past services. One of my colleagues," he continued, "is gone into Italy to provide settle- "ments for this numerous army, or rather to re- "move the inhabitants of that country, in order to "make way for them. The task of finding supplies "of money lies upon me; and I am persuaded you "will own we are very moderate, when we demand "no more than you gave to our enemies. Necessi- "ty, however, obliges us to exact, in one year, "what Brutus and Cassius levied in two." "*You* "*will please then to order*," said one of the audience, "*two summers and two harvests in this wonderful* "*year; for you, who can command us to pay the tax* "*of two years in one, can likewise order the fruits of* "*both years to be gathered in one* *."

Antony, who paid more regard to wit than to the considerations either of humanity or justice, was pleased with this answer, and agreed that the proposed subsidy should be levied in two years instead

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v.

of one *. From Ephesus, he travelled by the coast towards Syria, laid heavy contributions, disposed of lands and country palaces, of which he made gifts to his retainers and followers. He received frequent applications for such favours from those who attended him, under pretence that the estates, which they coveted, were either deserted or occupied by an enemy. To his cook, in particular, he is said to have given the grant of a large possession, for having pleased him in the dressing of a supper. In his own behaviour, he exhibited that dissipation and extravagance, into which he ever relapsed in the moments of triumph and relaxation, and shewed in the gaiety and festivity of his court, a perfect contrast to the melancholy with which the inhabitants of every province were seized on his approach †. He had probably seen Cleopatra in Italy, during her intimacy with Julius Cæsar; and now, supposing himself come to replace that successful adventurer as head of the empire, he thought of this prize also as the reward of his labours, and, with all his ambition, possibly considered her as the principal object of his journey to the East. In order to heighten the scene of their meeting, with a farce to consist of a supposed quarrel and reconciliation, he affected to believe a report of her having ordered her fleet from Cyprus to join that of Cassius in the late war, and he sent her a formal summons to meet him in Cilicia, and to give in her answers to this specific accusation.

* Plut. in Antonio. † Ibid.

Cleopatra accordingly appeared on the Cydnus on board of a splendid galley, with a numerous retinue, and dazzled the Roman Triumvir with the profusion of her ornaments, the elegance of her equipage, and the charms of her person. She was now about nine and twenty years of age, and being acquainted with the language and manners of different nations, particularly instructed in the literature of the Greeks, and being in the maturity of wit and beauty, she joined the arts of a coquet, with all the accomplishments which became the birth and the high condition of a queen. Being invited to sup with Antony, she pleaded that he should begin with accepting her invitation. At their first entertainment, observing that his raillery savoured of the camp, she humoured him in his manner, and even surpassed him in the vivacity and freedom of her speech.

From thenceforward Antony laid aside all business, followed the queen of Egypt to her kingdom, leaving his own provinces exposed to an enemy, by whom they were soon after assailed and overrun; and while this storm was raging in the East, and whilst his brother, with his other adherents in Italy, were struggling for his share in the government of the empire, and obliged to fly or submit to his rival, he passed the winter at Alexandria in frolic and dissipation *. To gratify the jealousy of Cleopatra, he ordered Arsinoë, her sister and competitor for the throne, who had hitherto been confined at Mi-

* Plut. in Antonio.

letus, to be put to death. In every other particular he suffered himself to be governed by her caprice, and with the ensigns and attendance of a Roman Consul, and first officer of State in the empire, lived like a boy under the influence of his first amour. The course of his pleasures, however, was in a little time effectually interrupted, by a report of what had befallen his affairs in Syria and the Lesser Asia.

Pacorus, the son of the king of Parthia, had passed the Euphrates with a great army, had overrun Syria, and was making hasty advances in Cilicia. He was conducted in this expedition by Labienus, a Roman officer *, who, on the part of Brutus and Cassius, had resided at the Court of Parthia, while the fate of the empire yet remained in suspense at Philippi, and who now persuaded the Parthians to attempt the conquest of opulent provinces in their neighbourhood, which, together with the Roman republic itself, were become the possession of mere adventurers, unacknowledged and unsupported by the laws of the commonwealth.

Upon this alarm, Antony had assembled the naval forces of Asia and of Egypt, and had sailed with two hundred galleys for the coast of Phœnicia; when the misconduct and distress of his relations in Italy were reported to him, and in order to re-establish his interest at Rome, and save the remains of his power, shewed him the necessity of directing thither the armament which he had fitted out against

* Supposed to be the son of him who served under Julius Cæsar in the reduction of Gaul, and afterwards against him in the civil war.

the Parthian invaders of his province *. Having committed the command of his forces in Asia therefore to Ventidius, he steered for Greece. Upon his arrival at Athens, he was received by Fulvia, whose salutations were, probably, less flattering than those to which he had been lately accustomed in Egypt. The husband and the wife, on this occasion, were mutually disposed to blame and to recriminate. He complained of the flame which had been so unseasonably raised in his affairs in Italy, and she of his notorious infidelities to her bed, and of his remissness in the care of his own interest. She was supposed, in fomenting the late quarrel with Octavius, to have acted so much from jealousy of Cleopatra, as to have industriously created troubles in Italy, in order to hasten the return of her husband from Egypt.

At Athens, Antony was likewise met by Scribonius Libo, the father-in-law of Sextus Pompeius, who, under pretence of conducting Julia, the mother of Antony, in safety to her son, brought overtures of an alliance, and proposals of a concert for the conduct of their operations on the opposite coasts of Italy against Octavius, now supposed the common enemy of both. To this proposal, however, Antony made no decisive reply. In the late partition of the empire, Italy was not made a part in the separate lot of any of the Triumvirs; but being equally open to all of them, Antony professed being on his way thither, not as an enemy of Octavius, but

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v. Plut. in Antonio.

as his colleague in the government, equally interested with himself to preserve the capital of the empire undisturbed. In answer to Libo, therefore, he acknowledged his obligation to Sextus Pompeius, for the honourable manner in which he had treated his relation; assured him, that if an opportunity offered, he should be happy to return the favour; and that if he were obliged to make war on Octavius, he should be glad of Pompey's assistance; or, in case matters were amicably settled, should not neglect his interest in any accommodation that followed.

Octavius being informed of this interview, seized the opportunity which it gave him of raising suspicions against Antony in the minds of the veterans. He published the intelligence he had received of his correspondence with the head of the Pompeian faction, and represented it as a prelude to some scheme for restoring the enemies of the late Cæsar, for re-establishing the ancient possessors of land in Italy, and, consequently, for dispossessing the veterans of the settlements recently made in their favour. By spreading these reports in the army, he took measures to secure its attachment, and was in condition to maintain his possession of Italy, in case he should find it necessary to refuse his colleague a free admission into any of the ports at which it was expected he might present himself.

Soon after the reduction of Perusia, a considerable body of Antony's forces stationed at the foot the Alps, being deprived of a head by the death Calenus, who had commanded them; Octavius paired to the quarters of those troops, gained th

over to his own interest, and, in order to secure their fidelity, made the necessary change of their officers. By these means, after he had supplanted the party of his rival in all the towns which they held in Italy, he now dispossessed them of the Cisalpine Gaul, for which their leader had so long contended against the Senate.

At the arrival of Antony in Greece, Octavius could muster a land force greatly superior to any that could be formed against him, even by the junction of his rival with Ænobarbus and Sextus Pompeius; but he was so much inferior in shipping, that if their fleets should unite, they must be masters of the sea, and prevent all the importations by which Italy was supplied from abroad. To sow the seeds of some jealousy between them, or to counteract the intrigues of Antony with Scribonius Libo and with Sextus Pompeius, he made offers of marriage to Scribonia, the sister of Libo, and aunt of Pompey's wife; and this proposal being favourably received by the brother, he sent Mucia, the mother of Sextus Pompeius, with an honourable retinue, to engage her son likewise to promote the intended alliance. By these means, he hoped to amuse, or to soften, the animosity of that family against himself; or at least, by these appearances of a friendly correspondence with Sextus Pompeius, in his turn, to alarm Antony, and thus to disconcert any plan which his rival, in the prospect of a breach with himself, might have formed for a coalition with the remains of the republican party. This marriage with Scribonia was the second project of the same kind which Octavius had formed

before the age of twenty-four, merely to lull the vigilance, or to blunt the animosity of his antagonists, while he himself continued to pursue his principal object with unremitting attention and ardour.

Antony, in every comparison with Octavius, not only had the advantage of years, but was reckoned the better soldier; and having had the principal share, if not the whole honour of the victory at Philippi, had great authority in the army, and was likely, wherever he appeared, to be favourably received by the troops who had formerly any where served under his own command. These, however, upon his approach to Italy, under various pretences, were sent by his crafty rival into the distant provinces. Lepidus too, although he had hitherto acquiesced in the late partition of the empire, by which he had been stript of his equal share in the power of a Triumvir; yet, as he was suffered to retain the title, and might throw his weight into the scale of either of the other two parties, or furnish a pretence for some part of the army to secede from his rival, it was thought proper, on the present occasion, to remove him to a distance. For this purpose, the government of the Roman province in Africa was assigned to him, and he himself, with six legions of doubtful inclinations, was dismissed to take possession of that comman

While Octavius was thus strengthening himsel Italy, or removing every object of distrust from way, Antony, with a less pacific appearance than had hitherto preserved, set out from Athens, a leaving Fulvia ill at Sicyon, joined at Corcyra fleet, which had come round the Peloponnesus, a

from thence sailed with two hundred galleys for the coast of Italy. In his passage he was joined by Ænobarbus, who considered the supposed enemy of Octavius as a friend, and they steered together for Brundisium. As there was no war declared, Antony expected to be freely admitted into port; but being disappointed in this expectation, he landed at some distance from the harbour, and invested or blocked up the town by sea and by land. Having thus committed hostilities, he no longer hesitated in accepting the alliance of Sextus Pompeius against Octavius, and proposed to that leader of the Pompeian party to make a descent some where on the opposite coast of Italy, to distract the forces of their common enemy, while he himself continued the siege of Brundisium.

Sextus Pompeius accordingly, notwithstanding that the marriage of his relation Scribonia with Octavius had taken place, not suffering himself to be imposed upon by this artifice, landed at Thurio, in the Bay of Tarentum, made himself master of that place, and of the country from thence to Consentia. He, at the same time, sent Menas, one of his admirals, into Sardinia, who got possession of that island, and gained to his party two legions which were stationed there.

Octavius sent Agrippa to oppose Pompey, while he himself advanced for the relief of Brundisium, but in a manner which renewed the suspicions of his personal courage. Being taken ill on the march, he stopped short at Canusium, and suffered Brundisium to fall into the hands of his rival. His lieutenant

Agrippa was more successful; pressed upon the enemy, who had landed near Tarentum, obliged them to abandon their conquests, and to take refuge in their ships.

After Antony had got possession of Brundisium, it soon appeared that this unprofitable quarrel between the two chiefs was equally disagreeable to the armies on both sides; and each of the leaders, in order to exculpate himself to the troops, endeavoured to load his antagonist with the blame. Antony complained, that, without any offence on his part, the ports of Italy had been shut up against him. Octavius recriminated; accusing Antony of a correspondence with the Pompeian party; and justified his own conduct, in the order he had given to shut the port of Brundisium; alleging, that this precaution was taken, not against Antony or the troops in his service, but against Ænobarbus, one of the assassins of Cæsar, with whom Antony had effected a junction, to make war upon Italy.

In whatever manner these representations were received by the troops, as those of the opposite sides had frequent intercourse, their mutual inclinations to peace became known to each other; and officers, who had access to both the leaders, made formal proposals to effect a reconciliation between them. Antony, to evince his willingness to the blood of the legions, dismissed Ænobarbus der pretence of employing him to execute a mission in Bithynia, and at the same time set structions to Sextus Pompeius to withdraw fron coast.

In this disposition of the parties, accounts were received of the death of Fulvia, an event which greatly facilitated the negociation for peace, as it gave hopes of cementing the alliance of parties by a family connection. It was accordingly proposed, that the sister of Octavius, now the widow of Marcellus, should be married to Antony; and upon this basis a treaty was framed, including a new partition of the empire, by which all the East, from the Euphrates to Codropolis on the coast of Illyricum, was assigned to Antony. The West, from thence to the Ocean and the British Channel, was assigned to Octavius. Italy, as the seat of government, and the principal nursery of soldiers for the supply of their armies, was to be equally open to both. Lepidus was suffered to remain in the possession of his province in Africa. Ænobarbus was included in this treaty, and declared at peace with the heads of the empire; but Sextus Pompeius, notwithstanding his late confederacy with Antony, and his newly contracted relation with Octavius *, was still to be treated as an enemy. He was to be counteracted by Octavius, while the war with the Parthians was supposed sufficient to occupy the forces of Antony.

Upon the conclusion of this treaty, the leaders gave mutual entertainments, and the troops, released from the unprofitable task of making war on each other, returned to the more agreeable occupation of exacting the rewards of their services. They understood, that Antony had gone into Asia to raise

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 28. Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v.

the money which was wanted to pay off their arrears, and to satisfy their claims: they had manifold scores, in which they stated the rewards and gratuities which they had been made to expect on different occasions; and they now became clamorous, in particular, for the sums which had been so liberally promised them before the battle of Philippi. The same violence which they had been taught to employ against the civil government of their country, they were ready at times to turn against their commanders. They addressed their exactions, on the present occasion, chiefly to Antony. From him they required an account of the money he had collected in Asia; and surrounding him in a mutinous manner, would not have abstained from violence to his person, if they had not been pacified by Octavius, who, having been the instrument of former liberalities, had credit enough with the army to make them acquiesce in the apology which was made for the delay of their payment, and in the fresh assurances which were now given, that all the promises which had been formerly made to them should be faithfully performed.

All discontents for the present being suspended, the legions submitted to be sent into different quarters, and the leaders, with every appearance of a perfect reconciliation, set out for Rome. They made their entry into the city together, on horseback, and dressed in triumphal robes: they were receiv
the People, of every rank and condition, with
monstrations of joy; which, under the sense o
liverance from the prospect of intestine war, s

cently impending, was very general, and very sincere.

The pacific appearances with which the joint sovereigns of the empire thus made their entry at Rome, were confirmed by the actual marriage of Antony with Octavia; and it was expected, that the late rivals, now become brothers, by this happy transaction, were to govern for the future with much cordiality and mutual confidence. Antony, to evince the sincerity of this intention on his own part, put Manius, the confident of his brother and of Fulvia, to death, as being the supposed author of the late tumults in Italy; and, probably the more fully to shew how far he was willing to sacrifice every consideration to his present connection, he betrayed a secret correspondence which Salvidienus, an officer serving under Octavius, had maintained with himself during the siege of Brundisium. This officer, in consequence of the detection, being condemned for treachery, killed himself*.

Upon the faith of these public renunciations of all partial attachments, Octavius and Antony, in the character of collegiate sovereigns, passed the remainder of the present year, and the whole of the following, at Rome, with great appearance of concord. This circumstance was in some measure ascribed to the discretion of Octavia, who, during the same period, was delivered of a child to Antony, and by the birth of this new relation, gave an additional pledge for the continuance of their union; but, notwith-

* Livi Epitome, lib. cxxvii.

standing these flattering appearances, Italy suffered under the distresses of a war still subsisting with Sextus Pompeius and the other exiles, who were in possession of Sicily and Sardinia.

This remnant of the family, and partisans of Pompey, exasperated by the treatment they had received from both parties in the late quarrel and reconciliation, and now possessed of a considerable naval force, blocked up the ports of Italy, and prevented the usual importation of corn. The inhabitants of many towns were reduced to great distress. Those of the metropolis, in particular, became outrageous, and, in contempt of the military force by which they were governed, rose in tumults, pulled down the houses of persons to whom they imputed their sufferings, and even attacked the Triumvirs themselves with reproaches and violence. Being furnished with arms, they resisted the troops which were employed to quell them, and, in their frequent conflicts, covered the highways with the slain.

The Triumvirs were inclined to end these troubles, by urging with vigour the war against Pompey, in order to oblige him to open the seas; but for this purpose a great reinforcement of shipping was necessary; and a tax was imposed, in order to defray the expence of a fleet. A public burden, coming so unseasonably, greatly increased the general discontent. The inhabitants of Rome, although they had suffered themselves to be stript of their p
consequence as Roman citizens, still felt the
of nature, and were provoked by exactions t
fected their property and means of subsist
they took courage from the disorder of the

and now ventured to censure an usurpation, which they had not dared to resist. "Italy, the head of "the empire," they said, "long used to exemption "from all taxation, was not only torn by domestic "wars, but impoverished by an extortion that was "practised to support quarrels, not with foreign "enemies, but with Romans, and to gratify the va- "nity or emulation of fellow-citizens, who exhaust- "ed all the strength of the commonwealth, merely "to appropriate the government of it to themselves: "for this, so many respectable citizens had been "proscribed; for this, sword and famine were still "permitted to rage; and the children of the first "families of Rome, in order to revenge their per- "sonal wrongs, and even to be supplied with food, "were forced to act the part of banditti, and of pi- "rates."

The populace of Rome, instigated by these representations, tore down the proclamation in which the new tax was announced; and seeming to recover their former consequence, though now under the government of military force, they became more riotous and dangerous than they had been in the utmost abuse of their political freedom, and in the height of their democratical power.

It became necessary, on account of the riots, and the growing scarcity of bread, to open a negociation with Sextus Pompeius, as the speediest means of relief from the present distress. Octavius once more availed himself of the relation he had acquired to the family of Pompey by his marriage with Scribonia, invited his father-in-law Libo to a visit in Italy,

and by his means proposed an interview between the parties, to be held at Puteoli in the Bay of Naples.

Sextus having agreed to this proposal came with his fleet upon the coast. Antony and Octavius went to Puteoli by land, attended by many of the principal citizens, and a numerous military escort. In order that the parties might meet in safety, it was proposed, that each should have a separate platform, erected on piles to be driven in the sea, reaching, on the one side, from the shore, on the other, from Pompey's ship, so as to bring the parties sufficiently near to hold their conference, though still with such a space or interval betwixt them, as might mutually secure them from any insult or violence.

These preparations being completed, the fleet of Sextus Pompeius ranged itself on the one side, and the land force of the Triumvirs on the other. As the interests of all men were involved in the issue, their expectations were greatly raised. The shores, the cliffs, the high lands, were covered with spectators, who gazed on the scene, and anxiously waited for the event. At the first conference, the Triumvirs offered Pompey a safe return to Rome, with an equivalent for his father's estate. He demanded admission into the Triumvirate, instead of Lepidus, who appeared in effect to be already excluded. As they parted without any agreement, equal dissatisfaction appeared among their adherents and followers on both sides. Pompey feared the defec of many who had hitherto adhered to him; and as he had lately put Murcus, a principal officer of his

own party, to death, from a jealousy of this sort, he was inclined to believe that many of his followers were disposed to accept of any terms, and to treat for themselves apart.

The distresses of Italy, on the other hand, strongly urged the Triumvirs to make the necessary concessions; and both parties came to a second interview, with better inclinations to adjust their pretensions. It was accordingly agreed, that Pompey should remain in possession of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica; that the Peloponnesus should likewise be ceded to him, and a sum of money be paid in compensation for the losses of his family *; that all the exiles now under his protection, except such as were actually concerned in the death of Cæsar, should be restored to their country, and to a fourth part of their former estates; that the navigation of the seas of Italy should be free, and vessels immediately suffered to pass from Sicily, and all the neighbouring countries, which were accustomed to supply the Italians with corn.

This treaty being ratified, was transmitted to Rome, and committed to the keeping of the Vestal Virgins. Every cause of hostility or distrust between the parties being thus done away, their platforms were joined by a bridge of planks, and they embraced each other. Those who were near enough to see this signal of peace raised a shout, which was returned from the multitudes which crowded the

* 500,000 Drach. or Denarii, about L. 500,000. Zonoras, lib. x, p. 283.

ships and the neighbouring shores. Every one, as having suffered under the distresses and hardships which were now brought to an end, took a part in the joy which was occasioned by the present event.

Historians, seeming to feel for those who were concerned in this transaction, have exerted their genius in describing it; and, among other particulars, have recorded, that friends or relations, who had been long separated, being to meet in peace, crowded with great ardour to the strand; that persons who had no such particular motive, being seized with the general contagion, pressed to have a nearer view of the scene; that numbers were suffocated in the crowd; that many from the boats and ships leapt into the sea, and waded or swam to land, and were met from the shore by others who expected to recover their relations and friends; that shouts of joy, or cries of despair, were raised, according as they were severally successful or disappointed in this expectation; that parents and children, disappointed in their hopes of meeting each other, tore their hair, and fell into agonies of grief; the whole exhibiting, though in a supposed termination of public calamities, a lively expression of the distress which the late troubles had occasioned, and striking marks of the wounds which were recently open, and bleeding in the vitals of the commonwealth, or rankling in the bosom of every private house *.

At the close of this scene, the leaders mu invited each other to a feast. Pompey, by lot,

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 37. Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v.

the first entertainment on board his ship: he made an apology for the want of accommodation; and playing on the word *Carinæ*, which signified a ship, and was the name also of a noted street at Rome, in which his father had a palace now occupied by Antony, "This," he said, "is now my *Carinæ*." While the company were yet on board, Menas, once the slave of the great Pompey, but now emancipated, and the first sea-officer in the fleet of his son, whispered him, that then was the time to revenge the death of his father and of his brother, and to recover the rank of his family, by dispatching these authors of all their calamities. "Let me cut "the cable," he said, "and put to sea; I promise "you that none of them shall escape." "This "might have been done by Menas, without consulting me," said Sextus; "but my faith is sacred, "and must not be broken."

The guests accordingly were suffered to depart, without having, in any way, been made sensible of the danger they ran; and they gave entertainments in their turns. At these feasts, additional articles were thought of, to confirm the treaty, and to regulate the measures of the future administration. To strengthen the coalition of parties, the daughter of Sextus Pompeius was betrothed to Marcellus, the nephew of Octavius, and now the step-son of Antony. The succession to the Consulate was fixed for four years. Antony and Libo were named Consuls for the first year; Cæsar and Pompey were to follow; next, Ænobarbus and Sosius; and last of all, Antony again with Cæsar. Under the admini-

stration of these last, it was supposed, in terms which the Triumvirs still affected to employ, that the public order and public tranquillity might be so well restored, that the republic would no longer need the interposition of extraordinary powers, and might be left to run its usual course.

Sextus Pompeius set sail for Sicily; the collegiate sovereigns of the empire returned to Rome; and, in their entry to the city, passed through multitudes, who, on the present occasion, gave very sincere demonstrations of joy. The People flattered themselves, that they were now to experience no more of their late distresses—no more civil dissensions—no more tearing of the father or the child from his family, to serve in the wars—no more oppression and cruelty from the licentiousness of armies—no more desertion of slaves—no more devastation of their lands—no more interruption of agriculture—no more famine. In the presence of exiles, who lately fled from the swords of their fellow-citizens, but who were now restored to the enjoyment of peace and security, they might perceive, it was said, the surest evidence of a general act of oblivion for all offences, and a termination of all party animosities and disputes.

Octavius and Antony, during the remainder of their continuance together at Rome, passed their time in literary amusements, and in the fashionable pastimes of the age, cock-fighting and quail-fighting *. They conducted affairs of State with

* Plut. in Antonio.

much concord and silence, that no public transaction is mentioned, besides the completing of the aqueducts projected by Julius Cæsar, and the celebration of the festivals, which had been vowed for the destruction of those who had conspired against his life *.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 32, 33.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Alarm of the Parthian invasion of Syria.—Arrangements of Octavius and Antony.—Departure of the latter, and residence at Athens.—State of the commonwealth.—Marriage of Octavius with Livia.—War with Sextus Pompeius.—Actions near the straits of Messina.—Agrippa succeeds to the command of Octavius's fleet.—His victory at sea.—Flight of Sextus Pompeius.—Breach between Octavius and Lepidus.

SUCH was the state of affairs at Rome, when the accounts which had been successively received from Syria, made the presence of Antony appear to be necessary in that part of the empire which had been specially committed to his care. His lieutenant Desidius Saxa, in opposing the Parthians under Pacorus and Labienus, had suffered a defeat, and being unable to brook his misfortune, had killed himself. In consequence of this catastrophé, the province of Syria was overrun by the enemy. Tyre, and all the principal towns on the coast, were already in their hands, and the province of Cilicia lay open to their inroads.

Upon this report, Antony sent forward Ventidius, to collect such forces as yet remained in the province of Asia, and to give some present check to the immediate progress of the enemy, while he himself proposed to follow, and to conduct the war in per-

son. Before his departure, he obtained in form, from the Senate and People, an act to confirm all arrangements which the Triumvirs had made respecting the revenue, or any other department of the State. In concert with his colleague, he made up the roll of the Senate, and marked out the succession of Consuls and other titular magistrates for the eight subsequent years. In their choice of persons for these several honours, each was careful to balance the nomination of his rival with an equal number of his own retainers and clients, or persons over whom he had entire influence; and in this silent competition for power, were named for the offices of State, on one side and the other, mere aliens, soldiers of fortune, persons who had but recently obtained their freedom, or confidential slaves, manumitted on purpose to serve this occasion *.

These arrangements being made, Antony, attended by his wife Octavia, set out for Athens. Here he learned, that the war in Syria was in a great measure at an end; that Pacorus, the son of the king of Parthia, with Labienus, having attacked Ventidius in his camp, were repulsed; that in their retreat they had been afterwards pursued, routed in different encounters, and dispersed; that Pacorus himself was killed †; that Labienus had fled, in disguise, in-

* One Maximus, being in the nomination for the office of Quæstor, was claimed, and adjudged to be a slave; another person of the same condition was discovered in a high station, and, as a punishment due for his presumption, was thrown from the Tarpeian rock. Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 34.

† Plut. in Antonio.

to Cyprus, was discovered, taken, and put to death; that the Parthians had abandoned all their conquests in Syria and in Palestine, and were hastening to repass the Euphrates.

Antony, upon this termination of a war, which so much alarmed his division of the empire, probably would have been inclined to resume his station in Egypt; but as the presence of Octavia rendered a visit to Cleopatra improper, his residence was fixed for the present at Athens. From thence he distributed to his officers their several stations and provinces, and disposed of kingdoms on the eastern frontier to princes who solicited his protection: that of Pontus he bestowed on Darius the son of Pharnaces, and grandson of Mithridates; that of the Jews and Samaritans, on Herod; that of Pysidia, on Amyntas; and that of Cilicia, on Polemon. During the winter, having dropped all the retinue of a Roman officer of State, he resigned himself to ease, domestic pleasures, or the conversation of the learned *, and seemed to have become the sober parent of a family.

But notwithstanding this wonderful appearance of moderation and reform, some species of extravagance and dissipation ever mingles in the history of Antony's life. And some of his frolics, even in this interval of wisdom, have made part in the subjects of obloquy and reproach, which his enemies, to justify their own cause, have thrown upon his memory; and which they have been able, by becoming the victorious party, to fix upon his name for ever. He

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. p. 714.

is said, at some of his entertainments, to have personated Bacchus, the young and irresistible conqueror of the world, and to have carried this extravagance so far, that the Athenians, now become finished courtiers, were induced to pay their devotions, by gravely proposing a marriage between himself and their goddess Minerva. To show that he carried some humour and some reason in his madness, he accepted the match; but under condition that the bride should be accompanied with a suitable portion; and in this jest turned the servility of his flatterers to profit, by exacting ten millions of drachmas *.

But in whatever manner Antony passed his supposed leisure at Athens, Octavius, whose conduct, on most occasions, is a manifest contrast to that of his colleague, did not fail to avail himself of the advantages of his situation in Italy, the supposed head of the empire, and of the bent of the times to monarchy, by uniting, as much as possible, all the channels of influence in his own person.

The concerts of the first Cæsar with Pompey and Crassus, though named a Triumvirate, were the mere effects of a private combination, to overrule the public councils, and to dispose of every preferment, and place of emolument or trust. But the powers now exercised by Octavius, Antony, and Lepidus, though extorted by force, had, in form at least, the sanction of a legal appointment, and were of the nature of those extraordinary commissions which had been

* About L. 300,000. Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii. c. 39.

frequently given in every age of the republic, and which were not improperly calculated for singular occasions, or uncommonly arduous state of affairs. A commission of Triumvirate, in so great an exigency of the State, professedly given to restore its tranquillity, and to re-establish public order, if it had been freely granted, was no way repugnant to former precedents, or disagreeable to the analogy of Roman forms; insomuch, that if the People had been less corrupted, the government of the republic might, by a single abdication, have been in effect restored.

The titles of Senate and People, of Consul, Prætor, and other magistrates or officers of State, were still retained, and continued to bear the appearance of ancient formalities, whether in the legislature, or in the exercise of executive power. The same members which formed the ancient political body seemed to exist, though much debilitated, and unfit to perform their functions. The Senate consisted of persons willing to acknowledge, or disposed to favour, the present usurpation: such persons only indeed were now to be found. Those of a different character had fallen in the civil wars, or perished under the late executions and massacres; and if they had still remained, would not have been suffered to take a part in the government, by those who, under the title of Triumvirs, had engrossed the supreme direction. Even the pretended Comitia were no longer those overbearing conventions, in which multitudes, assembled in a tumultuary manner, assumed the prerogatives of the Roman People, disposed of elections, or carried their own mandates into execution

with the irresistible force of numbers. This part of the republican constitution was become a mere name, employed to ratify the acts of the Triumvirs, and to confirm their nomination of persons to office. The forms of popular assembly, or Comitia, however, as well as those of the Senate, were retained, to give a sanction to deeds which might not be supposed of permanent authority, without the usual seal, or well known initials of the Senate and People of Rome *.

As the supreme power, and the exercise of every public function, both at Rome and in the provinces, were now vested in this pretended commission, the ordinary offices of State were filled up merely for the sake of form, or rather that there might be an opportunity to gratify the vanity of particular persons, by their advancement to public honours. The titles of Prætorian and Consular rank, retained by those who had filled those offices in the commonwealth, were come, as we have mentioned, to resemble the titles of honour by which the nobles are distinguished in the monarchies of modern Europe; and men had, for some time, begun to covet the office, not on account of the power it conferred, but for the sake of the title it was to leave behind with the persons by whom it had once been possessed.

For this reason, the ancient denominations of office were not likely to be discontinued at Rome, even upon the establishment of monarchy, or despotism itself. The regular term of a year, indeed, was already no longer annexed to the idea of magistra-

* S. P. Q. R.

cy. The honour of having been Consul or Prætor for a few months, for a few days, or even for a few hours, gave the titles and precedency that was wished for; and many, as soon as they had taken possession of the office, were removed, to make way for others, destined to be honoured with the same distinction.

In this manner, during the joint residence of Octavius and Antony at Rome, Asinius Pollio, and Domitius, holding the Consulate, were made to resign it, in order that two others might be admitted for a few days, of whom one was L. Cornelius Balbus, a native of Gades in Spain, and the first of his family that ever had a place even on the rolls of the People as a citizen of Rome. But this new citizen had followed Julius Cæsar in his wars, and amassed a considerable fortune in his service. To others, the dignity of Prætor and of Edile, vacated on purpose, was transferred for a few hours. These preferments gave no claim, as in the former times of the republic, to the government of provinces; they gave no influence, and, during their short continuance, scarcely implied any function in the city.

In this general abuse of the civil institutions, now reduced to mere titles and forms, the Tribunes of the People, by means of the superstitious regard which was paid to their persons, still retained a part of their consequence; and Octavius, instead of attempting to reduce it, affected to revere this sacred repository of the People's rights, in defence of which it was said that Julius Cæsar made war on the Senate; and instead of attempting to remove the sa-

cred fence with which these officers were provided against violence to their persons, he availed himself of it, by having his own name inscribed in their list; in this, as in many other particulars, discovering an admirable discernment of the means which were necessary to palliate and to secure a recent usurpation; and seeming to profit by the experience of his late uncle, who, after he had overcome every serious resistance, fell a sacrifice to trifles, or to the provocation he gave in the mere violation of forms, and to the frivolous ostentation with which he assumed the state of a monarch.

About this time is dated a considerable alteration made in the Roman law, by the addition of a rule respecting the effect of last wills. This rule is ascribed to Falcidius *, one of the colleagues of Octavius in the college of Tribunes. Hitherto Roman citizens were free to bequeath their fortunes at pleasure, and to divide them in any proportion among their friends or acquaintance, whether relations or strangers; and property held a course in its passage, by succession, from one generation to another, which excluded no person whatever from the hopes of inheritance, provided he could obtain the regard of his fellow-citizens. As it was the practice of every testator, even when he had no motive for disinheriting his nearest relations, to give some testimony in his will to the merit of every friend who survived him, it was reckoned an honour to be mentioned in many wills; and persons who

Lex Falcidia.

* Lex Falcidia.

had not the ordinary means of amassing a fortune, either in the government of provinces, or in the farm of the revenues, might nevertheless become rich by an extensive and well-supported course of good offices in the city. This practice is possibly less suited to monarchy, than it is to republics, and least of all to despotical governments, where the master wishes to leave no will independent of his own. He can awe the living, but the dying escape from his influence. This feeling perhaps already began to take place in the minds of the rulers at Rome, and in the minds of those who courted their favour; and it may have suggested the law of Falcidius, by which testators were not suffered to dispose, by will, of more than three-fourths of their effects: the other fourth was assigned to the heir at law.

While Antony yet resided at Athens, Octavius passed into Gaul, on a progress to review his armies, or to make the proper disposition of his force in the provinces; and it began to appear, that the late treaty which had been concluded with Sextus Pompeius, was no more than a temporary expedient to procure relief to the inhabitants of Italy from the distress which they suffered in the scarcity of provisions. The articles of treaty were never fully performed by either party. The domestic, or rather political, alliance which Octavius had contracted with Sextus Pompeius, in his marriage with Scribonia, by whom he had issue a daughter, afterwards so famous by the name of Julia, was likewise, about this time, broke off, to make way for what appears at last to be a marriage of

U. C. 715. Ap. Claudius Pulcher and C. Norbanus Flaccus.

choice with Livia, a name already mentioned, and to be often repeated in the subsequent parts of this history.

This sacred connection had hitherto appeared to Octavius merely as the means of obtaining some political end; and he had already, in difficult transactions, twice availed himself of this expedient, although it is remarked by historians, as an evidence of his youth, that, until his marriage with Livia, his beard was not sufficiently grown to need the use of a razor. In this alliance, however, he seems to have had a different object; and was so far from being led by utility alone, that he not only overlooked the want of this recommendation, but likewise got over many other more serious difficulties which stood in his way.

Livia Drusilla was the daughter of Livius Drusus, a citizen who had been in open enmity with Octavius and his party; and who, in despair, after the battle of Philippi, with other adherents of the republic, had fallen by his own hands. The daughter had been married to Tiberius Claudius Nero, who was also a declared enemy of the Cæsarean faction; and who, in the late contest of parties in Italy, put himself at the head of the ejected landholders of Campania, joined Lucius Antonius, and, as has been mentioned, on the reduction of Perusia, fled with his family into Sicily, where he took refuge with Sextus Pempeius. Being included in the general treaty of reconciliation which was framed at Baiæ, he returned to Rome. His wife had already born him a son, afterwards well known by the name of

Tiberius, was again with child, and six months gone in her pregnancy, when it was proposed, that she should part from her present husband, and in the embraces of Cæsar bring forth the child of whom she was then pregnant. The priests being consulted on the legality of this transfer, desired to know whether the pregnancy of Livia was well ascertained; and being informed that it was certain, made answer, That as there could asise no doubt concerning the parentage of her offspring, her separation from Tiberius Claudius, and her union with Octavius, were equally lawful.

The change which now took place in the family of Octavius, by his repudiating Scribonia, was considered as the prelude to a war with her relation Sextus Pompeius. Many articles of the late treaty had never been carried into execution. The Peloponnesus, under pretence of the time required to recover some arrears which were said to be due to Antony in that province, had not, according to agreement, been delivered to Pompey. In justification of other infractions of the treaty, it was urged against him, that, contrary to the faith he had pledged, his fleet had been considerably augmented, and his cruizers suffered to commit depredations on the traders of Italy. Some pirates being taken, and threatened with the torture, alleged in their own vindication, that they acted under his orders. The confessions o these men being published, with complaints and remonstrances, an altercation ensued, which was likely to end in hostilities and open war.

After these complaints had become mutual between Octavius and Sextus Pompeius, the rupture was hastened by the defection of Menas, one of Pompey's officers, the same person who proposed to carry off Antony and Octavius, by cutting the cable while they were at dinner on board of his master's ship. This officer, being intrusted with the command of a fleet in the ports of Sardinia, upon some disgust he had taken to his own master, entered into a correspondence with Octavius, made offer of his service, and proposed to surrender the island. This act of perfidy became known only by the acceptance and execution of the offer. Octavius thus obtained the possession of Sardinia, and received this fugitive Greek with sixty galleys into his own service; rewarded his treachery by employing him in the same rank which he possessed under his former leader, and by conferring upon him the golden ring, or well known-badge of nobility at Rome *.

As this transaction took place while the treaty was yet supposed to be in force, Pompey demanded that the traitor should be delivered up to him, and the island of Sardinia restored; but was answered, that in the matter of which he complained, he himself had been the aggressor, by giving refuge to deserters and fugitive slaves.

Pompey, on receiving this answer, no longer deferred the measures which were necessary to do himself justice †. He sent Menecrates, who succeeded Menas in the chief command of his fleet, to the sea

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 45. Orosius, Appian, &c. † Zonoras, lib. x. c. 23.

of Campania, with orders to make reprisals and to plunder Vulturnum, or any other place he could reach on the coast.

Octavius, on his part, had been some time endeavouring to supply his want of shipping, had built some vessels in the ports of Italy, which, with the addition of those he received by the desertion of Menas, put him in condition to enter on the war with advantage. He had ordered his equipments at two separate stations; the one at Tarentum, the other on the coast of Etruria; and, being now to make war on Sicily, he proposed to bring his naval forces together at Rhegium, in the straits, and opposite to Messina. Thither he likewise directed a powerful land army to march, and having a short passage into the island, to begin the war, by expelling Pompey from the principal seat of his power. He himself came round to Rhegium with that division of his fleet which had been fitted out at Tarentum. Calvisius commanded the other division, and made sail from the coast of Etruria to the same place.

Sextus Pompeius, having notice of the disposition which was thus made to attack him, likewise divided his forces. He himself took post at Messina to observe Octavius, and sent Menecrates to intercept Calvisius, and to prevent the junction of their fleets.

Menecrates accordingly came in sight of his enemy in the evening of the same day, lay that night under the island Ænaria, now Ischia, while Calvisius came to anchor near Cumæ on the contiguous

coast. Next morning, at break of day, both fleets got under sail; but Calvisius, having orders to bring his division safe to the general rendezvous at Rhegium, was desirous to avoid an engagement, and kept under the land. Menecrates, steering the same course, kept abreast of the enemy, till perceiving their design to avoid him, by lying close to the shore, he too stood in with the land, to attack them.

Calvisius, finding an action unavoidable, and thinking himself inferior in the skill of his mariners, determined to bring his ships to anchor close to the shore, where they could not be surrounded, and where his men, if attacked, having smooth water, might use their swords as on solid ground; and he accordingly formed a line in the direction of the coast, turning the prow and the beak of his ships to the sea.

In this position the squadron of Octavius received the shock of the enemy, and on the right, where Calvisius himself commanded, made a good defence, but in the centre, many of the ships were forced from their anchors, and stranded or burnt. Menecrates, in coming to engage, distinguishing the galley of Menas, his ancient rival, and the traitor to their common master, bore down upon him, and, in the shock, bore away the beak of the enemy's galley; but, in passing along the side, as the vessel brushed, lost all the oars of his own ship. They afterwards grappled, and fought till both the commanders were wounded; and Menecrates, finding himself disabled, and in danger of being taken, went headlong into the sea. His galley instantly struck, and was towed

off by the enemy. This event, although the advantage was otherwise greatly on the side of Pompey, dispirited the whole squadron; and Democharés, who succeeded Menecrates in the command of Pompey's fleet, neglecting the advantage he might have reaped from the situation and loss of the enemy, withdrew to the island of Ænaria, and from thence, on the following day, set sail for Sicily. Calvisius, having endeavoured to repair his damage, continued his voyage, under the land, towards the straits of Messina.

Octavius, at the same time, not knowing of this action, but being impatient to effect the junction of his fleets, made sail from Rhegium, and stood to the northward. When the greater part of the fleet had passed the port of Messina, he was observed by Sextus Pompeius, who put to sea, and attacked his rear. Octavius nevertheless continued on his way through the gut, and would have declined an action, if it could have been avoided; but finding himself in danger of suffering an absolute defeat from the enemy, who taking advantage of his continuing under way, pressed on his rear as in actual flight, he made a signal to halt; and from the same motives which had determined Calvisius to form under the land, making a like disposition, he hoped, that by being at anchor, his men might engage under less disadvantage with an enemy who were greatly superior in the management of their ships. In the event, however, he was much more unfortunate than Calvisius, and had great part of his fleet either stranded or burnt. He himself, while his ships were still en-

gaged, regardless of the doubts which were already entertained of his courage, left Cornificius to continue the fight, got on shore, and with a number of men, who had escaped from the wrecks, took refuge on the neighbouring hills.

At the approach of night, the lieutenant of Octavius, while the enemy still pressed upon him, seeing the danger of having all his ships forced on shore before morning, made a signal for the remains of the squadron to cut their cables, and stand out to sea. In making this movement, his own galley grappled with that of Democharès, and having disabled her, obliged the commander to move into another ship. At this instant the other division of Octavius's fleet, commanded by Calvisius, appeared to the *northward*; being seen first from the enemy's fleet, occasioned a sudden pause in the action.

Pompey, believing this to be a fresh enemy, whom, after so much loss and fatigue, he was not in condition to engage, took his resolution, to the great surprise of the squadron he had vanquished, to relinquish his prey, and retire to Messina.

Cornificius again came to anchor in the place of action, and being joined by Calvisius, passed the night in taking an account of his damage, in saving such ships as could be got off, or in removing the baggage and stores from such as were ashore. Octavius, at the same time, made fires on the hills, to assemble the stragglers who had escaped from the wrecks; of whom many repaired to his signals, without arms or necessaries of any sort.

Towards morning, a gale of wind arose from the

south, and rolled a great sea through the straits. It continued to blow all day and the following night; during which time, Menas being an experienced mariner, had not only originally come to an anchor with his division, as far as he could from the land, but continued all night to ease his anchors, by plying against the wind with his oars. Of the rest of the fleet, such ships as were near the land having drove in the night, many perished on the rocks. At break of day the wind abated; but, from the effects of the storm which had blown in the night, the strand was covered with dead bodies, and with the fragments of ships. The vessels that were still afloat, being about one half of the fleet, having stopped for a little time, to save as many as they could from the wrecks, set sail in a very shattered condition for Vibo. Here they arrived without any molestation from the enemy, who were contented to have made their own way in safety to Messina. Octavius himself having beheld the wreck of so many of his ships, took the route of Campania by land, and made the necessary dispositions to frustrate any attempts which Pompey might make on the coast.

The summer having been spent in these undecisive operations, both parties prepared for a vigorous renewal of the contest in the following spring. Pompey himself continued to alarm the coast of Italy during the winter, while he sent Apollophanes, one of his officers, to make a descent upon Africa. Octavius gave orders to [illegible] his land-forces [illegible] of

U. C. 706. M. Agrippa, L. Caminius Gallus, T. Statilius,

Antony, who had hitherto expressed a dislike to the war, and was probably jealous of the accessions of power which Octavius was likely to gain by the destruction of Sextus Pompeius.

Antony, however, upon this requisition from his colleague, set sail from Greece, and appeared at Tarentum with a fleet of three hundred ships, though still undetermined, it is supposed, which side he should take in the present contest. But Octavia, who had accompanied her husband to Tarentum, had the address to turn the scale in favour of her brother. She undertook to be the mediator of their differences, went on shore, and procured an amicable interview betwixt them. At this meeting they made an exchange of sea and land forces. Antony gave to Octavius one hundred and twenty ships, and had in return twenty-thousand legionary soldiers. To confirm the removal of all their suspicions, Julia, the infant daughter of Octavius by Scribonia, was, on this occasion, betrothed to Antyllis, one of the sons of Antony by Fulvia; and a daughter of Antony was betrothed to Domitius. These schemes of alliance, projected in the infancy of the parties, never took effect, but were among the artifices with which the parents endeavoured to amuse each other.

Octavius and Antony now agreed, with very little hesitation, that Pompey had forfeited the Consulate, the priesthood, and all the other advantages which had been ceded in his favour by the late treaty; and they made new arrangements respecting the succession to office, in behalf of themselves and their

friends. The principal object in these arrangements was the gratifying their adherents with titles of rank. In the preceding year, no less than sixty-seven persons had passed through the office of Prætor. This dignity, as well as that of Consul, was frequently, for the sake of the title, taken up and resigned in the same day. The office of Ædile, which used to be of so much consequence under the republic, as it gave an opportunity to court the favour of the People with entertainments and shows, being now of no value on this account, and, though still expensive, being lowest in the ranks of place, was generally declined *.

The period for which the pretended commission of the Triumvirs had been granted by the Roman Senate and People being now about to determine, Octavius and Antony, without having recourse to the same form of appointment, resumed the exercise of their power for five years longer. And having, in appearance, amicably settled the several points in dispute betwixt themselves, they separated in pursuit of their respective objects; Octavius being intent on the war with Sextus Pompeius, and his colleague on that with the Parthians. But, to the great danger of their future agreement, Antony was no longer attended by Octavia, who had hitherto served as the principal bond of their union, in continual danger of being broken by the jealousies and extravagancies of her husband. She had born him a child, was again pregnant, and being unable to at-

tend him in the dangers or fatigues to which he was likely to be exposed in the Parthian war, was prevailed on to remain in Italy, and to fix her residence at Rome *.

In the prospect of an approaching campaign, Agrippa was recalled from Gaul, where he had been employed by Octavius in the preceding summer, and during the miscarriages on the coast of Italy. This officer, although of mean extraction, rose to the highest honours which could, in this state of his country, be attained by a citizen. As he was not born to the dignity and pretensions of a Roman Senator, he cannot be accused, with others, of having betrayed that character; but coming forward amidst the ruins of a fallen republic, and after the extinction of those *virtues* which were necessary to its preservation, he appears among the first who understood and possessed the habits and accomplishments which are required in support of a monarchy; submission without servility or baseness, application, fidelity, and courage; estimating honours by his nearness to his prince, and merit by the degree in which he could promote his service †. He had in the preceding summer obtained some victories on the Rhine, and was the first Roman, after Julius Cæsar, who had passed that barrier of the German nations. Upon his arrival at Rome he might have had a triumph on account of these services; but more actuated by zeal and respect for his master,

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v. Dio. Cass. lib. xlviii, c. 46, &c.

† Vell. Pater. lib. ii, c. 79.

than by personal vanity, he said, that it did not become him to triumph while the prosperity of Cæsar was yet in suspense.

Agrippa was by his genius qualified for the execution of magnificent works, as well as for the steady and able conduct of military operations. Observing, that the disasters of the preceding year were to be imputed, in some measure, to the want of harbours and proper retreats for shipping on the western coast of Italy, he made it his first object to supply this defect, by opening a communication from the sea to the lakes in the neighbourhood of Baiæ, which were spacious within, and when thus rendered accessible by navigable entries, might furnish every convenience for the reception and construction of fleets. In describing the masonry which was necessary in the formation of these communications, mention is made of the peculiar advantage derived from the use of burnt earth taken from the neighbouring mountains; and which being used for sand in the composition of mortar, made an excellent cement for buildings which were to remain under water *.

While the summer passed in the execution of these works, and in the construction of ships, to encounter an enemy who was so formidable at sea, Menas, repenting of his late desertion, entered into a correspondence with his former master; and being assured of pardon, withdrew with some galleys from the fleet of Octavius, then under the command of Calvisius, and returned to his former service.

Octavius took this occasion to supersede Calvisius, upon an imputation of neglect, and appointed Agrippa to succeed him in the conduct of the war.

About a year was spent in the equipment of a fleet and in training the mariners, which, for the convenience of harbours and docks, was executed, as before, at two separate stations; one at Tarentum, under Statilius Taurus, where the ships which had been furnished by Antony still remained; the other in the new harbour of the Lucrine lake, near Puteoli, under the command of Agrippa.

U. C. 717. L. Gellius Poplicola, L. Munatius Plancus, M. Cocceius Nerva, P. Sulpicius Querinus.

Lepidus, to second the operations of Octavius, had assembled his forces on the coast of Africa; and it was concerted that Sicily should be invaded in three places at once: at Lilybæum, the nearest part to Africa, by Lepidus; at Mylæ, on the northern side of the island, by Agrippa; and at Tauromi-nium, on the eastern coast, by Statilius Taurus. It was projected that the armaments equipped for these different services should be at their places of destination as nearly as possible about the first of July.

While these preparations were making, Octavius, residing chiefly at Tarentum or at Cumæ, left the administration of civil affairs at Rome in the hands of Mæcenas, who, though not vested with any office of magistracy, or any other public character besides that of a person in the confidence of his master, possessed a supreme authority. Octavius himself, when the plan of the war was ripe for execution, joined that division of his forces which was led by Agrippa,

and sailed from Puteoli at the appointed time; but after he had cleared the bay of Naples, and weathered the promontory of Minerva, he met with a storm, by which many of his ships were damaged, and he was forced to put back into the port he had left.

This accident was likely to disconcert the operations of the campaign, or to delay the invasion of Sicily for another season. But the complaints of the people in Italy, suffering under the obstruction that was given by Pompey to the importation of corn, called for an immediate relief. Some of the projected operations of the campaign were already begun, and required to be supported. Lepidus had sailed with the first division of his army, and had landed in the neighbourhood of Lilybæum; and Statilius Taurus had advanced from Tarentum to Leucopetræ, opposite to Taurominium, the place at which he was ordered to make his descent. Urged by these considerations, Octavius, with such repairs as he could accomplish, in about thirty days after he had returned into port, again put to sea. At Strougylé he learnt that Pompey, with the greater part of his fleet, lay off Mylæ, to guard that access to the island of Sicily. Thinking this, therefore, a favourable opportunity to push his other attack from Leucopetræ to Taurominium, he himself returned to the coast of Italy, landed at Vibo, went from thence by land to Leucopetræ, and put the squadron from that place in motion for their intended descent on the opposite coast.

While Octavius was thus employed at one extremity of the Straits, Agrippa, on the other, had come

come to action with Pompey's fleet off the harbour of Mylæ, and obliged them to retire into port with the loss of thirty ships *. This circumstance still further confirmed Octavius in his intention to pass with his army into Sicily; and he, accordingly, without meeting with any obstruction, arrived at Taurominium, and landed his forces.

Sextus Pompeius, in the mean time, having had intimation of this design, soon after the action at Mylæ, had withdrawn in the night to Messina; and having put fresh men on board his ships, steered for Taurominium, and came in sight of the harbour soon after the enemy had disembarked. By the unexpected appearance of a fleet much superior to his own, Octavius was greatly alarmed; and leaving the command of the forces he had just landed to Cornificius, he ordered his ships to slip their cables, and make what sail they could to recover the harbour of Leucopetræ, on the Italian shore. He himself went on board a small pinnace, in order the better to escape the pursuit of the enemy, and with a very few attendants landed in a creek on the coast of Italy. His ships were dispersed, part taken, and many stranded among the rocks; but he himself made his way in the night to Leucopetræ, where a division of the army, under Messala, waited for the return of the ships, in which they were to follow the former embarkation.

Octavius, without being disconcerted by this dis-

* Orosius, lib. vi, p. 266.

aster, or by a consciousness of the part which he himself had acted, and which served to confirm all the former imputations of cowardice, without loss of time sent immediate dispatches to all the stations of his troops, to give notice of his safe arrival in the camp of Messala. Before he shifted his wet clothes, or took any food, he made all the necessary arrangements; sent a pinnace to Cornificius, whom he had left in the command of the army in Sicily, with orders to defend himself to the last extremity; and another to Agrippa, with instructions to move as soon as he could, by sea or by land, to the relief of those who were beset by the enemy at Taurominium. And he ordered Carinas, who with three legions lay embarked at Vibo, to sail without loss of time, and to join Agrippa at Liparé.

While Pompey was passing with his fleet along the coast from Messina to Taurominium, he had ordered a great body of horse on the shore to keep pace, as nearly as possible, with the motion of his ships; and as they approached to Taurominium, while he himself should block up the harbour, to lay waste the country, or to restrain the foraging parties of the enemy.

Cornificius, whom Octavius had left in the command of his forces at this place, finding himself in danger of being surrounded, took his resolution to depart from the coast, and, if possible, to join Agrippa, who, he had reason to believe, might by this time have effected his landing at Mylæ, on the opposite side of the island. He accordingly endeavoured to convey intelligence of his design, and requested

Agrippa to come forward to meet him with a proper force, and with the necessary supplies for the relief of his troops, and to favour his junction.

The route by which Cornificius was most likely to avoid Pompey's stations, led by the skirts of Mount Ætna, and over barren tracts, that were still covered, instead of soil, with pumice and lava, which had been discharged from the mountain, and which were not any where covered with vegetation, or supplied with water. His way over this species of soil lay through difficult passes, occupied by the natives, who either harassed his rear, or disputed his passage in front. But after having undergone great labour and distress, and having lost a considerable part of his army by fatigue or by famine, he was met by Laronius, with a reinforcement of troops and supply of provisions from Agrippa; and, upon the appearance of this relief, was suffered by the enemy to continue the remainder of his march undisturbed.

Thus the two separate divisions of the army of Octavius, with which he intended at once to have attacked the opposite sides of the island, were assembled together on the northern coast. Hither he himself soon after repaired, and began his operations by land at the head of twenty-one legions, twenty thousand horse, and above five thousand light or irregular infantry.

Pompey was yet strong in the neighbourhood of Messina, or in that angle of the island which pointed towards Italy. The ground being rugged and mountainous in the interior parts, forming a ridge from Mount Ætna to the head of Pelorus, his quar-

ters were accessible only, or chiefly, by the roads on the coast, leading from Mylæ on the one hand, and from Taurominium on the other, to Messina. Of these communications he was still master, by means of the fortresses which he possessed at Mylæ and at Taurominium. As he supposed that Lepidus, from the side of Africa, would attempt to cooperate with the forces of Octavius from Italy, he had stationed at Lilybæum a part of his fleet, and a considerable body of troops, commanded by Plennius, to oppose the descent and advances of the enemy on that quarter. The officer who had charge of his fleet on this station, had suffered the first embarkation of Lepidus to escape, and to effect their landing; but being so fortunate as to intercept the second, he in a great measure *disconcerted* the intended operations of the enemy on that side.

Lepidus, accordingly, with that part of his army which he had landed in Sicily, remained inactive in the neighbourhood of Lilybæum, until having accounts that Octavius was arrived in the island, that he had united together the different divisions of his army at Mylæ, and had obliged Sextus Pompeius to collect all his force in the neighbourhood of Messina, he supposed that the country from thence might be open to him; and he accordingly, notwithstanding that Plennius, with a considerable body of Pompey's force, remained behind him at Lilybæum, marched from one end of the island to the other; and having effected his junction with Octavius, confirmed him in the resolution to press upon Pompey

at once with their united forces, both by sea and land.

In execution of this plan, Agrippa made a feint to land at the head of Pelorus; and having drawn the attention of the enemy to that quarter, favoured the design of Octavius, who, in the mean time, surprised and took the fortress of Mylæ. The combined army of Octavius and Lepidus having gained this important advantage, continued still further to press upon Pompey, made movements which threatened to invest Messina itself, and to cut off the communications of his fleet and army with the country in the neighbourhood of that city. In order to avoid these inconveniences, Pompey found himself under a necessity to hazard a battle either by sea or by land, or wherever his antagonists presented an opportunity the most likely to procure him relief. He himself relied chiefly on his naval force; and accordingly, without seeking for any advantage of situation or surprise, presented himself to the enemy near to Naulochus, between the promontories of Mylæ and Pelorus, and was there met by Agrippa.

The fleets which were now to engage, consisted of about three hundred ships on each side. When formed in order of battle, their lines were nearly of equal extent. The construction of ships was the same; and they advanced deliberately on smooth water, without any circumstance that appeared to prognosticate the victory on either side. The armies, at the same time, were drawn up on the shore, and in sight of the scene which was to be acted before

them. After an obstinate fight, in which the fleet of Pompey already suffered considerably, seventeen of his ships at once withdrew from the action, and stood away for the Straits of Messina. Those that were nearest the land ran upon the shore, and were wrecked or taken; the remainder being farther at sea, and cut off from their own harbours, struck, and delivered themselves up to the enemy.

The progress of the action at sea was accompanied from the land with shouts or acclamations on the one side, and with silent affliction, or with cries of despair, on the other. Twenty-eight ships of Pompey's fleet were sunk; above two hundred and fifty, being the whole that remained besides the seventeen which fled to Messina, were stranded, taken or burnt *. Octavius lost only three ships.

Pompey, perceiving the extent of his calamity, was seized with despair; and, without having given any orders in camp, made haste to Messina. The army he had left in the field, seeing themselves deserted by their leader, went over to the enemy. He himself, at Messina, made a feint of mustering his forces, as for an obstinate defence. He called in all the ships which any where remained on the coast, and all the forces that could be found on the island †. But, in the midst of these pretended arrangements for a vigorous resistance, he had taken in secret his resolution to depart from Sicily; and having a vessel prepared for his reception, went on board with his daughter, and a few [illegible] he had chosen to attend him [illegible]

* Orosius, Lib. vi. c. 19. † Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v.

As soon as the vessel, in which it was known that Pompey had embarked, appeared under sail, all the ships which were then in the harbour put to sea, with intention to follow whatever course he should steer; but without receiving any orders or intimation of a place at which to re-assemble, in case of separation. The unfortunate leader observing, among the ships which followed him, some that were commanded by officers in whom, in the present state of his fortunes, he could not confide, wished to separate from them, gave out that he meant to avoid the coasts, and, in order to deceive them, in the night, extinguishing his lights, rowed close to the shore of *Italy*, and turning round the head-lands till he was opposite to Corcyra, stood over for that island, from thence to Cephalonia, and last of all to Lesbos, where he landed at Mytilené, a place at which he had resided with his mother Cornelia, during the campaign between his father and the first Cæsar in Thessaly, and from whence he had been carried, about twelve years before this date, to partake in the catastrophe of his father's fortunes on the coast of Egypt. At Mytilené, notwithstanding the memory of those discouraging circumstances, and the low state of his own affairs, he met with a hospitable reception, and passed the winter in humble expectation of protection from Antony, to whose generosity he intended to commit himself.

Octavius, in the mean time, suspecting that Pompey must have taken refuge in some part of the provinces which were in the jurisdiction of his colleague, was cautious not to awaken his jealousy, by presuming to violate his sanctuary, or by pretending to an-

ticipate the resolutions he might be inclined to take on the subject of this suppliant *.

After the only remaining leader of the Pompeian party had made so wretched an exit from Sicily, Plennius, who, soon after the departure of Lepidus from the neighbourhood of Lilybæum, had set out with six legions to join his commander, and who had come too late to be comprehended in the surrender of the army at Naulochus, threw himself into Messina, more with an intention to obtain favourable terms for the troops under his command, than with any hopes to retrieve the affairs of his master.

At this time Lepidus being near to Messina, while Octavius still remained at Naulochus, invested the place, and, without consulting his colleague, granted the terms which were asked by Plennius, took possession of the town, and incorporated with his own army the troops which had served under that officer. In concluding this treaty, and in taking the advantage of it to strengthen himself, without the concurrence or participation of Cæsar, he had earnest remonstrances made to him by Agrippa, who had come with his victorious fleet to Messina; but it soon after appeared that Lepidus not only thought himself entitled to decide in that instance, but, upon the accession of strength which he had gained, began to form much higher pretensions. He now reckoned under his own standard twenty-two legions, with a [illegible] and propo-

sed not only to keep possession of Messina, but to claim the whole island of Sicily as an appendage of his province in Africa. He accordingly sent detachments to secure the principal towns.

Octavius, already provoked at the precipitation with which Lepidus had, without his concurrence, granted a capitulation to the troops at Messina, loudly complained of the measures which he took to appropriate the island of Sicily to himself, without the consent of his associates in the empire; alleged that he had been called thither as a mere auxiliary, and had borne no part of the expence incurred in the war. Lepidus, on his part, complained of the injustice which had already been done to himself in withholding Spain, his original lot in the partition of the provinces; and said, if it were supposed that Africa, with the addition of Sicily, were more than an equivalent for Spain, he was willing to surrender them both in exchange for that province.

This dispute being likely to end in a serious quarrel, the ordinary intercourse between the two camps was discontinued, and precautions were taken by their respective officers, as in the presence of an enemy. Meantime, both armies saw with dislike the symptoms of an open rupture, and of a fresh war, in which soldiers, without any prospect of advantage, even to the victors, were mutually to imbrue their hands in blood, in order to decide a question of mere jealousy or emulation between their leaders.

In comparing the pretensions or prospects of the

chiefs to be engaged in this quarrel, the preference, in the esteem of both armies, was certainly due to Octavius. To his possession of Spain and the two Gauls, he joined that of Italy, with the metropolis, or seat of the empire. He bore the name of Cæsar, was at the head of that formidable military power, which had broken the force of the republic, extinguished the authority of the Senate, and held the property of land in Italy at discretion. By his means, the retainers of the party had obtained the preferable lots in the late distribution of settlements and military rewards.

Lepidus, on the contrary, without any faction attached to his person, and without any high reputation, had been placed in the command of armies by the appointment or sufferance of others. The origin of his merit with Julius Cæsar, which consisted in prostituting the *dignity* of Prætor to his first usurpations in the city, was an act of baseness. His place from thenceforward, in the military arrangements which ensued, was matter of course, or due merely to his rank, without any regard to abilities or merit. His being admitted as a third in the present division of the sovereignty, proceeded solely from the mutual jealousies of the other two, who wished for a person to witness their transactions, and to hold some species of balance between them. In the choice which they made of Lepidus, not his personal merit, but his want of any pretensions, that could interfere with either in the design which they [illegible] certained of possessing the empire, was [illegible] recommendation.

In this comparison, Octavius was conscious of a superiority, in the opinion even of the troops who had been inlisted to serve under the command of his rival. He accordingly thought this a favourable opportunity, while Antony was at a distance, and no enemy existing either in Sicily or Italy, to avail himself of the weakness and incapacity of Lepidus, to strip him of his share in the empire, and to seize upon the province of Africa, and the army now in Sicily, as an accession to his own strength. For this purpose, he employed proper agents in the camp of Lepidus, gained many of his principal officers by presents, and by the expectation of greater rewards. Having much contempt for the character of their leader, and thinking the way sufficiently prepared for an open declaration, he presented himself with a party of horse in the front of their camp, entered as a friend, with a few attendants; and mounting an eminence, from which he might be heard by the crowds that assembled around him, he complained of the steps which had been taken by their general toward a rupture between the two armies, and expressed his sincere desire that all differences might be removed, without engaging in new scenes of blood so many valiant men, who had deserved so well of their leaders.

It appears that numbers of officers and soldiers in the camp of Lepidus were prepared for the part they were to act on this occasion; they applauded the concern which Octavius expressed for the armies, and declared themselves willing to obey his com-

mands. Others, though not in the concert, followed this example, ran to their arms, and hastened to present Octavius with their colours, in token that they received him as their general.

Lepidus, to whom this visit and its consequences were altogether unexpected, being roused by such an indignity, ran forth to the streets of the camp, sounded to arms; and, as many of the troops were unapprised of what had passed, or, from mere habit, were disposed to obey his command, without considering who was their enemy, attacked Octavius, obliged him to repass through the gate at which he had entered, and to place himself under cover of the cavalry, who were waiting to receive him, and whose protection was now necessary to reconduct *him* in safety to his own camp.

In this manner the *design to* supplant Lepidus, on the point of *success*, appeared to be frustrated. But *the transaction* had made too deep an impression to be so slightly removed. The doubts which had been raised, and the choice now to be made of a leader, was generally decided in favour of Cæsar. The effect of this decision accordingly appeared in a great desertion from the army of his rival, either then, or during the subsequent night. The legions, lately come over from the service of Sextus Pompeius, beginning to desert their new leader, Lepidus threw himself, with the usual guards of his person, in the way to stop them. But finding that the very body with [illegible] expected to prevent this desertion joined those who were going to the enemy,

he mixed entreaties and threats, laid hold of an ensign-staff, and attempted by force to stop the officer, in whose hands it served to conduct a body of men from their station. "*Dead or alive,*" said the bearer, "*you shall quit your hold.*" The cavalry at the same time mounted their horses; but, without leaving their ground, sent a message to Octavius, desiring to know, whether he chose that Lepidus should be secured, or put to death? Having for answer, that Cæsar had no design upon the person of Lepidus, they moved away, without any further notice of their general.

The unfortunate Triumvir, seeing the defection of his army complete, and having no longer any friends or retinue to attend his person, laid aside his imperial robes, and, in the ordinary dress of a citizen, walked towards the camp and the tent of his rival. Multitudes followed him, to gratify their curiosity, in seeing what was to pass in so new a scene. A person who, the moment before, had been at the head of a great army, and reputed a third in the sovereignty of the empire, was now, by the sudden desertion of his own troops, reduced to the condition of a private man, and was to appear as a suppliant before an antagonist whom he had recently set at defiance. To complete the scene of his humiliation, in entering the presence of Octavius, he would have thrown himself on the ground, but was prevented by the courtesy of his rival, who, content to strip him of his command, and of his personal consequence, would not accept this mark of abasement,

and gave him leave to return into *Italy*, where he continued afterwards to live many years, equally neglected by those against whom he had been made the instrument of injustice or cruelty, as by those who had made him their tool.

END OF VOLUME FOURTH.

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